

DARDANELLES COMMISSION.

FIRST REPORT.

[Excisions in this Report, which have been made for diplomatic, naval, or military reasons, are shewn by asterisks, thus * * * * *].

Any words that have been inserted are shewn in square brackets, thus []

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



LONDON :
PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :
IMPERIAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C., and 28, ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. ;
37, PETER STREET, MANCHESTER ; 1, ST. ANDREW'S CRESCENT, CARDIFF ;
23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH ;
or from E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN ;
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,
the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of
T. FISHER UNWIN, LTD., LONDON, W.C.

1917.

Price 6d. Net.

[Cd. 8490.]

Table of Contents.

PART I.

ORIGIN AND INCEPTION.

	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTORY	1
II. HIGHER ORGANISATION PREVIOUS TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR	4
III. HIGHER ORGANISATION ADOPTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR	5
(1) The War Council	5
(2) The Admiralty	10
(3) The War Office... .. .	12
(4) Conclusions	13
IV. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS	13
(1) From the outbreak of the war until January 13th, 1915	13
(2) The Meeting of the War Council on January 13th	18
(3) Co-operation with the French	23
(4) The Political advantages of a purely Naval Attack	23
(5) The effect of modern artillery, &c.	24
(6) The Meeting of the War Council on January 28th	25
(7) Events from January 28th to February 16th	29
(8) The Bombardment of February 19th	31
(9) Events from February 16th to February 26th	31
(10) Events from February 26th to March 10th... .. .	33
(11) Appointment of General Sir Ian Hamilton	34
(12) Events from March 10th to March 16th	35
(13) The appointment of Admiral de Robeck	36
(14) The Bombardment of March 18th	37
(15) Events from March 19th to March 23rd	37
(16) Summary of Transactions	39
V. THE RESULTS OF THE OPERATIONS	39
VI. CONCLUSIONS	41

REPORT.

TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY :—

PART I.—ORIGIN AND INCEPTION.

I.—INTRODUCTORY.

1. The first section of the "Special Commissions (Dardanelles and Mesopotamia) Act, 1916," which received Your Majesty's assent on August 17th, 1916, provides, *inter alia*, that ten Commissioners are to be appointed "for the purpose of inquiring into the origin, inception, and conduct of operations of war in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment to the troops and Fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the responsibility of those departments of Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of the forces employed in that theatre of war." Some time must necessarily elapse before we can deal with the whole of the somewhat wide field of inquiry which, it will be seen, was contemplated by the Legislature. We have, therefore, thought it advisable to take advantage of the powers conferred on us by the sixth section of the Act in order to make an interim report dealing exclusively with the origin and inception of the attack on the Dardanelles. This mode of procedure will, we think, be found convenient for several reasons, and notably because, as we shall presently show, the methods adopted for attaining the objects, which His Majesty's Government had in view when the attack on the Dardanelles was conceived, speedily underwent considerable and important modifications.

Our colleagues, the Rt. Hon. Andrew Fisher, the Hon. Sir Thomas Mackenzie, K.C.M.G., and Mr. W. F. Roch, M.P., are not in entire agreement with our Report, and their minutes of dissent are appended thereto.

2. We shall endeavour to describe the various phases which prevailed during different and consecutive periods, and, so far as is possible, to assign precise dates to the transformations of method which occurred. For the moment, however, it will be sufficient to say that we shall assume that the period of origin and inception commenced at the outbreak of the war with Germany on August 4th, 1914, and concluded on March 23rd, 1915, on which day, it may be said, for all practical purposes, that it was definitely decided to abandon the original idea of a naval attack on the Dardanelles, which was to be supplemented at a later stage by a limited amount of military assistance, and to substitute in its place a military operation on a large scale, which would be assisted by the Navy.

3. We held our first meeting on August 23rd, in order to call as a witness General Sir Charles Monro, who was about to proceed to India. His evidence, however, only deals with the operations which were undertaken immediately before and after the decision had been taken, in the autumn of 1915, to evacuate the Gallipoli Peninsula. We need, therefore, make no further allusion to it in the present part of our report.

4. Subsequent to this meeting, an adjournment lasting twenty-seven days took place until September 19th, in order to enable Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, who was Secretary, in the first instance, to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and subsequently to the War Council, and whose time was taken up with the conduct of current and very important business, to prepare a summary of the proceedings of the Council in so far as they dealt with the Dardanelles expedition. We considered that the preparation of such a summary was an almost essential preliminary to the conduct of further inquiries. Since then we have held twenty sittings, and examined the following witnesses :—

Date.	Name.	Functions in the Autumn of 1914 and the Spring of 1915.
September 19th...	Lieut.-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.	Secretary to the War Council.
" 27th...	Do.	
" 26th...	Viscount Grey of Fallodon, K.G.	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
" 28th...	The Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill ...	First Lord of the Admiralty.
October 4th...	Do.	
" 24th...	Do.	
" 25th...	Do.	
" 26th...	Do.	
" 5th...	Commodore de Bartolomé, C.B.	Naval Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty.
" 5th...	Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, K.C.B., M.V.O.	Chief of the War Staff.
" 25th...	Do.	
" 5th...	Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, G.C.B., O.M., V.C., G.C.V.O.	Member of the War Staff Group at the Admiralty.

Date.	Name.	Functions in the Autumn of 1914 and the Spring of 1915.
October 6th...	Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., F.R.S.	Admiralty Staff.
" 6th...	Vice-Admiral Sir Sackville Carden, K.C.M.G.	In command of the Mediterranean Fleet up to March 17th.
" 10th...	Lieut.-General Sir James Wolfe Murray, K.C.B.	Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
" 10th...	Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, K.C.B.	In command of the Mediterranean Fleet from March 17th.
" 10th...	Rear-Admiral F. Tudor, C.B. ...	Third Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
" 10th...	Commodore Cecil Lambert ...	Fourth Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
" 13th...	Do.	
" 10th...	Sir Graham Greene, K.C.B. ...	Secretary to the Admiralty.
" 24th	Do.	
" 11th...	Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.	First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
" 12th...	Major-General H. Hickman ...	Commanding the Plymouth Garrison.
" 12th...	Major-General Charles Callwell, C.B.	Director of Military Operations.
" 12th...	Brigadier-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B.	Employed at the Admiralty up to the end of August, 1904.
" 12th...	Admiral Sir F. Hamilton, K.C.B., C.V.O.	Second Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
" 12th...	Rear-Admiral Morgan Singer, C.B.	Director of Naval Ordnance at the Admiralty.
" 12th...	Sir Reginald Brade, K.C.B. ...	Permanent Under-Secretary at the War Office.
" 13th...	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, P.C.	Generally summoned to the War Council.
" 13th...	General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., D.S.O.	In command at the Dardanelles from March 13th (date of leaving London).
" 18th...	Rear-Admiral Thomas Jackson, C.B., M.V.O.	Director of the Operations Division of the Admiralty War Staff.
" 18th...	Viscount Haldane of Cloan, K.T.	Lord Chancellor.
" 18th...	Field-Marshal Viscount French, O.M., K.C.M.G., &c.	Commanding the Expeditionary Force in France.
" 24th...	Captain Hall, R.N. ...	Director of the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty.
" 24th...	Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, K.C.B., D.S.O.	Now in command of the Dover Patrol.
" 26th...	The Marquis of Crewe, K.G., P.C.	Secretary of State for India.
" 30th...	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, P.C.	Chancellor of the Exchequer.
" 31st...	Commander Hubbard ...	Retired Royal Naval Reserve. Formerly in the Turkish Service.
" 31st...	The Rt. Hon. H. Asquith, P.C.	Prime Minister.
November 8th...	The Rt. Hon. R. McKenna, P.C.	Secretary of State for the Home Department.
December 1st...	Sir George Arthur, Bart. ...	Private Secretary to Lord Kitchener.
" 4th...	Major-General Sir Stanley Von Donop, K.C.B.	Master-General of the Ordnance.
" 4th...	H. J. Creedy, Esq., C.B. ...	Private Secretary to Lord Kitchener.

5. It will be observed that, with the exception of Commander Hubbard, who, after retiring from the Royal Naval Reserve, was employed as a captain in the Turkish Navy, all the witnesses who have so far appeared before us occupy, or have occupied, official positions. It is, indeed, obvious that none but officials could throw any light upon the special subject which has, up to the present time, engaged our attention.

6. We have availed ourselves of the powers conferred by the third section of the Act to take in secret session the evidence of all those witnesses who, up to the present time, have been examined. Although some portions of their evidence could, without objection, have been given in public, others dealt either with naval and military considerations, or with the relations between His Majesty's Government and their Allies which could not, without serious detriment to the public interests, have been published. It would have been very inconvenient, and, indeed, practically almost impossible, in conducting the examination of the witnesses, to have distinguished between the two categories of evidence. For this reason, the public have not, as yet, been admitted to any of our sittings. We can, however, give the most positive assurance, both to Parliament and to the nation at large that, in the body of this report, nothing material has been omitted, which can in any way throw a light either on what occurred or on the responsibility resting on the several individuals or departments concerned. Everything necessary to form a correct opinion upon the proceedings has been revealed. We should add that, in accordance with the provisions of the third section of the Act, "a full and complete record in shorthand has been kept of all evidence taken, whether in public or in private." We do not, however, recommend that this record should, for the present at all events, be published. In view of the

improbability of the evidence being published at an early date, we have embodied in our report copious extracts from the statements made to us by many of the witnesses. This has, of necessity, lengthened our report to a greater extent than we should otherwise have wished. We have also inserted marginal references showing the passages of the evidence on which we base the facts we have given and the opinions we have expressed. They may be useful in the event of the full evidence being published at some future time.

The extent to which the public may be admitted to the sittings of the Commission, which will be held at the later stages of our proceedings, will form matter for future consideration. There will be no such exclusion unless it be manifestly demanded in the best interests of the country.

7. We are particularly desirous of stating that the witnesses who appeared before us answered all the questions addressed to them with the utmost frankness. Neither was the least reluctance displayed to produce all such confidential documents as were necessary for the full elucidation of the questions which formed the subject of our enquiry. Further, the necessary steps were taken to enable us to learn what happened at meetings of the Cabinet. This latter point is, however, of less importance than might at first sight appear, for the reason that, as will be shown in the sequel to this Report, the principal discussions occurred and the most important decisions were taken, not at the meetings of the Cabinet, but at those of the War Council, which was in part composed of Cabinet Ministers. On the whole, we may state with the utmost confidence that we were furnished with all the materials necessary to form a correct and deliberate judgment upon the questions upon which Parliament had delegated us to express an opinion.

8. Before going any further, there are two preliminary observations which we wish to make.

In the first place, it has to be remembered that the events which we shall have to narrate happened in the last five months of 1914 or the first three months of 1915; that at that time a very heavy strain of work was thrown on all the Departments of the Government which were concerned; that in respect to many points of considerable importance the various witnesses called have had, in the absence of complete written records, to speak from memory of what actually occurred, and that the constant strain of work resulting from subsequent events of equal, or perhaps even of greater, importance may possibly, in view of the period which has elapsed, have, to some extent, obscured their recollection of all the circumstances. It can, therefore, be no matter for surprise that the evidence given as to the views expressed at the time by some of the leading officials should be, in certain cases, somewhat conflicting. We have, of course, attached special importance to opinions which were unquestionably expressed during the period when the desirability or otherwise of making an attack on the Dardanelles was under consideration. Without casting any sort of imputation on the good faith of the witnesses themselves, it is conceivable that, in giving to the Commission an account of the past they may have been to some extent unconsciously influenced by their knowledge of subsequent events.

9. In the second place, we have to remark that the premature and deeply regretted death of Lord Kitchener naturally renders it impossible for us to state, with the same confidence as that which obtains in the case of living witnesses, whether we have faithfully represented the opinions he entertained and the aims which he had in view at different periods of the proceedings. The difficulty is enhanced owing to the strong opinion which Lord Kitchener entertained as to the absolute necessity of maintaining the strictest secrecy in respect to all matters connected with military operations. Sir Maurice Hankey, Q. 499-500, indeed, stated that some difficulties at times arose owing to Lord Kitchener's unwillingness 5599. to impart full information even to the members of the War Council. We have, however, done all that is possible to ascertain both his views and intentions by closely examining such contemporaneous records as exist and by enquiry from those who were associated with him during his life-time. It is, in this connection, singularly unfortunate that that gallant officer, Colonel Fitzgerald, who was Lord Kitchener's personal military secretary, and who was probably better acquainted with his opinions than any other individual, shared the fate of his distinguished chief. We have not thought that we should be justified, in deference to the consideration which is rightly shown to the memory of the illustrious dead, in abstaining from a complete revelation of the action which Lord Kitchener took during the various phases of the events under consideration, nor have we hesitated to express our views on that action. It is necessary to do justice to the living as well as to the dead. Moreover, it must be steadfastly borne in mind that, at the time when the attack on the Dardanelles was under consideration, Lord Kitchener occupied a position such as has probably never been held by any previous Secretary of State for War. The circumstances of the case cannot be understood unless the nature of his position is fully realised. In this connection, we may quote the following passage from the evidence given by Mr. Winston Churchill: "Lord Kitchener's personal qualities and position played at this Q. 1195. time a very great part in the decision of events. His prestige and authority were immense.

He was the sole mouthpiece of War Office opinion in the War Council. Everyone had the greatest admiration for his character, and everyone felt fortified, amid the terrible and incalculable events of the opening months of the war, by his commanding presence. When he gave a decision it was invariably accepted as final. He was never, to my belief, overruled by the War Council or the Cabinet in any military matter, great or small. No single unit was ever sent or withheld contrary, not merely to his agreement, but to his advice. Scarcely anyone ever ventured to argue with him in Council. Respect for the man, sympathy for him in his immense labours, confidence in his professional judgment, and the belief that he had plans deeper and wider than any we could see, silenced misgivings and disputes, whether in the Council or at the War Office. All-powerful, imperturbable, reserved, he dominated absolutely our counsels at this time. If the course of my observations and the documents it is my duty to lay before you appear to constitute any reflection upon his military policy, I wish here to testify to the overwhelming weight of the burdens laid upon him, to his extraordinary courage and patience in all the difficulties and perplexities through which we were passing and to his unvarying kindness to me."

Although, however, we have thought that we should be failing in our duty if we did not deal fully with the part Lord Kitchener played in these transactions, we would ask those who may read this report to remember, in justice to his memory, in the first place, that it has not been possible to check his recorded opinions by the light of subsequent explanation, and, secondly, that if, in the eyes of any critics, he may, under circumstances of very great difficulty, be held to have committed some errors of judgment, the fact cannot in any way obscure the very distinguished services which he rendered to his country in other directions.

II. HIGHER ORGANISATION PREVIOUS TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

10. Before proceeding to deal with the facts connected with the origin and inception of the Dardanelles Expedition, we think it will be desirable to explain, in the first place, the higher organisation for the conduct of war which prevailed at the time of its outbreak, and, secondly, the changes which were subsequently made in that organisation. Further, we trust that we are not interpreting erroneously the wishes either of His Majesty's Government or of the Legislature when we say that, if our enquiry is to be of any real practical use for future guidance, we should not confine ourselves to a bald statement of facts, or even to the mere assignment of a proper share of responsibility to individuals or departments in connection with past events, but that we should go somewhat further and indicate briefly and in general terms the conclusions at which we have arrived in respect to the merits and demerits of the original, as also of the revised organisations which have been instrumental in conducting the war. It would, however, be exceeding the scope of our functions if we were to discuss in detail the measures which should be taken to remedy any administrative defects which the light of recent experience has revealed.

11. Before the war, and after its outbreak until nearly the end of November, 1914, the higher direction of military and naval operations was vested in the Cabinet, who were assisted by the Committee of Imperial Defence. This Committee was tentatively initiated in 1901 and re-constructed in 1904. The main functions of the Secretariat, as set forth in a Treasury Minute dated May 4th of that year, were "to collect and co-ordinate for the use of the Committee information bearing on the wide problem of Imperial Defence," and "to make possible a continuity of method in the treatment of the questions which may from time to time come before the Committee." It was laid down that the Committee was to be "merely a consultative or advisory body." This view was frequently confirmed in statements made by responsible Ministers in Parliament. It is quite correct in this sense that the Committee exercised no executive functions, that it was not a body which supervised the proceedings of the War Office or the Admiralty, that it was not a Court of Appeal against the decisions of either of those two Departments, and that it did not interfere in any War Office or Admiralty details. Nevertheless, the view that the Committee was purely advisory requires some qualification. In practice, it did more than advise. It decided. On being asked whether the Committee "decided on certain courses," the Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, replied in the affirmative, and, on being further asked whether "action was taken on their decisions," he replied: "Yes, what would happen would be that after the meeting the conclusion would be notified by me officially to the Department responsible for taking action."

12. It might, at first sight, perhaps be thought that, under such circumstances, the Committee might possibly encroach on the constitutional prerogatives of the Cabinet. Fears that this would happen have, indeed, from time to time been expressed. In dealing with this subject, however, the composition of the Committee has to be borne in mind. It varied slightly as occasion might demand, but the Prime Minister was always the President, and he usually invited the attendance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for War, Foreign Affairs and India, and also the First Lord of the Admiralty.

Mr.
Balfour,
Aug. 2nd,
1904,
May 11th,
1905.

Mr.
Asquith,
July 29th,
1909.

Q. 405-6.

Mr. Arthur Balfour, although not at the time of which we are now treating a member of the Cabinet, was also usually invited to attend the meetings both of the Committee of Imperial Defence and of the War Council which subsequently took its place. On the one hand, when any question came before the Cabinet, several of its most important members were, it is true, already pledged to views expressed in their capacities of Members of the Committee of Imperial Defence. On the other hand, the united Cabinet had the great advantage of learning the opinions which their colleagues had formed on any particular subject after it had been discussed in the presence of qualified experts. The Committee of Imperial Defence was, in fact, for all practical purposes, a Committee of the Cabinet with some experts added. It does not appear that the creation of such a body in any way fails to harmonise with sound constitutional practice.

13. Before leaving this branch of the subject, it may be remarked that, in explaining the functions of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey said that they had been "laid down in time of peace, and with a view to peace requirements." The natural result ensued. Very shortly after the outbreak of war, the Committee, although never formally abolished, fell into abeyance. Another institution was substituted in its place. It appears to us that a body such as the Committee of Imperial Defence, whose sole duty it is to prepare for war, should be organised to meet the requirements not of peace, but of war. We should add that the reason which dictated the transformation of the Committee of Imperial Defence was based, not so much on any defect inherent in that institution itself, but rather on the proved necessity of curtailing the number of members of the Cabinet who actually participated in the conduct of the war.

III. HIGHER ORGANISATION ADOPTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

(1) THE WAR COUNCIL.

14. From the commencement of the war until November 25th, 1914—that is to say, for a period of nearly four months—no change was made in the machinery for the superior conduct of naval and military operations. That machinery consisted, as we have already mentioned, of the Cabinet, assisted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, with the War Office and the Admiralty acting as its executive agents. The Cabinet at that time consisted of twenty-two members. It must have been obvious from the first that it was far too numerous to control effectively the conduct of the war, more especially by reason of the fact that many of the Ministers presided over Departments which, in some cases, were very slightly and, in others, were in no degree concerned with warlike operations. It is to be regretted that this rudimentary fact was not recognised immediately after the outbreak of war. Thus, for four months, during which time events of the utmost importance were occurring, the machinery employed for designing and controlling the higher operations of the war was both clumsy and inefficient. Eventually some improvement was effected. The War Council took the place of the Committee of Imperial Defence.*

15. The composition and functions of the War Council did not materially differ from those of the Committee of Imperial Defence. A change of some importance was, however, made in the procedure. It had been the practice to pass round the notes of the proceedings at the meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence to all the members who had been present, and who were thus able to correct any inaccuracies that might occur in the representation of their views. Owing to the great press of business, this practice was abandoned by the War Council. Longhand notes were, indeed, kept by the Secretary, but these, of course, cannot carry the same authority as corrected minutes. A very full and, we believe, accurate account of what occurred in connection with the Dardanelles Expedition at the various meetings of the Council was, however, furnished to us by the Secretary, and the full text of the notes, which record the proceedings in many matters wholly unconnected with the Dardanelles Expedition, was placed at the disposal of our Chairman, who was able to assure us of the general adequacy and correctness of the summary communicated to us by Sir Maurice Hankey.

16. The main change which was effected was, however, in connection with the powers of the Council as compared to those of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Whilst the latter body was in existence, the responsibility for all important decisions remained, theoretically in all, and practically in most cases, with the united Cabinet. The War Council remained, like the Committee of Imperial Defence, a Committee of the Cabinet with some experts added. Theoretically, the powers of the united Cabinet remained the same as before. Practically, they underwent a radical change. It was the Council, and not the united Cabinet, which finally decided the most important matters, and gave

* From June, 1915, onwards, the "War Council" was termed the "Dardanelles Committee." After the Coalition Government was formed a "War Committee" was instituted. Its functions did not differ from those of the War Council, but its composition underwent some change.

effect to its decisions without necessarily waiting for any expression of assent or dissent from the Cabinet. The Cabinet appear to have been generally informed of any important decisions which may have been taken by the Council, but not until after the necessary executive steps had been taken to give whole or partial effect to those decisions. This is what actually happened in the case both of the naval and military operations undertaken at the Dardanelles. Further, we have been given to understand that some members of the Cabinet did not wish to be informed of what was going on. Mr. Winston Churchill, in the course of his examination, said: "I have often heard the Cabinet say: 'We do not wish to be told about this—this is a secret matter, and the fewer who know about it the better.' " It would be an exaggeration to say that, in consequence of this method of conducting business, those members of the Cabinet who did not attend the meetings of the War Council were relieved of all responsibility in connection with the conduct of the war. But their responsibility was slight. It was limited to the fact that they, very rightly in our opinion, were content to delegate the full powers of the united Cabinet to their colleagues who were members of the War Council. For all practical purposes it may be held that, during the period under review, the powers and prerogatives of the united Cabinet were, in so far as the conduct of the war was concerned, held almost entirely in abeyance. The correctness of this view is confirmed by the testimony of Mr. McKenna, who, although a member of the Cabinet, did not, during the early stages of the war, attend the meetings of the War Council. Mr. McKenna was asked the following question by the Chairman:—

Q. 1160.

Q. 5939.

"Should I be correct in stating broadly that the responsibility of the united Cabinet amounted to this, that they had delegated their powers more or less to the War Council?" His reply was: "If I may say so, I think you have expressed it absolutely. There was a general acceptance by the Cabinet of the constitution and action of the War Council. But if the question is put to me that the Cabinet had in any real sense any responsibility for the individual decisions of the War Council, whether communicated to them or not, I can only say that, for my own part, it would be asking the Cabinet to accept the responsibility without any means of judging."

Further, a distinction has to be made between the real responsibility which devolved on the several Cabinet Ministers who were members of the War Council. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Lloyd George), the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward, now Viscount Grey of Fallodon) and the Secretary of State for India (the Marquis of Crewe) exercised undoubted and very legitimate influence, and occasionally stated their opinions, but the main responsibility rested on three members of the Council—namely, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for War (Lord Kitchener) and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Winston Churchill). The latter, in the course of his evidence, said: "In the early stages the war was carried on by the Prime Minister, and Lord Kitchener and me, I think, in the next place, but I was on a rather different plane. I had not the same weight or authority as those two Ministers, nor the same power, and if they said, This is to be done or not to be done, that settled it." We believe this description of the actual working of the machine to be substantially correct,* save that Mr. Winston Churchill probably assigned to himself a more unobtrusive part than that which he actually played.

Q. 1165.

17. It is obvious that the main questions which came under the consideration of the War Council in connection with the Dardanelles operations were of a highly technical nature on which the opinions only of those who were possessed of naval or military knowledge or experience would be of any real value. It is, therefore, essential to ascertain, with as great a degree of accuracy as possible, what was the precise position assigned to the expert members of the Council. We have devoted much attention to this subject. We think that the best plan which can be adopted in order to explain the situation will be to quote passages from the evidence both of the experts themselves and of the Ministers who were members of the Council.

18. It is clear that, in dealing with this question, a distinction has to be drawn between the War Office and the Admiralty. The Secretary of State for War (Lord Kitchener) was himself a distinguished expert. The only other officer possessing military experience who regularly attended the meetings of the Council was Lieutenant-General Sir James Wolfe Murray, who, on October 25th, 1914, succeeded the late Sir Charles Douglas as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Sir James Murray told us that "Lord Kitchener acted very much as his own Chief of the Staff." When asked whether he "considered himself the Staff Officer of Lord Kitchener and that he was not called upon to express any independent opinion unless he was especially asked to do so," he replied, "Certainly." He added that he was "never asked" to express any opinion.

Q. 2611.

Q. 2677.

Q. 2628.

19. The case of the Admiralty was different. The First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) was not himself an expert. Expert naval advice was represented by Lord Fisher, the

Q. 5929.

* Mr. Asquith, however, said that Mr. Churchill's statement required modification.

First Sea Lord, and by Sir Arthur Wilson, who, although he did not occupy any official position at the Admiralty, was, from the commencement of the war, habitually consulted both by the First Lord and the First Sea Lord. On one important occasion (January 28th) Sir Henry Oliver was also present.

The view taken by Lord Fisher of his own position at the War Council may be gathered from the following extract from his evidence :—

" *The Chairman.* I should like you to explain why you thought that at the War Council there were only two alternatives before you, one to yield your opinion absolutely and the other to resign. You were a consultative body. Is it possible to carry on business with a consultative body on such a basis as that? A. I can make it clear to you. The War Council only consisted of the Cabinet Ministers. We were not members of the War Council. I was not a member of the War Council, nor was Sir Arthur Wilson, nor Sir James Wolfe Murray. It is a mistake to call us members of the War Council—it was no such thing. We were the experts there who were to open our mouths when told to. Q. 1401-05.

" Q. Nothing else? —A. Nothing else.

" Q. And you did not consider yourselves members of the War Council?—A. Absolutely not. The members of the Cabinet were members of the Council, and the others were simply there ready to answer questions if asked.

" Q. And they never were asked?—A. They were sometimes, because I was asked how many battleships would be lost, and I said twelve.

" Q. But they were never asked anything about the Dardanelles?—A. No."

The following extract from Sir Arthur Wilson's evidence shows that the view which he took of his position was generally identical with that entertained by Lord Fisher.

" *The Chairman.* I want to understand what exactly your position, and that of the other members of the Council, was, because when the First Lord expounded the naval view if you did not agree would it not have been your duty to say so?—A. Probably not, unless I was asked. I was there to help the First Lord. Q. 1940-43.

" Q. And you were never asked?—A. No.

" Q. And you were there to help the First Lord?—A. Yes.

" Q. But not necessarily to agree with him?—A. Not to express agreement if I did not agree, but not to oppose him when it was not a matter which specially concerned me."

20. It is now necessary to explain the light in which the Ministerial Members of the Council regarded the position occupied by the experts.

Mr. Winston Churchill stated: "Whenever I went to the War Council I always insisted on being accompanied by the First Sea Lord and Sir Arthur Wilson, and when, at the War Council, I spoke in the name of the Admiralty, I was not expressing simply my own views, but I was expressing to the best of my ability the opinions we had agreed upon at our daily group meetings,* and I was expressing these opinions in the presence of two naval colleagues and friends who had the right, the knowledge, and the power at any moment to correct me or dissent from what I said, and who were fully cognisant of their rights." Statement, p. 5.

21. Viscount Grey of Fallodon said that the War Council "went entirely in these naval and military matters by the opinions expressed by the two Ministers." Further, he was asked the following question by Sir William Pickford :— Q. 723.

"I think we were told that of course the First Lord of the Admiralty would put the view of the Admiralty, and if the First Sea Lord were present and said nothing he would be taken to assent to the plan?" To this he replied: "I think the natural assumption would be that either he actively assented, or that he did not think it of sufficient importance to record a separate opinion, or did not desire to record a separate opinion, whatever the reason might be." Q. 846.

22. Mr. Arthur Balfour's views may be gathered from the following extracts from his evidence :—

" *The Chairman.* We want to arrive particularly at what was your view and the views of others similarly placed to yourself on the position of the expert advisers towards the War Council?—A. I think they were there to offer technical professional advice upon questions on which they could speak with authority, but on which a layman could not speak with authority. Q. 4124-34.

" Q. Do you think they were under any obligation to initiate opinions or merely to wait until they were asked?—A. That would depend on the view the Chairman took of their duties. My own view is that if professional advisers are present at such a Council as that, it is the business of the Chairman, and perhaps of other members, to see that nothing is passed over their heads on which they have an opinion until the opinion has been extracted.

* It will be subsequently explained that frequent meetings of what was known as the "War Staff Group" took place at the Admiralty.

"Q. With regard to any decision taken when the expert advisers did not express dissent, would you from that infer that they assented?—A. I should certainly assume that.

"Q. And if they dissented they must express dissent at the meeting?—A. I should certainly have assumed that.

"Q. Will you refer to Lord Fisher's evidence, Question 3401*?—A. Having read that, I do not assent to it as a broad question of principle. I think it is true that a technical adviser brought into a meeting of Cabinet Ministers might not care to start or initiate a discussion, but if the question before the Committee was, Do the Admiralty or do the War Office concur with such and such a view, with such and such a question, I certainly do not think they ought to be silent if they do not agree.

"Q. Supposing the Chief of a Department, taking particularly the Admiralty, presents certain views and gives the Council generally to understand that his expert advisers are behind him and agree to those views, do you think it would be the duty of the expert advisers present to say, 'That does not represent our views'?—A. I think the expert advisers—I do not refer particularly to Lord Fisher or Sir Arthur Wilson, but generally—if they feel their expert advice is not before the Council, that the Council are not aware of what their views are, ought to take means for letting their views be known. It need not necessarily be an interruption of the proceedings, thrusting themselves in, as it were, in the discussion, though that would be the natural method of doing it.

"Q. You look to them to state their opinions in the event of any expert advice being given in which they do not agree. Would you make a distinction between expert advice and matters of policy for the Cabinet?—A. Certainly.

"Q. We have had evidence given on this point, and Sir Arthur Wilson distinctly says he did not think he was called upon to give any opinion whatever, unless he was asked to do so, and there is a very similar statement by Lord Fisher, who, in fact, goes very far in that direction. I think I am not incorrectly stating both their views when I say they stated that they were there to be what they called loyal to their Chief, and in fact they were not to contradict him, and Lord Fisher goes so far as to say, when I pointed out to him that it was very difficult to carry on any consultation on that basis, that the only alternative left for him was to hold his tongue, though he dissented, or to resign. Does that suggest itself to you?—A. I dissent personally from that method of conducting business. I do not believe it is any use having in experts unless you try and get at their inner thoughts on the technical questions before the Council.

"Q. The military experts stood on rather a different footing, because during the period we are discussing Lord Kitchener was himself a military expert. We have had Sir James Wolfe Murray here, and he said that both in respect to his position at the War Office and in respect to his position on the Council he considered himself in the light of Lord Kitchener's Staff Officer and nothing else?—A. That may be so, and I think you are right in saying that Lord Kitchener's position was exceptional; though even there personally I think it is very little use having an expert present except to remind his Chief of particular facts and give him particular statistics, unless you are to find out what his opinion is.

"Q. But, of course, there was a great difference in Lord Kitchener's position and Mr. Churchill's position, because Lord Kitchener was himself an expert and a distinguished soldier, whereas Mr. Churchill had to rely on others. You think, then, it was the duty of the naval experts there to dissent if anything was said which did not represent their views?—A. Yes, with this qualification. I think their task ought to be facilitated by the Cabinet Ministers present, the Heads of their Departments or the Cabinet Minister who was in the chair.

"Q. By asking them?—A. By asking them."

23. Viscount Haldane of Cloan, who was at the time Lord Chancellor, gave the following evidence:—

Q. 4466. "The Chairman. Did you generally hold the view that if they (the expert members) did not dissent they assented?—A. I thought so, because they were there for the purpose of giving us information. . . .

Q. 4544. "Q. You expected Lord Fisher, if he had any great objection, to state it at the Council?—A. I certainly did. . . .

Q. 4600. ". . . If they (Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson) were what they were at the Defence Committee, it was their business to give the counsel which they were called there to give, and if they misunderstood their position they ought to have found out what it was. I am perfectly certain that if Lord Fisher had said to the Prime Minister, 'Do you wish me to speak?' he would have said, 'I most certainly do,' and we all did. We all looked upon him as there to take counsel with us.

* See para. 19.

"Q. In fact, you do not concur in the view of the War Council as expressed by Lord Fisher?—A. I do not. I think it is an excusable thing from the fact that the body sat in the Cabinet room in Downing Street instead of 2, Whitehall Gardens, and that there were a good many Cabinet Ministers present. For the rest, I think it was just the old Defence Committee, and certainly they had every opportunity of uttering as much as they liked. Not one of us was asked to speak. Questions were not put round. It was a general question.

"Q. And you also relied wholly on what the experts said at the Council, and nothing else? You did not go outside that at all? If they did not express dissent at the Council you considered they more or less assented?—A. Yes. When I heard it said, for instance, 'We have considered it and we think the forts can be reduced within a certain time, and with a certain expenditure of ammunition,' and the details were given to us, and Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson sat silent, I thought he (the First Lord of the Admiralty) was giving the view of the Admiralty War Staff, of which Lord Fisher was the head."

24. Lord Crewe, who was at the time Secretary of State for India, expressed the opinion "that the political members of the Committee did too much of the talking and the expert members as a rule too little"—a view in which Lord Haldane also concurred. Q. 5430.

Lord Crewe further said that the fact that the expert members did not express dissent at the meetings involved in his opinion, either "assent or at any rate acquiescence." Q. 4451.
On being asked whether he "expected that they (the experts) would express dissent on technical matters unless their chief represented their views," he replied, "Unquestionably." Q. 5431.

25. Mr. Lloyd George did not concur in the description given by Lord Fisher of the position he occupied on the War Council. On being asked the question, "If the experts present did not express dissent, did you assume that they assented to what was done?" he replied "Certainly." Q. 5689.
Q. 5508.

26. The views entertained by the Prime Minister on the point now under discussion are, of course, of special importance. Mr. Asquith stated that he did not concur in the view that it was the duty of the experts on the Council only to give their opinions if they were asked. When asked whether he held that if the experts did not dissent from the views expressed by the Heads of their Departments, it would be held that they assented, he replied: "Normally and regularly, yes." Speaking of an important meeting which took place on January 13th, Mr. Asquith said: "I should have expected any of the experts there, if they entertained a strong personal view on their own expert authority, to express it." Q. 5751.
Q. 5761.
Q. 5762.

27. Sir Maurice Hankey gave the following evidence:—

"Lord Nicholson: You were asked about the procedure of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Is it not the custom, when a naval or military member does not say anything after the First Lord or the Secretary of State speaks, to admit that he concurs, otherwise there would be such a lot of talk?—A. Yes, that is certainly very strongly my view. Q. 654-6.

"Q. And to avoid conversation as much as possible, if you do not object, either the First Lord speaks or the Secretary of State speaks?—A. Yes.

"Q. If one or the other remains silent it is understood that he concurs?—A. Yes."

28. There is one further feature in connection with the methods adopted in conducting the business of the War Council to which it is necessary to draw attention. The evidence as to whether, at the close of each meeting, the decisions were read out and understood by all present is contradictory. Thus, as regards a very important meeting held on January 13th, 1915, to which we shall presently revert, Sir Arthur Wilson, in reply to a question addressed to him, said: "I was under the impression that no decision had been taken at all." The following dialogue then ensued:— Q. 1936.

"The Chairman. If you thought there had been a decision taken would you have said you did not agree to it?—A. No. Q. 1938-39.

"Q. Why not?—A. Because it was not my business. I was not in any way connected with the question, and it had never in any way officially been put before me."

Sir James Murray, in answer to a question addressed to him by Mr. Clyde, said: "I sometimes left the War Council with a very indistinct idea of any decision having been arrived at at all." Q. 2648.

Speaking of the meeting of January 13th, Lord Fisher said: "I have not the least doubt a decision was come to, because very likely the Prime Minister went and wrote it down when the meeting was over, but it was never read out to us that that was the decision. Q. 3110-11.

* See para. 19.

"Q. You were not aware that any decision was come to?—A. No; I do not remember it; no more does Wilson."

Q. 5807.

On the other hand, Mr. Asquith states very positively that the decision taken on January 13th was read out before the Council broke up, although possibly some of the members may have left before this was done. Mr. Asquith's description of what occurred is confirmed by Sir Maurice Hankey.

29. The following are the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence which we have received as to the proceedings of the War Council :—

1. It was not the practice to ask the experts attending the Council to express their opinions.
2. The experts themselves did not consider it their duty either to express any opinions unless they were asked to do so, or to intimate dissent, at the Council board, if they disagreed with the views set forth by the Ministers in charge of their respective Departments.
3. The Chairman and the Ministerial members of the War Council looked to the naval and military experts to express their opinions if they dissented from the views put forward by the heads of their respective departments. As the experts did not express their opinions the Council was in technical matters guided wholly by the views laid before them by the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty.
4. The functions of the experts were, to a great extent, differently understood by the experts themselves and the Ministerial members of the Council.

We have dwelt at some length on this subject, as it has a very important bearing on the events which we are about to narrate.

(2) *The Admiralty.*

30. The Committee of Imperial Defence was not the only body which underwent considerable changes after the outbreak of the war. Important alterations were also made in the methods of conducting business both at the Admiralty and the War Office.

31. The authority of the Board of Admiralty is based on Letters Patent issued under the Great Seal in pursuance of certain Acts of Parliament, and on various Orders in Council, the latest and most important of which bear the dates of August 10th, 1904, January 7th, 1912, and July 19th, 1912.

The Board consisted at the commencement of the war, and still consists, of :—

- A First Lord.
- Four Sea Lords.
- Two Civil Lords.
- The Parliamentary Secretary.
- The Permanent Secretary.

The First Lord is "solely responsible to the Crown and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty."

The functions of the First Sea Lord are defined, *inter alia*, in the following terms :—

"Preparation for war. All large questions of Naval policy and Maritime warfare—to advise."

The other members of the Board are charged with various Departmental duties.

Neither the First Lord, nor the First Sea Lord, are under any legal obligation to consult either the Board collectively or any individual members of the Board, but the "Official Procedure and Rules," p. 51, contains the following note :—

"It is to be understood that in any matter of great importance the First Sea Lord is always to be consulted by the other Sea Lords, the Civil Lord, the Additional Civil Lord, and the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries; but each Member of the Board and the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries will communicate direct with the First Lord."

Q. 1048.

Q. 1049.

32. Immediately after the outbreak of war, and whilst Prince Louis of Battenberg was still First Sea Lord, a War Staff Group was formed at the Admiralty. At Lord Fisher's instance this Staff Group was "greatly strengthened" in November, 1914, and "became still more the supreme and isolated centre of Naval war direction." From that time onwards it consisted of the First Lord, the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Staff (Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver), Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, the Secretary to the Board (Sir Graham Greene) and the Naval Secretary (Commodore de Bartolomé). The Second Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton), who was previously included in the War Staff Group, ceased to be a member of that body.

33. The creation of a War Staff Group inevitably tended to diminish the authority and to minimise the collective activity of the Board of Admiralty. The meetings of the Board were less frequent than before the war. In 1913, Mr. Churchill being then First Lord, twenty-four meetings were held. From August 4th, 1914, to May 17th, 1915, when a change in the constitution of the Board took place, only twelve meetings were held. The frequency or infrequency of the official meetings of the Board afford, however, little or no real indication of the influence and authority exercised by its members, either collectively or individually. The functions of the Board, in its collective capacity, have never formed the subject of any very precise definition. The Second Sea Lord (Sir Frederick Hamilton) said: "There was considerable misapprehension always as to what the precise powers of the Board were. The popular notion, I fancy, is that the Board are severally and collectively responsible for anything that takes place, or any measures that are decided upon. In theory that may be very well, but in practice I doubt if it has ever been the case. Although undoubtedly the Board is collectively responsible for any large questions of policy . . . it is very difficult to say where a thing ceases to be a matter of detail and becomes a large question of policy."

Q. 3856-58.
P. 34.

34. In point of fact, the position occupied by the Junior Lords of the Admiralty depends almost wholly on the attitude assumed towards them by the First Lord, and, in a minor degree, by the First Sea Lord. The former especially can, at his will, utilise their services in matters lying outside their purely departmental duties, or he can decline to do so. Mr. McKenna informed us that, during the time he was First Lord of the Admiralty, the Board was habitually consulted on all important matters. He stated that in practice he never found any difficulty in harmonising the sole responsibility of the First Lord with the collective responsibility of the Board. "If," he added, "I were First Lord of the Admiralty and I did not consult my Board but consulted expert advisers, I should suggest to the Prime Minister that the Board ought to be changed. The expert advisers to whom the First Lord would naturally look would be his Board."

Q. 5999.

Q. 5988.

35. Sir Graham Greene informed us that from time to time a good deal of discontent had existed at the Admiralty owing to the dubious positions occupied by the Junior Sea Lords. On being asked whether this discontent was especially acute at the period with which we are dealing, he replied: "It may have been felt rather more keenly at that time, because there were two very active and strong personalities in the position of First Lord and First Sea Lord."

Q. 5122.

Q. 5124.

36. There can, indeed, be no doubt that, at the commencement of the war, the Junior Sea Lords resented the position in which they were placed. None of them were consulted about the Dardanelles Expedition.

The Second Sea Lord, Sir Frederick Hamilton, though generally of opinion that the Board of Admiralty had "a right to give their views on large matters of policy," did not complain of the treatment the Board received in the special case of the Dardanelles. He considered that that was "a matter for the Cabinet to decide." The Third Sea Lord (Rear-Admiral Tudor) said that the only opportunity he had of expressing an opinion on the subject was in the course of an informal conversation with Mr. Churchill. He added that his action "was not welcomed and it had no effect."

Q. 3858.

Q. 3873.

Q. 2911-12.

Q. 2926.

The Fourth Sea Lord (Commodore Lambert) testified to the fact that the Board had not been consulted about the Dardanelles Expedition, and expressed an opinion that "it would have been a wise and proper subject for the Board's discussion."

Q. 4092.

On November 22nd, 1915, the Junior Sea Lords addressed collectively a Minute to the present First Lord (Mr. Arthur Balfour), in which they said: "The principle on which the Order in Council is based that the supremacy of the First Lord is complete and unassailable has been pushed too far, and has tended to imperil and at some future time may again tend to imperil national safety. . . ."

Statement
handed in
by Com-
modore
Lambert.

"The present time may not be the proper one for effecting drastic changes, but of this we are certain, it is the proper and opportune moment to again call the attention of the First Lord to these matters and to express our conviction that had the naval members of the Board been regularly and collectively consulted on large questions of war policy during the progress of the present naval campaign, some at least of the events which the Empire does at this moment deplore so bitterly would not have happened, and that until the authority and responsibility of the Sea Lords is enlarged and defined, there will be no adequate assurance that similar disasters will not recur in the future."

It should be added that in answer to a Minute addressed to him by the Junior Lords on May 18th Mr. Churchill wrote:—

"I agree that the four Sea Lords should be more fully consulted on large questions of War policy as apart from the day to day conduct of the War, where action must

proceed easily and rapidly. But neither Prince Louis of Battenberg nor Lord Fisher were in favour of this practice, considering that War plans and War policy lay wholly in the domain of the First Sea Lord, with the First Lord directly over him exercising supreme executive power. It would appear desirable in future that the War situation should be reviewed each week by the naval members of the Board under the Presidency of the First Lord."

Q. 3084. Lord Fisher does not, however, appear to have concurred in this view. In the course of the evidence which he gave before us, he said: "With regard to the other Sea Lords, they were tremendously occupied with their business in providing the personnel and stores and other things for the Fleet. I think it would have been a very great pity to have taken them away from their proper duties to have sat round that table."

Q. 5766. 37. It is thus abundantly clear that, although no formal and official change was made, the spirit in which the business of the Admiralty was conducted underwent a great transformation immediately after the outbreak of the war. The Board of Admiralty sank into insignificance, its place being taken by the War Staff Group. The Board was, even to a less extent than previously, able to assume any "collective responsibility" for the general conduct of affairs. The individual members of the Board were not kept well-informed of passing events. They were not consulted before the naval attack on the Dardanelles was made. It is clear that Mr. Asquith was ill-informed as regards the methods under which Admiralty business was conducted when he stated to the Commission that the Members of the War Council "were entitled to assume" that any view laid before them by the First Lord of the Admiralty "was the considered opinion of the Board of Admiralty as a whole."

(3) *The War Office.*

38. The superior administration of the War Office is regulated by Letters Patent, dated February 6th, 1904, and by various Orders in Council issued in 1904, 1909 and 1910. Of these, the most important is the Order dated August 10th, 1904.

As in the case of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State is solely responsible to the Crown and to Parliament for "all the business of the Army Council."

The Council consists of:—

- A first Military Member, the Chief of the General Staff.
- A second Military Member, the Adjutant-General.
- A third Military Member, the Quartermaster-General.
- A fourth Military Member, the Master-General of the Ordnance.
- A Finance Member.
- A Civil Member.

The Secretary of the War Office is also Secretary to the Army Council.

All the members of the Council are responsible to the Secretary of State for the performance of such duties as he may from time to time assign to them, the duties assigned to each member being specified in King's Regulations, 1914, Appendix IV.

Q. 3484, 3499, 3500. 39. In consequence of the illness and subsequent death, in October, 1914, of Sir Charles Douglas, Sir James Wolfe Murray became Chief of the Imperial General Staff almost immediately after the war commenced. Otherwise, no changes took place in so far as the Military members of the Army Council were concerned. Sir Henry Sclater remained Adjutant-General, Sir John Cowans Quartermaster-General, and Sir Stanley Von Donop Master-General of the Ordnance.

Q. 4496-98. 40. Neither did any formal change take place in the duties and responsibilities of the Council. Viscount Haldane has informed us that, during the time he was Secretary of State for War, formal meetings of the Council were not of frequent occurrence, that they were usually held merely to register decisions which had already been taken, and that the informal were of far greater importance than the formal meetings. So far as outward form was concerned, the practice adopted by Lord Kitchener constituted no innovation on the practice which prevailed under his predecessors.

Q. 1302. On the other hand, on Lord Kitchener's becoming Secretary of State for War considerable changes had taken place in the military personnel at the War Office, and more important changes were introduced by him in the methods of administration. As regards personnel, according to an arrangement which Sir Reginald Brade informed us had been made previous to the outbreak of war, several of the most important members of the General Staff left the War Office and assumed commands or Staff appointments in the field. Numerous changes were also made amongst the junior members of the Staff. Mr. Winston Churchill, in speaking of the relations between the War Office and the Admiralty, said: "All the principal officers we were accustomed to work with went off to the war, and a new staff came in."

As regards administrative methods, we think it is much to be regretted that the principles of the devolution of authority and responsibility upon which the War Office system was based were ignored by Lord Kitchener. All the evidence laid before us points to the conclusion that Lord Kitchener was not in the habit of consulting his subordinates, that he frequently gave orders over the heads of the Chiefs of Departments and sometimes without the knowledge of the Chief of the General Staff, and, in fact, that he centralised the whole administration of the War Office in his own hands. Sir James Murray stated that that portion of the Field Service Regulations which deals with the duties of the Chief of the General Staff were "practically non-existent." On being asked whether he considered that Lord Kitchener centralised too much authority in his own person, he replied, "Yes, I do undoubtedly," and he added that the excessive centralisation of which he complained "was due not to the system, but to the personality of the individual who was Secretary of State."

General Callwell, the Director of Military operations, stated that "the real reason why the General Staff practically ceased to exist was because it was not consulted." He added that, so far as he was aware, Lord Kitchener never "conferred with anyone very much." General Callwell considered that the extreme centralisation practised "did not tend to the smooth working of the machine."

At a later period of the war, an Order in Council was issued restoring the power of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff which had been allowed to lapse. Sir Reginald Brade, on being asked why this Order was issued, replied, "I think the idea was that Lord Kitchener was in the habit of sending on his own orders in regard to operations, and that he did not ask, or disregarded, the advice of the officers of the General Staff. I think that was the object of it. I do not say that was the fact, but that was understood to be what happened—why that Order in Council was passed."

41. There can, in fact, be no doubt that the principle of centralisation was pushed to an extreme point by Lord Kitchener. It proved eminently successful during the minor operations in the Soudan, which he conducted with conspicuous skill. But it was unsuitable to a stronger force than that which Lord Kitchener commanded in the Soudan or to operations on so large a scale as those in which this country has recently been engaged. Its result was to throw on the hands of one man an amount of work with which no individual, however capable, could hope to cope successfully.

(4) *Conclusions.*

42. It will thus be seen that, almost immediately after the outbreak of war, the following important changes took place:—

1. The ordinary functions of the Cabinet practically lapsed in so far as the conduct of the war was concerned.
2. A War Council, with supreme powers, was instituted to take the place of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
3. The consultative functions which would ordinarily have been performed by the Board of Admiralty were transferred to a new body termed the "War Staff Group."
4. Some important changes were made in the personnel of the War Office. The staff and administrative functions of the office was practically centralised in the hands of one man.

IV. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

(1) *From the outbreak of the War until January 13th, 1915.*

43. It had for long been recognised by the naval and military authorities of this country that any attack on the Dardanelles would be an operation which presented very great difficulties. In 1878, Admiral Hornby, on the occasion of a naval demonstration made, with the consent of the Ottoman Government, before Constantinople, wrote a report on the subject. In 1906-07, at a time when the relations between the British Government and the Porte were somewhat strained, the matter came under consideration. Both the General Staff of the War Office and the Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty were alive to the great risks which would be involved even in a joint naval and military enterprise against the Gallipoli Peninsula. In a Memorandum, dated December 19th, 1906, prepared by the General Staff, the following passage occurs: "Military opinion, looking at the question from the point of view of coast defence, will be in entire agreement with the naval view that unaided action by the Fleet, bearing in mind the risks involved, is much to be deprecated."

Hankey
Papers.

Further, the works of Mr. Julian Corbett and other authorities had familiarised the general public with the view that it had become almost a fundamental principle of naval strategy that the attack of ships on forts, without military aid, was rarely productive of satisfactory results.* The experience gained at Port Arthur, Santiago, Wei-Hai-Wei and elsewhere was held to confirm this view.

44. It was contended that the improvements made in modern artillery, the experience recently gained in Belgium, in connection especially with the bombardment of Liège, Namur and Antwerp, and the use of aircraft, had rendered any analogy between the present and the past of little value. *A fortiori*, the experience gained by Admiral Duckworth in 1807 was valueless. We shall revert presently to this subject, with a view to discussing how far these precedents were applicable to the case of the recent attack on the Dardanelles.

Statement,
p. 6.
Churchill
Documents,
Appendix
A. 1.

45.

* * * * *

Churchill
Documents,
Appendix.
A. 2.

Q. 2364. 46. On October 31st, Turkey declared war. On November 3rd, the outer forts of the Dardanelles were bombarded for about ten minutes. The object of this bombardment was merely to find out, by a practical test, the effective range of the guns of the Turkish forts. Q. 2251. Sir Henry Jackson has expressed the opinion, in which we concur, that this bombardment was a mistake, as it was calculated to place the Turks on the alert. Commodore de Q. 1733. Bartolomé characterised this demonstration as "unfortunate." The orders to bombard emanated solely from the Admiralty and the War Council was not consulted.

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part I,
paras. 8-10.

47. On November 25th, the idea of making a serious attack on the Dardanelles was discussed at a meeting of the War Council. Mr. Churchill said that the best way to defend Egypt was to make an attack on some part of the coast of Asiatic Turkey, and, as an extension of this idea, he suggested an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula, which, if successful, would give us the control of the Dardanelles and enable us to dictate terms at Constantinople. He added that this would be a very difficult operation and would require a large force. Lord Kitchener agreed that it might become necessary to make a diversion by an attack on the Turkish communications, but considered that the moment had not yet arrived for doing so.

* * * * *

Mr.
Churchill's
statement,
p. 7.

Statement,
p. 8.

48. A proposal to collect transport, horse-boats, etc., at some British port in the Mediterranean was also discussed. The idea at the time was that a feint attack might be made on the Gallipoli Peninsula, in order to convey the impression that a landing was intended there, whereas the real point of attack would be made at some other point on the Turkish coast. This proposal was rejected owing to the shortage of tonnage for mercantile purposes, due partly to military demands. It was thought undesirable to aggravate this evil. Nevertheless, on November 30th, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, the Chief of the Staff at the Admiralty, again proposed that transport should be collected in Egypt sufficient to convey one division. Mr. Churchill passed this suggestion on to the War Office, adding that he thought transport should be collected, or kept in readiness at short notice sufficient to convey 40,000 men. Lord Kitchener at once replied: "I will give the Admiralty full notice. I do not think transports need be detained in Egypt yet." On receipt of this reply, Mr. Churchill "put the project on one side and thought no more of it for the time." Nevertheless, horse-boats continued to be despatched to Alexandria whenever the occasion was offered, "in case the War Office should, at a later stage, wish to undertake a joint naval and military operation in the Eastern Mediterranean."

* Sir Arthur Wilson, however, who has given special attention to this subject, does not accept the validity of this principle (see answer to Q. 4660).

49. Thus matters stood until January 2nd, 1915, when a very important telegram, which materially affected the situation, was received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Petrograd. In this telegram it was represented that the Russians were being somewhat hardly pressed in the Caucasus, and a hope was expressed, on behalf of the Russian Government, that, in order to relieve this pressure, a demonstration against the Turks would be made in some other quarter.

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part I,
pp. 5-6.

50. On the following day (January 3rd) a reply was sent to the Ambassador, authorising him to assure the Russian Government that a demonstration would be made against the Turks, but stating it was feared that any such action would be unlikely seriously to affect the withdrawal of enemy troops in the Caucasus. This telegram was sent from the Foreign Office, but it was drafted at the War Office. Lord Grey explained to us that the Foreign Office merely acted as a medium of communication. But it is not on this account to be inferred that Lord Grey in any way disapproved of the telegram. On the contrary, he held that "When an Ally appealed for assistance we were bound to do what we could," and that it would have had a bad effect if that assistance had been refused.

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part I, p. 6.

Q. 689.
Q. 693.

Mr. Asquith thinks that he did not see this telegram before it was sent, but it must not be by any means inferred on that account that he would not have approved of its despatch if he had seen it. Mr. Churchill did not see the telegram before it was sent, but he had a long conversation with Lord Kitchener on January 2nd, after the receipt of the Petrograd message, and he thinks that Lord Kitchener's reply was the outcome of that conversation.

Q. 5777-79.

Q. 1226.

51. This, therefore, was the first phase in the whole transaction. By January 3rd His Majesty's Government was pledged to make a demonstration against the Turks. The time and method of making that demonstration were, as yet, wholly undecided.

52. On January 2nd, Mr. Churchill received the following private letter from Lord Kitchener:

"I do not see that we can do anything that will seriously help the Russians in the Caucasus. The Turks are evidently withdrawing most of their troops from Adrianople and using them to reinforce their army against Russia, probably sending them by the Black Sea. . . . We have no troops to land anywhere. . . . The only place that a demonstration might have some effect in stopping reinforcements going East would be the Dardanelles. . . . We shall not be ready for anything big for some months."

It will be convenient to interrupt the thread of the narrative at this point in order to deal briefly with the question, which has formed the subject of much discussion, of who was primarily responsible for originating the proposal to make a purely naval attack on the Dardanelles.

53. In considering this question, it has to be remembered that Mr. Churchill himself, in common with all the experts who were consulted at the time, as well as those who gave their opinions subsequently, was greatly in favour of a joint naval and military attack rather than one conducted by ships alone. Lord Fisher, in giving his evidence, spoke of the "purely naval operation at the Dardanelles" as "Lord Kitchener's proposal," and condemned it in strong terms. He based this opinion on Lord Kitchener's letter to Mr. Churchill of January 2nd, quoted in the preceding paragraph. We are unable to concur in Lord Fisher's view. Lord Kitchener suggested and pressed for a demonstration, but that did not necessarily involve a deliberate attempt to force a passage. The proper conclusion seems to be that when a demonstration appeared to be necessary the First Lord thought it was possible to convert and extend that demonstration into an attempt to force a passage, and took the steps which are detailed in the immediately succeeding paragraph.

Q. 3087,
3141,
3304-08.

Churchill,
5381.

On a review of the whole of the evidence on this point, a fairly safe conjecture may be made of what was passing through Lord Kitchener's mind early in January. It has to be borne in mind that the question which both Lord Kitchener and the Government generally had to decide was not whether the attack on the Dardanelles should be amphibious or purely naval, but whether, owing to the impossibility of supplying an adequate military force,* any attack at all should be undertaken, or whether, on the other hand, the operation should be limited to a mere demonstration. Lord Kitchener was, without doubt, strongly impressed with both the military and political necessity of acting on the appeal made by the Russian Government. The new army he was creating was not yet ready. He had to provide for home defence, to which he attached the utmost importance. He was

* Lord Kitchener estimated, on January 13th, that 150,000 men would be required (Hankey Memorandum, Part II, para. 19 and Q. 379).

most unwilling to withdraw a single man from France. The views entertained by Mr. Churchill at the time as to the prospects of success of a purely naval operation, were, as we shall presently show, somewhat more optimistic than was warranted by the opinions of the experts. Under these circumstances, Lord Kitchener grasped, perhaps rather too eagerly, at the proposal to act through the agency of the Fleet alone, though he recognised the objections to any such undertaking, but it cannot with justice or accuracy be said that the responsibility for proposing the adoption of this course rested with him. It rested rather on the First Lord.

We should here mention that at a somewhat late stage of our Inquiry, Sir George Arthur intimated to us that he was in a position to give evidence bearing upon the question of the extent to which Lord Kitchener was primarily responsible for the initiation of the Dardanelles expedition. He subsequently handed in a statement descriptive of a conversation which he had held with Lord Kitchener, and which was to the following effect :—

Lord Kitchener stated that “ at a conference to which he was invited by the First Lord of the Admiralty, when the passage of the Dardanelles was the subject of discussion, he protested vigorously against any such an undertaking by the Navy without very strong and very carefully prepared support from and co-operation with the Army ”; that the First Lord had stated that the experience of the past was no longer admissible by reason of the “ marvellous potentialities of the ‘ Queen Elizabeth,’ ” which ship was about to be sent to the Dardanelles; that Lord Kitchener admitted that “ he had no expert knowledge of the ‘ Queen Elizabeth,’ and was therefore not in a position to contradict or depreciate the opinion as to her astounding effectiveness, which the First Lord had alleged would revolutionise all previous estimates of naval warfare ”; and that he “ contented himself with renewing his protest in which he was sure that he voiced all military opinion; but he said also that his inevitable uneasiness would have been considerably diminished had he been able to satisfy himself that the First Lord’s confidence both in the ‘ Queen Elizabeth ’ and in the success of his plan was wholly and whole-heartedly shared by his chief naval advisers.”

Q. 6167.

Much depends upon the date upon which this conversation occurred. Sir George Arthur was unable to give a precise date, but it resulted from his examination that without any doubt it was held about the same time as the War Council which took place on May 14th. At that Council, indeed, Lord Kitchener expressed himself in terms somewhat similar to those used by Sir George Arthur. He read the following statement :—

“ When the Admiralty proposed to force the passage of the Dardanelles by means of the Fleet alone, I doubted whether the attempt would succeed, but was led to believe it possible by the First Lord’s statements of the power of the ‘ Queen Elizabeth ’ and the Admiralty Staff paper showing how the operation was to be conducted. . . . I regret that I was led to agree in the enterprise by the statements made, particularly as to the power of the ‘ Queen Elizabeth,’ of which I had no means of judging.” It will be seen, therefore, that Sir George Arthur’s evidence has no direct bearing upon the immediate subject of our Inquiry, namely, the opinions Lord Kitchener expressed during the period of origin and inception, which, as we have already mentioned (para. 2), we consider to have closed on March 23rd, 1915.

We also called Major-General Sir Stanley Von Donop and Mr. H. J. Creedy, one of Lord Kitchener’s private secretaries, to give evidence on the same point, but neither added any material information to the facts which were already in our possession.

54. To resume the narrative of events. On January 3rd, 1915, the following telegram was despatched from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Carden† :—

“ Do you think that it is a practicable operation to force the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone ?

“ It is assumed that older battleships would be employed, that they would be furnished with mine sweepers and that they would be preceded by colliers or other merchant vessels as sweepers and bumpers.

“ The importance of the results would justify severe loss. Let me know what your views are.”

55. On January 5th, Vice-Admiral Carden replied to the Admiralty telegram of the 3rd, in the following terms :—

“ I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships.”

Naval
Operations
in the Dar-
danelles,
January–
March,
1915,
No. 1.

Naval
Operations
in the Dar-
danelles,
February–
March,
1915,
No. II.

† This, and other telegrams which purport to be textually reproduced, have been paraphrased, but great care has been taken not to make the least change in the sense.

In the course of the evidence given before us, Vice-Admiral Carden was asked to explain more fully what he meant by saying that the Dardanelles "might be forced." In reply, he stated: "I did not mean distinctly that they could be forced. I had it in my mind that it was impossible to form a real opinion on the subject until one had destroyed the outer forts at the entrance, and was able to get inside and actually find out the extent of the gun defences, of the mine field and the extent of the movable armament on both sides of the Straits." It is to be observed, however, that no reservation of this sort was made in the telegram sent to the Admiralty on January 5th.

56. On January 6th, the following telegram was sent from the First Lord to Vice-Admiral Carden:—

"High authorities here concur in your opinion.

"Forward detailed particulars showing what force would be required for extended operations. How do you think it should be employed, and what results could be gained?"

The wording of this telegram is certainly open to criticism. We shall deal presently with the views entertained by the various authorities at the Admiralty. Here we need only remark that at the time Lord Fisher was by far the highest naval authority at the Admiralty, and that, in the absence of any explicit statement to the contrary, Vice-Admiral Carden would naturally suppose that he was included amongst those who concurred in the view set forth in his telegram of January 5th. This, in fact, is what actually happened. Vice-Admiral Carden, on being asked "what high authorities did you think were meant?" replied: "Well, I knew that Lord Fisher was there and Sir Henry Jackson. I thought it was either or both of them." Now, Lord Fisher agreed with the telegram to Vice-Admiral Carden of January 3rd, but he does not think he was shown the telegram of the 6th before it was sent. "I think," he said in his evidence, "that I should have objected to that, and asked him (Mr. Churchill) to word it in some other way. Naturally, Carden would think I was in it, would he not?" Mr. Churchill, on the other hand, did not wish it to be inferred that Lord Fisher was included amongst the "high authorities." "I do not," he said, "think it would have been fair to include Lord Fisher then." As regards Sir Henry Jackson, to whose supposed concurrence Vice-Admiral Carden alluded in his evidence, he stated to the Commission that he could not remember whether he was or was not consulted before the telegram of January 6th was despatched. But Mr. Churchill, in reply to a question put to him by Mr. Clyde, stated that when he spoke of "high authorities" he meant only Sir Henry Jackson and Admiral Oliver, both of whom had expressed their opinions to him verbally.

57. On January 3rd, simultaneously with the despatch of the telegram to Vice-Admiral Carden, Mr. Churchill requested Sir Henry Jackson to prepare a memorandum on the project, which Sir Henry Jackson described as a "note on forcing the Passages of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus by the Allied Fleets in order to destroy the Turko-German squadron and threaten Constantinople without military co-operation." On January 5th, Sir Henry Jackson wrote a memorandum, which was not, however, received by Mr. Churchill till some time after the despatch of the telegram of the 6th to Vice-Admiral Carden. In this memorandum, Sir Henry Jackson did not pronounce any definite opinion either for or against the attack on the Dardanelles. He only dwelt on the minimum force required to undertake the operation, on the losses which would probably be involved in any attempt to "reach the Straits," to which he was strongly opposed, and on the necessity of providing a large supply of ammunition. He added: "Assuming the enemy squadron destroyed and the batteries rushed, they would be open to the fire of field artillery and infantry, and to torpedo attack at night, with no store ships with ammunition, and no retreat without re-engaging the shore batteries, unless these had been destroyed when forcing the passage. Though they might dominate the city and inflict enormous damage, their position would not be an enviable one, unless there were a large military force to occupy the town. Strategically, such a diversion would only be carried out when the object to be gained was commensurate with the loss the Fleet would sustain in forcing the passage. The actual capture of Constantinople would be worth a considerable loss; but its bombardment alone would not greatly affect the distant military operations; and even if it surrendered, it could not be occupied and held without troops, and would probably result in indiscriminate massacres."

58. On January 11th, Vice-Admiral Carden replied to the telegram sent to him from the Admiralty on the 6th. Four operations, he said, were possible. These were:

(a) The destruction of defences at the entrance to the Dardanelles.

(b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defences up to and including Cephez Point battery N.8.

(c) Destruction of defences of the Narrows.

(49-42)

C 2

Naval
Operations,
etc.,
No. IV.

Q. 2332.
Q. 2338.
Q. 3115-17.
Q. 3119.
Q. 3120.
Q. 1257.
Q. 2071-72.
Q. 1134-35.

Naval
Operations
etc.,
No. III.
Q. 1130.

Naval
Operations,
etc., No. V.

(d) Sweeping of a clear channel through the mine field and advance through the Narrows, followed by a reduction of the forts further up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora.

He estimated that it would take a month to carry out all these operations.

Q. 1140. This telegram, Mr. Churchill informed us, "made a great impression on every one who saw it. It was in its details an entirely novel proposition." We understand that the novelty of the proposition consisted in the abandonment of any attempt to rush the Dardanelles, and in the substitution in its place of a scheme by which the forts would be methodically attacked and destroyed one by one. "That, of course," Mr. Churchill said, "squared with the impression produced in many people's minds by the destruction of the strong forts on land by the German heavy artillery."

Naval Operations, etc., No. VI. 59. On January 15th, Sir Henry Jackson recorded his opinion on Admiral Carden's proposal. His memorandum began with the following remark: "Concur generally in his plans." After dealing at some length with the detailed proposals, Sir Henry Jackson concluded by saying: "I would suggest (a)* might be approved at once, as the experience gained would be useful." He did not recommend the undertaking of (c) and (d) unless the experience gained from (a) and (b) justified it. It will be observed that this Memorandum is dated January 15th, that is to say, two days after the meeting of the War Council on January 13th, to which we shall presently allude.

Q. 1265. 60. Sir Henry Jackson insisted strongly in the evidence which he gave before us that, in writing his Memorandum of January 15th, he agreed to an attack on the outer forts and nothing more. He did not consider that an attempt made by the Fleet alone to get through the Dardanelles was "a feasible operation." He thought that "it would be a mad thing to do." He denied the accuracy of the statement made by Mr. Churchill that he, Sir Henry Oliver, and Vice-Admiral Carden "were all agreed." He thought that Mr. Churchill was "very much more sanguine" than they were. But nothing of this sort was put on record at the time. The concurrence expressed by Sir Henry Jackson in his Memorandum of January 15th with the whole of Vice-Admiral Carden's plans is unqualified save by the expression of an opinion that only the first item of the programme, viz., that which involved the destruction of the outer forts, should be approved at once, with a view to gaining experience. The explanation of Sir Henry Jackson's reticent attitude is probably to be found in the answer which he gave to a question addressed to him by Mr. Fisher to the effect that it was not part of his duty to "unduly interfere with the naval policy except if he were invited to do so by some superior." He also said in the course of his evidence: "It was not for me to decide. I had no responsibilities whatever as to the decision. I had no responsibilities except just for the staff work which I did." He was consulted before the initial telegram of January 3rd was sent to Vice-Admiral Carden and expressed his concurrence with its contents.

Q. 1764-65 61. Sir Henry Oliver would greatly have preferred to wait until the army was ready, 1906-07. when a joint naval and military attack might have been made. But he, nevertheless, acquiesced in the naval attack. He thought "we should push on slowly Q. 1760. till either we overcame the enemy's defence, or till the enemy's defence brought us to a standstill." Further, he stated, "I think the view was that we would go on, and by Q. 1905. the time that we had got over the initial difficulties the military force would have been provided."

Q. 1587. 62. Commodore de Bartolomé's opinion was expressed before the Commission in the following terms: "My impression was always that the naval members would much sooner have had a combined operation, and that they only agreed to a purely naval operation on the understanding that we could always draw back—that there should be no question of what is known as forcing the Dardanelles."

63. We shall refer presently more particularly to the views entertained by Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson. Here it will be sufficient to state that as regards the other members of the Admiralty staff who were consulted, all would have preferred a joint naval and military attack, but none dissented from the bombardment of the outer forts. Their concurrence was not apparently very cordial; at the same time there can be no doubt that it was given. They were apparently much influenced by the consideration that the matter could be reconsidered after the results of bombarding the outer forts had been ascertained.

(2) *The Meeting of the War Council on January 13th.*

64. Before proceeding any further, it may be desirable to describe briefly the military and political situation which existed at the moment when the very important meeting of the War Council took place on January 13th.

* The destruction of defences at the entrance of the Dardanelles (*vide ante* para. 58).

65. At that time the rival armies in the Western theatre of war had reached a state of deadlock. The desperate attacks made by the Germans on the British position at Ypres had been repulsed with great losses to the enemy. It seemed tolerably clear that no attempts to break through the French and British lines could prove successful. On the other hand, the Allies were not in sufficiently superior strength to justify any hope that they would speedily break through the German lines. In the Eastern theatre of war, the Austrians had sustained some serious defeats. But the Russian position, though for the moment satisfactory, was in reality somewhat precarious, owing to a lack of munitions and inadequate railway communications, both being defects which could not be speedily corrected. In Serbia the position was very menacing. The attitude likely to be assumed by Bulgaria was the dominating factor in the Balkan Peninsula. All attempts to secure the military co-operation of the Balkan States had failed. "Diplomacy," as Lord Grey explained to us, "was perfectly useless without military success." Bulgaria was still neutral, but the proclivities of its ruler were well known. It was thought that a decisive military success on the part of the Allies would prove the most effective method for securing the continued maintenance of his neutrality. Italy was still neutral. It was under such circumstances that the British Government had to consider in what direction a blow could most effectively be delivered, in order at one and the same time to relieve the pressure on Russia and to deter Bulgaria from active adherence to the cause of the Central Powers. Q. 709.

66. We do not think it necessary, neither, so long as the war lasts, would it be at all advisable, to deal in a report intended for publication with the alternative projects which at the time came under the consideration of the Government. It will suffice to say that for various reasons, some political and others either naval or military, all, save the proposal to make an attempt on the Dardanelles, were rejected. The entrance of the Allied Fleets into the Sea of Marmora, followed, as would probably have been the case, by the occupation of Constantinople, would, it cannot be doubted, have exercised a profound effect on the future course of the war. The advantages capable of being secured by success in this enterprise were, indeed, so obvious that it is unnecessary to dwell on them at any length. But they may be briefly mentioned. It would, without doubt, have finally deterred Bulgaria from joining the cause of the Central Powers. It would have enabled the Russian Government to import the war material of which they stood greatly in need. It would, to the great advantage of Russia herself and of the rest of the world, have enabled Russian agricultural products to be exported. Finally, it would have gone far to settle a question which has been a constant source of trouble to Europe for centuries past. These advantages were so great that they may possibly have produced a tendency on the part of the members of the War Council to be governed by them to an excessive degree, and to neglect unduly the sole question which was really open to discussion, namely, the advisability of undertaking at that time a purely naval enterprise. That question was obviously one on which only the opinions expressed by naval and military experts would be of any value. It becomes, therefore, essential to consider what were the views entertained and expressed on January 13th by the naval and military advisers of the Government.

The principal and, indeed, the sole adviser of the Government on military questions was Lord Kitchener. The actual proposal on which Lord Kitchener had to give an opinion at the meeting held on January 13th was thus summarised in Sir Maurice Hankey's notes of the proceedings of the Council: "Mr. Churchill said he had interchanged telegrams with Vice-Admiral Carden, the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, in regard to the possibilities of a naval attack on the Dardanelles. The sense of Admiral Carden's reply was that it was impossible to rush the Dardanelles, but that, in his opinion, it might be possible to demolish the forts one by one. To this end Admiral Carden had submitted a plan. His proposal was first to concentrate his fire on the entrance forts. When they were demolished he would proceed to deal with the inner forts, attacking them from the Straits and from the seaward side of the Gallipoli Peninsula. This plan was based on the fact that the Dardanelles forts are armed mainly with old guns of only thirty-five calibre. These would be outranged by the guns of the ships, which would effect their object without coming into range. Three modern ships, carrying the heaviest guns, would be required for reducing some of the more modern works, and about twelve old battleships would deal with the remainder. These could now be spared for the task without reducing our strength in the main theatre of war. Among others, he mentioned the "Triumph," "Swiftsure," "Goliath," "Glory," and "Canopus," all of which had been employed hitherto for trade protection. Four of the Majestic class, which were to have been "scrapped," their 12-inch guns being utilised for monitors, could also be made available, though this would entail a delay in the completion of the monitors. Two battle-cruisers were, he said, already in the Mediterranean. The new battle-cruiser

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part III,
p. 23.

"Queen Elizabeth" was already to be sent to Gibraltar for gun trials, and it would be feasible to allow her to conduct her trials against the Dardanelles forts, instead of against a target.

"The Admiralty were studying the question, and believed that a plan could be made for systematically reducing all the forts within a few weeks. Once the forts were reduced the minefields would be cleared, and the Fleet would proceed up to Constantinople and destroy the 'Goeben.' They would have nothing to fear from field guns or rifles, which would be merely an inconvenience."

Sir Maurice Hankey then records:—

"Lord Kitchener thought the plan was worth trying. We could leave off the bombardment if it did not prove effective."

Lord Fisher said nothing, but it is essential to inquire fully as to what views he really entertained at this moment. He occupied a position of great responsibility. It is highly probable that if either Lord Kitchener or Lord Fisher had, from the first, expressed, on technical grounds, strong objections to the attack on the Dardanelles, the project would have been abandoned, and it may be regarded as quite certain that, under this hypothesis, the plan would have been much more carefully examined than appears to have been the case. Lord Crewe, in the course of his evidence, stated: "I should be very sorry indeed to state what the effect would have been on our minds if Lord Fisher had made a full statement of his actual objections from the naval point of view, speaking as First Sea Lord. Of course then the Government would have had to consider whether the political advantages were worth the risk. I cannot say what the ultimate decision would have been, but I have not the least doubt that it would have altered the form and manner of our consideration of the whole subject to a great extent." Lord Grey also said: "Of course if we had thought that we were forcing upon naval officers an operation which they were reluctant to undertake, I think we should not have contemplated it for a moment; but we understood that the naval officers who were on the spot who were to carry it out, and who had advised about it, were in favour of it, and we were attracted by what we were told about big guns and forts, and so forth, and we were prepared to authorise the operation being proceeded with."

67. Lord Fisher made a very full statement to us of the views which he entertained. Mr. Churchill also dwelt at length on this subject, and allusion has been made to it by many other witnesses. We think that we can now confidently describe the attitude he assumed both on January 13th and at later periods. It is certain that Lord Fisher did not underrate the importance of the Dardanelles enterprise. On January 3rd, in a "private and personal" letter to Mr. Churchill, Lord Fisher said: "I consider the attack on Turkey holds the field." He then sketched out the broad outlines of a general plan of operations in the Eastern theatre of war. This plan involved, *inter alia*, the withdrawal of a considerable force from France, and was, therefore, at all events for the time being, incapable of execution. Lord Fisher, in fact, like all other experts, both naval and military, was in favour of a combined attack, but not of action by the Fleet alone. It is certain that, from the very first, he disliked the purely naval operation, but it is especially to be observed that his main objection was not based upon the impracticability of the scheme, considered on its own merits, but on the strong opinion which he entertained that the British Fleet could be better employed elsewhere. All the evidence we have received, including that of Lord Fisher himself, tends to confirm the perfect accuracy of the following statement made to us by Mr. Asquith:—

"As I understand, because I had frequent conversations with him, Lord Fisher's objection to the Dardanelles operations was not so much a technical objection upon naval grounds. It is quite true that, I think throughout, he thought the best chance of success for such an operation would have been a combined operation in which both the land and sea forces were engaged; but Lord Fisher's main objection, at least the one he always impressed on me, was not based in any degree upon the technical or naval merits or demerits of the Dardanelles operations, but upon the fact that he preferred another objective. . . . So far as I understood, from all the conversations I had with him, it was much more upon that ground than upon any specific objection on what you may call technical naval grounds that he was opposed to it."

68. We have already mentioned (para. 2) that in our present Report we propose only to deal with events which occurred up to March 23rd, but it may be advisable so far to forestall the contents of our future Report as to say that throughout the whole of the proceedings Lord Fisher consistently maintained the attitude described in the above extract from Mr. Asquith's evidence. He reluctantly acquiesced in the Dardanelles operations so long as he thought they would not seriously interfere with the plans which

he wished to carry into execution elsewhere. But when in the month of May he became convinced that the demands made on the Fleet for action in the Dardanelles would prejudice his alternative schemes, he resigned his post at the Admiralty. It should be clearly understood that his resignation was due solely to this cause and not to objections he entertained to the original scheme for attacking the Dardanelles considered exclusively on its own merits. Lord Fisher did, indeed, state in the course of his evidence that he "was dead against the naval operation alone because he knew it must be a failure." He also said, "I must reiterate that as a purely naval operation I think it was doomed to failure." But he did not at the time record any such strongly adverse opinions as these, neither does he appear to have impressed others with the strength of his objections. Lord Grey stated: "We (the Members of the War Council) understood that the naval authorities, who were to be charged with the carrying out of the operation, considered it a practicable operation by naval means alone." Lord Grey "got to know that Lord Fisher did hold views of his own," but he thinks that this fact did not come to his knowledge until after the decision of January 13th had been taken. Mr. Asquith, on being asked in what light he interpreted the views of the experts, replied: "Very favourable. Mr. Churchill told me so, and I thought they were." Further, on being asked whether Lord Fisher had ever given him to understand that from the first he considered that the Dardanelles expedition was "doomed to failure," Mr. Asquith replied: "No, he never said that to me. He would always have preferred a conjoint military and naval operation, but he never said it was doomed to failure; and I do not think he thought it was."

Mr. Churchill said to us: "I think I am entitled to state that it was my impression, and it was the impression of every one present at this meeting of the 13th, that in what I said I carried with me the full agreement of those who were there." It is perhaps somewhat overstating the case to say that Lord Fisher was in "full agreement," but it is undeniable that, by not dissenting, Lord Fisher may reasonably have been held to agree, and that, so far as we have been able to ascertain, he did not, before the meeting, express anything approaching to strong disapproval save on the ground to which we have already alluded, namely, that he feared that the Dardanelles operations would interfere with the execution of other schemes which he favoured. Indeed, on January 12th, Lord Fisher initialled and passed on to the Chief of the Staff the following Minute, which had been written by the First Lord: "Secret. Minute by the First Lord to Secretary, First Sea Lord, Chief of Staff. The forcing of the Dardanelles as proposed and the arrival of a squadron strong enough to defeat the Turkish Fleet in the Sea of Marmora would be victory of first importance and change to our advantage the whole situation of the war in the East. It would appear possible to provide the force required by Admiral Carden without weakening the margin necessary in Home waters, as follows." The details connected with the proposed movements of ships were then given. Moreover, on January 14th, Lord Fisher concurred with a Memorandum which was sent from the First Lord to the Prime Minister in which the following passage occurs: "The attack on the Dardanelles will require practically our whole available margin. If that attack opens prosperously it will very soon attract to itself the whole attention of the Eastern theatre, and if it succeeds it will produce results which will undoubtedly influence every Mediterranean Power. In these circumstances we strongly advise . . . that we should devote ourselves to action in accordance with the third conclusion of the War Council, viz., the methodical forcing of the Dardanelles." We shall have presently to revert to the views entertained both by Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson when we come to deal with a further meeting of the War Council, which took place on January 28th.

69. The actual decision arrived at by the War Council on January 13th, after hearing the views expressed by Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill—Lord Fisher, Sir Arthur Wilson and Sir James Murray remaining silent—was couched in the following terms:—

"The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective."

70. It is impossible to read all the evidence, or to study the voluminous papers which have been submitted to us, without being struck with the atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which seems to have characterised the proceedings of the War Council. We have already (para. 28) mentioned that some of those present at the meetings of the Council left without having any very clear idea of what had or had not been decided. The decision of the Council, taken on January 13th, is another case in point. The Admiralty was to "prepare" for a naval expedition, and nothing more. It would naturally be inferred from the wording of the decision that the matter was to be reconsidered by the Council when the preparations were complete, and after

Q. 3123.

Q. 3179.

Q. 746 and 866.

Q. 853.

Q. 855-56, 868.

Q. 5785.

Q. 5839.

Q. 1153.

Q. 5154.

Q. 5153.

Hankey Memo-
randum,
Part I.,
para. 57.

the Admiralty plan was matured. Actual approval of the bombardment was withheld. The following extract from the evidence given by Mr. Asquith will show that this is the way in which he understood the decision :—

Q. 5780-82. “ *The Chairman.* Did you understand that it (*i.e.*, the decision quoted in para. 69) was merely provisional, to prepare, but nothing more? It did not pledge you to anything more?—*A.* No.

“ *Q.* You did not think it approved it?—*A.* No. I think all of us thought this was a very promising operation, and the Admiralty ought to get ready for it.

“ *Q.* But nothing more?—*A.* No, no more than that.”

Mr. Churchill apparently considered that the decision of January 13th went further than the approval of mere preparation. Employing Parliamentary metaphor, he likened the meetings of January 13th and 28th respectively to the Second and Third readings of a Bill. “ I do not think,” he said, “ that the meeting of the 13th would be the introduction; it was more than that—it was the approval of a principle, with the general knowledge of how it was to be given effect to.” The statement made by Lord Crewe probably represents with accuracy the manner in which the decision was generally

Q. 5440. understood by the members of the Council. “ I think,” he said, in answer to a question which was addressed to him, “ I should say that it was approved subject to the occurrence of any unforeseen event which might have made it from one point of view unnecessary.”

The following extract from General Callwell’s evidence shows how he regarded the decision taken on January 13th. It may, with some confidence, be presumed that General Callwell’s views were shared by other officials both at the War Office and the Admiralty.

Q. 3724. “ *Mr. Clyde.* When the naval operation was undertaken, did you understand it to be an undertaking to force the Dardanelles with ships only?—*A.* Yes, certainly, to force it gradually.

Q. 3726. “ *Q.* As undertaken, did you understand it to be anything of the limited character of a demonstration?—*A.* No, certainly not. . . .

Q. 3739-40. “ *Q.* In short, you regarded it from the beginning as a definite serious project definitely to force the passage of the Dardanelles?—*A.* Certainly.

“ *The Chairman.* From the early stage in January?—*A.* Yes, from the very beginning, the 13th January.”

71. The decision taken at this meeting of the Council calls for one further observation. When (see para. 70) Mr. Churchill spoke of the “ general knowledge ” imparted to the Council of how the “ principle ” which he advocated should be carried into effect, he, without doubt, meant that the force to be employed was to be purely naval. On this point all the witnesses whom we have examined were unanimous.

Q. 830. Thus, Lord Grey said: “ My recollection is that it was distinctly said to us that the troops would not be asked for; that if the Navy could not carry out the operation by itself, the operation would not be proceeded with; and that our first consent was given on that understanding; and I gave my consent on that understanding because I was informed—I believed Lord Kitchener’s opinion to be—that no troops were available.”

72. The determination to employ ships alone must be considered in connection with the phrase used in the recorded decision taken on January 13th, that the Admiralty, in preparing for the bombardment, was to consider “ Constantinople as its objective.” It was from the first recognised by all the naval experts that small bodies of troops would have to be landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula, partly for finally demolishing the forts which had been bombarded by the Fleet, and partly also, in all probability, to attack those batteries which could not effectively be reached by the ships’ guns. It is almost inconceivable that any one, whether military, naval or civilian, could have imagined for one moment that Constantinople would be captured without military help on a somewhat large scale. It is clear that by the decision of January 13th, although the War Council only pledged itself for the moment to naval action, they were, in reality, committed to military action on a large scale in the event of the attempt to force the Dardanelles by the Fleet alone proving successful.

73. We have mentioned (para. 50) that the first phase of these transactions was reached on January 3rd, when the Russian Government was informed that a “ demonstration ” of some sort would be made against the Turks.

Q. 691. A demonstration may, as Lord Grey pointed out, “ of course, not mean active operations at all.” The second phase was reached on January 13th. The idea of a mere demonstration, which would not involve active operations, was then definitely abandoned. A decision, which was somewhat variously interpreted, was taken that the Admiralty should “ prepare ” for an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula, with the ulterior object of pushing on to Constantinople. The attack was intended to be purely naval, but, if

successful, in our opinion, necessarily involved, at a somewhat later period, the active co-operation of considerable military forces with the Fleet.

(3) *Co-operation with the French.*

74. The first step very wisely taken by the First Lord of the Admiralty after he had received from the War Council a mandate to "prepare" for a bombardment of the Gallipoli Peninsula was to communicate with the French Government with a view to securing the co-operation of the French fleet. M. Augagneur, the French Minister of Marine, visited London. In the course of the discussions which took place with him an arrangement was speedily made as to the sphere of maritime action in the Mediterranean to be assigned respectively to the naval forces of the two countries. The French squadron at the Dardanelles was to be placed under the command of Admiral Carden. The detailed plan of action proposed by the Admiralty was then communicated to the French Government and examined by the Ministry of Marine at Paris [by whom it was accepted.]

Documents,
etc.

(4) *The Political Advantages of a purely Naval Attack.*

75. The allusion made in M. Augagneur's letter (para. 74) to the possibility of desisting from the naval attack if "insurmountable difficulties" were encountered renders this a convenient opportunity for dwelling at somewhat greater length on this argument, which played an important part in the decision taken at the meeting of the War Council of January 28th, which we are about to describe, and which assumed even greater importance at a later stage of the proceedings.

76. It may confidently be asserted that anyone conversant with Eastern affairs would have predicted, in January, 1915, that if a serious attack on the Dardanelles was made and if it failed, the result would be to give a shattering blow to British prestige and influence throughout the East. As a matter of fact, the attack failed, but, so far as can at present be judged, the political consequences, although a serious check to British arms was shortly afterwards experienced in Mesopotamia, have been so slight as to be almost inappreciable. An additional proof is thus furnished of the extreme difficulty experienced by any Western when he endeavours to forecast the ratiocinative processes of the Eastern mind. But this result could not be, and was not, foreseen at the time when the decision had to be taken. Lord Kitchener, as might naturally be expected from his long Eastern experience, was more especially impressed with the harm which would ensue from failure, but although he and others realised the inevitable risk which would have to be run, they thought, in the first instance, that any serious loss of prestige could, in any case, be avoided by desisting from the attack if, after some experience had been gained, the prospect of success was greatly diminished. A great distinction was made between the withdrawal of the fleet and evacuation by a military force when it had once been landed. Q. 274-75.

Lord Grey said: "Once you got fairly in and made it apparent to the whole world that you were making a serious effort to force the Straits, of course there was loss of prestige if you failed; but I do not think there would have been much lost if we had failed to take the outer forts and then gone away again." Q. 745.

Mr. Asquith stated: "One of the great reasons put forward in the first instance which appealed to Lord Kitchener and everybody was that if it was merely a naval attack, it could have been abandoned at any moment without any serious loss of prestige." Q. 5826.

Mr. Arthur Balfour said: "I think it was always in the view of the Admiralty and of the responsible people that if the outer forts attack failed, you could always divert all your naval efforts to some other theatre of operations." Q. 4504.

Sir Arthur Wilson, also, looking at the matter from the naval rather than from the political point of view, was asked the following question by Sir William Pickford: "So long as you were not so far committed that you could not stop, you did not see much objection to it?" His reply was: "I did not think there was any harm." Q. 2031.

77. It will be seen in the sequel to this report that, when the time came for applying the principles enunciated above, the argument based upon the loss of prestige, which would result from the acknowledgment of a partial failure, exercised so predominant an influence

as practically both to nullify the intentions which had been originally formed and to obliterate the recollection of the considerations which were advanced prior to any definite action having been taken.

(5) *The Effect of Modern Artillery, etc.*

Memo-
randum,
Part II,
para. 45.

78. It may be as well here also to allude to another consideration which appears to have carried great weight at the War Council on the occasion of their meeting on January 28th. Sir Maurice Hankey gives the following amongst other reasons for differentiating the position in 1914-15 from that discussed by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907 (see para. 43).

"The fall of the Liège and Namur forts had led to the belief that permanent works were easily dealt with by modern long-range artillery, and this was confirmed by the fall of the outer forts.

"The utilisation of aircraft had led to the hope that, in a comparatively confined space like the Gallipoli Peninsula, the value of naval bombardment, particularly by indirect laying, would be enormously increased."

79. We have received abundant evidence to show that these arguments weighed strongly both in the minds of Ministers and experts,.

Q. 868.

Lord Grey said: "The experience of this war was supposed to have changed the prospect of successful attack upon forts and made successful attack upon forts a practicable operation where it had not been a practicable operation before."

Q. 1130.

Mr. Churchill said: "This war had brought many surprises. We had seen fortresses reputed throughout Europe to be impregnable collapsing after a few days' attack by field armies without a regular siege."

The arguments involved in the consideration of this subject are of so highly technical a character that none but specialists can express any very confident opinion upon them. At the same time, the presumed analogy between the Belgian forts and the position in the Dardanelles weighed so strongly in the minds of the Government that we think it incumbent on us to deal briefly with the subject, and to state such conclusions as we have been able to form from the evidence laid before us.

80. It is, we think, correct to say that the rapid destruction of the Belgian fortresses by heavy howitzers came as a surprise in land warfare. It may be accounted for:—

1. By the foresight and reticence displayed by the German military authorities in ascertaining the results obtainable from the high-angle fire of howitzers of large calibre, and in providing the requisite ordnance and ammunition.

2. By the increased facilities now available for transporting and mounting such heavy ordnance.

3. By the advantage derivable from the use of aircraft for observing and reporting the fall of the projectiles.

It must also be remembered that, when the heavy armament of the fortresses had been dismounted or silenced, an ample military force was immediately forthcoming to seize and hold the works.

Comparing heavy howitzers as used in the destruction of the Antwerp, Namur and Liège forts with heavy guns, as mounted in the ships that made the attack on the Dardanelles, the advantages of the howitzer over the gun are:—

1. The projectile descends at such an obtuse angle that it clears the parapet or vertical defence of the guns in the forts and explodes more nearly in the centre and does more damage.

2. The penetration of any overhead protection of the forts is assured.

3. The steep angle of descent enables the projectiles to clear any hills in front of the forts and also to reach batteries in concealed positions, such as those mounted in a hollow of the land.

The disadvantages are:—

1. To ensure any degree of accuracy the howitzers must be fixed in relation to the object.

2. The wind, especially at very long ranges, is detrimental to the accuracy of fire.

3. The range is comparatively short.

The advantages of the gun over the howitzer are:—

1. Higher velocity and consequently greater penetration.

2. Greater accuracy.

The disadvantages are:—

1. Although penetration is greater, the protection that can be given to shore guns would probably resist all direct hits. There is no limit to the protection that may be given

to guns in forts, and therefore to ensure each gun being silenced the gun itself would have to be hit.

Guns as mounted on board ships cannot be given sufficient elevation to obtain high-angle fire similar to howitzers, but at long ranges or at short ranges by reducing the muzzle velocity an angle of descent of about 21 degrees can be obtained. The "Queen Elizabeth's" mountings can give about 20 degrees of elevation, but this is not sufficient for really high-angle fire. Thus, in the case of the "Queen Elizabeth," lying 15,000 yards from Gaba Tepe and firing with reduced three-quarter charge at Kilid Bahr, the angle of descent would be $17^{\circ} 18'$; firing at Chanak the angle of descent would be $20^{\circ} 20'$.

2. Guns, owing to the small angles of descent, are not able to attack concealed forts and batteries.

3. Guns mounted in ships cannot fire from concealed positions, but provided their gun power is greater than that of the forts, the ships could keep out of range.

Thus it will be seen that for the destruction of forts, and especially those in concealed positions, the howitzer is a superior weapon to the gun. With reference to Mr. Churchill's statement regarding the destruction of the Belgian fortresses, the new and surprising fact was mainly due to the causes we have mentioned, only the third of which is applicable to guns mounted on board ships. On the other hand, the improvement in the power of the latest naval guns in comparison with the defensive capabilities of forts is certainly appreciable, especially in the case of the heavy guns in the new ships—"Queen Elizabeth" and "Inflexible"—that were used in the Dardanelles operations.

81. In the case of the Dardanelles, the reduction of the forts was a very much more difficult and hazardous operation than the naval attacks which had failed in the cases of Port Arthur, Santiago or Wei-Hai-Wei, because after the outer forts were silenced, the forts on each side of a long, narrow strait had to be dealt with.

The waters readily lent themselves to be defended by mines, and the mine-fields could be easily protected by gun fire.

The facilities for firing Whitehead torpedoes from fixed tubes on each side of the Straits were very good, and many of these positions might be concealed. A certain number of them were known to exist.

The topography of the land on each side of the Straits was most favourable for concealed batteries of guns and howitzers, and the breadth of the Peninsula opposite Kilid Bahr was about 6 to 7 miles, and at Chanak was about 8 to 9 miles. Thus, ships bombarding those forts by indirect fire from off Gaba Tepe might find concealed batteries that would compel them to go some distance from the land, and might force them out of range. Ships bombarding from inside the Straits would also be fairly certain to be attacked by concealed batteries. Lastly, it was not certain when submarines might appear on the scene.

In the evidence of Mr. Churchill and certain naval officers of high position, stress was laid on the result of the bombardment of the outer forts as indicating what might be expected from similar action inside the Straits. In our opinion there was little analogy between the two operations, as in the former case the ships bombarding could keep out of range; the concealed batteries could not attack them; they were free from mines and Whitehead torpedoes.

The Fleet bombarding the Dardanelles had the important advantage over fleets previously engaged in the bombardment of forts that seaplanes were available for observation; but apparently they did not fulfil expectations, as the engine power was deficient, and there was much difficulty experienced in rising from the water when there was any sea.

In the bombardment of the outer forts ships were placed to observe the fall of the projectiles, and succeeded in doing so; but when the forts inside the Straits were attacked, ships were not very effective for this purpose, and it would seem that on the 18th March, when the determined attack was made, there was hardly any attempt to observe the fall of the shots.

82. Looking to all the facts of the case, we are disposed to think that undue importance was attached to the ease with which the Belgian forts were destroyed, and that the extent to which there was any analogy between those forts and the forts at the Dardanelles was over-rated.

(6) *The Meeting of the War Council on January 28th.*

Q. 1146.

83. Mr. Churchill stated to us that, in the early days of January, Lord Fisher "assented" to the purely naval attack on the Dardanelles. It was, of course, known that, in common with all other experts, he would have preferred a joint naval and military attack had troops been available. It was also known that he would have preferred operations in

Q. 1201.

another theatre of war. But, so far as we have been able to ascertain, there is no contemporary record to show that he expressed any opinion adverse to the proposed attack on the Dardanelles considered exclusively on its own merits. Shortly after the meeting of January 13th, Lord Fisher's attitude underwent some change. The real divergence between his views and those of Mr. Churchill became more apparent than heretofore. The latter thus describes what occurred: "During the weeks that followed I could see that Lord Fisher was increasingly worried about the Dardanelles situation. He reproached himself for having agreed to begin the operation. Now it was going to broaden out into a far larger and far longer undertaking than he had contemplated, his great wish became to put a stop to the whole thing. Although our relations continued to be friendly and pleasant, it was clear to me that there was a change. Although we agreed on every definite practical step that had to be taken, there was a deep difference in our underlying view. He knew that I wanted the fleet to carry out its plan in its integrity. I knew that he wanted to break off the whole operation and come away."

Q. 5853.

Mr. Asquith has borne testimony to the fact that there were at this time constant differences of opinion between the First Lord and the First Sea Lord, but he added: "They got on well together, all the same." The evidence given to us by both Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher amply confirms this latter statement.

Documents
appended
to Mr.
Churchill's
statement,
Appendix
D. 1.

Do.
Appendix
D. 2.

Q. 1177.

See also

Q. 1255-56

84. These differences eventually culminated in the submission by Lord Fisher direct to the Prime Minister on January 25th of a Memorandum setting forth his views. It is an interesting and, in many respects, important paper. But it has no very direct bearing on the immediate subject of our inquiry. Moreover, inasmuch as it dwells exclusively on the general naval policy which should be adopted by this country, and does not discuss the practicability or otherwise of the attack on the Dardanelles, it would be most inadvisable that it should be reproduced in this report. It may, however, without detriment to the public interest, be said that Lord Fisher generally deprecated the use of the fleet for coastal bombardments or attacks on fortified positions. His Memorandum was immediately answered by another prepared by Mr. Churchill on January 27th, in which, whilst expressing full concurrence in the general principles of naval policy advocated by Lord Fisher, he contended that the proposal to bombard the Gallipoli Peninsula did not conflict with those principles. Mr. Churchill further informed us that it was not until he had seen Lord Fisher's Memorandum of January 26th, that he "perceived . . . that the First Sea Lord had, since the first meeting of the War Council, developed serious misgivings about it" (*i.e.* about the decision taken on January 13th).

Q. 5852.

Q. 5854.

Q. 3125,
3239-48,
5195.

Q. 3256.

85. It appears that subsequent to the submission of this Memorandum, Lord Fisher intimated that he did not wish to attend any more meetings of the War Council. The Prime Minister was extremely desirous that Lord Fisher should not absent himself from the meeting which was about to take place. It was arranged, therefore, that, prior to the official meeting on January 28th, Lord Fisher and Mr. Churchill should meet in the Prime Minister's room and discuss the matter with him. Save in respect to some points of slight importance as regards the precise language used, the accounts given to us by Mr. Asquith and Lord Fisher, as regards what occurred at this private meeting, tally. Mr. Churchill advocated the attack on the Dardanelles. Lord Fisher spoke in favour of those alternative schemes, which we have not thought it advisable to describe, but to which we have already alluded (para. 67). He did not criticise the attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula on its own merits. Neither did he mention to the Prime Minister that he had any thought of resigning if his opinions were overruled. The Prime Minister, after hearing both sides, expressed his concurrence in Mr. Churchill's views. Immediately afterwards, the War Council met at 11.30 a.m.

86. Sir Maurice Hankey's record of this meeting, in so far as it concerns the subject of our inquiry, is as follows:—

"Mr. Churchill said that he had communicated to the Grand Duke Nicholas and to the French Admiralty the project for a naval attack on the Dardanelles. The Grand Duke had replied with enthusiasm, and believed that this might assist him. The French Admiralty had also sent a favourable reply, and had promised co-operation. Preparations were in hand for commencing about the middle of February. He asked if the War Council attached importance to this operation, which undoubtedly involved some risks.

"Lord Fisher said that he had understood that this question would not be raised to-day. The Prime Minister was well aware of his own views in regard to it.

"The Prime Minister said that, in view of the steps which had already been taken, the question could not well be left in abeyance.

"Lord Kitchener considered the naval attack to be vitally important. If successful, its effect would be equivalent to that of a successful campaign fought with the new armies.

One merit of the scheme was that, if satisfactory progress was not made, the attack could be broken off."

Mr. Balfour then dwelt on the advantages which would accrue from a successful attack on the Dardanelles, and concluded by saying that "it was difficult to imagine a more helpful operation."

"Sir Edward Grey said it would also finally settle the attitude of Bulgaria and the whole of the Balkans.

"Mr. Churchill said that the naval Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean had expressed his belief that it could be done. He required from three weeks to a month to accomplish it. The necessary ships were already on their way to the Dardanelles."

87. It is to be observed that the Memorandum addressed by Lord Fisher to the Prime Minister on January 25th was not in the hands of the War Council when this meeting took place, neither were they informed of the conversation between the Prime Minister, Lord Fisher and Mr. Churchill which immediately preceded the meeting. The result, coupled with Lord Fisher's silence, was that the Members of the War Council, although they may have had some rather vague idea that Lord Fisher was not in agreement with the First Lord, were by no means well-informed of his views. Lord Fisher has explained to us the reasons of his silence. He "did not want to have an altercation with his Chief at the Council." Mr. Churchill, he said, "was my Chief, and it was silence or resignation." When asked what he meant by stating to the Council that "he had understood that the (Dardanelles) question would not be raised to-day," he replied: "I thought we would have time to think over it. I did not think that it would be gone on with at the meeting." When Lord Fisher found that he was mistaken in this opinion and that a final decision was at once to be taken, he was greatly dissatisfied. He rose from his seat with the intention of going to the room of Mr. Bonham Carter, the Prime Minister's Private Secretary, and intimating his intention to resign. Lord Kitchener at the same time rose from his seat and, before Lord Fisher could leave the room, had some private conversation with him at the window. He strongly urged Lord Fisher not to resign, and pointed out that he was the only one present who disagreed with the Dardanelles operation. Eventually, according to a note Lord Fisher made at the time, the latter "reluctantly gave in to Lord Kitchener's entreaty and resumed his seat."

88. During all these proceedings, Sir Arthur Wilson, for reasons very analogous to those which inspired Lord Fisher's attitude, remained silent (see para. 19). In the course of his evidence he said to us that he was "moderately adverse" to the plan of bombarding the Dardanelles. He added: "I thought other things might be better, but both the First Lord and I recognised that it was not my business to interfere, and if they decided on a plan all I was to do was to help them to the best of my ability. In fact, the main object in my declining to have any official appointment was that I might be put into a position in which I should have to oppose the First Lord or the First Sea Lord, or to support one against the other."

The following extracts from Sir Arthur Wilson's evidence are also worthy of attention: "*Admiral Sir William May.* In the discussions prior to the 13th January, leaving the First Lord out, was there any general consensus of opinion favourable to an exclusively naval attack?—A. I do not think there was."

"Q. In representing the opinion of the Admiralty to the War Council on the 13th January or on the 28th January, did the First Lord reflect these unfavourable opinions?—A. No. I think he rather passed them over. He was very keen on his own views"

"*Sir William Pickford.* In what way did you think the First Lord on the 28th failed to represent the difficulties to the War Council?—A. In the first place, he kept on saying he could do it without the army; he only wanted the army to come in and reap the fruits, I think, was his expression; and I think he generally minimised the risks from mobile guns, and treated it as if the armoured ships were immune altogether from injury. I do not mean to say he actually said they were immune, but he minimised the risk a great deal."

Mr. Churchill, in answer to a question addressed to him by the Chairman, said: "The effect produced upon my mind was that Sir Arthur Wilson's state of mind on the subject, which I watched very carefully, was favourable to the bombardment, and encouraged me in thinking the bombardment would be successful. All the same, if Sir Arthur Wilson had been asked to give a vote, he would have voted in the negative."

"Q. He would have voted in the negative because he wanted to do some other operation?—A. Yes."

"Q. He never said to you, on the ground of the merits of the thing itself and the practicability of the thing itself, independently of operations elsewhere, that he thought

you had better not undertake that operation ?—A. No one of those who were consulted—there were very few, but they were very important people—ever argued against the practicability. No one ever said : ‘ This is a thing which you cannot do,’ and showed by practical simple reasons that it could not be done ; the only arguments which were ever used were these general arguments which you have heard and I thought myself to some extent a judge of those.”

Statement
by Mr.
Churchill,
p. 15.

89. A further meeting took place on January 28th at 6 p.m., but in the interval between the two meetings an incident occurred which is thus related by Mr. Churchill : “ Although the War Council had come to a decision in which I heartily agreed, and no voice had been raised against the naval plan, I felt I must come to a clear understanding with the First Sea Lord. I had noticed the incident of his leaving the table, and Lord Kitchener following him to the window and arguing with him, and I did not know what was the upshot in his mind. After lunch I asked him to come to see me in my room, and we had a talk. I strongly urged him to undertake the operation, and he definitely consented to do so. I state this positively. We then repaired to the afternoon War Council meeting, Admiral Oliver, the Chief of the Staff, coming with us, and I announced finally on behalf of the Admiralty and with the agreement of Lord Fisher that we had decided to undertake the task with which the War Council had charged us so urgently.

“ This I take as the point of final decision. After it, I never looked back. We had left the region of discussion and consultation, of balancings and misgivings. The matter had passed into the domain of action.”

90. Thus the third phase of these transactions was reached. There was no longer, as on January 13th, any question of “ preparing ” for an attack on the Dardanelles. It was finally decided that an attack should be made, by the fleet alone, with Constantinople as its ultimate objective.

Q. 3326.

91. We wish to add some comments on these proceedings. Both Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson are distinguished officers who, in the course of their honourable careers, have rendered eminent services to their country. We have not the least doubt that the attitude which they adopted at the War Council was dictated by a strong sense of duty. But we have no hesitation in recording our opinion that it was a mistaken sense of duty. Lord Fisher, indeed, himself recognised that he “ stretched loyalty to an extreme pitch.” It has probably happened to most officials who occupy or have occupied high places that they have at times disagreed with the heads of their departments. There may perhaps be occasions when such disagreement justifies resignation. But those occasions are extremely rare. More generally, it is the duty of the official not to resign but to state fully to the head of his department and, should any proper occasion arise, to other members of the Ministry, what are the nature of his views. Then, if after due consideration those views are over-ruled, he should do his best to carry out the policy of the Government, even although he may not be in personal agreement with it. This duty was in a very special degree incumbent upon an officer placed in Lord Fisher’s position, though it perhaps applies to a somewhat less extent to Sir Arthur Wilson. Both of these officers were distinguished experts. They must have been aware that the questions which the Council had to decide were of so technical a nature that none but expert opinion could be of any value, and they must also have been aware that none of the Ministerial members of the Council had any expert naval knowledge. We hold, therefore, that although they were not asked definitely to express their opinions, they should have done so. We dwell on this point because we consider that if the principles on which Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson acted were to be generally accepted by officials in other departments, they would exercise an extremely bad effect upon the general efficiency of the public services. They would tend to cripple independence of thought and their application would leave the Parliamentary heads of the various departments without that healthy assistance which they have a right to expect, and which is, at times, much more likely to be rendered by reasonable and deferential opposition than by mere agreement resting wholly on the ties of discipline.

Q. 1961.

92. There can be no doubt that at the two meetings on January 28th, Mr. Churchill strongly advocated the adoption of the Dardanelles enterprise. When Sir Arthur Wilson was asked “ Did the First Lord express an opinion in favour of it ? ” he replied : “ Yes ; very much. He pressed it very strongly.” We think that, considering what Mr. Churchill knew of the opinions entertained by Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson, and considering also the fact that the other experts at the Admiralty who had been consulted, although they assented to an attack on the outer forts of the Dardanelles and to progressive operations thereafter up the Straits as far as might be found practicable, had not done so with any great cordiality or enthusiasm, he ought, instead of urging Lord Fisher, as he seems to have done at the private meeting after luncheon on January 28th,

to give a silent, but manifestly very reluctant, assent to the undertaking, not merely to have invited Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson to express their views freely to the Council, but further to have insisted on their doing so, in order that the Ministerial members might be placed in full possession of all the arguments for and against the enterprise. We have not the least doubt that, in speaking at the Council, Mr. Churchill thought that he was correctly representing the collective views of the Admiralty experts. But, without in any way wishing to impugn his good faith, it seems clear that he was carried away by his sanguine temperament and his firm belief in the success of the undertaking which he advocated. Although none of his expert advisers absolutely expressed dissent, all the evidence laid before us leads us to the conclusion that Mr. Churchill had obtained their support to a less extent than he himself imagined.

93. Further, we are very clearly of opinion that the other members of the Council, and more especially the Chairman, should have encouraged the experts present to give their opinion, and, indeed, should have insisted upon their doing so; and, moreover, that if the latter had expressed any doubts a short adjournment should have taken place, in order to allow the matter to be further considered, possibly by the light of what other experts, not having seats on the Council, might have to say. It was common knowledge that naval opinion generally condemned the attack on forts by ships unaided by any military force. The Prime Minister was himself aware of this fact. Such being the case, it would appear that special care should have been taken to elicit a full expression of the opinions entertained by the experts, and that they should have been urged to state them in their own way. What actually happened was that the stress laid upon the unquestionable advantages which would accrue from success was so great that the disadvantages which would arise in the not improbable case of failure were insufficiently considered. Q. 5767.

(7) *Events from January 28th to February 16th.*

94. At the end of January the methods by which the Government hoped that the Fleet would reach Constantinople, if open to some objections on the ground of their practicability, were perfectly clear and comprehensible. They had resolved that an attempt should be made by the Fleet alone in order to force the passage of the Dardanelles. There was no intention of calling for military aid on any large scale. Admiral Carden thought that the operation was "worth trying," though at a later period, when he found that the defences "were much more extensive and powerful than had been anticipated," he changed his mind. In the first instance, he considered that only some small landing parties, consisting principally of Marines, would be required to complete the demolition of the forts. None of the responsible authorities appear to have paid much attention to the course of action which it would be necessary to adopt after the passage of the Dardanelles had been forced. Admiral Carden thought that "as the operations progressed he would receive further orders from the Admiralty as to the precise lines they wished him to act upon." The fact that, even after the passage had been forced, communications with the Fleet in the Sea of Marmora might, to some extent, be impeded by such batteries as had not been destroyed, was recognised. But in London, where, according to General Callwell's evidence, the resistance likely to be offered by the Turks had, from the first, been greatly under-estimated, no great importance appears to have been attached to this argument. Lord Kitchener was of opinion that directly the passage had been forced the Gallipoli garrison would evacuate the Peninsula, inasmuch as their communications with Constantinople would be cut off. In a Memorandum dated March 23rd he wrote: "Once the ships are through, the position of the Gallipoli Peninsula ceases to be of any military importance." Moreover, he and others, including Lord Grey, confidently looked forward to a revolution taking place in Constantinople if once the British Fleet appeared in the Sea of Marmora. Q. 2352. Q. 2354. Q. 2434. Q. 2441. Q. 3600. Hankey Memorandum, Part I, para. 62. Q. 5415. Q. 759. Q. 4904.

* * * * *

95. After the meeting of January 28th, the objective of the British Government remained the same, but the views entertained as to the means of realising it underwent a gradual but profound change. The necessity for employing a large military force

Q. 3735.

Q. 1195.

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part II,
para. 34.

Do.
Part II,
para. 38.

Naval
Operations
in the Dar-
danelles,
January-
March, 1915,
No. VIII.
Q. 5917.

became daily more apparent. The idea of a purely naval operation was gradually dropped. The prestige argument grew in importance. It does not appear that either the Cabinet or the War Council ever definitely discussed and deliberately changed the policy. General Callwell says that it would be very difficult to assign any date at which the change took place. "We drifted," he said, "into the big military attack." At the evening meeting on January 28th, Lord Kitchener had stated very plainly, in connection with the question which was then under discussion of affording assistance to Serbia, that "we had at present no troops to spare." Mr. Churchill was of a different opinion. He said: "I assert that in February there was nothing in the situation in France, or on the Russian front, or in this island, which would have prevented the War Office from concentrating within striking distance either of Salonika or the Dardanelles eight or nine, or even ten, infantry divisions." But, of course, on a matter of this sort Lord Kitchener's opinion carried the greatest weight. He would not go further than stating at a meeting which took place on February 9th that "if the Navy required the assistance of the land forces at a later stage, that assistance would be forthcoming." There appears, indeed, to be some reason for supposing that Lord Kitchener realised from the first that the aid of the Army would eventually be necessary at the Dardanelles. At a meeting on May 14th, he said: "I realised that if the Fleet failed to achieve their object, the Army would have to be employed to help the Navy through."

On February 15th, Sir Henry Jackson wrote a long Memorandum, which was sent to Admiral Carden not as orders, but as "suggestions, to be adopted by him or not at his discretion." This Memorandum concludes in the following terms:—

"The provision of the necessary military forces to enable the fruits of this heavy naval undertaking to be gathered must never be lost sight of; the transports carrying them should be in readiness to enter the Straits as soon as it is seen the forts at the Narrows will be silenced.

"To complete their destruction, strong military landing parties with strong covering forces will be necessary. It is considered, however, that the full advantage of the undertaking would only be obtained by the occupation of the Peninsula by a military force acting in conjunction with the naval operations, as the pressure of a strong field army of the enemy on the Peninsula would not only greatly harass the operations, but would render the passage of the Straits impracticable by any but powerfully armed vessels, even though all the permanent defences had been silenced.

"The naval bombardment is not recommended as a sound military operation, unless a strong military force is ready to assist in the operation, or, at least, follow it up immediately the forts are silenced."

96. A very important informal meeting of some of the Ministers took place on February 16th. It must be borne in mind that at that time no bombardment of the Gallipoli Peninsula had as yet taken place. The idea, therefore, of a purely naval operation was by no means abandoned. At the same time, owing to the repulse of the Turkish attack on Egypt, which had recently taken place, and to further changes in connection with plans in the Western theatre of war, to which we need not allude more particularly, it was decided to mass a considerable force in the Mediterranean to be used as occasion might require. Sir Maurice Hankey was, unfortunately, not present at this informal meeting, but the decisions which were arrived at were eventually incorporated into those of the War Council. They were as follows:—

"1. The XXIXth Division, hitherto intended to form part of Sir John French's Army, to be despatched to Lemnos at the earliest possible date. It is hoped that it may be able to sail within nine or ten days.

"2. Arrangements to be made for a force to be despatched from Egypt, if required.

"3. The whole of the above forces, in conjunction with the battalions of Royal Marines already despatched, to be available in case of necessity to support the naval attack on the Dardanelles.

"4. Horse-boats to be taken out with the XXIXth Division, and the Admiralty to make arrangements to collect small craft, tugs, and lighters in the Levant.

"5. The Admiralty to build special transports and lighters suitable for the conveyance and landing of a force of 50,000 men at any point where they may be required."

Sir Maurice Hankey states that this was "the all-important decision from which sprang the joint naval and military enterprise against the Gallipoli Peninsula." This decision may, in fact, be regarded as the fourth phase of the transactions. It had not been definitely decided to use troops on a large scale, but they were to be massed so as to be in readiness should their assistance be required.

Naval
Operations
in the Dar-
danelles,
January-
March, 1915,
Part II,
para. 42.

(8) *The Bombardment of February 19th.*

97. The first bombardment of the outer forts took place on February 19th. In his report on the operation, dated March 17th, Admiral Carden said: "The result of the day's action on the 19th February showed apparently that the effect of long-range bombardment by direct fire on modern earthwork forts is slight. Ports 1-4 appeared to be hit on many occasions by 12-inch common shell well placed; but when the ships closed in all four guns opened fire. And on the second day, although a heavy and prolonged fire at short range was poured into the forts, 70 per cent. of the heavy guns were found to be in a serviceable condition when the demolition parties landed." In his evidence before us he qualified this by saying "About 70 per cent. of the guns appeared to the officers in command of the landing parties to be efficient; but I do not think it actually follows that they were. Their magazines were all blown up; their electrical communications to their firing point, or whatever their communications were, were probably all destroyed, so that though the gun itself was intact, it does not at all follow that it could be made effective under a considerable time. . . . The forts were in such a state when the bombardment was finished that it would have taken a considerable time to make use of even the guns that were not actually disabled by having the muzzles blown off or having a charge put in the breach or something of that sort; it would have taken a considerable time, I think, to make use of that 70 per cent. of guns. The personnel would have had to have been undisturbed for a considerable time to have come back to the forts and made use of that 70 per cent. of guns. But 70 per cent. of the guns were apparently intact on their mountings." Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, also, who can speak with authority on this subject, inasmuch as he has had, during the present war, a wide experience of bombardments in the North Sea, generally confirmed Admiral Carden's view. "If," he said, "they actually destroyed 30 per cent. in the short time they did very well."

Naval Operations in the Dardanelles, January-March, 1915, No. IX.

Q. 2358-59

Q. 5008.

98. It may here be mentioned that the decisions taken by the War Council on January 13th and 28th were not communicated to the whole of the Cabinet until a day or two before the bombardment took place. Mr. Asquith informed us that the approval of the Cabinet was "unanimous." Mr. McKenna was the only Cabinet Minister who appeared before us and who was not present at the early meetings of the War Council. He was asked whether he concurred in the view that the Cabinet approved. His reply was as follows:—

Q. 5936.

Q. 5748-50.

"From Mr. Asquith's point of view I readily understand how he came to that conclusion. The statement was made to us that the War Council had come to a unanimous decision that the bombardment of the Dardanelles should be undertaken, and we were told that all the necessary orders had been given, and that the bombardment would open within either twenty-four or forty-eight hours of the time at which he was speaking. So far as my recollection goes, there was no comment and certainly no criticism of Mr. Asquith's statement, and consequently I do not think it was open to him to come to any other conclusion in the circumstances than that the Cabinet approved. But from my point of view and from the point of view of many of my colleagues with whom I have spoken on the subject, our view of the matter would be somewhat different. I should say for myself that I had not at the time the means of forming an opinion, much less of expressing one. We accepted without comment or criticism. . . . I fully recognise the justification for the Prime Minister in assuming our approval. Assent I distinguish from approval. He, having all the facts in his mind and not knowing how ignorant we were of the reasons which led up to it, assumed that assent was approval."

Q. 5938-40.

(9) *Events from February 16th to February 26th.*

99. Sir Maurice Hankey states in his Memorandum that a series of "acute discussions" took place at the War Council on February 19th, 24th and 26th. Subsequent events proved that the decisions taken during this period marked a very important epoch in the first stage of the Dardanelles operations. It was in the course of these ten days that the views of Lord Kitchener, who was in reality the leading spirit of the triumvirate which was conducting the war, underwent a considerable change. It is not necessary to quote at length the proceedings which took place during this period, but it is essential to gain a clear insight into the nature and importance of the decisions which were actually taken.

Part II, para. 50.

100. The first point which must strike any one who has carefully studied the documents and listened to the evidence submitted to us is that the original idea of

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part II,
para. 50.

possibly breaking off the attack on the Dardanelles, which had manifestly been waning ever since its first conception early in January, altogether disappeared from the purview of the responsible authorities by the middle of February. At the meeting on the 24th, Lord Kitchener said that he "felt that if the Fleet would not get through the Straits unaided, the Army ought to see the business through. The effect of a defeat in the Orient would be very serious. There could be no going back. The publicity of the announcement had committed us." Lord Grey said that "failure would be morally equivalent to a great defeat on land." Whilst, however, the expression of these views is conclusive as showing that the original idea of limiting the operations wholly to the Fleet had been greatly modified, even if it had not been wholly abandoned, and that military operations on a large scale were contemplated, it is not easy to define with precision the nature of the programme which took its place. The scope of the intended military operations was left in doubt. Lord Kitchener and others still clung to the idea that success was attainable by naval action alone. In the course of the discussion on February 24th he asked Mr. Churchill whether he "contemplated a land attack." The latter said, in reply, that "he did not, but it was quite conceivable that the naval attack might be temporarily held up by mines, and some local military operation required." The telegrams sent from the War Office give some indication of what was passing in Lord Kitchener's mind at this time. On February 23rd, he sent through Sir John Maxwell, who was in Egypt, instructions to General Birdwood, who was about to proceed to the Dardanelles, to report "whether it is considered by the Admiral that it will be necessary for troops to be employed to take the forts, and, if so, what force will be necessary; whether a landing force will be required of the troops to take the forts in reverse, and generally in what manner it is proposed to employ the troops." On February 24th, he telegraphed to Sir John Maxwell: "It is proposed that the Navy should silence the guns and destroy the forts with gun fire. It is not intended that parties should be landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula, except under cover of the naval guns, to help in total demolition when the ships get to close quarters." On February 26th, Sir John Maxwell telegraphed that the French officer, who had formerly been military attaché at Constantinople, thought that "a military expedition is essential for opening the Dardanelles passage to the Allied Fleet, and it would be extremely hazardous to land on the Gallipoli Peninsula, as the peninsula is very strongly organised for defence." On the evening of the same day, Lord Kitchener telegraphed to General Birdwood through Sir John Maxwell: "The forcing of the Dardanelles is being undertaken by the Navy, and as far as can be foreseen at present the task of your troops, until such time as the passage has actually been secured, will be limited to minor operations, such as final destruction of batteries, after they have been silenced, under the covering fire of the battleships. It is possible, however, that howitzer batteries may be concealed inland with which the ships cannot deal effectively, and, if called upon by Admiral Carden, you might have to undertake special minor operations from within the Straits for dealing with these. Remember, however, that there are large enemy military forces stationed on both sides of the Straits, and you should not commit yourself to any enterprise of this class without aerial reconnaissance and assurance of ample covering fire by the Fleet. At any time during the bombardment of the Dardanelles you can, of course, apply for and obtain any additional forces from your corps in Egypt that you may require up to the total of its strength."

W.O.
telegrams,
p. 2.

Do.
p. 2.

Do.
p. 3.

Do.
p. 4.

Q. 1197.

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part II,
para. 51.

101. In the meanwhile, the Admiralty, in accordance with the decision arrived at on February 16th (see para. 96), had been preparing transports to convey the XXIXth Division to the Mediterranean. It was calculated that their departure would commence on the 22nd. On the 20th, however, Colonel Fitzgerald, Lord Kitchener's Personal Military Secretary, called at the Admiralty and stated that it had been decided that the XXIXth Division were not to go. This decision led to an acute difference of opinion between Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill. The discussions on the subject at the meetings of the War Council on February 24th and 26th were animated. Mr. Churchill made "the strongest possible appeal" for the immediate despatch of the XXIXth Division. He formally recorded his dissent at the Division being retained in this country, and added that he "must disclaim all responsibility if disaster occurred in Turkey owing to the insufficiency of troops." Lord Kitchener, on the other hand, held that the Naval Division and Marines, together with the Australians and New Zealanders, whom it was proposed to bring from Egypt, constituted an adequate force and that the 33,000 men available from the XXIXth Division and a Territorial Division which it was proposed to send from home would not be likely to make the difference between success

and failure. He was also uneasy about the position both in the Western and Russian theatres of war. He therefore declined to yield, and the Council, although Mr. Churchill's views appear to have received some support, finally decided in accordance with Lord Kitchener's advice. It is clear that, at the time of the discussion, Lord Kitchener still thought that the Fleet, unaided, would be able to obtain entrance into the Sea of Marmora. "He felt convinced, from his knowledge of Constantinople and the East, that the whole situation in Constantinople would change the moment the Fleet had secured a passage through the Dardanelles. We should be in a better position to judge the situation when the defences at the Narrows began to collapse."

102. With the decision finally taken on February 26th, the fifth phase in these transactions may be said to have closed. On February 16th, it had been decided to employ troops on a large scale. This decision still held good, but its execution was to be delayed. At the same time, the idea of forcing the Dardanelles by the action of the Fleet alone had not been abandoned.

(10) *Events from February 26th to March 10th.*

103. Another meeting of the War Council was held on March 3rd. By this time Lord Kitchener's opposition to the despatch of the XXIXth Division had apparently weakened. On the question being raised by Mr. Churchill, he said that "he proposed to leave the question open until March 10th, when he hoped to have heard from General Birdwood." General Birdwood, however, arrived at the Dardanelles before the 10th. On the 5th, he telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: "I am very doubtful if the Navy can force the passage unassisted. In any event the forcing of the passage must take a considerable time; the forts that have been taken up to the present have been visible and very easy, as the ships could stand off and shoot from anywhere, but inside the Straits the ships are bothered by unknown fire." This was followed on the 6th by a telegram to the following effect: "I have already informed you that I consider the Admiral's forecast is too sanguine, and though we may have a better estimate by March 12th, I doubt his ability to force the passage unaided." On March 10th, Lord Kitchener, being then somewhat reassured as regards the position in other theatres of war, and being also possibly impressed by General Birdwood's reports, announced to the War Council that "he felt that the situation was now sufficiently secure to justify the despatch of the XXIXth Division."

W.O.
telegrams,
No. 174.

Do.
No. 183.

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part II,
paras. 49
and 62.

104. The sixth phase in these transactions was thus reached. The decision of February 16th, the execution of which had been suspended on the 20th, again became operative on March 10th. In the meanwhile, three weeks of valuable time had been lost. The transports, which might have left on February 22nd, did not get away till March 16th.

105. It is with great reluctance and hesitation that we comment on these proceedings, for it is obvious that Lord Kitchener was mainly responsible for the decisions taken during the critical period between February 16th and March 10th, and it is quite possible that, were he alive, he might be able to throw a new light upon them. Nevertheless, we think it is incumbent on us to state the conclusions at which, with the evidence before us, we have arrived.

106. Lord Kitchener's position at this time was one of great difficulty. With the forces at his disposal he had to provide for home defence and also for maintaining an adequate force both in Flanders and Egypt. Was he to add to the demands which he had to meet the further liability of undertaking an additional military operation on a large scale in another and distant theatre of war? It can be no matter for surprise that he hesitated to do so. Subsequent events showed that the fears he entertained for the immediate future were groundless, but to impute any shadow of blame on that account would involve judging by the light of the wisdom which is the product of after-knowledge. Dealing, however, solely with the evidence which was available at the time, it certainly seems strange that the actualities of the situation should not have been more fully realised both by Lord Kitchener and his colleagues. From the moment when large bodies of troops were massed in the immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, even although they were not landed, the situation underwent a material change. Whatever may have been the intentions of the Government, the public opinion of the world must have been led to believe that an intention existed of making a serious attack both by land and sea.

The loss-of-prestige argument, therefore, naturally acquired greater force than had been formerly the case. From the time the decision of February 16th was taken there were really only two alternatives which were thoroughly defensible. One was to accept the view that by reason of our existing commitments elsewhere an adequate force could not be made available for expeditionary action in the Eastern Mediterranean; to face the possible loss of prestige which would have been involved in an acknowledgment of partial failure, and to have fallen back on the original plan of abandoning the naval attack on the Dardanelles, when once it became apparent that military operations on a large scale would be necessary. The other was to have boldly faced the risks which would have been involved elsewhere and at once to have made a determined effort to force the passage of the Dardanelles by a rapid and well-organised combined attack in great strength. Unfortunately, the Government adopted neither of these courses. Time, as Mr. Asquith very truly said to us, was all-important. Yet for at least three weeks the Government vacillated and came to no definite decision in one sense or the other. The natural result ensued. The favourable moment for action was allowed to lapse. Time was given to the Turks, with the help of German officers, to strengthen their position, so that eventually the opposition to be encountered became of a far more formidable character than was originally to have been anticipated. Moreover, even when the decision was taken, it was by no means thorough. As we shall presently show, the hope of dispensing altogether with military assistance, save in respect to what were called "minor operations," was not abandoned. We think that Mr. Churchill was quite justified in attaching the utmost importance to the delays which occurred in despatching the XXIXth Division and the Territorial Division from this country.

Q. 5908.

(11) *Appointment of General Sir Ian Hamilton.*

Q. 1197.

107. Early in March it was decided to send out General Sir Ian Hamilton to command the troops which were being assembled in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. His instructions are dated March 13th. These and the conversation he had with Lord Kitchener immediately before his departure from London render it abundantly clear that the scope of the intended military operations was at that time not fully decided. Sir Ian Hamilton's instructions contain the following passages:—

Hankey
Memo-
randum,
Part II,
para. 63.

"1. The Fleet have undertaken to force the passage of the Dardanelles. The employment of military forces on any large scale for land operations at this juncture is only contemplated in the event of the Fleet failing to get through after every effort has been exhausted.

"2. Before any serious undertaking is carried out in the Gallipoli Peninsula, all the British military forces detailed for the expedition should be assembled, so that their full weight can be thrown in.

"3. Having entered on the project of forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning the scheme. It will require time, patience and methodical plans of co-operation between the naval and military commanders. The essential point is to avoid a check which will jeopardise our chances of strategical and political success.

"4. This does not preclude the probability of minor operations being engaged upon to clear areas occupied by the Turks with guns annoying the Fleet or for the demolition of forts already silenced by the Fleet. But such minor operations should be as much as possible restricted to the forces necessary to achieve the object in view, and should as far as practicable not entail permanent occupation of positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula."

Q. 4364-68.

Q. 4365.

Q. 4373.

Q. 4377.

Q. 4381-86.

108. Sir Ian Hamilton, in the evidence which he gave before us, dwelt strongly on the total absence of information furnished to him by the War Office Staff. No preliminary scheme of operations had been drawn up. "The Army Council had disappeared." No arrangements had been made about water supply. There was "a great want of staff preparation."

As regards the verbal instructions given to him by Lord Kitchener before he left London, he spoke as follows:—

"Mr. Roch: Did you gather from that conversation with Lord Kitchener that he contemplated military operations then?—A. No; he repeatedly said—he broke in talking about landing by saying: 'I do not expect you to do it at all. I hope to get through without it.' He contemplated certainly landing on the Bosphorus.

"Q. As far as I gather he contemplated that the Navy would do the forcing of the Straits?—A. Certainly.

"Q. And you went out under that impression?—A. Yes, I did entirely.

"Q. Until you got the telegram from Lord Kitchener of the 19th March those were the first instructions you received from him that you were to undertake landing operations

to take the Peninsula?—*A.* No doubt in conversation with me Lord Kitchener did contemplate such a thing, except that he insisted I must not do so piecemeal.

“*Q.* You recollect the telegram: ‘You know my views that the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced,’ and so on—‘those operations must be undertaken after careful consideration.’” I read those as rather peremptory instructions that you were to take the Peninsula?—Undoubtedly.

“*Q.* That is how I read it, and that is the way you read it?—*A.* Yes. I do not mean to say I had altogether parted with my discretion, and if I had chosen to say, ‘This is altogether an impossibility,’ I might have said so, but I did not think so.”

(12) *Events from March 10th to March 16th.*

109. Between March 10th and March 16th some important telegrams were exchanged between the First Lord and Admiral Carden. On March 11th, the First Lord sent the following telegram to the Admiral:—

“Personal and Secret. Caution and deliberate methods were emphasised in your original instructions, and the skill and patience which has enabled your progress to be carried thus far without loss are highly appreciated. (No. 101.)

“If, however, success cannot be obtained without loss of ships and men, results to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss. The whole operation may be decided and consequences of a decisive character upon the war may be produced by the turning of the corner Chanak; and we suggest for your consideration that a point has now been reached when it is necessary to choose favourable weather conditions to overwhelm forts of the Narrows at decisive range by bringing to bear upon them the fire of the largest possible number of guns, great and small. Under cover of this fire landing parties might destroy the guns of the forts, and sweeping operations to clear as much as possible of the mine-field might also be carried out. Admiralty telegrams, January 3–May 29, 1915, No. 87.

“It might be necessary to repeat the operation until the destruction of all the forts at the Narrows and the clearing of the approaches of mines had been accomplished.

“We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but we recognise clearly that at a certain period in your operations you will have to press hard for a decision; and we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived. Every well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive our support.

“Before you take any decisive departure from the present policy we wish to hear your views.”

At midnight on March 13th, Admiral Carden replied:—

“Your 101 is fully concurred in by me.

“I consider stage when vigorous sustained action is necessary for success has now been reached. I am of opinion that, in order to ensure my communication line immediately Fleet enters the Sea of Marmora military operations on a large scale should be opened at once.” Do. No. 93.

On March 15th, the First Lord sent the following further telegram to Admiral Carden:

“When General Hamilton arrives on Tuesday night concert with him in any military operations on large scale which you consider necessary . . . The XXIXth Division (18,000 additional men) cannot arrive till the 2nd April. (No. 109.)

“We understand that a good clear passage is intended to be swept through the mine-fields, and the forts at the Narrows eventually attacked at close range. Further, that the battle fleet will support by its fire as necessary the operations against the forts or the light and movable armament, and that several days will be required to complete this task. Admiralty telegrams, January 3–May 29, 1915, No. 95.

We understand that you propose then to put the forts at the Narrows effectually out of action by engaging them at a decisive range, and that when this is done forts beyond will be attacked at convenience, and further sweeping carried out as necessary. Assuming this to be your intention, we cordially approve it and desire the scheme to be pressed forward. No time is to be lost, but there should be no undue haste. We gather that an attempt to rush the passage without having previously cleared a channel through the mines and destroyed the primary armament of the forts is not contemplated at this stage. No operation of this nature should be decided upon before consulting us. Before undertaking it careful study will be required of the parts to be played by the Army and Navy in close co-operation, and it might then be found that a naval rush will be costly, without decisive military action to take the Kilid Bahr plateau.”

On March 16th, Admiral Carden replied:—

“Your 109. I will consult with General Hamilton as soon as he arrives. My intentions are exactly expressed by your second paragraph. Plans of operations are Do. No. 98.

* See para. 109 for the full text of this telegram.

practically complete, and I hope to commence on the 17th March; but as it is essential to have good visibility and a wind which will prevent smoke interference, a later date may be chosen. Meanwhile, careful search is being made for mines in the area in which ships will have to manœuvre . . .

"It is not intended to rush the passage before a channel is cleared."

On March 16th, Admiral Carden was obliged to resign his command for reasons wholly based on the state of his health.

Admiralty
telegrams,
January 3–
May 29,
1915,
No. 100.

(13) *The Appointment of Admiral de Robeck.*

110. On March 17th, the First Lord sent the following telegram to Vice-Admiral de Robeck:

Do.
No. 102.

"Secret and Personal. I am conferring upon you the command of the Mediterranean Detached Fleet, with fullest confidence in your ability. In doing so I presume that you fully agree with Admiralty telegrams 101 and 109 and your predecessor's replies thereto (see para. 111), and that in your independent and separate judgment the immediate operations proposed are practicable. Do not hesitate to say if you think otherwise. If you agree, the operations should be carried out without delay and without further reference at the first favourable opportunity. You should work in closest harmony with General Hamilton."

On the same day (March 17th) Admiral de Robeck replied:—

Do.
No. 105.

"Personal and Secret. I am very grateful for your telegram. Telegrams mentioned by you meet with my full concurrence.

"Weather permitting, I will proceed with operations to-morrow.

"I am convinced that success depends on our ability to clear the mine-fields for forcing Narrows. To do this successfully the forts must be silenced while sweeping operations are in progress.

"I have had to-day an entirely satisfactory interview with Generals Hamilton and D'Amade and Admiral Wemyss on my flagship."

111. The following extracts from Admiral de Robeck's evidence give some indication of the manner in which at the time he approached the subject:—

Q. 2692–94.

"*The Chairman.* Did you agree that that operation (i.e., the destruction of the forts without military aid) was practicable?—A. I think everyone thought it was better to have a combined operation, but one was not consulted as to whether it was the right way to do it or not—we were told to bombard these forts, so we did it.

"Q. You were told from the Admiralty?—A. Yes.

"Q. Was that your view of what Admiral Carden thought—that he was told to do it—that he had no discretion?—A. I think he was directly told to get on and do it . . .

Q. 2704–09.

"Q. Therefore, you were in agreement with Admiral Carden as to the possibility of a successful issue to the operations which were then being proposed?—A. Yes.

"Q. That is to say, that you thought the forts could be demolished one by one without the help of an army?—A. Well, you see, I say that depended on clearing the mine-field. You see I add: 'It depends on our ability to clear the mine-field in forcing the Narrows.' That is telegram 105.

"Q. When you got the telegram from the Admiralty did you consider that there was any sort of moral pressure being put on you to agree, or that you were free to give an independent judgment?—A. I think I would always give my opinion. Of course, one thing one must remember—at that time we had already started the operation. We had already bombarded the outer forts once, so that the operation had begun. In my opinion it would never have done then to have stopped at that moment, having once commenced the attack.

"Q. It would never have done on what ground?—A. I think as regards the Turks.

"Q. On purely naval or on political grounds?—A. On political grounds, I think; not on naval grounds.

"Q. You thought there would be very great loss of prestige if we had stopped then?—A. Yes . . .

"*Mr. Fisher.* . . .—A. What was in our minds was that we would have got straight through to Constantinople, and it was generally anticipated that the arrival of the Fleet there would be the end of the ruling powers in Turkey. That was what we were always given to understand—that there would have been a revolution in Constantinople if we had arrived there with the Fleet . . .

Q. 2797–99.

"*Sir Frederick Cawley.* As a matter of fact, you entirely relied upon the political situation—that there would be a revolution in Turkey and that the whole situation would be altered, so that you would not need supplies, and you would not need a force to make

good your position ?—*A.* We fully realised that we could only stay in the Marmora, if they did not alter their attitude, for a given length of time, say a fortnight, or at the most three weeks.

“*Q.* If you had got through, transports could not have followed you up ?—*A.* Then, I think not—not with the guns we could not get at.

“*Q.* And if this political situation had not so changed to our advantage, and there had not been a revolution, our Fleet would have been bottled up there ?—*A.* We should have had to come down again. Yes, like Admiral Duckworth . . .

“*Mr. Clyde.* What ground had you then on the 17th of March for concurrence ?— *Q.* 2897–99.
A. The necessity for going on. We were sent there to carry out a certain object, and the thing was to try and do it.

“*Q.* I think from the first when you went there you rather looked at the matter from the point of view of an Admiralty order to force the Dardanelles, and your job was to do it if you could ?—*A.* Yes ; that was our first object. Therefore, the order was to carry out a certain operation or try and do it, and we had to do the best we could.”

112. From these explanations it may be gathered that Admiral de Robeck at the time considered the exclusively naval operation practicable if only the mine-field could be cleared, that his opinion was greatly influenced by political considerations, and particularly by the loss of prestige which would be involved if the attack were abandoned, and that the main reason which dictated the answer sent to the Admiralty questions on March 17th was “the necessity of going on.” In fact, Admiral De Robeck thought he had orders to force the passage of the Dardanelles, and that it was his duty to do his best to carry out those orders.

(14) *The Bombardment of March 18th.*

113. The facts connected with the bombardment on March 18th are already so well known that we need not dwell on them at any length. The results may be summarised as follows :—

The “Irresistible,” the “Ocean” and the “Bouvet” were sunk, and the crew of the latter were nearly all lost.

Admiralty
telegrams,
Nos. 106
and 107.

* * * * *

Admiral de Robeck reported: “Squadron is ready for immediate action except as regards ships lost and damaged, but it is necessary to reconsider the plan of attack. A method of dealing with floating mines must be found.”

(15) *Events from March 19th to March 23rd.*

114. On March 19th, Sir Ian Hamilton telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: “I have not yet received any report on the naval action, but from what I actually saw of the extraordinarily gallant attempt made yesterday I am being most reluctantly driven towards the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less likely to be forced by battleships than at one time seemed probable, and that if the Army is to participate its operations will not assume the subsidiary form anticipated.

War Office
telegrams,
No. 299.

“The Army’s share will not be a case of landing parties for the destruction of forts, etc., but rather a case of a deliberate and progressive military operation carried out in force in order to make good the passage of the Navy.” Lord Kitchener at once replied in the following terms: “You know my views that the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced, and that if large military operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula by the Army are necessary to clear the way, those operations must be undertaken after careful consideration of the local defences, and must be carried through.” We have already mentioned (para. 108) that Sir Ian Hamilton regarded this telegram in the light of a “peremptory instruction that he was to take the Peninsula.” We think that he was justified in doing so. On March 22nd, Sir Ian Hamilton again telegraphed to Lord Kitchener stating that he proposed to go to Alexandria. On March 23rd, Lord Kitchener telegraphed to Sir Ian Hamilton: “I hear that April 14th is considered by you as about the date for commencement of military operations if the Dardanelles have not been forced by the Fleet before that date. I think that you had better know at once that I regard any such postponement as far too long. I should like to know how soon you could act on

Do.
No. 298.

Do.
No. 322.
Do.
No. 344.

shore." These telegrams are conclusive proof that Lord Kitchener had by that time wholly abandoned the idea of a purely naval operation, and realised the fact that military operations on a large scale were necessary. The telegrams also prove that Lord Kitchener, in contemplating military action, had no clear idea as to when a landing could be made. As a matter of fact the landing did not take place until April 25th.

War Office
telegrams,
No. 347.

On March 23rd, Sir Ian Hamilton telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: "I have now conferred with Admiral and we are equally convinced that to enable the Fleet effectively to force the passage of the Dardanelles the co-operation of the whole military force will be necessary."

Mr.
Churchill's
statement,
page 31.

115. The first impression produced by the receipt of the news of the bombardment was that the naval operations should continue in spite of the losses which had been incurred. The following statement in Mr. Churchill's narrative shows what happened. "I regarded it as only the first of several days' fighting, though the loss in ships sunk or disabled was unpleasant. It never occurred to me for a moment that we should not go on, within the limits of what we had decided to risk, till we reached a decision one way or the other. I found Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson in the same mood. Both met me that morning (the 19th) with expressions of firm determination to fight it out. The First Sea Lord immediately ordered two battleships, 'London' and 'Prince of Wales,' to reinforce Admiral de Robeck's fleet to replace casualties, in addition to the 'Queen' and 'Implacable,' which were on the way." It should also be added that the French Ministry of Marine ordered another old battleship, the "Henri IV.," to replace the "Bouvet" which had been lost. The first telegrams received from Admiral de Robeck dated March 19th and 20th clearly indicate that he shared the view entertained at the Admiralty. On the latter date, especially, he said: "Dardanelles will not be entered by any ships unless everything is ready for sustained attack. Meantime, in order to draw off some of enemy's field guns, feints at landing in various places will be made."

Admiralty
telegrams,
No. 112.

Mr.
Churchill's
statement,
page 32.
Admiralty
telegrams,
No. 115.

A meeting of the War Council was held on the morning of the 19th, at which it was decided "to inform Vice-Admiral de Robeck that he could continue the naval operation against the Dardanelles if he thought fit." On March 23rd, however, Admiral de Robeck changed his views. He spoke of the "mine menace" being "much greater than we expected." He said that time would be required for "careful and thorough treatment, both in respect of mines and floating mines." He added: "Time will be required for this, but arrangements can be made by the time the army will be ready. A decisive operation about the middle of next month appears to me better than to take great risks for what may well be only half measures." He further said: "It does not appear to me practicable to land a sufficient force inside the Dardanelles to carry out this service. This view is shared by General Hamilton."

Do.
No. 123.

Mr.
Churchill's
statement,
page 32.

Do.
page 32.

On the 26th, Admiral de Robeck further telegraphed: "The check on the 18th March is not, in my opinion, decisive, but on the 22nd March I met General Hamilton and heard his views, and I now think that, to obtain important results and to achieve the object of the campaign, a combined operation will be essential." This telegram, Mr. Churchill says, "involved a complete change of plan and was a vital decision. I regretted it very much. I believed then, as I believe now, that we were separated by very little from complete success." The whole question was then discussed at great length at the Admiralty. Mr. Churchill records: "I proposed that we should direct the Admiral to renew the naval attack, according to his previous intention. The First Sea Lord, however, did not agree; nor did Sir Arthur Wilson; nor did Sir Henry Jackson. Lord Fisher took the line that hitherto he had been willing to carry the enterprise forward, because it was supported and recommended by the Commander on the spot. But now that Admiral de Robeck and Sir Ian Hamilton had decided upon a joint operation, we were bound to accept their view. I do not at all blame Lord Fisher for this decision. The arguments for it were very strong indeed. But so were the arguments against it. Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, with whom I discussed the matter, were inclined to my view, but as our professional advisers and the Admiral on the spot were against it, it was impossible to go further, and I bowed to their decision. But with regret and anxiety."

116. This was the last phase of the "origin and inception" period. From this time onward two points became perfectly clear. One was that the Government had no intention of abandoning the attack on the Dardanelles; the second was that the attack would be made both by the Navy and by military forces who would be employed on a large scale.

(16) *Summary of Transactions.*

117. The various stages through which these transactions passed may be summarised as follows :—

1. As early as November, 1914, the idea of attacking the Dardanelles had been mooted, but there does not appear at that time to have been any sort of intention of making a purely naval attack.
2. On January 3rd, 1915, the Russian Government were informed that a “demonstration” would be made against the Turks in some quarter.
3. On January 13th, the Admiralty were instructed to “prepare” for an attack on the Dardanelles. It was understood at the time by the First Lord, and apparently by others, that this involved approval of the attack. The intention at the time was that the operations should be purely naval and that no troops, save small parties for such purposes as the demolition of forts, should be used. It was thought that if the experience gained by attacking the outer forts was unsatisfactory, the attack might be broken off without any loss of prestige.
4. On January 28th, the decision to attack the Dardanelles by ships alone was definitely confirmed. There was still no intention of using troops, save for minor operations.
5. On February 16th, it was decided to mass large bodies of troops in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles with a view to assisting further operations when once the Fleet had forced a passage.
6. On February 19th, the first bombardment took place. The results were not decisive, but at the same time were fairly satisfactory.
7. On February 20th, principally owing to the anxiety felt by Lord Kitchener in respect to the state of affairs in other theatres of war, the decision to send troops from England to the Dardanelles was suspended.
8. On March 10th, Lord Kitchener resolved to sanction the departure of troops from England.
9. On March 18th, the second bombardment took place. The losses incurred were heavy, but, in the first instance, both Admiral de Robeck and the officials at the Admiralty wished to continue the purely naval attack.
10. On March 23rd, owing to representations made by Admiral de Robeck and Sir Ian Hamilton, it was decided to postpone further operations until adequate military forces could be assembled. The idea of making a purely naval attack was definitely abandoned.

(V.) THE RESULTS OF THE OPERATIONS.

118. There can be no doubt that, as a result of these and subsequent operations the main objective, as defined in the decision of the War Council on January 13th was not attained. The attempt to force the Dardanelles and to reach Constantinople failed. It would, however, be an exaggeration to say that the expedition, considered as a whole, was a complete failure. Such was by no means the case. The enterprise was originally undertaken in order to create a diversion in favour of the Russians. In this respect it may be said to have been very fairly successful. Another point to which great importance was attached was to influence the attitude of all the Balkan States, and especially to secure the neutrality of Bulgaria. That neutrality was not secured, but it can scarcely be doubted that, had it not been for the Dardanelles expedition, Bulgaria would have joined the Central Powers at a far earlier date than was actually the case. Further, a large force of Turks, which might have been employed in other theatres of war, was for some long while immobilised. The Prime Minister spoke very decisively on these points. We give the following extracts from his evidence :—

“*The Chairman.* In spite of the fact that it was a failure in one sense, do you think *Q. 5833-36.* it was a success in another, and that if you had not carried out that expedition to the Dardanelles, the position of the Allies would have been very much worse than it is now ? —*A.* Yes, I am unhesitatingly of that opinion. I say so now, after all the experience we have gained, and after what one must admit to have been the ultimate failure of the expedition. I say deliberately that there is no operation in the whole of this war which promised better results than the Dardanelles operation. If it had succeeded, and it would

have succeeded but for things which in the course of your enquiry you will come across and no doubt pronounce upon, in my judgment it would have produced a far greater effect upon the whole conduct of the war than anything that has been done in any other sphere of the war.

“Q. I think nobody can doubt that for a moment, but it does not go very far. If successful it would have had an enormous effect; but the question I wanted to ask you was this; even as it was, you think the effect was very beneficial?—A. I do, even though it failed. If you like I will tell you why.

“Q. Yes, please.—A. I will give you two reasons. There are a great many I might give, but I will give two. In the first place, it undoubtedly staved off and postponed for months the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers. There is no doubt whatever about that. In the second place—and this was the point Lord Kitchener always insisted upon up to the end—he said to me a hundred times it contained and immobilised very nearly 300,000 Turkish soldiers for the best part of nine months, who otherwise would have been a most formidable accretion to the enemy forces. Even though it failed, I consider it had very effective and powerful results.

“Q. You feel very confident that the Bulgarians would have gone in on the German side sooner if it had not been for that?—A. Yes, I am certain of it.”

Lord Grey also said :—

Q. 713-16.

“*The Chairman.* . . . A. I have no doubt whatever that some untoward consequence would have happened if it had not been for the Dardanelles operations. Whether the staving off of those untoward consequences was worth the cost of life and the expenditure of energy, ending of course in failure to get through, is a matter really on which everyone must form their own opinion. I can only state that there were certain consequences which would have happened sooner if the Dardanelles Expedition had not been going on. I should strongly controvert any statement that the expedition was of no use at all.

“Q. You think it was decidedly of use?—A. Yes, I think it was decidedly of use; but if you put the question whether it was worth such a tremendous expenditure of effort, that must remain a matter of opinion.

“Q. But it did gain valuable time?—A. It did gain valuable time.

“Q. And heartened the Russians?—A. Oh, yes, it did.”

We are generally in agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey, but we regard Lord Kitchener's estimate of the number of Turkish troops immobilised for nearly nine months as conjectural.

Whether the advantages obtained were in any degree commensurate with the loss of valuable lives and treasure which was incurred, must, of course, as Lord Grey very truly said, remain a matter of opinion, but there can be no doubt that those advantages were important. We repeat that it would be an exaggeration to regard the Dardanelles Expedition as a complete failure. We have already mentioned (para. 76) that the loss of prestige in abandoning the expedition, which at one time caused great anxiety, was in reality inappreciable.

Q. 4348-49.

119. It is interesting, but perhaps not very profitable, to speculate on what might have occurred if, subsequent to the bombardment of March 18th, the naval attack had been at once pressed on aided by such troops as were then on the spot. We have already stated (para. 115) that Mr. Churchill was strongly in favour of adopting this course, and that he received some support both from Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour. The idea, however, had to be abandoned because the weight of both naval and military authority was much opposed to it. But there were exceptions. Commodore de Bartolomé agreed with Mr. Churchill. Sir Ian Hamilton also stated that General Birdwood wished to “land at once,” and he added “I think there was a good deal to be said for it.” Sir Ian, however, held that “Lord Kitchener's original orders not to land if he could avoid it” held good. Enver Pasha, at a much later date, is reported to have said: “If the English had only the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles they could have got to Constantinople, but their delay enabled us thoroughly to fortify the Peninsula, and in six weeks' time we had taken down there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns.”

Q. 1198.

Q. 4923.

Q. 4916.

* * * * *

Q. 4925.

* * * * *

Mr. Asquith, in dealing Q. 5909.

with this branch of the question, said: "I have always thought myself—but it is an opinion of no value, because it is the opinion of a layman—that if they had pushed then they would have got through, in which case the results would have been incalculable."

Whatever weight may be attached to these opinions and reports it must be remembered that out of the sixteen ships which attacked the Straits on March 18th, three were sunk and four were rendered unfit for further immediate action. Had the attack been renewed within a day or two there is no reason to suppose that the proportion of casualties would have been less, and, if so, even had the second attack succeeded, a very weak force would have been left for subsequent naval operations.

(VI.) CONCLUSIONS.

120. We trust that we have given so full a summary of the somewhat involved events, which have formed the subject of our enquiry, that any member of the public who reads this report will be able to draw his own conclusions. Those conclusions, it may be anticipated with some confidence, will vary. The facts, indeed, are such that no one, who approaches the subject in a thoroughly judicial spirit, will be inclined to dogmatise about them. Notably, there is wide room for difference of opinion as to the relative degree of responsibility, as also to the amount of praise or blame which may reasonably be assigned to the principal authorities and departments concerned. All we can say is that we have endeavoured to the best of our ability to assess this responsibility, judging wholly by the evidence which has been laid before us to the complete exclusion of all other considerations of whatsoever character. It is for others to judge how far we have succeeded in this attempt.

121. The general conclusions at which we have arrived are as follows:—

(a) The question of attacking the Dardanelles

* * * * *

was, on the initiation of Mr. Churchill, brought under the consideration of the War Council, on November 25th, 1914, as "the ideal method" for defending Egypt.

(b) It may reasonably be assumed that, inasmuch as all the authorities concerned were, *prima facie*, in favour of a joint naval and military rather than a purely naval attack, such attack, if undertaken at all, would have been of the former rather than of the latter character had not other circumstances led to a modification of the programme.

(c) The communication from the Russian Government on January 2nd introduced a fresh element into the case. The British Government considered that something must be done in response to it, and in this connection the question of attacking the Dardanelles was again raised. The Secretary of State for War declared that there were no troops immediately available for operations in the East. This statement was accepted by the War Council, who took no steps to satisfy themselves by reports or estimates as to what troops were available then or in the near future. Had this been done we think that it would have been ascertained that sufficient troops would have been available for a joint naval and military operation at an earlier date than was supposed. But this matter was not adequately investigated by the War Council. Thus the question before the War Council on January 13th was whether no action of any kind should, for the time being, be undertaken, or whether action should be taken by the Fleet alone, the navy being held to be the only force available.

(d) The political arguments which were adduced to the War Council in favour of prompt and effective action, if such were practicable, were valid and of the highest importance, but the practicability of whatever action was proposed was of equal importance.

(e) Mr. Churchill appears to have advocated the attack by ships alone before the War Council on a certain amount of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion,

which favoured a tentative or progressive scheme, beginning with an attack upon the outer forts. This attack, if successful, was to be followed by further operations against the main defences of the Narrows. There does not appear to have been direct support or direct opposition from the responsible naval and military advisers, Lord Fisher and Sir James Wolfe Murray, as to the practicability of carrying on the operation as approved by the War Council, viz., "To bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective."

- (f) The First Sea Lord and Sir Arthur Wilson, who was the only other Naval Adviser present at the War Council, expressed no dissent. Lord Kitchener, who occupied a commanding position at the time the decision was taken, was in favour of the project. Both Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson would have preferred a joint naval and military attack, but they did not express to the War Council and were not asked to express any opinion on the subject, and offered no objection to the naval operations as they considered them experimental and such as could be discontinued if the first results obtained were not satisfactory. Moreover, such objections as they entertained were mainly based on their preference for the adoption of other plans in other theatres of war.
- (g) We think that there was an obligation first on the First Lord, secondly on the Prime Minister and thirdly on the other Members of the War Council to see that the views of the Naval Advisers were clearly put before the Council, we also think that the Naval Advisers should have expressed their views to the Council, whether asked or not, if they considered that the project which the Council was about to adopt was impracticable from a naval point of view.
- (h) Looking at the position which existed on January 13th, we do not think the War Council were justified in coming to a decision without much fuller investigation of the proposition which had been suggested to them that "the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective." We do not consider that the urgency was such as to preclude a short adjournment to enable the Naval and Military advisers of the Government to make a thorough examination of the question. We hold that the possibility of making a surprise amphibious attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula offered such great military and political advantages that it was mistaken and ill-advised to sacrifice this possibility by hastily deciding to undertake a purely naval attack which from its nature could not attain completely the objects set out in the terms of the decision.
- (i) We are led to the conclusion that the decision taken on February 16th to mass troops in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles marked a very critical stage of the whole operation. It ought to have been clear at the time that, when this was once done, although the troops might not have been actually landed, it would become apparent to all the world that a really serious attack was intended, and that withdrawal could no longer be effected without running a serious risk of loss of prestige. We consider that at that moment, inasmuch as time was all-important, no compromise was possible between making an immediate and vigorous effort to ensure success at the Dardanelles by a joint naval and military occupation, or falling back on the original intention of desisting from the naval attack if the experiences gained during the bombardment were not satisfactory.
- (j) On the 20th February Lord Kitchener decided that the 29th Division, part of the troops which by the decision of February 16th were to have been sent to the East, should not be sent at that time, and Colonel Fitzgerald by his order instructed the Director of Naval Transports that the transports for that division and the rest of the Expeditionary Force would not be required. This was done without informing the First Lord, and the despatch of the troops was thus delayed for three weeks. This delay gravely compromised the probability of success of the original attack made by the land forces, and materially increased the difficulties encountered in the final attack some months later.

- (k) We consider that, in view of the opinions expressed by the naval and military authorities on the spot, the decision to abandon the naval attack after the bombardment of March 18th was inevitable.
- (l) There was no meeting of the War Council between March 19th and May 14th. Meanwhile important land operations were undertaken. We think that before such operations were commenced the War Council should have carefully reconsidered the whole position. In our opinion the Prime Minister ought to have summoned a meeting of the War Council for that purpose, and if not summoned, the other Members of the War Council should have pressed for such a meeting. We think this was a serious omission.
- (m) We consider that the responsibility of those members of the Cabinet who did not attend the meetings of the War Council was limited to the fact that they delegated their authority to their colleagues who attended those meetings.
- (n) We are of opinion that Lord Kitchener did not sufficiently avail himself of the services of his General Staff, with the result that more work was undertaken by him than was possible for one man to do, and confusion and want of efficiency resulted.
- (o) We are unable to concur in the view set forth by Lord Fisher that it was his duty, if he differed from the Chief of his Department, to maintain silence at the Council or to resign. We think that the adoption of any such principle generally would impair the efficiency of the public service.
- (p) We think that, although the main object was not attained, certain important political advantages, upon the nature of which we have already dwelt (para. 118), were secured by the Dardanelles expedition. Whether those advantages were worth the loss of life and treasure involved is, and must always remain, a matter of opinion.

122. We cannot close this report without expressing our high appreciation of the services rendered to us both by Sir Maurice Hankey, whose Memoranda, which we have frequently quoted, have been of the utmost service to us, and by our able Secretary, Mr. Grimwood Mears.

All which we humbly report for your Majesty's gracious consideration.

CROMER.
 ANDREW FISHER.
 THOMAS MACKENZIE.
 FRED^K. CAWLEY.
 J. A. CLYDE.
 STEPHEN L. GWYNN.
 W. H. MAY.
 NICHOLSON.
 W. PICKFORD.

E. GRIMWOOD MEARS,
Secretary.

February 12th, 1917.

MINUTE OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE ANDREW FISHER.

I am not in agreement with the majority as regards the form their Report takes, though I readily recognise they have drawn it up as it is with the sole aim of helping others who may read it to arrive at the conclusions they believe to be justified by what they have seen and heard as Commissioners.

Though I have no rooted objections to the recitation of introductory events and of established facts which are necessary for an intelligent understanding of the points at issue before the Commission, I am of opinion it is unwise for Commissioners (in this case a jury of the nation) to traverse particular portions of the evidence which have led them to arrive at their verdict. I am in a greater difficulty to understand the point of view which, whilst arriving at certain conclusions upon the evidence, cheerfully admits that the perusal of the same evidence may lead other people—not members of the Commission—to other conclusions; the net result suggesting an absence of decision which will go far to destroy the whole value of the findings.

The particular conclusions of the Majority Report from which I dissent are as follows :—

Paragraph “(g) we also think that the Naval Advisers should have expressed their views to the Council, whether asked or not, if they considered that the project which the Council was about to adopt was impracticable from a naval point of view.”

Paragraph “(o) We are unable to concur in the view set forth by Lord Fisher that it was his duty, if he differed from the Chief of his Department, to maintain silence at the Council or to resign. We think that the adoption of any such principle generally would impair the efficiency of the public service.”

I dissent in the strongest terms from any suggestion that the Departmental Advisers of a Minister in his company at a Council Meeting should express any views at all other than to the Minister and through him, unless specifically invited to do so. I am of opinion it would seal the fate of responsible government if servants of the State were to share the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament and to the people on matters of public policy. The Minister has command of the opinions and views of all officers of the Department he advises on matters of public policy. Good stewardship demands from Ministers of the Crown frank, fair, full statements of all opinions of trusted experienced officials to colleagues, when they have direct reference to matters of high policy.

ANDREW FISHER.

DISSENT AND SUGGESTION BY THE HONOURABLE SIR THOMAS

MACKENZIE, K.C.M.G.

Whilst agreeing that if conclusions are introduced at this stage it is necessary to support them by the descriptive narrative (although, in my opinion, such narrative should not embody the findings arrived at), I take exception to Part V, "The result of the operations" (pages 39 and 41), which should, I think, be struck out of the Report. We are only at the "Origin and Inception" stage of the inquiry, and it seems to me premature to express any opinion on general results at this point of the proceedings. Sufficient evidence has not been taken to enable us to arrive at a decision on the objects attained by the operations. Connecting this section with paragraph (p) of the "Conclusions" (page 43), I do not think the Commission is as yet justified in reaching the conclusions mentioned. It will be necessary for us to investigate such questions as the conduct of the offensive on the Peninsula, and the carrying out of the various subsidiary operations, etc., before we can estimate with any degree of accuracy the costs involved and form an opinion as to the results of the enterprise, for only then will events assume their true perspective. Indeed, it may well be that our further investigations will shed a different light on the results attained, and reveal facts which may have the effect of materially altering the judgment expressed in the two paragraphs under notice. They may even demand inquiries being instituted outside the scope of those entrusted to the Commission; and, in any case, it is only after we have brought under review all the available evidence on the Dardanelles campaign as a whole that we shall be able to estimate cost and assess results and also apportion blame or credit where called for or merited.

I also dissent from paragraphs (g) and (o) of the "Conclusions" (pages 42 and 43). I hold that if the Departmental Adviser of a Minister states his opinion to his Minister, he has discharged what may be reasonably considered to be his official duty. And in such a case as we have under notice, where the Minister and his adviser were both present at a meeting of the War Council, I feel that the adviser had fulfilled all that was required of him, seeing that he was not asked to express his views to the meeting. The Minister, and not the adviser, must be regarded as responsible for representing the Departmental view, but in such circumstances the Minister should have stated his adviser's opinion fully to the assembly.

The report shows that this view does not commend itself to the majority of the Commission, and as it is of importance that the opinions of such expert advisers should at all times be readily available and given in connection with the deliberations of the War Committee, and to assist members in arriving at right conclusions, I am of opinion that the Chief of Staff and the First Sea Lord should be appointed members of the War Committee.

THOMAS MACKENZIE.

MINUTE BY MR. ROCH.

While I concur in some of the conclusions contained in this report, I regret that I am unable to sign it.

The conclusions which I have come to, and the review of the evidence which, I think, justifies those conclusions are contained in a separate memorandum.

WALTER ROCH.

22nd *December*, 1916.

MEMORANDUM BY MR. ROCH.

1. Consideration of the scope of the inquiry showed that the story of these operations fell naturally into three chapters. First, the circumstances leading up to the campaign, second, the conception, execution and failure of the plan for forcing the Dardanelles by ships alone, and third, the attempt and failure to take the Gallipoli Peninsula by military operations aided by the Fleet.

This memorandum is presented dealing with the First two Chapters.

2. The policy and higher direction of the war, during the period under review, were in the hands of a body known as the War Council. This body—a development of the Committee of Imperial Defence—consisted of the following Cabinet Ministers :—

Mr. Asquith (Prime Minister).
 Lord Haldane (Lord Chancellor).
 Lord Kitchener (Secretary of State for War).
 Mr. Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer).
 Sir E. Grey (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).
 Mr. Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty), and
 Lord Crewe (Secretary of State for India).

Its Councils were attended regularly by Mr. A. J. Balfour, Lord Fisher, Sir Arthur Wilson, Sir Jas. Wolfe Murray and Lt.-Col. Hankey, who acted as Secretary.

Particular meetings were attended by other Cabinet Ministers and various officers, including Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in France.

3. During the same period the naval strategy of the war was controlled by a body known as “The War Group” presided over by Mr. Churchill as First Lord and consisting of :—

Lord Fisher (First Sea Lord).
 Admiral Oliver (Chief of the Staff).
 Admiral of the Fleet, Sir A. Wilson, and
 Commander de Bartolomé (Naval Secretary to Mr. Churchill).

The consultations of this body were on occasions attended by Sir Henry Jackson, who was serving on Admiral Oliver's staff.

The Board of Admiralty occupied a subordinate position. Its members (other than Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher) were not consulted on naval policy or even kept well-informed on naval events. They were merely managers of the different departments assigned to them.

At the War Councils Mr. Churchill was the spokesman of the Admiralty, attended by Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson.

Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson both insisted that they were not members of this Council in the same sense as the Cabinet Ministers who were present. They considered themselves to be merely naval advisers, and only entitled to express their opinions when asked for them.

Neither Mr. Churchill nor the Cabinet Ministers who were members of the Council accepted this view, and were equally insistent that they assumed the assent of both Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson to be implied unless they expressed their dissent.

4. The military strategy and conduct of the war were under the complete and sole control of Lord Kitchener. He, in effect, combined in himself the functions and duties of Secretary of State and Commander-in-Chief. Under his régime the General Staff was not consulted and really ceased to exist.

Lord Kitchener was attended at the War Council by Sir James Wolfe Murray, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

At these Councils Sir Jas. Wolfe Murray stated that he neither gave nor was asked for any opinion.

5. The problem of forcing the Dardanelles had been considered in recent years on different occasions and under varying circumstances :—

- (a) By Lord Fisher when the Mediterranean Fleet under his command lay at Lemnos during the South African War.
- (b) By Lord Fisher in 1904 when as First Sea Lord he satisfied himself that “ even with military co-operation the operation was mightily hazardous.”
- (c) By the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1906. The General Staff was then opposed to any naval or military action at the Dardanelles.

This view was substantially concurred in by the Director of Naval Intelligence, the sole difference of opinion recorded between the General Staff and the Director of Naval Intelligence being that :—

“ While the former appear to regard the enterprise in question as too hazardous, the latter, while recognising the great risk involved, is of opinion that it is within the bounds of possibility that an operation of this nature might be forced upon us and that in such an event there is no reason to despair of success, though at the expense, in all likelihood, of heavy sacrifices.”

6. The possibility of an attack on the Dardanelles was discussed, for the first time, at a War Council on 25th November, 1914.*

Mr. Churchill then expressed the view that the best way of defending Egypt was an attack on some part of the coast of Asiatic Turkey, and suggested an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula, which, if successful, would give us the control of the Dardanelles, and enable us to dictate terms at Constantinople.

A feint attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula—the real objective being some other point on the Turkish Coast—was discussed.

Owing to the shortage of merchant shipping, occasioned largely by military demands, the project was put on one side.

7. By the end of November, 1914, the great German effort to reach the Channel Ports had been defeated at the first battle of Ypres, and a winter lull set in during the succeeding weeks.

The end of 1914, and the beginning of 1915, was spent by the War Council in attempts to arrive at their future military policy, and to make plans for the employment of the new armies in the Spring.

On the 28th December, 1914, a memorandum was circulated to the members of the War Council by Sir Maurice Hankey.

This memorandum called attention to the “ remarkable deadlock ” which had occurred in the Western theatre of war. It invited consideration of the possibility of seeking some other outlet for the effective employment of the new armies. It further suggested that Germany could perhaps “ be struck most effectively, and with the most lasting results on the peace of the world, through her Allies, and particularly Turkey.” And asked the question whether it was not possible “ now to weave a web around Turkey, which will end her career as a European power ? ”

This was followed on the 1st January by a memorandum from Mr. Lloyd George also pointing to the East as the true objective and outlining a far-reaching policy directed against Austria in co-operation with the Greeks, Roumanians and Serbians, and also against Turkey.

8. Other plans and policies were discussed, producing three schools of thought at the War Council.

- (a) One school holding that all efforts should be concentrated in the Western theatre of war, since there and there alone could decisive success be achieved.
- (b) A second school maintaining that a complete deadlock had already set in the West and advising operations designed to obtain the support of Italy and Roumania against Austria, secure Greek co-operation, and achieve the destruction of Turkey as a European power.
- (c) A third school advocating the intermediate view that the theory of a complete deadlock in the West was not yet proved or disproved, and that our main military efforts should be concentrated on the Western line until failure showed the necessity of seeking other theatres.

It is remarkable that none of these various policies and plans were ever discussed by the War Council in the light of written detailed staff estimates of men and munitions.

9. While the minds of the members of the War Council were engaged on these general discussions, on the 2nd January, 1915, a telegram was received at the Foreign Office from the British Ambassador at Petrograd conveying a request from the [Russian Military

* Turkey had declared war on us on the 31st October, 1914.

Authorities] to Lord Kitchener, that a Naval or Military demonstration against the Turks should be arranged in order to relieve the pressure felt by the Russian Troops at the Caucasus.

To this telegram, Lord Kitchener on his own initiative replied through the Foreign Office on the following day, promising to make a demonstration, but expressing a doubt as to whether any such steps would cause any serious withdrawal by Turkish troops.

10. On the 2nd January, the position was discussed by Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill and Lord Kitchener then asked Mr. Churchill if the Navy could make a demonstration at the Dardanelles.

Lord Kitchener on the same day in a letter to Mr. Churchill expressed the view that he did not see "that we can do anything that will seriously help the Russians in the Caucasus We have no troops to land anywhere. The only place that a demonstration might have any effect in stopping reinforcements going East would be the Dardanelles We shall not be ready for anything big for some months."

11. Simultaneously Lord Fisher expressed his view of the position in a private letter to Mr. Churchill. "I consider the attack on Turkey holds the field, but only if it is immediate; however, it won't be. We shall decide on a futile bombardment of the Dardanelles, which wears out the invaluable guns of the 'Indefatigable,' which probably will require replacement. What good resulted from the last bombardment? Did it move a single Turk from the Caucasus?"

And he concluded by sketching out an ambitious policy requiring the co-operation of Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, and necessitating the withdrawal of substantial forces from France.

12. On the 4th January, Lord Fisher further embodied his views in a formal Minute to Mr. Churchill.

"It seems necessary to lay down in the first place what the British Naval policy is :

- (a) In the first place that policy is to conserve our naval superiority over the Germans, and in no wise jeopardise by minor operations, whose cumulative effect is to wear out our vessels, and incur losses in ships and men. We cannot afford any more losses or any further deterioration, except for absolutely imperative operations.
- (b) The naval advantages of the possession of Constantinople, and the getting of wheat from the Black Sea, are so overwhelming that I consider Colonel Hankey's plans for Turkish operations vital and imperative, and very pressing."

13. During the next few days, the following telegrams were exchanged between Mr. Churchill and Admiral Carden, who was then in command of the Mediterranean Fleet.

(1) 3rd January: From Mr. Churchill to Admiral Carden :—

"Are you of opinion that it is practicable to force the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone? It is assumed that older battleships would be employed, that they would be furnished with mine sweepers, and that they would be preceded by colliers or other merchant vessels as sweepers, and the importance of the results would justify severe losses. Let me know what your views are."

(2) January 5th: From Admiral Carden to Mr. Churchill :—

"I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships."

(3) January 6th: From Mr. Churchill to Admiral Carden :—

"High authorities here concur in your opinion. Forward detailed particulars showing what force would be required for extended operations. How do you think it should be employed, and what results can be gained?"

Admiral Oliver, though doubtful, if he saw this last telegram, did concur with it.

Lord Fisher did not see it.

Sir Henry Jackson did not remember whether he was consulted with regard to it or not.

Mr. Churchill explained that by "high authorities" he did not include Lord Fisher, and that he meant Sir Henry Jackson and Admiral Oliver.

Admiral Carden understood Mr. Churchill to include either Lord Fisher or Sir Henry Jackson or both.

14. By the 5th of January Sir Henry Jackson had completed a Memorandum in accordance with instructions given to him by Mr. Churchill on the 3rd.

It was not seen by Mr. Churchill until some days later.

This Memorandum was in the main directed to the possibility of rushing the Dardanelles, and entered into minute details of the force required, and the losses which would be involved in "reaching the Straits."

* Lord Fisher was here referring to a short bombardment of the outer forts at the Dardanelles on the 3rd November, 1914, which had been undertaken by an Anglo-French Squadron to try the range of the naval guns.

It contained also the following observations under the heading of "General Remarks."

- "Assuming the enemy squadron destroyed and the batteries rushed, they would be open to the fire of field artillery and infantry, and to torpedo attack at night, with no store ships with ammunition, and no retreat without re-engaging the shore batteries, unless those had been destroyed when forcing the passage.
- "Though they might dominate the city and inflict enormous damage, their position would not be an enviable one unless there was a large military force to occupy the town.
- "Strategically such a diversion would only be carried out when the object to be gained was commensurate with the loss the fleet would sustain in forcing the passage.
- "The actual capture of Constantinople would be worth a considerable loss, but the bombardment alone would not greatly affect the distant military operations, and even if it surrendered, it could not be occupied and held without troops, and would probably result in indiscriminate massacres."

This memorandum was not circulated to the members of the War Council.

Sir Henry Jackson insisted in his evidence that he had "always stuck" to this memorandum: "that it would be a very mad thing to try and get into the Sea of Marmora without having the Gallipoli Peninsula held by our own troops or every gun on both sides of the Straits destroyed. He had never changed that opinion and he had never given any one any reason to think he had."

15. Admiral Carden's reply to Mr. Churchill's telegram of 6th January was received on the 11th January. This telegram suggested four successive operations as being possible:

- (a) The destruction of defences at the entrance to the Dardanelles.
- (b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defences up to and including Cephez Point, Battery No. 8.
- (c) The destruction of defences of the Narrows.
- (d) Sweeping of a clear channel through the minefield, and advance through the Narrows followed by a reduction of forts farther up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora.

And estimated that a month would be necessary to carry out these operations.

This telegram was immediately circulated to the members of the War Council.

Admiral Carden stated in his evidence that he "had it in his mind that it was impossible to form a real opinion on the subject until one had destroyed the outer forts at the entrance and was able to get inside and actually find out the extent of the gun defences, of the minefield, and the extent of the movable armament on both sides of the Straits." But there is no indication of this view in any of his telegrams to the Admiralty.

16. Admiral Carden's plan was then discussed by the members of the War Group at the Admiralty at their daily consultations.

Their views were not expressed in any written memoranda, and it is, therefore, difficult to state precisely what those views were.

I think there was no real consensus of favourable opinion.

Lord Fisher told us that he "was instinctively against it," and that to a large extent "having expressed his indisposition to have much to do with it, he more or less left it alone. Sir Henry Jackson was a very able man and so was Admiral Oliver, and he (Lord Fisher) more or less stood aside. He backed it up in every possible way so far as executive work was concerned."

Sir Arthur Wilson stated that "he never recommended it. He never strongly resisted it because it was not his business to do so, but so far as he did remark on it he was against it," and that "the question of the Dardanelles had never been put to him definitely at all. Sir Henry Jackson was working at the details of the scheme and he (Sir A. Wilson) was looking at the details of others."

Admiral Oliver stated that "his opinion always was that we might go a certain length by naval attack but it would depend on the resistance that the enemy made and the state of their defences how far we could go," and that he would have preferred not "stirring the place up until it had been decided to make a proper attempt, that is to say to make a big attempt with Army and Navy."

Commodore Bartolomé stated that "his view had always been that it should be a combined operation, but he thought that if the Dardanelles were attacked by a purely naval force a certain proportion, probably not more than half, could get through . . . but having got through he did not see what they could do."

All were agreed in thinking that the proposed operations could not lead to disaster as they could be broken off at any moment. All assumed that the War Council looked

upon immediate action as a political necessity, and that no troops for a joint operation could be obtained.

Sir Henry Jackson was not a member of the War Group, though he was present at some of the meetings at which the proposed operations were discussed. He alone expressed his views in writing.

Those views are contained in the memorandum of the 5th January, which has been referred to in para. 14, and in a further memorandum of the 15th January, in which he deals specifically with Admiral Carden's plan. This later memorandum is referred to in para. 20.

17. On the 12th January Lord Fisher suggested the possible employment of the "Queen Elizabeth" in the proposed operations, in the following minute to Admiral Oliver :—

"I have told Crease to find out from Percy Scott and the gunnery experts of anything to prevent 'Queen Elizabeth' firing all her ammunition at the Dardanelles forts instead of uselessly into the sea at Gibraltar and to let you know. If this is practicable she could go straight there, hoist Carden's flag, and go on with her exercises and free the 'Indefatigable' to Malta for refit and allow 'Inflexible' to go straight from Gibraltar to join the second Battle Cruiser Squadron."

On the same day Admiral Oliver also received a minute from Mr. Churchill, which was formally concurred in by Lord Fisher, and was in the following terms :—

"The forcing of the Dardanelles as proposed and the arrival of a squadron strong enough to defeat the Turkish fleet in the Sea of Marmora would be a victory of first importance and change to our advantage the whole situation of the war in the East. It would appear possible to provide the force required by Admiral Carden without weakening the margin necessary in home waters."

The minute then gave full details of the ships to be employed and concluded by saying :—

"All arrangements should be secretly concerted for carrying the plan through, the sea-planes and auxiliary craft being provided, Admiral Carden to command . . definite plans should be worked out accordingly."

18. On the 13th January, 1915, Admiral Carden's plan was unfolded in detail by Mr. Churchill to the War Council.

He concluded, in the words of Sir M. Hankey's Note, by stating that "the Admiralty were studying the question and believed that a plan could be made for systematically reducing all the forts within a few weeks. Once the forts were reduced the minefields would be cleared, and the Fleet would proceed up to Constantinople and destroy the 'Goeben.'"

"They would have nothing to fear from field guns or rifles, which would be merely an inconvenience."

At this Council, Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson expressed no opinion.

The actual decision come to was that :

"The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective."

At this Council it was assumed that no troops were available, and this was accentuated by the fact that the Council on the same day sanctioned a plan of Sir John French's for offensive military operations in France.

19. This decision by the War Council set the mechanism of the Admiralty in motion.

The plan of attack was communicated to the French, the co-operation of a French squadron was sought, and arrangements were made for the command by a British Admiral.

A Fleet concentration scheme was prepared by the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff.

All these preparations were made through the ordinary routine of the Admiralty. They were concurred in by Lord Fisher, who himself added the "Lord Nelson" and "Agamemnon" to the Fleet allocated to the operations.

On the 14th January the abandonment of a subsidiary naval bombardment in the East was recommended by Mr. Churchill in a formal minute to the Prime Minister.

This Minute, which was concurred in by Lord Fisher, was in the following terms :

"The attack on the Dardanelles will require practically our whole available margin.

If that attack opens prosperously, it will very soon attract to itself the whole attention of the Eastern theatre, and if it succeeds, it will produce results which will undoubtedly influence every Mediterranean power.

"In these circumstances we strongly advise . . . that we should devote ourselves to . . . the methodical forcing of the Dardanelles."

20. On the 15th January, Sir Henry Jackson completed a memorandum on Admiral Carden's plan.

This memo began with the words—"Concur generally in his (*i.e.* Admiral Carden's) plans. Our previous appreciations of the situation differed only in small details."

It then dealt in detail with the two first operations (*a*) and (*b*) outlined by Admiral Carden's plan. Suggesting that when these had been attempted "the experience thus gained would show the practicability of continuing this direct attack on other forts in the Narrows," and ended by suggesting that "(*a*) might be approved at once as the experience gained would be useful."

Sir Henry Jackson insisted that in this memorandum he recommended only an attack on the outer forts.

He also insisted that when he prepared his memorandum he accepted the policy of a purely naval attack. To use his own words: "It was not for me to decide. I had no responsibilities whatever as to the decision. I had no responsibilities except just for the staff work which I did." And he stated further that he gave his expert advice on Admiral Carden's plan "if it was approved to do it. Whether the game was worth the candle is another thing."

This memorandum, though it was read by Mr. Churchill at the War Council of the 28th January, was not circulated to the members.

21. The plans for the purely Naval attack were thus maturing.

As the time for final decision by the War Council drew near, Lord Fisher's attitude of passive dislike developed into one of active hostility.

On the 25th January, he took the very unusual step of submitting a Memorandum on Naval Policy direct to the Prime Minister.

This Memorandum, Mr. Churchill stated, gave him the first indication "that the First Sea Lord had, since the first meeting of the War Council, developed serious misgivings about it."

22. Lord Fisher's memorandum was in two parts.

The second part contained the outline of a large naval scheme which was directed to what seemed to Lord Fisher a more decisive theatre of the war, and which had been his main pre-occupation.

The first part set forth Lord Fisher's objections to the proposed operations in the Dardanelles as being opposed to what he conceived to be the British Naval Policy.

The following extracts sufficiently illustrate those views:

"They (*i.e.* the Germans) have already endeavoured without success to scatter our naval strength by attacks on our trade and not much more successfully to reduce our main strength by submarines and mines."

"Pressure of sea power . . . is still a slow process and requires great patience. In time it will almost certainly compel the enemy to seek a decision at sea, particularly when he begins to realise that his offensive on land is broken. This is one reason for husbanding our resources.

"Another reason is that the prolongation of war at sea tends to raise up fresh enemies for the dominant naval power in a much higher degree than it does on land owing to the exasperation of neutrals. The tendency will only be checked by the conviction of an overwhelming naval supremacy behind the nation exercising sea power.

"The sole justification of coastal bombardments and attacks by the fleet on fortified places, such as the contemplated prolonged bombardment of the Dardanelles forts by our fleet, is to force a decision at sea, and so far and no further can they be justified.

"So long as the German High Sea Fleet possesses its present great strength and splendid gunnery efficiency, so long is it imperative, and indeed vital, that no operation whatever should be undertaken by the British Fleet calculated to impair its present superiority, which is none too great in view of the heavy losses already experienced in valuable ships and invaluable officers and men whose places cannot be filled in the period of the war (in which respect the Navy differs so materially from the Army).

"Even the older ships should not be risked, for they cannot be lost without losing men, and they form the only reserve behind the Grand Fleet."

23. Mr. Churchill at once himself drafted a reply to Lord Fisher which was also submitted to the Prime Minister.

This memorandum contained an elaborate analysis of the Comparative strength of the British and German Navies, showing that for all existing purposes the margin of the British fleet for all requirements was, in Mr. Churchill's opinion, ample and even overwhelming.

It concluded with the following general reply to Lord Fisher's argument.

"It is believed that, with care and skill, losses may be reduced to a minimum, and certainly kept within limits fully justified by the importance and necessity of the operations. It cannot be said that this employment of ships which are (except the 'Duncans') not needed and not suited to fight in the line of battle, conflicts with any of the sound principles of naval policy set forth by the First Sea Lord. Not to use them where necessary because of some fear that there will be an outcry if a ship is lost would be wrong, and, if a certain proportion of loss of life among officers and men of the Royal Navy on these ships can achieve important objects of the war and save a very much greater loss of life among our comrades and allies on shore, we ought certainly not to shrink from it."

24. Lord Fisher had also intimated to Mr. Churchill that he was not going to the War Council, as he did not like "this Dardanelles affair."

On the night of the 27th January, Lord Fisher was informed that the Prime Minister considered it imperative that Lord Fisher should be in his private room with Mr. Churchill half an hour before the War Council began. They met as arranged on the morning of the 28th. It is impossible to expect, after so long a lapse of time, an actual reproduction of what took place at this interview.

My view of the evidence is that Lord Fisher left the room under the impression that the Prime Minister was in favour of the proposed operations at the Dardanelles and that the Prime Minister had formed the conclusion that Lord Fisher's objections were due to his preference for his own alternative scheme as a matter of high policy, and were not directed against the practicability of the operations.

25. The Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher then went at once to the meeting of the War Council.

The following is the note of what occurred supplied to us by Sir Maurice Hankey:—

"Mr. Churchill informed the War Council that he had communicated to the Grand Duke Nicholas and to the French Admiralty the project for a naval attack on the Dardanelles. The Grand Duke had replied with enthusiasm, and believed that this might assist him. The French Admiralty had also sent a favourable reply, and had promised co-operation. Preparations were in hand for commencing about the middle of February.

"Mr. Churchill asked if the War Council attached importance to this operation, which undoubtedly involved some risks.

"There was no hostile criticism, though Lord Fisher said that he had understood that this question would not be raised to-day, and that the Prime Minister was well aware of his own views with regard to it.

"To this the Prime Minister replied in the sense that, in view of the steps which had been taken, the question could not well be left in abeyance.

"Apart from this the opinions expressed were entirely favourable to the enterprise.

"Among the advantages claimed for it were that—

It would cut the Turkish Army in two.

It would put Constantinople under our control.

It would finally settle the attitude of Bulgaria and the whole of the Balkans.

It would give us the advantage of having the Russian wheat, and enable Russia to resume exports.

(This would restore the Russian exchanges which were falling, owing to her inability to export, and causing great embarrassment.)

It would open a passage to the Danube.

If successful, its effect would be equivalent to that of a successful campaign fought with the new armies.

One merit of the scheme was that, if satisfactory progress was not made, the attack could be broken off.

"The War Council were informed by Mr. Churchill that the naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean had expressed his belief that it could be done. He required from three weeks to a month to accomplish it. The necessary ships were already on their way to the Dardanelles. He also said that, in response to his inquiries, the French had expressed their confidence that Austrian Submarines would not get as far as the Dardanelles, and that, so far as could be ascertained, the Turks had no submarines. He did not anticipate that we should sustain much loss in the actual bombardment, but in sweeping the mines some losses must be expected. The real difficulties would begin after the outer forts had been silenced, and it became necessary to attack the Narrows.

"Mr. Churchill fully explained the plan of attack on a map."

26. To this account one incident—not without dramatic intensity—must be added.

Lord Fisher learnt in the course of the discussion that a final decision was being come to.

“Thereupon” (to quote from a note made by Lord Fisher at the time) “Lord Fisher left the Council table, followed by Lord Kitchener, who asked Lord Fisher what he intended to do. Lord Fisher replied to Lord Kitchener that he would not return to the Council table and would resign his office as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener then urged on Lord Fisher that he (Lord Fisher) was the only dissident, that the Dardanelles operations had been decided upon by the Prime Minister, and he put it to Lord Fisher that his duty to his Country was to carry on the duties of First Sea Lord. Lord Fisher, after further conversation, reluctantly gave in to Lord Kitchener’s entreaty and resumed his seat.”

27. This incident had not escaped the attention of Mr. Churchill, who felt, to use his own words, that he “must come to a clear understanding with the First Sea Lord.” They met after the adjournment of the War Council in Mr. Churchill’s room. Mr. Churchill strongly urged Lord Fisher to undertake the operations.

Lord Fisher definitely consented.

Accompanied by Admiral Oliver, in place of Sir A. Wilson, they then repaired to the afternoon meeting of the War Council.

At the close of this meeting Mr. Churchill stated that the Admiralty had decided to push on with the project to make a naval attack on the Dardanelles.

It is remarkable to have to record :

- (a) That Lord Fisher’s memorandum and Mr. Churchill’s reply were not placed before the War Council at these meetings.
- (b) That no members of the Council—other than the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher—knew until a later date of the discussion which had preceded their deliberations.

28. Lord Fisher insisted in his evidence that he had taken every step—short of resignation—to show his dislike of the proposed operations.

He told us “that in his judgment it is not the business of the chief technical advisers of the Government to resign because their advice is not accepted unless they are of opinion that the operations proposed must lead to disastrous results. The attempt to force the Dardanelles as a purely naval operation would not have been disastrous so long as the ships employed could be withdrawn at any moment, and only such vessels were engaged, as in the beginning of the operations was in fact the case, as could be spared without detriment to the general service of the fleet.”

In answer to the question why he made no protest at the meetings of the War Council, Lord Fisher further stated :—

“Mr. Churchill knew my opinion. I did not think it would tend towards good relations between the First Lord and myself nor to the smooth working of the Board of Admiralty to raise objections to the War Council’s discussions. My opinion being known to Mr. Churchill in what I regarded as the proper constitutional way, I preferred thereafter to remain silent.”

When on the 14th May the War Council decided to continue the operations at the Dardanelles and to divert further ships for the purpose Lord Fisher thought that his great alternative scheme, which had been his main pre-occupation during this period, and to which his mind and energies had been almost exclusively devoted, was doomed. To use his own words again : “It seemed to me that I was faced at last by a progressive frustration of my main schemes of naval strategy.”

On the following day he resigned his post as First Sea Lord.

29. The decision of the War Council was then translated into action.

The Plan of operations was finally approved by M. Augagneur (the French Minister of Marine), who pronounced them to be “prudent et prévoyant.”

The final arrangements for the naval attack were completed and a detailed staff paper on the proposed operations were sent by the Admiralty to Admiral Carden on the 5th February.

On the 17th or 18th of February the Prime Minister conveyed to the Cabinet the unanimous decision of the War Council. It was accepted by them without question, criticism, or discussion of any kind.

The bombardment opened on the 19th February.

30. Attention was called in paragraph 8 to the varying schools of thought which existed in the War Council at the beginning of 1915.

During the ensuing weeks what may be called the Eastern school of thought gained strength under the shadow of the threatened Austro-German attack on Serbia, the coming offensive against Russia, the failure of our diplomacy in the Balkans due to the want of military success, and the growing appreciation of the fact that the naval attack on the Dardanelles might after all be fruitless without considerable military support.

In the course of the discussions which then took place rival plans and policies were constantly before the Council.

But I am unable to find that the War Council ever really faced or ever really decided whether it was within their power to undertake military operations on a large scale in another theatre of war, or that the great and obvious political advantages to be gained by operations in the East were ever considered in the light of military possibility.

This was due to the complete absence during their discussions of detailed staff estimates in terms of munitions and men, and to the too confident belief in the success of the purely naval attack on the Dardanelles, in the chance of an ineffective Turkish resistance and in the decisive effect of the appearance of the Fleet off Constantinople.

31. Early in February a proposal was made that a British and French division should be sent to Salonica to support Serbia in conjunction with the Greeks. Lord Kitchener was ready to send the XXIX division and expressed the opinion that it would be very useful to the Navy in their attack on the Dardanelles to have some good troops at Salonica.

On the 15th February this scheme ultimately broke down owing to the lack of Greek co-operation.

32. Meanwhile the necessity for troops to support the Naval attack grew more apparent.

It was emphasized by a memorandum which Sir Henry Jackson had completed on the 15th February and sent, by way of suggestion, to Admiral Carden.

This memo., while giving detailed notes on the proposed operations, concluded with the following general remarks :—

“The provision of the necessary military forces to enable the fruits of this heavy naval undertaking to be gathered must never be lost sight of; the transports carrying them should be in readiness to enter the Straits as soon as it is seen the forts at the Narrows will be silenced.

“To complete this destruction strong military landing parties with strong covering forces will be necessary.

“It is considered, however, that the full advantage of the undertaking would only be obtained by the occupation of the Peninsula by a military force acting in conjunction with the naval operations, as the pressure of a strong field army of the enemy on the Peninsula would not only greatly harass the operations, but would render the passage of the Straits impracticable by any but powerfully-armed vessels, even though all the permanent defences had been silenced.”

“The naval bombardment is not recommended as a sound military operation unless a strong military force is ready to assist in the operation, or at least, follow it up immediately the forts are silenced.”

33. On the 16th February the War Council came to the following decision :—

“(1) The XXIXth Division, hitherto intended to form part of Sir John French's Army, to be dispatched to Lemnos at the earliest possible date. It is hoped that it may be able to sail within nine or ten days.

“(2) Arrangements to be made for a force to be dispatched from Egypt, if required.

“(3) The whole of the above forces, in conjunction with the battalions of the Royal Marines already dispatched, to be available in case of necessity to support the naval attack on the Dardanelles.

(4) “Horse boats to be taken out with the XXIXth division, and the Admiralty to make arrangements to collect small craft, tugs and lighters in the Levant.

(5) “The Admiralty to build special transports and lighters suitable for the conveyance and landing of 50,000 men at any point when they may be required.”

34. This decision marks a great development of the plan which had been sanctioned by the War Council of the 28th January.

Confidence still existed that the Fleet would force the Dardanelles and that local military operations would only be necessary to complete the demolition of the forts and deal with concealed howitzers.

But the idea grew steadily that the character of these operations was extending, and that considerable forces (estimated by Lord Kitchener on the 19th February at three

divisions) would be necessary to secure the passage of the Dardanelles after the fall of the forts.

35. Side by side with the development of the original plan, referred to in the last paragraph, there grew up also the idea that it would be impossible for reasons of prestige and policy to break off operations in the event of the failure of the Fleet.

The notes of the War Council shew that on the 24th of February, Lord Kitchener felt "that if the Fleet would not get through the Straits unaided, the Army ought to see the business through. The effect of a defeat in the Orient would be very serious. There could be no going back. The publicity of the announcement had committed us."

And that Sir E. Grey expressed the view that "Failure would be equivalent to a great defeat on land."

But that a different opinion was given by Mr. Lloyd George who :

"strongly urged that the Army should not be required or expected to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the Navy and that if the Navy failed, we should try somewhere else, in the Balkans, and not necessarily at the Dardanelles."

36. The necessary steps to concentrate troops in the Mediterranean went forward.

On the 20th of February, the two Australian and New Zealand divisions in Egypt were prepared for service at the Dardanelles, and placed under the command of General Birdwood. Transports were arranged for them and for the XXIXth division and the Naval division at home. By the end of February, a French division was ready to embark.

The naval division sailed on the 3rd of March.

37. On the 20th of February, Lord Kitchener, on his own initiative, without communicating with Mr. Churchill, cancelled the transports for the XXIXth division. And, owing to his anxiety as to the position in France, would not consent to its release until the 10th of March.

This action by Lord Kitchener lead to a strong protest on the part of Mr. Churchill, who at a War Council on the 26th of February asked "that it might be placed on record that he dissented altogether from the retention of the XXIXth division in this country. If a disaster occurred in Turkey owing to the insufficiency of troops, he said he must disclaim all responsibility."

38. On the 23rd February, General Birdwood was ordered to proceed to the Dardanelles to confer with Admiral Carden.

General Birdwood then made a reconnaissance of the position, and from the telegrams which passed between him and Lord Kitchener it is clear :—

- (a) That Lord Kitchener still intended that troops should be used for minor operations only.
- (b) That General Birdwood did not expect that the Navy would be able to force the passage of the Straits unaided.
- (c) But that General Birdwood fully appreciated the formidable character of the defences of the Peninsula and anticipated that major military operations would be necessary.

These telegrams, however, were not circulated to the members of the War Council.

39. On the 10th of March, Lord Kitchener announced to the War Council that the following was the approximate strength of the forces available against Constantinople :—

			All ranks.	Guns.	Horses.
Naval Division	...	...	11,000	6	1,266
Australian Infantry	...	...	30,600	64	9,370
Australian Mounted Troops*	...	...	3,500	12	4,000
XXIXth Division	...	...	18,000	56	5,400
French Division	...	...	18,000	40	5,000
Russian Army Corps	...	...	47,600	120	10,750
			<u>128,700</u>	<u>298</u>	<u>35,786</u>

At this Council, Mr. Churchill informed the members that the Admiralty still believed that they could affect the passage of the Straits by naval means alone, but they were glad to know that military support was available if required.

* No transport yet available.

40. On the 12th March, Sir Ian Hamilton was nominated to command these forces, and left for the Dardanelles on the 13th. He was assisted by no staff preparation, and no preliminary scheme of operations of any kind. And it was still assumed that the Navy would force the passage of the Straits.

41. While the concentration of troops was being made in the Mediterranean, and the events which have been described were taking place in the Councils at home, the naval attack at the Dardanelles was proceeding.

The details of this attack, and the gallantry displayed by the naval forces are well known.

42. The attack on the outer forts began on the 19th February and was completed on the 25th, though when the demolition parties landed they found 70 per cent. of the heavy guns in a serviceable condition, and had to blow them up with guncotton.

Mine-sweepers were then able to enter and sweep the lower reaches of the Straits. The ships of the fleet entered on the 27th, and attacked Ford Dardanus, which was sufficiently damaged on the 1st and 2nd of March to make sweeping possible up to within 3,000 yards of Cephez Point.

43.

* * * * *

44.

* * * * *

45. Meanwhile the progress of the Fleet in the early days of March was slow.

On the 7th the forts at the Narrows were engaged, but with only partial success, and sweeping made no progress.

Trawlers and destroyers were then sent by night above the mine-fields so that they might sweep down with the current. They came under the enemy's searchlights and were exposed to a terrible fire. The Turkish mobile armament began to develop with harassing effect on the sweepers. The results were small, few mines being exposed or destroyed.

46. This slow progress was watched by the Admiralty with anxious eyes.

* * * * *

The following telegrams were then exchanged between the Admiralty and Admiral Carden :—

101. March 11.

Personal and Secret.

From First Lord to Vice-Admiral,
Eastern Mediterranean.

- “ Caution and deliberate methods were emphasised in your original instructions (and the skill and patience which has enabled your progress to be carried thus far without loss are highly appreciated.)
- “ If, however, success cannot be obtained without loss of ships and men, results to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss. The whole operation may be decided and consequences of a decisive character upon the war may be produced by the turning of the corner of Chanak ; and we suggest for your consideration, that a point has now been reached when it is necessary to choose favourable weather conditions to overwhelm forts of the Narrows at decisive range by bringing to bear upon them the fire of the largest possible number of guns, great and small. Under cover of this fire landing parties might destroy the guns of the forts, and sweeping operations to clear as much as possible of the minefield might also be carried out.
- “ It might be necessary to repeat the operation until the destruction of all the forts at the Narrows and the clearing of the approaches of mines had been accomplished.
- “ We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but we recognise clearly that at a certain period in your operations you will have to press hard for a decision and we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived. Every well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive our support.
- “ Before you take any decisive departure from the present policy we wish to hear your views.”

13 March.

105. From First Lord to Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean.

* * * * *

- “ From the above it is evident that methodical and resolute conduct of the operations by night and day should be pursued, the inevitable losses being accepted. The enemy is harassed and anxious now. Interference with submarines will be a very serious complication. Time is of the essence.”

13 March.

From Vice-Admiral, Eastern Mediterranean, to Admiralty :—

- “ Your 101 is fully concurred in by me. I consider stage when vigorous sustained action is necessary for success has now been reached. I am of opinion that in order to ensure my communication line immediately fleet enters Sea of Marmora military operations on a large scale should be opened at once.”

47. On the 16th March Admiral Carden was compelled by the advice of the Medical Officer to go on the Sick List.

On the 17th March Admiral de Robeck was appointed in his place. He was asked by the First Lord to give the operations suggested in the telegrams to Admiral Carden his “separate and independent judgment,” to which he expressed his full concurrence.

The great Naval attack began on the 18th.

48. This attack, although carried out with much skill and gallantry, met with little or no success and resulted in the following damage being done to the Fleet :—

The “ Irresistible,” the “ Ocean ” and the “ Bouvet ” were sunk, and the crew of the latter were nearly all lost.

The “ Inflexible ” had various compartments flooded, and at one time was in danger of sinking.

The “ Suffren ” was also hit below water, and had to be docked.

The “ Gaulois ” was badly damaged and had to be beached on Drepana Island.

The “ Charlemagne ” had her stoke-hold flooded ; the “ Agamemnon ” had one 12-inch gun damaged.

The “ Lord Nelson ” had one 9·2 inch gun put out of action ; the “ Albion's ” fore-turret was put out of action for some days.

Thus, out of the 16 attacking ships, three were sunk, and four others so severely damaged that they had to be docked. In spite of these losses Admiral de Robeck telegraphed to the Admiralty on the following day that the squadron “ was ready for

immediate action except as regards ships lost and damaged but it was necessary to reconsider the plan of attack."

49. News of these events reached the Admiralty on the following day.

Lord Fisher and Sir A. Wilson, when consulted by Mr. Churchill, were determined to continue the attack.

Lord Fisher immediately ordered two battleships, the "London" and the "Prince of Wales," to reinforce the fleet in addition to the "Queen" and "Implacable."

On the same day the War Council authorised

"the First Lord of the Admiralty to inform Vice-Admiral de Robeck that he could continue the naval operations against the Dardanelles if he thought fit."

The War Council did not meet again until the 14th May.

50. Meanwhile on the 23rd March Admiral de Robeck had met in Council with Generals Hamilton and Birdwood.

Admiral de Robeck told us that at this Conference it was apparent to him that an army was necessary to keep his lines of communication and that to effect this it was "necessary to hold the Peninsula."

While ready to continue the action he therefore telegraphed that day to the Admiralty his opinion that

"a decisive operation about the middle of next month appears to me better than to take great risks for what may well be only half measures."

51. The final decision to abandon the naval attack was told by Mr. Churchill in his statement to us in the following words :—

"We discussed the whole question at length on the morning of the 23rd at our daily meeting" (*i.e.*, of the War Group at the Admiralty), "Sir Henry Jackson being present.

"I proposed that we should direct the Admiral to renew the naval attack according to his previous intention. The First Sea Lord, however, did not agree; nor did Sir A. Wilson. Nor did Sir Henry Jackson. Lord Fisher took the line that hitherto he had been willing to carry the enterprise forward, because it was supported and recommended by the Commander on the spot. But now that Admiral de Robeck and Sir Ian Hamilton had decided upon a joint operation, we were bound to accept their view. I do not at all blame Lord Fisher for this decision. The arguments for it were very strong indeed.

"Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, with whom I discussed the matter, were inclined to my view, but as our professional advisers and the Admiral on the spot were against it, it was impossible to go further, and I bowed to their decision, but with regret and anxiety."

The naval attack on the Narrows was never resumed.

52. The story of the landing on the 25th April, the preparations which preceded it, the delay in concentrating troops for the subsequent operations, do not come within the scope of this memorandum.

53. I wish to record the following conclusions :—

(1) The facts disclosed in the course of the inquiry show that the War Council concentrated their attention too much on the political ends to be gained by an offensive policy in the East and gave too little attention to the means by which that policy could be translated into terms of naval and military action.

The War Council never had before them detailed staff estimates of men, munitions, and material, or definite plans showing them what military operations were possible.

The War Council also underestimated without any real investigation the strength of the Turkish opposition.

(2) The War Council rejected without sufficient consideration all previous opinions against a purely naval attack on forts. The problem of forcing the Dardanelles, even by a purely naval attack, required the consideration of the expert engineer and artilleryman as much as that of the expert naval officer, and should therefore have been submitted to a joint naval and military staff for investigation.

(3) Mr. Churchill failed to present fully to the War Council the opinions of his naval advisers, and this failure was due to his own strong personal opinion in favour of a naval attack. Mr. Churchill should also have consulted the Board of Admiralty before such a large and novel departure in naval policy was undertaken.

- (4) It is difficult to understand why the War Council did not meet between the 19th March and the 14th May. The failure of the naval attack on the 18th March showed the necessity of abandoning the plan of forcing the passage of the Dardanelles by purely naval operations. The War Council should then have met and considered fully the future policy to be pursued.
- (5) Important political advantages were gained by the first success of the naval attack and the possibility of further success. But these advantages would not have continued unless further operations had been undertaken at the Dardanelles or elsewhere in the East after the failure of the naval attack on the 18th March.
- (6) Finally, I strongly recommend that operations of a similar character should in future be thoroughly considered by a joint naval and military staff before they are undertaken. It is essential for the success of such operations that both the Navy and the Army should be recognized as integral factors consulting and co-operating in the common policy to be pursued.

WALTER ROCH.

DARDANELLES COMMISSION.

SUPPLEMENT

TO

FIRST REPORT.

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



LONDON :
PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :
IMPERIAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C., and 28, ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. ;
37, PETER STREET, MANCHESTER ; 1, ST. ANDREW'S CRESCENT, CARDIFF ;
23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH ;
or from E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN ;
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,
the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of
T. FISHER UNWIN, LTD., LONDON, W.C.

1917.

[Cd. 8502. Price 1d. net.]

DARDANELLES COMMISSION.

Supplement to First Report.

THE Government authorise publication of the following notes, which, so far as public interests allow, replace the sense of some of the portions excised from the full Report of the Dardanelles Commission :—

REPORT BY THE COMMISSION.

Paragraph 45.

Towards the end of August 1914 Mr. Churchill formed the opinion that Turkey would join the Central Powers. On the 1st September he wrote privately to General Douglas, who was then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in the following terms :—

“I arranged with Lord Kitchener yesterday that two officers from the Admiralty should meet two officers from the D.M.O's. Department of the War Office to-day to examine and work out a plan for the seizure, by means of a Greek Army of adequate strength, of the Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British Fleet to the Sea of Marmora.

“In his absence I would ask you to give the necessary directions, as the matter is urgent, and Turkey may make war on us at any moment.

“The meeting can take place either here or at the War Office as soon as you can arrange with our Chief of the Staff. I will myself explain verbally to the Committee the points on which His Majesty's Government desire information.”

On September 3rd General Callwell, the Director of Military Operations, wrote a Memorandum on the subject, in which he said that—

“it ought to be clearly understood that an attack upon the Gallipoli Peninsula from the sea side (outside the Straits) is likely to prove an extremely difficult operation of war.”

He referred to the discussions which had taken place in 1906-07, and expressed the opinion that it would not be justifiable to undertake the operation with an army of less than 60,000 men.

Paragraph 94.

An officer from the Admiralty was asked the following question: “Did the intelligence in your possession favour the idea that the arrival of the British Fleet would have produced a revolution in Constantinople?” He replied: “Oh, yes; certainly it would. I feel no hesitation in saying that.”

Paragraph 119.

At the time of the bombardment it was suspected by the Admiralty that the forts of the Dardanelles were getting short of ammunition. Evidence was subsequently obtained which showed that the suspicion was well-grounded.

MINUTE BY MR. ROCH.

Paragraph 43.

The success of this first attack at once produced important diplomatic results. The eyes of the Balkan nations were fixed on the Dardanelles.

On March 1st the British Minister in Athens telegraphed that M. Venizelos proposed to offer the co-operation of a Greek army corps of three divisions in the Gallipoli Peninsula. He telegraphed again on the 2nd that this proposal had been made after the King had already been "sounded," and that he heard from another source that the King "wanted war."

* * * * *

Within a fortnight Intelligence reports showed that the Turks were moving back to Adrianople and developing their front against Bulgaria.

On March 17th General Paget, who was engaged on a special mission in the Balkans, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that—

"The operations in the Dardanelles have made a deep impression ; that all possibilities of Bulgaria attacking any Balkan State that might side with the *Entente* is now over, and there is some reason to think that shortly the Bulgarian Army will move against Turkey to co-operate in the Dardanelles operations."

THE FINAL REPORT

OF THE

DARDANELLES COMMISSION.

(PART II—CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, &c.)
WITH APPENDIX OF DOCUMENTS AND MAPS.

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses:
IMPERIAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C. 2, and 28, ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. 1;
37, PETER STREET, MANCHESTER; 1, ST. ANDREW'S CRESCENT, CARDIFF;
23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH;
or from E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

CONTENTS.

PART II.—CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, &c.

	Page
Introductory	3
List of Witnesses	3
Origin and Inception of Joint Naval and Military Attack	6
Preparations for the Landing	15
The Landing on April 25th	18
The Decision to continue the Operations	22
The Operations in May, June and July	28
The Operations in August at Helles and Anzac	30
The Operations at Suvla	34
The Decision to Evacuate	53
The Water Supply	62
Food	68
Medical Arrangements	69
Postal Arrangements	81
The Zion Mule Corps	83
General Review	84
General Conclusions	86
Memorandum by the Rt. Hon. Andrew Fisher... ..	92
Supplementary Report by the Hon. Sir Thomas Mackenzie	93

APPENDIX.

Despatches of General Sir Ian Hamilton dated—	Page
I.—May 20, 1915	97
II.—August 26, 1915	109
III.—December 11, 1915	118
Statements of—	
Surgeon-General Babbie	155
Lieutenant-Colonel Percival	166
Lieutenant-Colonel Williamson	167
Major McClintock	170
Captain McCurdy	185
Detailed Map of Gallipoli Peninsula	187
Outline Map of Turkish Empire	188

REPORT TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

PART II.—CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, &c.

1. On February 12th, 1917, in pursuance of the powers contained in the Special Commissions (Dardanelles and Mesopotamia) Act, 1916, Section 6, we presented an interim report dealing exclusively with the origin and inception of the attack on the Dardanelles. By Section 1 of that Act we were also charged with the duty of enquiring into the conduct of operations of war in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the responsibility of those departments of the Government whose duty it had been to minister to the wants of the forces employed in that theatre of war, and we now present our report upon these matters.

2. We deeply regret the death of the Earl of Cromer, who was Chairman of the Commission during the first part of our enquiry. His ability, judgment and experience of public affairs, especially those connected with the East, eminently fitted him for such a position, and we feel that the country suffered a great loss by his death.

We also regret that we have been deprived of the services of Mr. J. A. Clyde, K.C., M.P., and Sir Frederick Cawley, Bart., M.P., who retired from the Commission upon their acceptance of the positions of Lord Advocate and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

3. With the exception of the examination of General Sir Charles Monro, which took place on the 23rd August, 1916, on the eve of his departure for India, we held our first meeting on this part of the Inquiry on the 4th January, 1917, and since then we have held 68 sittings and examined the following witnesses :—

<i>Date.</i>	<i>Name.</i>
4th January, 1917 ...	Colonel Sir John Steevens, K.C.B. Brigadier-General Samuel Henry Winter, C.B., C.M.G.
5th January, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. Sir John Grenfell Maxwell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O. Major-General C. McGrigor, C.B., C.M.G.
8th January, 1917 ...	General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O.
9th January, 1917 ...	General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O.
10th January, 1917 ...	Brigadier-General D. G. Prendergast. Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. P. Percival, D.S.O. Major-General Sir E. A. Altham, K.C.B., C.M.G. Brigadier-General Herbert Edward Stockdale, C.M.G., D.S.O. Major-General Sir Stanley von Donop, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
11th January, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel D. Brady, R.E. Lieutenant-Colonel John Henry Patterson. Surgeon-General Sir W. Babbie, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.B., K.H.S.
12th January, 1917 ...	Surgeon-General William George Birrell. Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. Forman, R.H.A. Major-General the Hon. H. A. Laurence, K.C.B.
15th January, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B.
16th January, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford. Major-General Frederick Hammersley, C.B.
17th January, 1917 ...	Brigadier-General R. P. Maxwell. Major-General Frederick Charles Shaw, C.B.
18th January, 1917 ...	Major-General Frederick Charles Shaw, C.B. Brigadier-General William H. Sitwell, C.B., D.S.O. Lieutenant-General Sir Bryan Mahon, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O.
19th January, 1917 ...	Brigadier-General the Hon. R. Stuart-Wortley, C.B., D.S.O. Captain Joseph Trumpeldor. Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Patterson. Colonel Harold Edward Street, C.M.G. Colonel Cecil Allanson, C.I.E., D.S.O. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Merton Stephen, C.M.G.

<i>Date.</i>	<i>Name.</i>
23rd January, 1917 ...	Brigadier-General A. Joly de Lotbinière, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E. Major-General G. F. Ellison, C.B., C.M.G. Brigadier-General A. W. Roper, C.B.
24th January, 1917 ...	Major-General E. N. Woodward, C.B. Brigadier-General H. Haggard. Brigadier-General Gilbert S. McDowell Elliott.
25th January, 1917 ...	Brigadier-General F. F. Hill, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Major-General Sir Herbert V. Cox, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.S.I. Major-General Walter Braithwaite, C.B.
26th January, 1917 ...	Major-General Walter Braithwaite, C.B. Lieutenant-Colonel L. R. Beadon.
29th January, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Aspinall, C.M.G. Lieutenant-Colonel John B. Wells, D.S.O. Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. B. Forster.
30th January, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General the Hon. A. G. A. Hore Ruthven, V.C., D.S.O. Rev. W. Murphy, C.F. Major-General W. G. B. Western, C.B. Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Rochdale.
31st January, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O. General John Edward Lindley.
1st February, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander J. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Colonel Edward J. Granet, C.B. Colonel Patrick Rivers Mantell, D.S.O.
2nd February, 1917 ...	Captain H. V. Simpson, R.N. Major-General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle, K.C.B., D.S.O. General Sir Archibald Paris, K.C.B.
5th February, 1917 ...	Mr. Keith Arthur Murdoch. Commodore Edwin Unwin, V.C., C.M.G. Mr. G. E. P. Murray, C.B.
6th February, 1917 ...	Mr. H. Chas. Woods. Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Romer. Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Williamson.
8th February, 1917 ...	The Dowager Countess of Carnarvon. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Myers. Staff Sergt.-Major K. M. Little.
9th February, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel G. St. C. Thom. Colonel (Salvation Army) Isaac Unsworth. Captain R. H. A. Newsome, M.C., R.E.
12th February, 1917 ...	General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.P.
15th February, 1917 ...	Lord Hindlip. Major Arthur William Mayo-Robson, C.B., C.V.O. Lieutenant-Colonel D. J. Stoney-Archer. Rev. Canon R. McClean, C.F.
16th February, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie O. Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.P. Major H. F. McClintock. Lieutenant-General Sir H. Sclater, K.C.B.
19th February, 1917 ...	Brigadier-General G. E. Matthews, C.B., C.M.G.
22nd February, 1917 ...	Surgeon-General Sir James Porter, K.C.B. Captain W. Maxwell. Surgeon-General Sir Alfred Keogh, G.C.B.
26th February, 1917 ...	Col. Warren Low, C.B., M.B., F.R.C.S., A.M.S. Captain Henry Percy Douglas, R.N. Major-General Sir Stanley von Donop, K.C.B. Surgeon-General Sir Arthur May, K.C.B.
27th February, 1917 ...	Captain D. A. McCurdy. Brigadier-General H. L. Reed, V.C., C.M.G. Major-General Sir Andrew H. Russell, K.C.M.G., C.B.
1st March, 1917 ...	Mr. Noel Ross. Captain E. C. Carver, R.N. Captain O. L. Martin.
5th March, 1917 ...	General Sir Julian Byng, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O. Captain Thomas R. Ritchie.
6th March, 1917 ...	Major-General Sir William Douglas, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O. Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.
7th March, 1917 ...	The Most Hon. the Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G., G.C.B.
8th March, 1917 ...	The Most Hon. the Marquess of Crewe, K.G.
9th March, 1917 ...	Mr. Henry Woodds Nevinson. Major-General J. Poett, C.B., C.M.G. Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B.
12th March, 1917 ...	Sergeant-Major Arthur Price. Sergeant-Major Henry Nicholson.
13th March, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas M. Cunninghame, Bt., D.S.O. The Right Hon. Sir Edward Carson, K.C., M.P. Brigadier-General D. S. Richardson.

<i>Date.</i>	<i>Name.</i>
14th March, 1917 ...	The Right Hon. Sir Edward Carson, K.C., M.P. Brigadier-General Gilbert S. McDowell Elliott. Major-General Charles Callwell.
15th March, 1917 ...	The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
20th March, 1917 ...	The Right Hon. the Earl of Selborne, K.G., G.C.M.G.
21st March, 1917 ...	Mr. Graeme Thomson.
22nd March, 1917 ...	Brigadier-General W. H. Sitwell, C.B., D.S.O. Mr. George Clerk, C.B.
26th March, 1917 ...	Surgeon-General William George Birrell. Colonel Thomas Joseph Kearns, C.B. Major-General S. S. Long, C.B. General Sir William Nicholls, K.C.B.
28th March, 1917 ...	Major-General Granville G. A. Egerton, C.B.
29th March, 1917 ...	The Right Hon. Winston Churchill, M.P.
30th March, 1917 ...	The Right Hon. H. H. Asquith, K.C., M.P. General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O. General Sir John Cowans, K.C.B., M.V.O. Sir Charles Harris, K.C.B.
2nd April, 1917 ...	The Right Hon. David Lloyd George, M.P.
3rd April, 1917 ...	Mr. H. J. Creedy, C.B.
1st May, 1917 ...	Brigadier-General H. C. Frith, C.B. Sir George Riddell. Captain Sir George Arthur, Bt., M.V.O. Mrs. Walrond.
2nd May, 1917 ...	The Rev. Henry A. Hall, C.T.F. Brigadier-General J. H. Johnston, D.S.O.
3rd May, 1917 ...	Mr. Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett.
15th May, 1917 ...	Rear-Admiral Roger John Keyes, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O.
16th May, 1917 ...	Rear-Admiral Roger John Keyes, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O.
23rd May, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General Sir James Wolfe Murray, K.C.B.
10th July, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel the Earl of Granard, K.P., G.C.V.O. Surgeon-General Sir Neville Howse, V.C., K.C.B.
16th July, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Frederick Stopford, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B. Sir Frederick Treves, Bart., G.C.V.O., C.B.
17th July, 1917 ...	General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O. Major Kent Hughes.
19th July, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel John Corbin.
24th July, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Ryan, C.B. Lieutenant-Colonel John Gordon.
28th August, 1917 ...	Colonel Charles Cooper Reilly, C.B. Colonel Charles Mackie Begg, C.M.G. Captain Jacka, V.C., M.C.
29th August, 1917 ...	Major Ross Cairns McCay, D.S.O. Surgeon-General Sir Richard Ford, K.C.M.G., C.B. Lieutenant-Colonel M. P. Corkery. Major E. W. Powell, R.A.M.C.
30th August, 1917 ...	Fleet-Surgeon G. M. Leveck, R.N. Lieutenant-Colonel P. C. Fenwick, C.M.G. Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred E. C. Keble, D.S.O.
31st August, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Mr. James Balfour, New Zealand Postal Service. Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. K. White.
1st September, 1917 ...	Lieutenant-Colonel Beadon. Surgeon-General Birrell.
5th September, 1917 ...	Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Erskine Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O. Surgeon-General Birrell. Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred E. C. Keble, D.S.O. Colonel Sir Courtauld Thomson, C.B. Major Purchas, R.A.M.C.

4. The investigation of the facts connected with this part of the enquiry has been rendered more difficult than it would otherwise have been by the deaths of Lord Kitchener and his personal military secretary, Colonel Fitzgerald. As explained more fully in paragraph 9 of our first report, Lord Kitchener had entire control of military matters, and was for a long time the sole mouthpiece of War Office opinion in the War Council, the Dardanelles Committee which replaced the War Council in May, the War Committee which was substituted for the Dardanelles Committee in November, 1915, and the Cabinet. He held a strong opinion as to the necessity of secrecy in military matters, and seldom communicated his intentions or his reasons for action to anyone.

We have the records of his action and of his communications with those in command in the Eastern Mediterranean, but we have not and cannot obtain the reasons sometimes

arising from affairs in Gallipoli itself, sometimes from events in other theatres of war, and sometimes from general diplomatic considerations, which moved him to those actions. This is a great disadvantage, but it is inevitable.

• 5. Our first report, dealing with the origin and inception of the attack on the Dardanelles, stated our conclusions on the events between October 14th, 1914, and March 23rd, 1915, and we do not propose to repeat them. It is necessary, however, in order to make this report intelligible, to recapitulate shortly some of the facts existing before the last-mentioned date.

THE ORIGIN AND INCEPTION OF THE JOINT NAVAL AND MILITARY ATTACK.

6. When the naval attack was sanctioned by the War Council on January 28th, 1915, there was no question of supporting it with large military forces. Such forces were not then available, and Lord Kitchener represented that they would not be available for some considerable time.

During January, 1915, the War Council were occupied in discussing their future military policy, based on the possibility of a stalemate in the Western theatre of war, and on the necessity of operations elsewhere.

In the course of these discussions, Lord Kitchener, on January 8th, expressed an opinion in favour of an attack on the Dardanelles. He then informed the Council that the Dardanelles appeared to be the most suitable military objective, as an attack there could be made in co-operation with the Fleet. He estimated that 150,000 men would be sufficient for the capture of the Dardanelles, but reserved his final opinion until a close study had been made.

7. These discussions resulted in two general conclusions.

The first conclusion was expressed in a despatch from Lord Kitchener to Sir John French on January 9th, in which Lord Kitchener wrote with regard to the possibility of the employment of British Forces in a different theatre of war.

"The Council considered carefully your remarks on this subject in reply to Lord Kitchener's letter, and came to the conclusion that, certainly for the present, the main theatre of operations for British forces should be alongside the French Army, and that this should continue as long as France was liable to successful invasion and required armed support. It was also realised that should the offensive operations subsequently drive the Germans out of France and back to Germany, British troops should assist in such operations. It was thought that after another failure by Germany to force the lines of defence held by the French Army and yours, the military situation in France and Flanders might conceivably develop into one of stalemate, in which it would be impossible for German forces to break through into France, while at the same time the German defences would be impassable for offensive movements of the Allies without great loss of life and expenditure of more ammunition than could be provided. In these circumstances it was considered desirable to find some other theatre where such obstructions to advance would be less pronounced, and from where operations against the enemy might lead to more decisive results.

For these reasons the War Council decided that certain of the possible projects for pressing the war in other theatres should be carefully studied during the next few weeks, so that as soon as the new forces are fit for action plans may be ready to meet any eventuality that may be then deemed expedient, either from a political point of view or to enable our forces to act with the best advantage in concert with the troops of other nations throwing in their lot with the Allies."

And the second conclusion was embodied in the decision recorded by the War Council on January 13th :—

"That if the position in the Western theatre of war becomes, in the spring, one of stalemate, British troops should be dispatched to another theatre and objective, and that adequate investigation and preparation should be undertaken with that purpose and that a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence be appointed to deal with this aspect of the question."

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey in his statement comments on the second conclusion as follows :—

"Although this conclusion does not mention the Dardanelles as an objective, and probably had little influence over the decision to use troops against the Dardanelles, which was forced on the Allies by pressure of circumstances, it is of some importance as an indication that, in the opinion of the War Council, troops might have to be employed in some theatre of war other than the Western Front. Even the early investigations which preceded this decision had shown—what those held subsequently were to confirm—that there were only two alternative theatres of war to the Western Front at that time in the region of feasibility, namely, the Dardanelles and Serbia."

On January 13th and 28th, 1915, the War Council decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles by means of the Navy alone. A joint naval and military operation was not considered in consequence of Lord Kitchener's statement, accepted by the War Council,

Sir Maurice
Hankey's
Memorandum,
Part II., page 5,
para. 16.

Minutes of Meet-
ing of 14th May,
1915.

that there were not, and would not for some months be, any troops available for such an operation. At a meeting of the War Council on May 14th, Mr. Churchill stated that if he had known three months before that an army of from 80,000 to 100,000 men would be available in May for an attack on the Dardanelles, the attack by the Navy alone would never have been undertaken.

8. Towards the end of January, diplomatic efforts were made to secure the co-operation of Greece with Serbia, which met with no success. As by February 15th the negotiations to secure Greek co-operation with Serbia had failed, attention began once more to be directed to the Dardanelles, and on February 16th the War Council decided to send the 29th Division, and a force from Egypt, to Lemnos to support the naval attack. It was also decided that the Admiralty should build special transports and lighters, suitable for the conveyance of a force of 50,000 men and their landing at any point where they might be required. The despatch of the 29th Division was afterwards postponed till March 10th. The transports collected for this Division were countermanded by a message, delivered to the Director of Transports by Colonel Fitzgerald on behalf of Lord Kitchener. It is right, however, to say that the Director of Transports did not act on these instructions until he had orders to do so given to him by Lord Fisher, who was then First Sea Lord.

Sir Maurice Hankey's Memorandum, Part II, pp. 5, 6 paras. 18, 20, et seq.

Part II, page 11, para. 39

Q. 23414, 23423, 23437.

9. Future military plans were discussed in a series of meetings of the War Council on February 19th, 24th and 26th. At these meetings there arose an acute difference of opinion as to whether the 29th Division should be sent at once to the Eastern Mediterranean, and Lord Kitchener's anxiety about a possible German offensive on the Western Front caused him to withhold his consent to the despatch of that Division until March 10th.

From the record of these discussions it appears that the policy contemplated was:—

- (a) To support the naval attack with three divisions which Lord Kitchener thought might be required to secure the passage of the Straits after the fall of the forts.
- (b) To concentrate as large a military force as possible in the Eastern Mediterranean ready to secure control of the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, and Constantinople, after the Straits had been forced by the Fleet.
- (c) As an alternative, to hold these forces ready for any action which might determine the attitude of the Balkan States, and thus bring into the struggle at least Rumania and Greece, possibly Bulgaria, and unite the whole of the south-east of Europe with Britain and France in a combined action against the Central Powers.

In the course of these discussions, Lord Kitchener informed the Council "that if the Fleet could not get through the Straits unaided, the Army ought to see the business through. The effect of a defeat in the Orient would be very serious. There could be no going back." The naval attack on the Dardanelles had committed us to offensive action in the Near East. The same view was expressed by Sir E. Grey, who stated that failure would be equivalent to a great defeat on land. Mr. Asquith also told us that from this time onward Lord Kitchener was determined that the Army should see the naval attack through.

Sir Maurice Hankey's Memorandum, Part II, page 25, para. 84.

Q. 25191.

10. At the War Council on February 19th, Mr. Asquith read out extracts from a memorandum of the General Staff prepared on December 19th, 1906, for the Committee of Imperial Defence, which was afterwards circulated to the members of the Council, and in which the possibility of a combined attack, naval and military, upon the Dardanelles had been considered.

Sir Maurice Hankey's Memorandum, Part II, paras. 44 and 45.

This memorandum pointed out that:—

"5. When the question of dispatching a military expeditionary force to the Gallipoli Peninsula comes to be passed in review, the first point to be considered is the general one of whether a landing is possible at all, in face of active opposition under modern conditions.

In regard to this history affords no guide.

The whole conditions of war have been revolutionised since such an operation was last attempted.

Military opinion, however, will certainly lean strongly to the view that no landing could now-days be effected in the presence of an enemy, unless the co-operating naval squadron was in a position to guarantee, with its guns, that the men, horses, and vehicles of the landing force should reach the shore unmolested, and that they should find, after disembarkation, a sufficiently extended area, free from hostile fire, to enable them to form up for battle on suitable ground.

"In the opinion of the General Staff, a doubt exists as to whether the co-operating fleet would be able to give this absolute guarantee."

"8. The successful conclusion of a military operation against the Gallipoli Peninsula must hinge, as already stated, upon the ability of the fleet, not only to dominate the Turkish defences with gunfire, and to crush their field troops during that period of helplessness which exists while an army is in actual process of disembarkation, but also to cover the advance of troops once ashore, until they could gain a firm foothold, and establish themselves upon the high ground in rear of the coast defences of the Dardanelles.

"However brilliant as a combination of war, and however fruitful in its consequences, such an operation would be, were it crowned with success, the General Staff, in view of the risks involved, are not prepared to recommend its being attempted."

The Director of Naval Intelligence, while generally in agreement with the General Staff, and fully concurring as to the great risks involved in a joint naval and military enterprise against the Gallipoli Peninsula, expressed the view that :—

"The memorandum somewhat underrates the value of the assistance which might be rendered by a co-operating fleet by means of a heavy covering fire at the actual point of disembarkation and during the stages of the advance, immediately succeeding the landing, as well as by feints and diversions along the 45 nautical miles of littoral between the Bulair line and Cape Helles.

The effectiveness of covering fire from men of war, as an adjunct to land forces, was well illustrated by the Japanese attack on Kinchow, where the fire of the Japanese gun-boats turned the scale at the critical moment, and enabled the attackers to force the left of the Russian position, while the torpedo boats, in rear of the Russian lines, interrupted, by their fire, the passage of trains in either direction.

In that enterprise, the co-operating vessels were very small, and the fire they were able to develop was insignificant, compared with what might be brought to bear in the Gallipoli Peninsula, where the hydrographical conditions are such that any number of vessels of the largest size and power could be employed to support the land forces."

Sir Maurice
Hankey's Memo-
randum.

Sir Maurice Hankey informed us that it was generally held by the War Council that the General Staff memorandum of 1906 was not wholly applicable to the conditions obtaining in 1915. There is no record of the precise reasons for this opinion, but speaking from memory he thinks that they were somewhat as follows :—

- (i) Turkey in the Balkan wars had shown herself to be much less formidable as a military power than had been previously assumed.
- (ii) There had been a considerable development of naval ordnance since 1906.
- (iii) The fall of the Liège and Namur forts led to the conclusion that permanent works could easily be dealt with by modern long-range guns.
- (iv) By the use of aircraft the value of naval bombardment, especially by indirect laying, would be enormously increased.
- (v) The development of submarines led to the hope that the Turkish communications to the Gallipoli Peninsula through the Sea of Marmora would be very vulnerable.

11. On February 24th, the question of the appointment of a military commander was mentioned at the War Council, and the first to be considered was Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood. The scope of the military operations, however, gradually became enlarged, and it was thought advisable to select an officer of greater experience and higher rank. General Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed on March 12th, and sailed on the next day.

12. Following the decisions of the War Council, Lord Kitchener gave orders on February 20th for two Australasian divisions in Egypt to prepare for service at the Dardanelles; and by the end of February a French Division and the Royal Naval Division were ready to embark for the same destination. All these were placed under the command of Sir William Birdwood.

On February 23rd, Sir William Birdwood was ordered to proceed to the Dardanelles to confer with Admiral Carden. He then made a reconnaissance of the position and the telegrams which subsequently passed between him and Lord Kitchener show :—

- (a) That Lord Kitchener still intended troops to be used for minor operations only.
- (b) That Sir William Birdwood, on the other hand, did not expect the Navy to force the Straits unaided; and
- (c) That Sir William Birdwood fully appreciated the formidable character of the defences of the Peninsula, and anticipated that large military operations would be necessary.

War Office Tele-
grams, Nos. 107
(a), 110 (a), 122
(a), 162, 168, 174
and 183.

13. In the course of these preparations Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell, Commanding-in-Chief in Egypt, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener on February 24th that he understood that the Gallipoli Peninsula was everywhere heavily fortified and prepared for defence, and was practically a fort, advance against which from any quarter without heavy guns would seem to be hazardous. Sir John Maxwell was also impressed by the

views of Colonel Maucorps, who was a member of the French military mission in Egypt, and who had been for five years Military Attaché at Constantinople. On February 26th he telegraphed to Lord Kitchener an appreciation by Colonel Maucorps, which recommended an attack on the Asiatic side of the Peninsula as presenting the least difficulties, and expressed the opinion that it would be extremely hazardous to land on the Gallipoli Peninsula, as the Peninsula was very strongly fortified for defence. It was also pointed out that the garrison of the Peninsula was 30,000 strong, composed of the 9th Division of the IIIrd Army Corps, with reserve formations, under the command of Djavad Pasha, who was an excellent and very energetic officer; and that the Bulair lines had been re-made and re-armed.

14. The object of the operations at the Dardanelles was to gain an entrance to the Sea of Marmora and dominate Constantinople. At a meeting on March 10th Lord Kitchener announced to the War Council that the "approximate strength of the forces available against Constantinople" would be as follows:—

Sir Maurice Hankey's Memorandum. Part II, p. 18, para. 54.

Naval Division	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	11,000
Australasian Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	30,600
Australasian Mounted Troops	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,500
29th Division	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	18,000
French Division	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	18,000
Russian Army Corps	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	47,600
								128,700

It should be noted that the despatch of the Russian Corps referred to above was to follow and be contingent upon our obtaining access to Constantinople through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora.

15. The facts which have been mentioned show that from an early date in February a military landing on some scale on the Gallipoli Peninsula was contemplated, and that, as time went on, a landing in considerable force became increasingly probable. There was therefore sufficient time for a preliminary plan of operations and plan of landing to be put forward by the General Staff. Such would be the usual course. In fact, among the duties assigned to the department of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the King's Regulations is the preparation of plans of offensive operations and of plans of concentration and reinforcement in connection therewith. When asked by the Prime Minister at the War Council meeting of March 19th whether any general plan and scheme of disembarkation had been worked out, Lord Kitchener said that, though the question had been examined in the War Office, sufficient information was not forthcoming for the preparation of a detailed scheme of landing, which would be undertaken by Sir Ian Hamilton in concert with the Naval Commander-in-Chief. No general plan of operations had been prepared by the War Office. We can see no reason why a general plan or alternative general plans should not have been worked out, and we think that the elaboration of such plan or plans by competent officers of the General Staff would have put the military problem in a clearer light before the War Council.

Q. 7256.
(23011-3).
Q. 23097.

Sir Maurice Hankey's Memorandum. Part II, p. 21, para. 65.

16. While the concentration of troops in the Eastern Mediterranean was proceeding, Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who was writing frequent appreciations of the position in regard to naval action, presented a minute to Mr. Churchill on March 11th, in which he stated:—

Mr. Winston Churchill's Statement. Page 30.

"The position has considerably changed recently; there are now ample military forces ready at short notice for co-operation with him (*i.e.* the Admiral), and I suggest the time has arrived to make use of them.

"To advance further with a rush over unswept mine-fields, and in waters commanded at short range by heavy guns, howitzers, and torpedo-tubes, must involve serious losses in ships and men, and *will not* achieve the object of making the Straits a safe water-way for the transports. The Gallipoli Peninsula must be cleared of the enemy's artillery before this is achieved, and its occupation is a practical necessity before the Straits are safe for the passage of troops as far as the Sea of Marmora.

"I suggest the Vice-Admiral be asked if he considers the time has now arrived to make use of military forces to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula, and clear away the enemy artillery on that side—an operation he would support with his squadrons.

"With the Peninsula in our possession, the concealed batteries on the Asiatic side, which are less formidable, could be dealt with more easily from the heights on shore than by ships' guns afloat, and the troops should be of great assistance in the demolition of the fortress's guns."

Mr. Churchill communicated this minute to Lord Kitchener, and asked him for a "formal statement of the War Office view as to land operations." To which Lord Kitchener replied on March 13th :—

"Most Secret.

"In answer to your questions, unless it is found that our estimate of the Ottoman strength on the Gallipoli Peninsula is exaggerated, and the position on the Kilid Bahr Plateau less strong than anticipated, no operations on a large scale should be attempted until the 29th Division has arrived and is ready to take part in what is likely to prove a difficult undertaking, in which severe fighting must be anticipated."

17. On March 12th, Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and was summoned to the War Office to receive his instructions from Lord Kitchener. In his evidence Sir Ian Hamilton told us that he made full notes of this interview shortly afterwards, and that Lord Kitchener informed him :—

"That I knew his feelings as to the value of the Near East. He said, rifle for rifle, at that moment he had made up his mind we could nowhere make as good use of the 29th Division as by sending them to the Dardanelles. With good luck each of its 12,000 rifles might attract 100 more to our side of the war.

"But the diversion of this Division had been opposed.

"I must clearly understand (1) that the 29th Division was only a loan, to be returned the moment they could be spared. (2) That every man, gun, rifle, or cartridge sent out to me is looked upon as sheer waste by powerful interests, both those at home and in France, who have strategical ideas."

"He said we soldiers were clearly to understand that we were string number 2. The sailors said they could force the Dardanelles on their own, and we were not to chip in unless the Admiral definitely chucked up the sponge.

"Once we started fighting we had to see the enterprise right through at all costs. No Asiatic adventure was to be countenanced.

"Lord Kitchener then explained, at some length, that owing to our command of the sea, military operations on the peninsula itself would be a limited liability . . . meaning thereby that the area was restricted, and as the numbers of the enemy would be restricted, so the numbers which would have to be drawn from home would be restricted. His idea was once we began to march about Asia Minor the liability would become unlimited, and I would very likely have to make demands on him for reinforcements of all descriptions, which in the present state of affairs would be very difficult to give."

The only information which Sir Ian Hamilton was able to obtain before leaving consisted of the official handbooks; the outline of a plan which had been worked out by the Greek General Staff for an attack on the Dardanelles; and a statement by Lord Kitchener that the Kilid Bahr plateau had been entrenched and would be sufficiently held by the Turks, and that south of Achi Baba the point of the Peninsula would be so swept by the guns of the fleet that no enemy positions would be encountered in that quarter. This last statement was made on the authority of a map which afterwards proved inaccurate, and of little use. From Sir Ian Hamilton's evidence it would seem that no really good maps were available until some were taken from Turkish prisoners.

He was not supplied with the memorandum, prepared by the General Staff in 1906, for the consideration of the Committee of Imperial Defence, together with the remarks of the Director of Naval Intelligence thereon, in which the possibility of a joint naval and military attack upon the Dardanelles was fully discussed; nor were the views of Colonel Maucorps, late French Military Attaché at Constantinople, reported by Sir J. Maxwell to Lord Kitchener on February 26th, communicated to him.

Sir Ian Hamilton was also informed that Major-General Braithwaite was to be his Chief of the General Staff. General Braithwaite himself had been informed of his appointment on the afternoon of March 11th, and told to get a staff together. This he proceeded to do, and he also obtained such information as was available at the War Office, which was of a very meagre description.

18. On March 13th Sir Ian Hamilton again saw Lord Kitchener, and was given formal written instructions for his guidance.

These instructions were as follows :—

"1. The Fleet has undertaken to force the passage of the Dardanelles. The employment of military forces on any large scale for land operations, at this juncture, is only contemplated in the event of the Fleet failing to get through after every effort has been exhausted.

"2. Before any serious undertaking is carried out in the Gallipoli Peninsula, all the British military forces detailed for the expedition should be assembled so that their full weight can be thrown in.

"3. Having entered on the project of forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning the scheme. It will require time, patience, and methodical plans of co-operation between the naval and military commanders. The essential point is to avoid a check, which will jeopardise our chances of strategical and political success.

Sir Ian Hamilton.
Q. 4318.

Q. 4325, 7276.

Q. 7277.

Q. 13235.

" 4. This does not preclude the probability of minor operations being engaged upon, to clear areas occupied by the Turks with guns annoying the Fleet, or for the demolition of forts already silenced by the Fleet. But such minor operations should be as much as possible restricted to the forces necessary to achieve the object in view, and should as far as practicable not entail permanent occupation of positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

" 5. Owing to the lack of any definite information we presume that the Gallipoli Peninsula is held in strength, and that the Kilid Bahr Plateau has been fortified and armed for a determined resistance. In fact we must presuppose that the Turks have taken every measure for the defence of the Plateau, which is the key to the Western Front at the Narrows, until such time as reconnaissance has proved otherwise.

" 6. Under present conditions it seems undesirable to land any permanent garrison, or hold any lines on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Probably an entrenched force will be required to retain the Turkish forces on the Peninsula and prevent reinforcements arriving at Bulair, and this force would naturally be supported on both flanks by gun-fire from the Fleet. Troops employed on the minor operations mentioned above (paragraph 4), should be withdrawn as soon as their mission is fulfilled.

" 7. In order not to reduce forces advancing on Constantinople, the security of the Dardanelles passage, once it has been forced, is a matter for the Fleet, except as in paragraph 6 with regard to Bulair.

" The occupation of the Asiatic side, by military forces, is to be strongly deprecated.

" 8. When the advance through the Sea of Marmora is undertaken, and the Turkish fleet has been destroyed, the opening of the Bosphorus, for the passage of Russian forces, will be proceeded with.

" During this period, the employment of the British and French troops, which will probably have been brought up to the neighbourhood of Constantinople, should be conducted with caution.

" As soon as the Russian Corps has joined up with our troops, combined plans of operations against the Turkish army (if it still remains in European Turkey) will be undertaken, with a view to obtaining its defeat or surrender.

" Until this is achieved, landing in the town of Constantinople, which may entail street fighting, should be avoided.

" 9. As it is impossible now to foretell what action the Turkish military authorities may decide upon, as regards holding their European territories, the plan of operations for the landing of the troops and their employment must be left for subsequent decision.

" It is, however, important that as soon as possible after the arrival of the Fleet at Constantinople, all communications from the West to the East across the Bosphorus, including the telegraph cables, should be stopped.

" Assuming that the main portion of the Turkish army is prepared to defend European Turkish territory, it may be necessary to land parties to hold entrenched positions on the East side of the Bosphorus, and thus assist the Fleet in preventing all communication across the Bosphorus.

" 10. Should the Turkish army have retired to the East side of the Bosphorus, the occupation of Constantinople and the Western territories of Turkey may be proceeded with.

" 11. As in certain contingencies, it may be important to be able to withdraw our troops from this theatre at an early date, the Allied troops working in conjunction with us should be placed in those positions which need to be garrisoned, and our troops might, with advantage, be employed principally in holding the railway line, until a definite decision is come to as to future operations.

" 12. You will send all communications to the Secretary of State for War, and keep him fully informed of the operations and your anticipations as to future developments.

" March 13th, 1915.

" (Signed) KITCHENER."

19. Sir Ian Hamilton, General Braithwaite, and the General Staff left on March 13th, arriving at Mudros on the 17th.

The administrative branches of the Staff did not start until a later date, arriving at Alexandria on April 1st.

20. Immediately on his arrival Sir Ian Hamilton attended a conference with Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck on board the "Queen Elizabeth." This conference was attended by Admiral de Robeck, Sir Ian Hamilton, Général d'Amade, Admiral Guepratté, Admiral Wemyss, General Braithwaite, Commodore Keyes and Captain Pollen.

Sir Ian Hamilton told us that in the course of this conference he was informed by Q.Q. 4336-7. Sir John de Robeck that :—

" The Peninsula is rapidly being fortified, and thousands of Turks work like beavers all night on trenches, redoubts, and entanglements.

" Not one living soul has yet been seen, but each morning brings evidence of nocturnal activity. All landing places are now commanded by lines of trenches, and are effectively ranged by field guns and howitzers, which so far cannot be located, even approximately, as our naval seaplanes are too heavy to rise out of rifle range.

" He said, the Turkish searchlights were fixed and mobile, they were of the latest pattern, and were run by skilled observers. The Germans evidently got hold of the Turks, and all that sort of work was being done in shipshape style by the Turks. . . .

"The War Office had taken too sanguine a view in thinking that the ships' guns would be able to prevent the Turkish troops lodging themselves on the Peninsula, because de Robeck said he knew they were there from seeing the trench work increased every morning.

"Many more troops have come down. The German officers have grappled with the situation, and have got their troops scientifically disposed, and heavily entrenched. So much so that they have not much to fear from the flat-trajectory guns of the Navy. The number of field guns on the Peninsula is now many times greater than it was."

On March 18th the substance of this conference, except as regards the small effect likely to be produced by the flat-trajectory gun fire of the Navy, was telegraphed by Sir Ian Hamilton to Lord Kitchener.

And in a private letter, Sir Ian Hamilton, on the same day, wrote to Lord Kitchener:—

Sir Ian Hamilton's
letter to Lord
Kitchener,
March 18th, 1915.

"Here, at present, Gallipoli looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the map in your office.

"The increases to the garrison, the new lines of trenches, nightly being excavated, the number of concealed field guns, the rapidity of the current, are all brought forward when discussing military operations.

"My present impression is that, if it eventually becomes necessary to take the Gallipoli Peninsula by a military force, we shall have to proceed bit by bit."

It may here be noted that on May 9th Sir John de Robeck telegraphed to the Admiralty: "The Navy has not been able to give the Army as great assistance as was anticipated. The Navy is of small assistance when it is a matter of trenches and machine guns, and the check of the Army is due to these factors."

Q. 25093.

21. On March 19th the failure of the naval attack on the previous day was discussed at a meeting of the War Council, and Mr. Churchill was authorised to inform Sir John de Robeck that he could continue the naval operations if he thought fit. In the course of the discussion which followed, Sir Maurice Hankey's notes show that Lord Kitchener said he had given Sir Ian Hamilton as many men as he could use on the ground.

Q.Q. 4337-40.

22. On March 18th Sir Ian Hamilton made a reconnaissance down the coast, arriving at Cape Helles to find the naval engagement in "full blast."

On the 19th the result of this reconnaissance was communicated by him to Lord Kitchener in the following telegram, which was received *after* the War Council mentioned in the last paragraph:—

War Office tele-
gram No. 299.

"Yesterday we steamed close along the western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Here and there landing places were, of course, observed.

"So near were we that we could see quite clearly the barbed wire defences covering the trenches. . . .

"I have not yet received any report of the naval action, but from what I actually saw of the extraordinary gallant attempt made yesterday, I am being most reluctantly driven towards the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less likely to be forced by battleships than at one time seemed probable, and that if the Army is to participate, its operations will not assume the subsidiary form anticipated.

"The Army's share will not be a case of landing parties, for the destruction of forts, etc., but rather a case of a deliberate and progressive military operation, carried out in order to make good the passage of the Navy."

This telegram had been dispatched at 2 p.m. At 5.45 p.m. on the same day the following reply was sent by Lord Kitchener:—

War Office tele-
gram No. 298.

"With reference to the last paragraph of your telegram of to-day. You know my views that the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced, and that if large military operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula by the Army are necessary to clear the way, they must be undertaken, after careful consideration of the local defences, and must be carried through."

War Office tele-
gram No. 304.

On March 20th Sir Ian Hamilton intimated to Lord Kitchener that "he understood his views completely."

Q 4344.

23. On March 22nd Sir Ian Hamilton had another conference with Sir John de Robeck on board the "Queen Elizabeth." This conference was attended by Admiral de Robeck, Sir Ian Hamilton, Admiral Wemyss, General Braithwaite, General Birdwood, and Captain Pollen.

Sir Ian Hamilton's note of this conference is to the following effect:—

"He (*i.e.* Vice-Admiral de Robeck) is now quite clear and strong that he cannot get through without the help of all my troops.

"Wemyss agreed with de Robeck.

"No voice was raised to question the momentous decision.

The result of this important conference was then communicated by Sir Ian Hamilton to Lord Kitchener, and by Sir John de Robeck to Mr. Churchill, in the following telegrams :—

(1) Sir Ian Hamilton to Lord Kitchener, March 23rd :—

"I have now conferred with the Admiral, and we are equally convinced that to enable the Fleet effectively to force the passage of the Dardanelles, the co-operation of the whole military force will be necessary.

"The strength of the enemy on the Gallipoli Peninsula is estimated at about 40,000, with a reserve of 30,000 somewhere west of Rodosto.

"The unsettled weather prevailing in March introduces a dangerous, incalculable factor into the operation of landing a large force in face of certain opposition, but the weather next month should be more settled, and I am sanguine of the success then of a simple, straightforward scheme, based on your broad principles. War Office telegram No. 347.

"I have already worked out the main features of my scheme, and I can communicate them, if you think it safe to do so.

"Practically the whole of my force will be required to effect what I have planned, and on the thoroughness with which I can make the preliminary arrangements, of which the proper allocation of troops, etc., is not the least important, the success of my plans will largely depend.

"This is one of the principal reasons why I attach importance to the thorough organisation of the expedition at a convenient base like Alexandria."

(2) Sir John de Robeck to First Lord, March 23rd :—

"At a meeting to-day with Generals Birdwood and Hamilton was informed by the latter that the Army will not be ready to commence military operations until the 14th April.

"All guns of position guarding the Straits must be destroyed, in order to keep up our communications when the Fleet gets through the Sea of Marmora. These guns are numerous, and not more than a small proportion of them can be put out of action by gun-fire. War Office telegram No. 115.

"The enemy were obviously surprised by the landing of a demolition party on the 26th February.

"Judging by the events of the 4th March, future operations of this nature will probably meet strenuous and well-considered opposition.

"It does not appear to me practicable to land a sufficient force inside the Dardanelles to carry out this service. This view is shared by General Hamilton.

"On the other hand failure to destroy the guns may well nullify any success of the Fleet, by enabling the Straits to be closed up, after the ships have gone through, and there may not then be ships available to keep the Straits open, as losses may be heavy.

"Until the Sea of Marmora is reached, the mine menace, which is much greater than we expected, will remain. This requires careful and thorough treatment, both in respect of mines and floating mines.

"Time will be required for this, but arrangements can be made by the time the Army will be ready.

"A decisive operation about the middle of next month, appears to me better than to take great risks for what may well be only half measures.

"It now appears to me that there may, possibly, be above the Narrows mine-fields of which we have very little information. War Office telegram No. 117.

"Obstacles may be sunk in the Channel by the Germans, and submerged hulks and pontoons placed there. I have in mind particularly the very large pontoons in the Golden Horn, on which the old Road Bridge from Stambul to Pera was laid.

"The howitzers, which it is so difficult to spot from the sea, will, of course, remain.

"I think it will be necessary to take and occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula by land forces before it will be possible for first-rate ships, capable of dealing with the "Goeben," to be certain of getting through, and for colliers and other vessels, upon which the usefulness of the big ships largely depends, to get through."

(3) Sir John de Robeck to First Lord, March 26th :—

"The check on the 18th March is not, in my opinion, decisive, but on the 22nd March I met General Hamilton, and heard his views, and I now think that to obtain important results, and to achieve the object of the campaign, a combined operation will be essential. War Office telegram No. 123.

"For the Fleet to attack the Narrows now would jeopardise the success of a better and bigger scheme and would, therefore, be a mistake."

(4) Sir John de Robeck to First Lord, March 27th :—

"On the 22nd after conference with the General and acquaintance with his views, I gathered that he considered co-operation of the Army and Navy to be a sound operation of war, and that he was quite prepared to co-operate with the Navy in forcing the Straits, he could not take action until the 14th April.

"In my opinion, decisive and overwhelming results will be effected by the plan discussed with General Hamilton, and now being prepared.

"The assumption underlying the plan originally approved for forcing the Dardanelles, by ships, was that forts could be destroyed by gun-fire alone. As applied to the attacking of open forts, by high velocity fire, this assumption has been conclusively disproved.

"For example, the damage caused to Fort 8 is, possibly, the disablement of one gun, though this fort has frequently been bombarded at long and close range. The destructive power of shells which hit, was either uselessly expended on the parapet, or only effected the demolition of some unimportant outwork in the background of the fort.

"It has been impracticable, even at ranges of 700 or 800 yards, to obtain direct hits on each gun. This was attempted in the case of Forts 3 and 6. In Fort 4, on the 26th February, although the fort had been heavily shelled for 2 days, at both long and short range, one gun was found loaded and ready to fire. At the most it is possible for ships to dominate the forts to such an extent that the guns cannot be fought by their crews.

"To effect more permanent disablement would require an excessive expenditure of ammunition at point blank range.

"This opinion is strengthened by recently received information on the operations against Tsin Tau.

"The analogy of the attack on the cupola forts at Antwerp by heavy howitzer fire is quite misleading, when applied to the case I have described.

"It is necessary for ships to come under fire at the Narrows, in order to engage Forts 7 and 8 at close range. It is necessary, therefore, to silence these, and this entails expenditure of valuable ammunition.

"I am also in some anxiety as to the wear of the old guns. Several premature bursts of common shell occurred on the 18th and put guns out of action from time to time.

"A bombardment, which could not be carried to a decisive result, would be the worst policy.

"It is, therefore, necessary to land demolition parties to destroy forts.

"General Hamilton is not prepared to undertake the task of covering these parties at the Narrows and I quite agree. It is impracticable to carry out the demolition by surprise. The difficulties of clearing a passage for the Fleet (and the forts have to be kept silenced by gun-fire, while it is carried out) are materially increased by the dangers from mines, which are greater than we anticipated, and the number of torpedo tubes, which are reported to have increased, and which cannot be destroyed.

"I consider the result of naval action might be either a brilliant success or quite indecisive.

"A great factor towards success is the effect that would be produced on the Turkish Army by the appearance of the Fleet off Constantinople.

"The situation in Turkey, at present, appears to be controlled by the Army, but this in itself is dominated by the Germans.

"If the advent of the Fleet into the Sea of Marmora fails to dismay the Turkish Army, and they close the Straits behind us, ships would only be able to operate as indicated in your 86 and 88, and maintain themselves in the Marmora for a length of time that is governed almost entirely by the number of ammunition ships and colliers which can accompany them, and the percentage of unprotected ships which we can expect to get through is small, as the passage will be contested.

"While the forts are still intact I can see no practical solution to the problem of passing supply ships for the Fleet through the Dardanelles.

"It would be vital, in this event, for the Peninsula to be occupied by the Army, as the guns on the Asiatic side can be commanded from the European shore, sufficiently to permit ships to pass through. This would open the Strait.

"The assistance of all naval forces available will, in my judgment, be needed to land the Army of the size contemplated, in the teeth of strenuous opposition.

"The Turks would not, necessarily, be induced to abandon the Peninsula by a landing at Bulair, and there is no doubt that this can better be done by a fleet intact outside the Straits than by the remnants of a fleet, short of ammunition, inside the Straits.

"Our success would be assured when the Army holds the Peninsula and the squadron is through the Dardanelles.

"Co-operation, which would really prove the deciding factor in reducing the length of time necessary for the completion of the campaign in the Sea of Marmora, and for the occupation of Constantinople, will be ensured by this delay of perhaps a fortnight."

Admiralty telegram No. 125.

24. These telegrams mark the close of the period of consultation between Sir Ian Hamilton and Sir John de Robeck as to the policy to be pursued. Thereafter these officers were occupied with detailed plans for the landing.

It is only necessary to observe :

(a) That Sir John de Robeck's views, as expressed in his telegram of March 27th, were endorsed by Mr. Churchill's telegram, in reply, of the same date :—

"That the result might have been achieved without involving the Army, according to the original plan, had been my hope, but I see clearly that a combined operation is now essential for the reasons you mention.

"The date is not distant, for time has passed and the troops are available. The Admiralty telegram, approving all your proposals, will, therefore, be sent."

Admiralty telegram No. 451.

(b) That Sir Ian Hamilton's plan of operations was to some extent anticipated by Lord Kitchener in a telegram to him on April 2nd :

"Limpus's report, which I have been reading, and of which the Admiral has a copy, seems to point to the advisability of effecting the main landing in the neighbourhood of Cape Helles and Mordo Bay, while making a feint in considerable force south of Kaba Tepe, with the possibility of landing and of commanding the ground of Sari Bahr, so that the enemy, on its southern slopes, may be prevented from supporting those on the Kilid Bahr Plateau.

"I presume that, preparatory to destroying the forts at the Narrows, you will attack in force to occupy this plateau.

"The most necessary points for consideration seem to me, at a distance, to be night attacks, and crossing barbed wire entanglements.

"As to entanglements, which artillery fire has not completely cleared, it is worth remembering how thorn zaribas were successfully crossed in the Sudan by means of the native angerib bed.

"Men carrying angeribs are placed immediately behind the hand grenade and attacking lines, and directly the fire of the defence is dominated, they rush forward and place the angerib on the entanglement. A recrudescence of fire from the trench may ensue, which is again dominated, and the process continued until men can jump over the last entanglement. If each attacking company does this, many roads over obstructions can be made.

"I do not in the least wish to influence your judgment, formed locally, on the situation to be dealt with in the Gallipoli Peninsula, but only give you all this for what it is worth.

"I hope that arrangements will be made for adequate bombardments by the Navy of the positions to be attacked, and for the advance of your troops to be covered by its shell fire.

"When you have decided on your plans, I shall be glad to have a general idea of them. Secrecy will be observed here."

To which Sir Ian Hamilton replied on April 4th :

"Reference concluding sentence there is no need to send you my general idea as you have already got it in one, even down to the details. War Office telegram No. 451.

"I have not got enough gun ammunition to destroy barbed wire by field guns, howitzers, or machine guns, and the entanglements are mostly defiladed from naval guns.

"I therefore must rely on other methods, including that suggested by you "

25. After March 19th there was no further meeting of the War Council until May 14th, and we are unable to ascertain any precise date on which, after the failure of the naval attack, military operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula were definitely decided on. Mr. Asquith informed us that between these dates there were thirteen meetings of the Cabinet, at eleven of which the operations at the Dardanelles were brought up for report ; and that they were on several occasions the subject, not merely of report, but of long and careful discussion. Q. 28189. Q. 28192.

It would appear therefore that these operations and the policy they involved were undertaken with the knowledge of the Cabinet, but we think, as was stated in our previous Report, that they should have been fully discussed by the War Council.

26. During this period negotiations took place for the intervention of Italy on the side of the Allies ; and the course of these negotiations made it undesirable to discontinue operations after the failure of the naval attack. Lord Kitchener had, as we have previously stated, told the War Council on February 24th that, if the Fleet could not get through the Straits unaided, the Army ought to see the business through. The same opinion was expressed in his written instructions to Sir Ian Hamilton on March 13th.

In addition, the failure to penetrate the German lines at the battle of Neuve Chapelle and in the Champagne (Perthes) had strengthened the view that a stalemate had set in in the West. The need for relieving the pressure in the Caucasus still existed. The urgency of opening up a line of communications, first to supply Russia with munitions and military stores, and secondly, to enable the Russian harvest of 1914 to be exported and thus re-establish the Russian exchanges, had not diminished. And undoubtedly the fear existed that to abandon the enterprise might have a bad effect in Russia.

These considerations, together with the fact that the military difficulties had not been sufficiently realised, seem to have led to the decision to initiate the joint naval and military attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE LANDING.

27. Sir Ian Hamilton's Administrative Staff did not arrive at Alexandria until April 7th. The preparations for the landing were, therefore, carried out by his General Staff. With regard to these preparations it is necessary to consider :—

- (a) The change of the main base from Lemnos to Alexandria.
- (b) The necessity for re-loading and re-arranging the transports of the 29th and the Royal Naval divisions, and
- (c) The estimates made of the strength of the Turkish forces to be encountered.

(a) CHANGE OF BASE FROM LEMNOS TO ALEXANDRIA.

28. Lemnos had been originally selected as a base for the naval attack in February and March. Lemnos was also contemplated as the base when, on February 16th, the War Council decided to send out the 29th Division. On February 20th, 30,000 Australian troops under Sir William Birdwood were ordered by Lord Kitchener to get ready to lend further support to the naval attack, and a brigade of these troops was sent from Egypt to War Office telegram No. 84.

N 10. Lemnos, arriving there early in March. On February 23rd Vice-Admiral Sir Sackville Carden telegraphed to Sir John Maxwell that, before the landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the troops sent from Egypt would have to live on board their transports; and on February 26th he sent a similar message, adding that the troops could land for exercise.

War Office telegram No. 152. • On March 2nd, the War Office telegraphed to Sir William Birdwood :—

“ Reports from Athens indicate that there is no water at Mudros Bay. Special arrangements for distilling and for tank vessels are being made by the Admiralty, but there may be some delay.

“ After consulting the naval authorities on the spot, please report on the subject.”

War Office telegram No. 214. On March 9th the Royal Naval and the French Divisions began to arrive at Lemnos, and on that date Sir John Maxwell transmitted to the War Office a telegram from Admiral Carden to the effect that, since the water supply was not assured, no more troops should

War Office telegram No. 237. be sent from Egypt for the present. This was followed, on March 12th, by a further telegram transmitted from Admiral Wemyss, reporting that water supply for 10,000 men

War Office telegram No. 261. and their horses was available, but that disembarkation was difficult and tedious with the appliances at their disposal, that embarkation would be still more difficult, and suggesting that troops coming from Egypt should be held in readiness there. On March 16th, Sir John Maxwell informed the War Office that “ he gathered from Admiral Wemyss

War Office telegram No. 263. and the officers on the spot that Lemnos could not be a base for a large force.” In addition to this, it was found necessary to repack the transports, and it was impossible to do this at Mudros. On March 18th Lord Kitchener sanctioned Alexandria as the main base, subject to the final decision of Sir Ian Hamilton and Sir John de Robeck.

Thereafter Alexandria was used as the main, and Lemnos as the advanced base.

(b) THE RE-LOADING AND RE-ARRANGEMENT OF TRANSPORTS.

Q. 15794. 29. The allocation of the transports for the 29th and Royal Naval Divisions was made by the War Office and by the Royal Marine Office of the Admiralty respectively. When the transports for the 29th Division arrived at Avonmouth, it was found that some of them had already been partially loaded at another port with fodder for horses, and it was accordingly impossible to stow on them all the vehicles forming the first line transport for the units on board. This part of the first line transport was sent on three freight ships which had been told off to take the Mechanical Transport belonging to the Division, and these ships arrived ten days later than the transports.

Q. 15831. In addition to this some of the ships were not well or conveniently stowed.

Q. 15832. The units of the Royal Naval Division, also, were not embarked complete, the personnel having been placed in one ship, the transport in another, and the horses in another. The stores were not packed as they should have been owing to their not having arrived until a few hours before the ships sailed.

Q. 22565. Proposals were made to restow at Malta the transports which were bringing out the 29th Division, but the accommodation in the harbour did not allow of this. QQ. 24468-70. The transports were, therefore, sent to Alexandria, and some delay was caused by the Q. 13256. fact that they had to await the arrival of the slower ships (presumably the freight ships), which had essential things on board.

Q. 21259. 30. No special instructions were given in the first instance as to how the transports should be packed. The reason for this was that the exact use to be made of the troops was not decided, and no plan of operations had been prepared. The ordinary principles which govern embarkation in the absence of special instructions therefore applied. We were informed by the Director of Movements that these principles are :—

Q. 11441. (1) To split up units as little as possible.

(2) To ensure that, when units are split up, the ships on which they are embarked should sail on the same day, or on dates as near each other as possible.

(3) To embark troops in such a way that they should be able to take the field at once on disembarkation.

QQ. 11442-57. He explained, however, that these principles cannot always be adhered to, especially in the matter of sending men and their transport together. Many transports, especially the larger ships, some of which were used in this instance, are not fitted to carry animals or vehicles. Transports are not collected at a port and then loaded simultaneously, but dealt with as they arrive. It is possible to carry units and their first line transport together if instructions are given to do so, but it takes a longer time and requires a larger number of transports, because in that case the transports would have to sail only partly loaded.

In this case no such special instructions were issued. It would have been hardly possible to do so, as the plan of operations was not determined. General Braithwaite, Sir Ian Hamilton's Chief of the General Staff, says that no one could have given the order satisfactorily unless he had worked it backwards from the shore on which he wished to disembark the men, and nothing of that kind was possible here. Indeed the plan was so little known that a great deal of transport which was quite useless for the actual expedition was taken, *e.g.*, a much larger number of horses than was necessary, and all the mechanical transport required according to the ordinary war establishments. The Quartermaster-General's department at the War Office pointed out that the mechanical transport would not be needed, but it was sent by the direct order of the Secretary of State. When the objects of the expedition became more clearly defined this was discontinued.

Q. 13250.

We think therefore that, in the absence of a scheme of operations, a considerable amount of re-stowage would in any case have been necessary. The chief complaint made against the packing was the separation of the men from their first line transport and animals, and this has been explained above. There was some bad stevedoring, but it must be remembered that at Liverpool, where part of the force embarked, there were considerable troubles as to dock labour; that this was the first long sea embarkation that had been undertaken by the officers in charge; and that the orders were suddenly given and had to be carried out at once.

Q.Q. 11500-11.

Q. 11502.

Q. 11498.

31. On the whole we think that, though there may have been instances of bad stowage, the real reason for the extensive repacking was the absence of knowledge of the operations for which the embarkation was required, and that the embarkation officers at the ports of loading were not to blame.

32. At first sight the delay caused by this repacking and the change of base from Lemnos to Egypt appears serious, but on examination we think that the effect was very slight. When the transports were ordered to Alexandria and Port Said to repack, no plan of operations had been settled, the whole of the Staff had not yet arrived, and there were many arrangements to be made. The first mention of repacking is on March 18th, 1915, and the last repacked transport left Alexandria on April 16th, 1915. The landing was on April 25th, 1915. We think that plans and arrangements could not have been completed until the greater part of this interval had elapsed, and that the effective delay did not amount to more than a few days, which was not important.

War Office telegram No. 287.
M.F. 5.

Q.Q. 12289-97.

Q. 7843.

33. The Administrative Staff did not arrive in Alexandria until April 1st.

The Commander-in-Chief and General Staff left for Mudros shortly after, leaving the Administrative Staff behind. Major-General Woodward, the Deputy Adjutant-General, protested against this decision to the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff, but did not succeed in getting it reversed. We think that the Chiefs of the Administrative Staff should have accompanied General Headquarters, it being of high importance that these officials should be in touch with the Commander-in-Chief and work in close concert with the Chief of the General Staff.

Q. 12288.

(c) ESTIMATE OF TURKISH FORCES.

34. Before the landing Sir Ian Hamilton estimated the strength of the Turkish forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula as 40,000 with a reserve of 30,000 west of Rodosto. This estimate was increased, later, by the addition of the 2nd Army Corps Nizam, which had been moved in April from the Caucasus to Constantinople, and made available to reinforce the forces on the Peninsula.

A more detailed and comprehensive estimate was conveyed by the War Office in a telegram to the General Staff in India on March 1st:—

" We appreciate the situation as follows:—

" It is believed that divisions now consist of Nizam brought up to establishment by Redif.

" In European Turkey, including Gallipoli, are nine divisions, totalling 120,000 men.

" In Smyrna, Asiatic Dardanelles, and Panderma there are two strong divisions, and depôt battalions, totalling 40,000 men.

War Office telegram
No. 146.

" In Caucasus there are 17 divisions, many of which are weak, totalling 190,000 men.

" In Syria and Palestine there are five divisions, totalling 70,000 men.

" In Mesopotamia is a 4th Division (new formation) of 1st Corps of 12 battalions, lately arrived Baghdad, also 35th and 38th divisions.

" It is possible that the 6th Reserve Corps is also in the Caucasus, though its reported existence is not yet confirmed."

After the landing had been effected, Sir Ian Hamilton presented a revised estimate in his telegram to Lord Kitchener of April 30th :—

War Office
telegram
No. 672.

"The Turkish troops are as follows :—

"1. 2nd, 7th, 8th and 9th divisions, all of 3rd Army Corps; Pamir Division of 3rd Reserve Corps; part of 5th division, 2nd Army Corps.

"Total, say, 44,000.

"2. Probably on Peninsula, but not definitely ascertained, 11th Division and part of 10th, both of 4th Army Corps, and perhaps 44th and 58th Regiments unallotted.

"Total, say, 26,000.

"This information has mainly been ascertained from statements by prisoners.

"Documents obtained locally and found on dead Turks show that two regiments have just come from Plagak.

"3. Not on Peninsula, but available at short notice, part of 6th Army Corps.

"Say, 20,000.

"Bulair is watched by the Fleet, and already three demonstrations have been made, but it is impossible to stop reinforcements crossing the Isthmus during the night.

"Generally reinforcements arrive by the sea to Gallipoli, but as the fleet have now two submarines off that town, I hope this will be rendered very dangerous in future."

THE LANDING ON APRIL 25TH.

35. Two important questions to be considered concurrently in drawing up a plan of operations were the place or places of landing on the Peninsula, and the objective or objectives of the troops when landed.

Sir Ian
Hamilton's
Despatch,
20th May,
1915.
*London
Gazette*,
6th July,
1915.

As regards the first of these questions, Sir Ian Hamilton had, when at Mudros, made such reconnaissance as could be made from the sea, and states that the dominating features in the southern part of the Peninsula were—(1) Sari Bahr mountain, 970 feet high; (2) Kilid Bahr plateau, 700 feet high, a natural fortification artificially fortified, covering the Narrows from an attack from the Ægean; (3) Achi Baba, 600 feet high, commanding the extreme south of the Peninsula near Cape Helles.

After considering the other plans open to him he decided to make two main landings, one, which was divided into several subordinate landings, in the extreme south of the Peninsula, and the other north of Kaba Tepe and near the south-western foothills of Sari Bahr.

In his despatch he mentions two other main alternatives which he considered :—

1. A landing on the north coast of the Gulf of Xeros, and
2. A landing on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.

He rejected the first on the ground that Bulair would lie between him and the Narrows, and that in attacking Bulair he would be open to attack from the Turkish forces in Thrace.

He had made a reconnaissance of Bulair, and had come to the conclusion that it was not possible to effect a landing there.

He did not think that he had a sufficient force for operations on the Asiatic shore, and his instructions from Lord Kitchener were opposed to a landing there.

These are the only alternatives discussed in the despatch, but others were considered, and Suvla is mentioned in an appreciation signed by Colonel Aspinall and submitted to Sir Ian Hamilton's Chief of the General Staff. A landing there is dismissed in a few words, and it does not seem to have been thought to be a place which merited the same attention as Bulair and the Asiatic Coast. Probably the reason for this was that when it was decided to land on the European side, but not to attempt a landing at or near Bulair, it was considered that the best way to help the Fleet was to attack at the southern end of the Peninsula. This is the opinion expressed by Sir Ian Hamilton and by General Braithwaite.

QQ. 7365-9.

Q. 13293.

The question also must have arisen whether the available force was sufficient for more than two main landings. In order to make Suvla Bay secure as a base it was necessary to occupy the northern ridge by the sea, the Karakol Dag, up to Ejelmer Bay, and thence the heights running south from Ejelmer Bay to Anafarta Sagir. Sir Ian Hamilton did not consider that he had sufficient force to do this as well as land at Anzac and Helles, and Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston also said that the force would not have been strong enough for such an operation.

Q. 7377.

QQ. 17900.

38, 44, 45,

46.

QQ. 21627-

8.

Sir William Birdwood expressed the opinion that, looking at the matter in the light of after events and assuming that there was no greater force defending Suvla at that time than at the later landing, Sir Ian Hamilton's force was sufficient to have landed at Suvla with safety, and that it would have been well to do so; but he added, "I also think I should have done what Sir Ian Hamilton had done, only in the light of what has happened since and the inability to force Achi Baba."

Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston informed us that, once a landing had been decided upon, he thought Sir Ian Hamilton's choice of landing places was a perfectly justifiable one.

On the other hand, several witnesses criticised the selection of the landing places, and expressed themselves in favour of other schemes of disembarkation. Whatever weight may attach to these divergent opinions, we consider that the choice of landing places was a matter lying within the discretion of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and Sir Ian Hamilton appears to us to have exercised his discretion with reasonable care and circumspection.

36. As regards the objective or objectives of the troops when landed, we gather from the instructions issued by General Braithwaite to the General Officers Commanding the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps and the 29th Division respectively, and the latter's Operation Orders based on these instructions, that the following movements were contemplated.

At Anzac the force which landed first, called the covering force, after it had overcome any resistance at or near the shore which the Turks might offer, was to occupy the Sari Bahr heights and thus cover the left flank of the force, called the main body, which was to land shortly afterwards. This body was to advance four miles east of the landing-place and assault Mal Tepe, a hill overlooking the Straits and three-quarters of a mile south of Boghali.

At Helles the troops were similarly divided into a covering force and main body, and after overcoming any resistance at or near the shore which the Turks might offer, they were to occupy Krithia and Achi Baba.

When the Anzac and Helles forces had established themselves at Mal Tepe and Achi Baba, the intention was that a converging attack should be made from those points upon the Turkish position at Kilid Bahr.

As the Turkish resistance near the shore proved too strong at Anzac and Helles, the proposed advance inland to Sari Bahr, Mal Tepe, Krithia, and Achi Baba did not take place.

37. It has been already stated that there were several distinct landings at the extreme southern end of the Peninsula, and this was the subject of considerable comment by several witnesses. Speaking generally, it is not wise to divide a force, as it is thereby exposed to the danger of being attacked and beaten in detail. Sir Ian Hamilton's reasons for doing so in this case are given in his despatch of May 20th, 1915, published in the *London Gazette* of July 6th, 1915, where he says: "Nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success, whereas on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. . . . The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many places as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable if awkward contingency—the separation by considerable intervals of the force." In view of the restricted space on the beaches and the importance of preventing a concentration of the Turkish forces against the small numbers which could be landed at any one place, we are not prepared to question the propriety of Sir Ian Hamilton's dispositions.

London Gazette,
p. 6568.

The landing places selected were S at the north-east corner of Morto Bay, V and W (called Lancashire landing) on each side of Cape Helles, X (called Implacable landing) just above Tekke Burnu, and Y, just above Gurkha bluff, and due west of Krithia. There was another beach called Y 2, which was considered, but no landing was made there. What afterwards was known as Anzac was beach Z, a little to the north of Kaba Tepe. The nature of the beaches is fully described in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, to which reference has already been made, and the description need not be repeated. A landing was also made by the French at Kum Kale, on the Asiatic side, but this was only intended to be temporary, and these troops were soon withdrawn to a position on the right of the British forces at Helles.

The landings at V, W and X were intended to be the main landings, those at S and Y being intended mainly "to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements."

London Gazette,
p. 6568.

A feint was also made in the neighbourhood of Enos in order to prevent Turkish troops from being sent from the north of the Peninsula to resist the landings.

38. We propose to discuss the arrangements for the provision of water and the care of the sick and wounded in a separate part of this report, and it is not necessary therefore to refer to them here except to say that the landing operations at Helles and Anzac were not checked by a lack of water.

39. The landings, as described in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, appear to have been well planned, and were carried out in the face of exceptional difficulties and at the cost of heavier casualties than had been expected. The conduct of the forces engaged was exemplary.

An unfortunate sense of unfairness was created by the fact that when Sir John de Robeck's despatch dealing with these operations was published the troops employed at certain landings were praised by name, whereas those who landed at V Beach, which was regarded as the most difficult of all to capture, were praised without identifying them. The explanation is that Sir John de Robeck's despatch, as written, contained a detail of the troops assigned to the several landings, and reference to this showed at once that the battalions whose successful accomplishment of their task at V Beach "bordered almost on the miraculous" were the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers, and 2nd Hampshire Regiment. But this detailed list was withheld from publication as likely to give useful information to the enemy, and the troops in question were inadvertently denied the public tribute of Sir John de Robeck's praise.

QQ. 18764-5. 40. It is not necessary to discuss the landings except in the case of that on "Y" beach, as to which there seems to have been some misunderstanding. The landing on this beach was made by the 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, under Colonel Koe, and the Plymouth Battalion of the Royal Marine Light Infantry, under Colonel Matthews. Colonel Matthews, as the senior officer, was in command.

The object was to move inland and try to capture a gun which was stated to be in position there, and make a demonstration so as to draw the enemy in that direction, and relieve the pressure at the foot of the Peninsula. The force was then to withdraw and work up towards X beach to join the rest of the 87th Brigade, to which the Royal Marine Light Infantry were attached. This Brigade was to work up past X beach and join the force from beach Y, and the united force would then move on Krithia. The landing was made without opposition, and 2,000 men were on the ridge in a very short time. They advanced in the direction ordered, but were not met by the force coming from Beach "X," which was unable to make its advance as proposed. Colonel Matthews then withdrew to the head of the gully up which he had advanced, and entrenched there.

The force was undisturbed by the enemy until between 4 and 5 p.m., when it was attacked by a large number of Turks coming from the direction of Krithia. After hard fighting extending over many hours, the force under Colonel Matthews, having suffered many casualties and exhausted practically all its ammunition, was obliged to retire to the beach and re-embark.

Q. 18687. The decision to withdraw was made by Colonel Matthews.

Immediately after landing, he had reported that there was no opposition, and afterwards, when attacked by superior forces and in want of ammunition, had sent a message to say that unless he had more ammunition he must withdraw: but he did not receive an answer to either message.

If a larger force had been landed at this beach in the first instance, or if it had been possible, either by diverting some part of the troops from X beach or otherwise, to send reinforcements before the Turkish troops came up in the evening, a further advance might have been made, but it is difficult to say whether, without the expected co-operation from X beach, it would have been successful.

Q212. 41. At Anzac the landing was effected after severe fighting at a place rather further north than was intended, and in the confusion of landing the troops crossed one another, and the battalions got mixed, which checked the advance and made delay for reorganisation necessary.

The fighting was so severe throughout April 25th and the ground gained so small that by the evening, Sir William Birdwood feared that it might be necessary to withdraw the troops and informed Sir Ian Hamilton accordingly.

In reply the latter directed him to maintain his position at all costs.

42. Both at Anzac and at the south of the Peninsula the troops by the evening of the first day after the disembarkation were occupying positions on and near the shore. At the south, contact had been established across the extreme end of the Peninsula. In neither case, however, was it found possible to carry the advance beyond a short distance from the shore.

At Anzac it had been intended to occupy Sari Bahr and Mal Tepe, and at Helles to occupy Krithia and Achi Baba, within a very short time of the first landing, and ultimately to have effected a junction of the Anzac-Helles forces. In both cases the difficulties proved too great to allow of these intentions being carried out, and in fact none of these objectives was ever attained.

The nature of the ground was a formidable obstacle, but the main difficulty lay in the fact that the Turks had been warned of the probability of an attack by the bombardment of the forts, followed by the assembling of troops, and consequently had made preparations by trenches, wire entanglements, etc., protected by artillery, machine-guns and rifle fire, to resist the attack, that they were in considerable force and well led (partly by German officers), and that they fought extremely well both in defence and counter-attack. Q. 21272. Q. 17816.

An opinion had prevailed, in consequence of the events of the Balkan wars and some recent fighting in Mesopotamia, that the Turkish soldiers had deteriorated as fighting men, but the fighting at Helles and Anzac during the landing and in the following months proved this to be a mistaken view. Sir Maurice Hankey's Memorandum, Part II, p. 14. para 45 (ii). Q. 11674.

43. Heavy and continuous fighting, described in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, followed for several days, with the result that a little more ground was gained and the positions improved, but very little real progress was made. The force at Helles was reinforced during May by the arrival of the 29th Indian Brigade, the 42nd (Territorial) Division, and three Battalions of the Royal Naval Division. If the Indian Brigade and the 42nd Division had been assembled at Mudros and ready to support the attack of the 29th Division, Brigadier-General Street, senior General Staff Officer with Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, was of opinion that the attack would have been successful.

Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston was not so confident on this point. Q. 17977.

The evidence does not make it clear why these troops were not sent at once, but if it were possible, looking to all the circumstances, to send them, we think it would have been well to do so. On the evidence before us we see no reason why they should not have been sent. Sir Ian Hamilton expressed a wish for the services of a brigade of Gurkhas, but we cannot find that he definitely applied for the troops mentioned above. Q. 7856.

Throughout these attacks there was a shortage of artillery and gun ammunition.

44. We must again refer to Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch for the particulars of this fighting, but it may be useful to quote some of his telegrams. They express an optimistic opinion of the chances of ultimate success, but they do not disguise the difficulties.

On April 30th, 1915, he gave as an estimate of the Turkish forces in or about the Peninsula :—

- (1) On the Peninsula, 44,000.
- (2) Probably on the Peninsula, 26,000.
- (3) Not on the Peninsula, but available at short notice, 20,000.

On May 4th he reported that the supply of ammunition was becoming a serious matter owing to the continuous fighting, to which Lord Kitchener replied that the supply was not calculated on the basis of a prolonged occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and said: "It is important to push on." On May 7th he reported that some progress, but not so much as he had hoped, had been made, and that progress was slow and opposition stubborn. On May 9th, after describing the third consecutive day's attack on Achi Baba, he said: "I might represent the battle as a victory, but actually the result has been failure, as the main object remains unachieved. Our troops have done all that flesh and blood can do against semi-permanent works, and they are not able to carry them. More and more munitions will be needed to do it. I fear this is a very unpalatable conclusion, but I see no way out of it." War Office telegram No. 732. War Office telegram No. 768. War Office telegram No. 791.

He then estimated the forces engaged in the following manner:—"I estimate that the Turks had about 40,000 opposed to our 25,000 rifles. There are 20,000 more in front of Australian-New Zealand Army Corps, 12,000 rifles at Kaba Tepe. By bringing men over from the Asiatic side the Turks seem able to keep up their strength. I have only one more Brigade of the Lancashire Territorial Division to come, and that will not suffice to make any appreciable difference in the situation as regards pushing through."

War Office telegram No. 790. To this Lord Kitchener replied that the whole situation naturally gave him some anxiety, particularly as the transport service was much hampered by the want of ships.

War Office telegram No. 810. On May 10th, Sir Ian Hamilton reported that the guns of the Navy had not been able to give him so much help as he had hoped, because of the spoon-shaped nature of the ground from Achi Baba to Cape Helles, which exposed only the outer edges to direct fire, while the inner slopes consisted of broken ground facilitating concealed works.

He explained that the 25,000 rifles which he had mentioned the day before had reference to the number of British rifles actually in the fighting line. The telegram continues: "With regard to future operations, the Admiral agrees with me in thinking that the only sound procedure is to hammer away until the enemy gets demoralised. Meanwhile grand attacks are impracticable and we must make short advances during the night and dig in for the day until we get Achi Baba. I then hope to be able to make progress without this trench method, but Achi Baba is really a fortress. If two fresh divisions organised as a corps could be spared me I could push on from this end and from Kaba Tepe with good prospects of success, otherwise I am afraid it will degenerate into trench warfare with its resultant slowness."

War Office telegram No. 824. On May 11th, Lord Kitchener cabled that he was sending out the Lowland Division and some artillery, and this message was acknowledged on May 12th.

War Office telegram No. 843. On May 13th, Sir Ian Hamilton telegraphed, expressing a hope that the 29th Division would be made up to strength by drafts.

It was the rule to send out 10 per cent. of an expeditionary force to replace casualties in the first instance. At the time of this expedition the rule had fallen into abeyance in the case of units going to France, the distance being short and communication rapid. Although the troops for the Dardanelles were to operate at a distance from England, Lord Kitchener would not allow the additional 10 per cent. to be sent with them. The matter was mentioned to him by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, the Adjutant-General, to whom it had been represented by Brigadier-General Woodward, who was Director of Mobilization at the War Office at the time of his appointment as Deputy Adjutant-General of the Expeditionary Force. Sir Henry Sclater said the reason given to him by Lord Kitchener for his decision was that the operations in Gallipoli would so soon be over that to form a base in Egypt would be practically locking up men who were much more urgently required in France. In Sir Henry Sclater's opinion, the men could not have been sent without denuding France of reinforcements, but General Woodward dissented from this view.

THE DECISION TO CONTINUE THE OPERATIONS.

45. In these circumstances an important meeting of the War Council was held on May 14th to discuss the situation.

It was clear that the conditions had materially changed. The landings had been successfully effected, but the expectation that it would be possible to carry the important positions of Achi Baba and Sari Bahr in the first rush had definitely failed, the task having proved far more difficult than was anticipated. The casualties had been very heavy; they amounted to about 14,000, exclusive of the French. This made the question of drafts and reinforcements very serious. It was now apparent that the operations would not follow the course which had been expected. Instead of the troops on landing being able rapidly to drive the Turks out of their positions and to occupy the heights dominating the defences of the Narrows, they found themselves confronted by lines of entrenchments and entanglements, possession of which could only be gained by the deliberate methods of trench warfare.

Probably at this time the very large expenditure of ammunition required to reduce hostile trenches had not been thoroughly realised, but, as already pointed out, Sir Ian Hamilton had informed Lord Kitchener on May 9th, 1915, that more and more munitions would be needed, and it was known that, as afterwards stated on May 17th, 1915, the advance could probably be made with half the loss of life then reckoned upon if there were a liberal supply of gun ammunition, especially of high explosive. The positions held by the force were unfavourable: they consisted of hardly more than a fringe. They were, including the beaches, commanded by shell fire, and there were no opportunities for withdrawing the troops for rest behind the line. At Helles the positions were exposed also to shell fire from the Asiatic shore, though this was afterwards kept down to a great extent by the fire of monitors.

War Office telegram No. 881.

The problem of transport was serious. There was a scarcity of ships, and owing to the necessity of using Mudros as a subsidiary base for troops, munitions, and stores this scarcity was aggravated. Mudros had practically none of the usual facilities of a port. Stores not immediately wanted had to be kept on board the transports. Communication with different ships and different parts of the harbour was much impeded by want of light craft. Besides, there was always the probability of danger from submarines. In consequence the transports were detained at Mudros, and great delay and congestion resulted.

This condition of Mudros as a port was probably not of much importance so long as the operations were expected to be of short duration, but it was a serious matter which had to be faced if the operations were materially prolonged in time and enlarged in extent.

46. The Dardanelles Expedition could not be considered by itself; though great results were expected from it if successful, it was subsidiary, in the view of the military authorities in England, to the main operations in France.

The demands from France for both men and munitions were very great, and there was much difficulty in supplying them. An offensive at Festubert, disappointing in its result, took place in May, and it was obvious that the demands of France were likely to increase rather than decrease. Moreover, there were requirements in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and elsewhere, which had to be met.

47. There was another matter which had to be considered. As stated in our interim report, the occurrence which led to action being taken with a view to forcing the passage of the Dardanelles was an enquiry from the Russian Government on January 2nd, 1915, as to whether the British Government could do anything to relieve the Turkish pressure upon their troops in the Caucasus. A reply was sent that a demonstration would be made in the direction of the Dardanelles; and when this demonstration took shape, it was arranged that in the event of our gaining access to the Sea of Marmora the Russians should co-operate with us, if possible, by sea and land in the vicinity of Constantinople.

A Russian Army Corps was designated for the purpose of military co-operation; but before the scheme, so far as Constantinople was concerned, had any chance of becoming operative, the Russian reverse in Galicia had begun, and it seemed possible that this occurrence, apart from its influence on the Balkan States, might lead to a diversion of the force which was to be available near Constantinople, should we succeed in forcing the passage of the Dardanelles.

48. On May 12th the Admiralty ordered the withdrawal of the "Queen Elizabeth" from the Dardanelles Expedition, this decision being strongly opposed by Lord Kitchener. It is difficult to say why Lord Kitchener should have attached so much importance to the retention of the "Queen Elizabeth." Naval gun fire in support of the military operations had not hitherto proved to be as valuable as had been anticipated, and the reduction in naval gun power entailed by the withdrawal of the warship in question was stated by the Admiralty to be more than made good by the addition of monitors and other vessels to the Fleet.

49. The War Council had to determine whether, in the changed circumstances, the requirements of all the different areas of war could be supplied, and whether it was wise to continue the operations on the Peninsula. Diplomatic efforts had been made ever since the beginning of the Dardanelles Expedition to secure the co-operation of the Balkan States, the most prominent and powerful being Bulgaria, and these States were much influenced not only by the course of current events, but by their appreciation of the consequences likely to result from the action in the Near East which was being taken or contemplated by the Central Powers on the one hand and the Entente Allies on the other. It was important, therefore, not to do anything which would show weakness. The expedition had been begun in consequence of a communication from Russia, and the Russians considered that the effect so far had been to hold up Turkish troops and relieve the pressure on their forces. It was hoped that, if successful, the expedition would open the way to Constantinople.

Finally, it was anticipated that an abandonment of the expedition would have a very bad effect upon British prestige in the East.

All these matters were taken into consideration, as well as the purely military question of the prospects of success of the operations in which we were engaged.

The tendency was towards sending out sufficient reinforcements for a further effort, but no final decision was reached, except that Lord Kitchener should ask Sir Ian Hamilton what force he would require to ensure success at the Dardanelles.

War Office
telegram
No. 852.

50. As a result of this decision, Lord Kitchener telegraphed to Sir Ian Hamilton on May 14th: "The War Council would like to know what force you consider would be necessary to carry through the operations on which you are engaged. You should base this estimate on the supposition that I have adequate forces to place at your disposal." On May 17th, Sir Ian Hamilton answered, pointing out the difficulties of the position, and concluded: "If the present condition of affairs were changed by the entry into the struggle of Bulgaria or Greece or by the landing of the Russians, my present force kept up to strength by the necessary drafts, plus the Army Corps asked for on May 10th, would probably suffice to finish my task. If, however, the present situation continues unchanged, and the Turks are still able to devote so much exclusive attention to us, I shall want an additional Army Corps, *i.e.*, two Army Corps additional in all. I could not land these reinforcements on the Peninsula until I can advance another 1,000 yards, and so free the beaches from the shelling to which they are subjected on the western side, and gain more space, but I could land them on the adjacent islands of Tenedos, Imbros and Lemnos, and take them over later to the Peninsula for battle. This plan would surmount the difficulties of water and space on the Peninsula, and would perhaps enable me to effect a surprise with the fresh divisions. I believe I could advance with half the loss of life that is now reckoned upon if I had a liberal supply of gun ammunition, especially of high explosive."

War Office
telegram
No. 894.

Lord Kitchener, on May 18th, replied, expressing his disappointment that his preconceived views as to the conquest of positions necessary to support the troops on land were miscalculated, and his opinion that the question of whether we could long support two fields of operations draining on our resources, required grave consideration. He concluded: "I know that I can rely on you to bring the present unfortunate state of affairs in the Dardanelles to as early a conclusion as possible, so that any consideration of a withdrawal with all its dangers in the East may be prevented from entering the field of possible solutions."

51. Sir Ian Hamilton's telegram of May 17th afforded the information called for by the War Council on May 14th, and would, no doubt, have been considered at once, but, unfortunately, just at this time the political crisis which resulted in the formation of the Coalition Government took place, and no authoritative conclusion was arrived at until June 7th.

52. Between these two dates the War Council had been increased in numbers by the addition of some members of the Unionist Party, and its name had been changed to that of the Dardanelles Committee. Its members were Mr. Asquith, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Curzon, Lord Grey, Lord Crewe, Lord Kitchener, Lord Selborne, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. McKenna, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Winston Churchill. Sir Edward Carson became a member in August, after the Suvla operations.

Q. 24707.

53. In Mr. Churchill's opinion this political crisis produced an unfortunate delay by preventing an "unbroken and uninterrupted stream of reinforcements." According to his evidence Lord Kitchener, before May 14th, had informed him that it was intended to send two Divisions. Therefore Mr. Churchill had provided the transport for them, and informed Sir Ian Hamilton of the fact, but after May 14th Lord Kitchener changed his mind and sent one Division only. At the same time Sir Ian Hamilton's telegram of May 17th was held over till after the formation of the new Government, and no action was taken on it. Mr. Asquith agrees that the political situation was the main cause of the delay in sending reinforcements, but thinks that there was a shortage of available troops. Lieutenant-General Sir John Cowans also says that there was a difficulty in getting and equipping the men. We think that the political crisis was the main cause of delay. The Government had to decide whether operations other and larger than were originally contemplated should be undertaken. This was a question of policy, and some of the new members of the Government had to be satisfied that the expedition was a justifiable enterprise.

War Office
telegram
No. 881.
Q. 21880.
Q. 2517.

54. On May 28th, Lord Kitchener prepared a memorandum for the use of the members of the Dardanelles Committee, describing the objects and progress of the operations up to that date, and setting out what he considered to be the different courses then open. This appreciation shows that the difficulties which had been experienced by Sir Ian Hamilton had been communicated to Lord Kitchener, and that they were brought by him to the distinct notice of the members of the Committee.

In this document he pointed out that "the difficulties of the enterprise had proved more formidable than was at first anticipated, and that a much greater effort than was originally budgeted for was now required." After describing the course of events, he repeated: "The main advantage of withdrawing from the Dardanelles is to put an end to an operation the difficulties of which have been under-estimated, which has already made a considerable inroad on our resources, and which will make a very considerable drain on both our naval and military resources before it is brought to a successful conclusion." He then discussed the advantages of withdrawal, and summarised his conclusions as follows:—

"Three solutions offer themselves--

1. Withdrawal ;
2. To seek, if possible, an immediate decision ;
3. To continue to push on and make such progress as is possible.

"The disadvantages of withdrawal have been shown above to be so great that this course could, in my opinion, only be justified in order to avoid a great disaster.

"On the other hand, it has been shown that the military forces and, what is even more important, the necessary supplies of ammunition asked for by the General Officer Commanding on the spot cannot be spared to bring the affair to a rapid conclusion, though I am somewhat in doubt, from the experience of trench warfare in Flanders, whether such increased forces would enable him to carry the position as he anticipates. Sir John French's forces have been increased very greatly, but no such advance as he had anticipated has occurred.

"The third course, however, has much to commend it. It avoids any immediate blow to our prestige ; it keeps the door open to Balkan intervention ; it ensures our hold on a strategical position of great importance, which rivets the attention of the Turks and in all probability limits active operations on their part against Egypt, or in Mesopotamia, or the Caucasus.

"The only thing to be said against it is that it involves certain dangers, viz., the risk arising from German submarines and of gas, assisted by the prevailing north winds. There are furthermore, in my opinion, possibilities of the Turks not being able to maintain resistance on the present scale. This would enable our troops to advance, as well as to take advantage of any movement that Bulgaria or Greece may take in our favour."

55. On June 2nd, Sir Ian Hamilton had telegraphed to the effect that, in his opinion, the change in the Russian military position owing to reverses in Galicia had set free 100,000 Turks ; that there were 80,000 in the Peninsula ; and that he might have, in all, a quarter of a million men brought against him. He concluded : "Taking all these facts into consideration, it would seem that for an early success some equivalent to the suspended Russian co-operation is vitally necessary. It is, broadly, my view that we must obtain the support of a fresh ally in this theatre, or else that there should be got ready British reinforcements to the full extent mentioned in my No. M.F. 235 (set out in para. 50), though, as stated above, the disappearance of Russian co-operation was not contemplated in my estimate."

War Office
telegram
No. 1044.

In a further message, five days later, Sir Ian Hamilton stated that direct progress would be slow, and that he had been considering another line of operations starting from Enos, which he had rejected because of the objections of Sir John de Robeck.

War Office
telegram
No. 1075.

56. Lord Kitchener's memorandum and the whole situation were considered by the Dardanelles Committee on June 7th, 1915, and the following conclusions were reached:—

1. To reinforce Sir Ian Hamilton with the three remaining Divisions of the New Army, with a view to an assault in the second week of July.
2. To send out certain Naval units, which would be much less vulnerable to submarine attack than those under Admiral de Robeck's command.

There are no Minutes of this meeting, but it is stated by Mr. Churchill that the intention of the Committee was to authorise a more energetic prosecution of the operations than that mentioned in Lord Kitchener's third proposition of May 28th, and

that Lord Kitchener himself said: "Do not let Sir Ian Hamilton throw away his strength in the interval, but let us send out ample reinforcements to carry the thing through." Lord Selborne agrees that the decision of the Committee contemplated a more vigorous continuation of the operations than the course proposed by Lord Kitchener.

War Office
telegram
No. 1084.

57. Just after midnight of June 7th Sir Ian Hamilton sent a telegram reviewing the situation and emphasising the need for reinforcements.

"Without additional troops sufficient to provide for reliefs, as well as reinforcements, the men are undoubtedly getting worn out, and this will end in reducing our forces at Cape Helles to position of defenders in state of close siege, as is practically the case at Australian and New Zealand Army Corps already.

* * * * *

"In the action of June 4th the troops succeeded in breaking through the centre of the enemy's line, but were so weakened by the effort that they could not take advantage of success, nor even retain all the ground gained. The whole position might have been captured and a great step made in advance, had there been plenty of fresh reserves available to push through and confirm success."

Lord Kitchener had in fact a few hours earlier cabled to Sir Ian Hamilton assuring him that the Government intended to make due provision for reinforcements.

The full text of the telegram is as follows:—

War Office
telegram
No. 1081.

"Your difficulties are fully recognised by the Cabinet, who are determined to support you. We are sending you three Divisions of the New Army. The first of these will leave about the end of this week, and the other two will be sent as transport is available. The last of the three Divisions ought to reach you not later than the first fortnight in July. While steadily pressing the enemy, there seems no reason for running any premature risks in the meantime."

As a matter of fact the embarkation of the 13th Division took place from June 16th to June 23rd; of the 11th Division from July 1st to July 7th; and of the 10th Division from July 7th to July 14th.

58. Another cause contributed at this time to weaken the British troops and make the requests for reinforcements urgent. The weather had become very hot, and with the heat there came swarms of flies. On the whole the sanitation of the British camps and trenches was satisfactorily carried out so far as was possible with the appliances which could be procured, but the Turkish trenches were very near, and the state of them was very bad; there were many unburied bodies, both of men and animals, at no great distance, and it was found impossible to keep down the plague of flies. These conveyed a great amount of infection, and this was also disseminated by the dust constantly carried about by the wind. The most common illness which resulted was a kind of dysentery, though paratyphoid and other complaints prevailed. Apart from reduction in numbers caused by death, the force was seriously weakened by the number of men always ill and the lowering of vitality produced in those who were still on duty.

59. On June 9th the Cabinet confirmed the decision of the Dardanelles Committee.

This conclusion was an acknowledgment that the attempt to seize the Peninsula by a rapid advance had failed; and that a larger force, more continued operations, and greater supplies of ammunition would be necessary to obtain success.

War Office
telegrams
Nos. 5443,
1141a,
1142a,
1147a, 5316.

60. Another meeting of the Dardanelles Committee was held on June 12th, 1915, at which the Prime Minister submitted for consideration a memorandum by Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, who had been on the Peninsula as a War Correspondent. In this memorandum Mr. Ashmead Bartlett expressed an unfavourable view of the positions then occupied at Anzac and Helles and of the prospects of success in an advance from those positions, and advised an attack at or near the isthmus of Bulair. The Committee decided to ask Sir Ian Hamilton for information on the matter, and a telegram was sent accordingly on June 12th. Sir Ian Hamilton answered on June 13th, giving his reasons against an attack in the neighbourhood of Bulair. He had sent substantially the same information the day before in answer to an inquiry from the War Office. These reasons seem to have satisfied the Committee, and an attack at Bulair was not further considered at that time.

61. It should be mentioned here that on June 21st Lord Kitchener had asked if Sir Ian Hamilton required a fourth Division, and he had answered that he did not feel justified in refusing it, and that on June 25th Lord Kitchener had said that the Cabinet would like to know whether he considered it necessary or desirable that a fifth Division should be sent. On June 29th Sir Ian Hamilton answered that, as the fourth and fifth Divisions could not arrive with the first three, he adhered to his original plan of trying to turn the enemy's right at Anzac with the first three Divisions and to gain a position from Kaba Tepe to Maidos. He would use the fourth and fifth, in case of non-success at first, to reinforce this wing; and in case of success, possibly to push through from Helles, but more probably to effect a landing on the southern shore of the Dardanelles. He concluded: "To summarise, I think I have reasonable prospects of success with three Divisions, with four the risk of miscalculation would be minimised, and with five, even if the fifth Division had little or no gun ammunition, I think it would be a much simpler matter to clear the Asiatic shore subsequently of big guns, i.e., Kilid Bahr would be captured at an earlier date, and success would be generally assured." In accordance with the views expressed by Sir Ian Hamilton, it was decided to send him a fifth as well as a fourth Division.

War Office
telegrams
Nos. 1241,
1264, 1286,
1315.

62. During July, Sir Ian Hamilton further considered the scheme outlined in his telegram to Lord Kitchener of June 29th and a definite plan of action was elaborated under his orders.

This plan is described in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch of December 11th, 1915. In June he had asked for and been promised a reinforcement consisting of three Divisions of the New Army, to which the infantry of two Territorial Divisions had been subsequently added. He expected all these troops to arrive between July 10th and August 10th, and this anticipation was realised. After considering several other courses, he decided to employ a part of them to strengthen the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps at Anzac, and the remainder to effect a surprise landing in Suvla Bay. In his despatch Sir Ian Hamilton's objectives are defined as follows:—

"(1) To break out with a rush from Anzac and cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from land communication with Constantinople.

"(2) To gain such a command for my artillery as to cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from sea traffic whether with Constantinople or with Asia.

"(3) Incidentally, to secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for Anzac and all the troops operating in the northern theatre."

Sir Ian Hamilton determined that the operations should begin on August 6th, as the moon would then rise at an hour favourable for night landings, and the last of his reinforcements were due to arrive a day or two before that date. The plan is described in greater detail in the instructions issued by the Chief of the General Staff, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, to the General Officer Commanding VIIIth Corps at Helles, and the General Officer Commanding IXth Corps at Imbros, dated July 29th, and to the General Officer Commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps at Anzac, dated July 30th. These instructions will be found among the Appendices to this Report.

At Helles the troops of the VIIIth Corps were to attack the Turks on August 4th and following days, not so much with a view to gaining ground in the direction of Krithia or Achi Baba as for the purpose of distracting the enemy's attention from the contemplated operations at Anzac and Suvla, and of preventing him from reinforcing the positions which it was intended to seize and occupy.

The operations at Anzac were held by Sir Ian Hamilton to be of primary importance, those at Helles and Suvla being described as complementary.

Instructions
for G.O.C.
A. & N.Z.
Army Corps.
30th July,
1915.

Instructions
to G.O.C.
VIIIth and
IXth Corps.
29th July,
1915.

THE OPERATIONS IN MAY, JUNE AND JULY.

63. In the meantime, fighting had continued on both the Anzac and Helles fronts. At Anzac severe fighting took place by reason of very heavy attacks made by the Turks. These attacks were defeated and some slight ground was gained, but it did not amount to more than straightening out short lengths of trench here and there, and, broadly speaking, the force remained in the position which it had occupied on the day of landing.

QQ. 15500-1.

At Helles, up to June 4th, only minor operations were undertaken, and small advances were made in parts of the lines, but on that day a great attack was made along the whole front from the Straits to the sea.

The attack was partially successful, and the Manchester Brigade and some companies of the 5th Lancashire Fusiliers and part of the 42nd Division, which arrived early in May, got nearly to Krithia, reaching a position favourable to an attack on Achi Baba.

War Office
telegram,
No. 1068a.

Unfortunately, the Turks, by a counter-attack, were able to carry a redoubt called the Haricot, which had been taken from them at the first attack, and this redoubt enfiladed the positions won by the Naval Division on the right of the Manchester Brigade. It was obliged to fall back, uncovering the Manchester Brigade, which also had to retire. Sir Ian Hamilton speaks of the day as having promised great things, but ended disappointingly, and describes the result in the following terms: "To sum up, a good advance of at least 500 yards, including two lines of Turkish trenches, has been made along a front of nearly three miles in the centre of our southern section, but we are back to our original right and left. Making fresh effort now to advance the left to bring it into line with the centre, though the Turkish position here is extraordinarily strong naturally, with a deep ravine on one side and the sea on the other."

Q. 16138.
Q. 7416.

On June 21st the French stormed the Haricot redoubt and repulsed the Turkish counter-attacks, and on June 28th another great attack was made by the British force, which had considerable success.

As described by Major-General de Lisle, Commanding the 29th Division, an advance was made of about a mile, and five lines of trenches were taken. Sir Ian Hamilton speaks of this advance as running up level to Krithia. He says that, if he had had reinforcements and ammunition on the spot, the success could have been made decisive:—"We had the Turks beaten then." But, naturally, the result of this continuous fighting had much exhausted and depleted the British troops, the stocks of ammunition were low, the drafts were coming forward very slowly, so that all units were much under strength, and no large reinforcements would arrive for some time. He was, therefore, unable to follow up the success, and during July only small operations took place. In the meantime the continuance of Russian reverses in Galicia encouraged the Turks, lessened their apprehension of a Russian landing near Constantinople, and enabled them to send up reinforcements.

On June 29th and 30th a heavy attack was made on the Anzac position and was repulsed.

Details of these operations will be found in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch of August 26th, 1915, published in the London Gazette Supplement of September 20th, 1915.

War Office
telegram,
No. 1250.

64. On June 22nd Lord Kitchener sent the following description of the Divisions of the New Army to Sir Ian Hamilton: "The three Divisions being sent to you are well trained with fine personnel. From the training point of view, there is not much to choose between them, but they might be placed in the following order—11th, 13th, 10th. The infantry is excellent, and their shooting good. The artillery have fired well. The R.E., R.A.M.C., and A.S.C. are above the average. You will understand that the new officers' knowledge is not yet instinctive, and allowance should be made for this by the staff; if so, in a short time there will be no finer troops in Europe. Upon the personality of the commander, of course, will depend the choice of Divisions for any particular operation."

It will be seen that for new troops a high character was given to them, and possibly this was the main reason why the landing at Suvla was entrusted to a portion of them without the help of more experienced troops. A night attack in an unknown country was a difficult task for inexperienced soldiers, and they would have been much strengthened by an admixture of more seasoned units. The fourth and fifth Divisions (the 53rd Welsh and 54th East Anglian) consisted of Territorial troops.

65. At this point it will be convenient to refer to the selection of a commander for the IXth Corps, which consisted of the 10th, 11th and 13th Divisions, and of commanders for those Divisions and the two Territorial Divisions.

On June 15th Sir Ian Hamilton had submitted to Lord Kitchener his opinion of the qualities necessary for a Corps Commander on the Gallipoli Peninsula in these words: "In that position only men of good, stiff constitution and nerve will be able to do any good." To secure such qualities it would have been advantageous to select some officer who had proved the possession of them in the fighting of the previous ten months. Most of these officers, however, were employed on the Western Front, and could not easily be replaced. The difficulty was increased by the fact that Sir Bryan Mahon, who commanded the 10th Division, was a Lieutenant-General.

War Office
telegram
No. 1167.

Sir Ian Hamilton asked for one of two Lieutenant-Generals then in France, Sir Julian Byng or Sir Henry Rawlinson, but neither could be spared. The former was sent to take over the command of the IXth Corps after the failure at Suvla. There may have been reasons for allowing him to leave France then which did not exist in June, but had it been possible it might, perhaps, have been better to appoint him in the first instance. In the result the choice practically lay between Sir Frederick Stopford and another Lieutenant-General whom Sir Ian Hamilton considered for physical reasons to be unsuited for trench warfare, and Sir Frederick Stopford was appointed. It is only to this extent that Sir Ian Hamilton can be said to have asked for Sir Frederick Stopford.

Sir Frederick Stopford was an officer with a good record, but he had not been actively employed for some time.

The qualifications mentioned by Sir Ian Hamilton would apply equally to the Divisional Commanders. As regards these we find little or nothing in the evidence that reflects on the capacity for command in the field of Sir Bryan Mahon, who had trained and commanded the 10th Division in Ireland. Major-General Hammersley had similarly trained and commanded the 11th Division, upon which the heaviest of the fighting at Suvla fell, and in ordinary course he took out his Division to the Gallipoli Peninsula. We think this was unfortunate, as he had suffered from a breakdown some two years before; and although he had apparently recovered, his previous illness may account for the want of promptitude and decision which, we regret to say, he appears to have shown when faced by what were, no doubt, exceptional difficulties. The 13th Division was commanded by Major-General F. C. Shaw, who proved himself to be well qualified for the appointment. Sir Ian Hamilton detached this Division from the IXth Corps and placed it at Sir William Birdwood's disposal. Major-General the Hon. J. E. Lindley commanded the 53rd Territorial Division. The Division was much split up and disintegrated as soon as it landed at Suvla, and on August 17th he resigned the command, his reason being that he understood Sir Ian Hamilton to be dissatisfied with him and thought that his Division might have a better chance under another commander. Major-General F. S. Inglefield, commanding the 54th Territorial Division, was 60 years old when he took out the Division to the Gallipoli Peninsula, and at this age was, perhaps, hardly equal to the strain of field service under specially arduous conditions.

THE OPERATIONS IN AUGUST AT HELLES AND ANZAC.

66. The operations in August were, as we have already said, divided into three attacks, one at Helles, one at Anzac, and one at Suvla. These attacks were made by three distinct forces not in direct communication with one another. The control of operations so divided was difficult, and Sir Ian Hamilton decided that the best position from which he could exercise such control was Imbros, where he had his headquarters. He was then in cable communication with the three Corps Headquarters, and could reach any one of them in less than an hour. This choice of Imbros has been criticised, but we think that the reasons given for it are satisfactory.

The attack at Helles was made on the same day as the other attacks—August 6th, 1915. Its scope and form were, as has been said, to be determined solely with reference to its effects on the main operations, and it was directed against certain Turkish trenches mentioned in the Instructions to General Officer Commanding, VIIIth Corps. Unfortunately, when it was made these trenches were found to be occupied by a very strong force of Turks collected there for the purpose of an attack on the British position. The British attack on that day failed, but fighting continued for about a week, the severest taking place round what was called the Vineyard, a plot of ground 200 yards long by 100 yards wide. No substantial success was obtained by this fighting so far as an advance was concerned, but the result was to keep the Turkish troops in that part engaged and to draw some reinforcements from other parts of the Peninsula which could otherwise have been employed at Anzac or Suvla. In view of the fact that the Turks were in sufficient force to resist the attacks at Anzac and Suvla, we think the value to be attached to the subsidiary operations at Helles must remain problematical.

Instructions
to G.O.C.,
and
N.Z. Army
Corps,
30 July,
1915.
Q. 21308.
Instructions
for G.O.C.,
IXth Corps,
29 July,
1915.

67. The operations at Anzac and Suvla were more nearly connected with one another than with those at Helles, and the operation orders relating to them will be found in the Appendix. It will be seen that certain times are specified at which important points were to be occupied. We are of opinion that, considering the nature of the country, it was impossible to rely upon this time-table being carried out, but we do not think that the accurate carrying out of the time-table was vital to the general success of the operations. The principal assistance to be given to the Anzac Force by the troops landing at Suvla was the seizure of Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe, on account of the presence there of artillery likely to interfere with the Anzac Force, and any other help by moving troops up the slopes of Sari Bahr was only to be given, if possible, after the fulfilment of the primary mission of the General Officer Commanding IXth Corps, i.e., securing Suvla Bay as a base. In fact, Ismail Oglu Tepe was never occupied, but we have not any evidence to show that the presence of artillery on that hill had any material effect on the Anzac attack.

68. For the purpose of the attack from Anzac General Birdwood's force had been reinforced by the 13th Division, the 29th Brigade of the 10th Division, and the 29th (Indian) Brigade. These had been taken over to the Peninsula at night and concealed in dug-outs near the shore so that they might escape the notice of the Turks. This operation seems to have been carried out with credit to those engaged in it, and to the Dominion troops who prepared the dug-outs.

Sir William Birdwood had under his command 37,000 rifles and 72 guns, and he could count on naval support from two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. The force was divided into two main portions—one (consisting of the Australian Division together with the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades and two Battalions of the 40th Brigade), which was to hold the existing position and make frontal attacks from it; the other (consisting of the New Zealand and Australian Division, less the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, the 13th Division less five Battalions, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, and the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade), which was to attack the Chunuk Bahr ridge. The 29th Brigade of the 10th Division less one Battalion and the 38th Brigade were in reserve.

Q. 11817, 8
Sir Ian
Hamilton's
Despatch,
11 Decem-
ber, 1915.
(In Appen-
dix.)

69. About 5 p.m. on August 6th, the operations began by an attack on the position known as Lone Pine, its main object being to divert the enemy's attention and reserves from the principal attack on the Sari Bahr heights. The position is described by Sir Ian Hamilton as having been strongly entrenched and obstinately held. According to his despatch it was carried with great gallantry by the Australian troops, and held against counter-attacks which were continued until August 12th. The assault on Lone Pine was presumably effective in keeping a considerable Turkish force from opposing the main attack on the Sari Bahr heights.

Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatch, 11 December, 1915. (In Appendix.)

It may be here mentioned that two minor attacks were also made with the same object as the attack on Lone Pine, namely, to distract the enemy's attention from the main attack on the Sari Bahr heights. The first of these minor attacks took place at midnight on the 6th, and was directed on a Turkish trench opposite the extreme right of the Anzac front; the second took place at 4.30 a.m. on the 7th, and was directed on a point called Baby 700, just north of Hill 180, opposite the centre of the Anzac front. Both these attacks were repulsed with heavy loss.

Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatch, 11 December, 1915. (In Appendix.)

Beginning at 9.30 p.m. on the 6th, the flanking or encircling movement on the Chunuk Bahr ridge and Sari Bahr was made in two covering and two attacking columns. The constitution of these columns and the tasks assigned to them are thus described in the despatch :—

"It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success.

"(1) The right covering force was to seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere ravines. If this enterprise succeeded it would open up the ravines for the assaulting columns, whilst at the same time interposing between the right flank of the left covering force and the enemy holding the Sari Bahr main ridge.

"(2) The left covering force was to march northwards along the beach to seize a hill called Damakjelik Bahr, some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. If successful it would be able to hold out a hand to the IXth Corps as it landed south of Nebrunesi Point, whilst at the same time protecting the left flank of the left assaulting column against enemy troops from the Anafarta valley during its climb up the Aghyl Dere ravine.

"(3) The right assaulting column was to move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines to the storm of the ridge of Chunuk Bahr.

"(4) The left assaulting column was to work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe), the summit of the whole range of hills.

"To recapitulate, the two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damajelik Bahr, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the IXth Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sari Bahr from any forces of the enemy which might be assembled in the Anafarta valley.

"The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir Alexander J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division. The two covering and the two assaulting columns were organized as follows :—

"Right Covering Column, under Brigadier-General A. H. Russell.—New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.

"Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

"Left Covering Column, under Brigadier-General J. H. Travers.—Headquarters 40th Brigade, half the 72nd Field Company, 4th Battalion South Wales Borderers, and 5th Battalion Wiltshire Regiment.

"Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox.—29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

"Divisional Reserve.—6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment and 8th Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the 39th Infantry Brigade and half 72nd Field Company at Aghyl Dere."

70. The right covering column took Old No. 3 Post and Table Top, both of them stated to be positions of great strength, and so opened up the Sazli Beit Dere and also cleared the Chailak Dere; in doing so it had to pass a barbed wire obstacle of a formidable nature. It also occupied Bauchop's Hill, described as a "maze of ridge and ravine everywhere entrenched."

Sir Ian
Hamilton's
Despatch,
11 Decem-
ber, 1915.
(In
Appendix.)

The left covering column advanced up the Aghyl Dere, rushing the Turkish trenches on the way, and occupied Damakjelik Bahr, thus protecting the left rear of the whole Anzac attack.

The right assaulting column advancing over difficult country reached Rhododendron spur, a point 500 yards west of Chunuk Bahr.

The left assaulting column advanced up the Aghyl Dere, which divides into a northern and southern branch, and one half of the column followed the northern half and got across into the northern end of the Azma Dere ravine. The other half followed the southern branch and reached the lower slopes of Hill Q, a point on the Sari Bahr ridge a little lower than the highest point—Koja Chemen Tepe—and separated from it by a deep ravine.

Sir Ian
Hamilton's
Despatch,
11 Decem-
ber, 1915.
(In
Appendix.)

This was the position on the afternoon of August 7th, and that evening the force was re-organized for a fresh advance to take place on the early morning of the 8th. The despatch states:—

"The columns were composed as follows:—

"Right Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand Infantry Brigade, two Battalions 13th Division, and the Maori Contingent.

"Centre and Left Columns.—Major-General H. V. Cox.—21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Infantry Brigade (less one Battalion), with 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

"The right column was to climb up the Chunuk Bahr ridge; the left column was to make for the prolongation of the ridge north-east to Koja Chemen Tepe, the topmost peak of the range."

71. On August 8th the only important success was attained by the right column, which succeeded in occupying Chunuk Bahr, an important position, though it was not one from which the Straits could be seen. The centre and left columns met with such heavy opposition that they were unable to make any material advance, and the left suffered so heavily that it had to be withdrawn to its original position.

Sir Ian
Hamilton's
Despatch,
11 Decem-
ber, 1915.
(In
Appendix.)

On August 9th, 1915, the attack was renewed, with the troops again re-arranged in three columns, whose constitution and objectives were thus described:—

"The columns for the renewed attack were composed as follows:—

"No. 1 Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiments, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two Battalions of the 13th Division.

"No. 2 Column, Major-General H. V. Cox.—21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Brigade (less the 7th Gloucesters, relieved), with the 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.

"No. 3 Column, Brigadier-General A. H. Baldwin, Commanding 38th Infantry Brigade.—Two Battalions each from the 38th and 29th Brigades and one from the 40th Brigade.

"No. 1 Column was to hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 6th, and, in co-operation with the other columns, to gain the whole of Chunuk Bahr, and extend to the south-east. No. 2 Column was to attack Hill 'Q' on the Chunuk Bahr ridge, and No. 3 Column was to move from the Chailak Dere, also on Hill 'Q.' This last column was to make the main attack, and the others were to co-operate with it."

72. A part of No. 1 Column, under the command of Major, now Lieutenant-Colonel Allanson, consisting of a detachment of the 6th Gurkhas and of the 6th South Lancashire Regiment (450 strong), succeeded in getting to a point on the ridge from which the Straits and the country on the far side could be seen. The exact point which they reached is not quite clearly ascertained, but it probably was at or near the top of the Chunuk Bahr ridge, near the highest point, which is called Koja Chemen Tepe. From this point the Narrows could be seen.

They were afterwards driven back by artillery fire to the trenches in which they had been the night before, and later in the day were counter-attacked by the Turks in force and driven down the hill.

The suggestion has been made that this artillery fire came from the British ships, and Lieutenant-Colonel Allanson inclined to this view. But Colonel Allanson's account is that the salvo struck his men when they were pursuing the Turks a short distance down the reverse slope; and we accept Sir William Birdwood's opinion that, if the Gurkhas were on the reverse slope near the crest, it would have been impossible for naval guns to hit them. We do not think it possible to say whether the shells were Turkish or came from the high-angle fire of our howitzers putting a barrage on the reverse slopes. As Sir Alexander Godley remarks, it is often not possible in a modern battle to be quite certain as to particular facts.

Q. 11758.
Q. 21301.
Q. 15702.

73. No. 3 column, under Brigadier-General Baldwin, which was attacking the same ridge from another direction, was unfortunately deflected to the left, in the direction of a place called The Farm, and never reached the ridge. In Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch it is said that Brigadier-General Baldwin, through no fault of his own, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way. Sir Alexander Godley thinks it possible that General Baldwin did not exactly lose his way, but was driven rather to the left on to the lower slopes leading to The Farm by the heavy rifle and machine-gun fire which was sweeping the higher ground up which he should have gone. General Baldwin, with most of his staff, was killed very soon afterwards, and therefore it is impossible to ascertain what actually occurred.

Sir Ian
Hamilton's
Despatch,
11 Dec. 1915
(In
Appendix.)
Q. 11801.
QQ. 15559-
15657.

74. No progress of any importance had been made from Suvla, and there was nothing in the operations in that area to divert the Turkish reinforcements from Sari Bahr. Thus the counter-attacks in that direction, which finally drove the British troops from the ridge, could be made in full strength.

General Baldwin, on arriving at The Farm, and finding that he could not reach the ridge according to the original plan, deployed his attack where he was, and some of his men charged up their side of the slope. The Turks, who were in overwhelming numbers, drove them back to The Farm, and then attacked the New Zealand troops which were holding Chunuk Bahr; but the New Zealanders, though much exhausted, continued to hold the position until relieved during the night.

On August 10th, 1915, the Turks, in great strength, attacked Chunuk Bahr and carried it. They also turned the flank of General Baldwin's column, and drove it from its position. It was in this fighting that General Baldwin and all his staff were killed. Reserves were sent up and the Turks driven back, but they kept their hold on Chunuk Bahr.

Sir Ian
Hamilton's
Despatch,
11 Dec. 1915
(In
Appendix.)

Sir Ian Hamilton says that he thought at one time of throwing his reserves into the Anzac battle, but was prevented from doing so because he feared that the water supply at Anzac would not be sufficient for a larger number of troops. Sir William Birdwood told us that he did not think he could have provided water for more troops; but it seems doubtful, in any case, if the reserves could have been put into the fighting line in time to save the situation.

Q. 21372.
Q. 21325.
QQ. 13108-
13109,
21324.

75. The country over which these operations were carried out was extremely difficult. General Cox describes it in this way: "It was an extraordinarily difficult bit of country and a confused country. There does not seem to be any reason why the hills should go where they do. It has been done by tremendous rushes of water. It is mad-looking country and very difficult." The ground was very steep and without paths or tracks, broken up into gullies and tangled hollows, and covered with thick scrub. The weather, too, was very hot, and the climate very trying, even to the Australian and New Zealand troops, who had been acclimatised for several months; and much more so to the British troops, who had not been long out of England. A very hard task was therefore set to the troops. Sir William Birdwood, who presumably knew the country so far as it could be known, thought that the attack ought to succeed, and that the difficulties of the country would help him to surprise the Turks; and both he and Lieutenant-General Godley ascribe the failure to the Turks being in too strong force. Sir William Birdwood says "They were too strong for us. They were just too strong, but only just, because we got up there in two places, but we could not maintain ourselves." Sir Alexander Godley says "The enemy was too strong for us."

Q. 15669.

QQ. 13075-
13078.

Q. 11784.

Q. 21305.
QQ. 21307.
21311.
Q. 15570.

THE OPERATIONS AT SUVLA.

76. We think it is necessary to review in some detail the operations at Suvla, as these have given rise to controversy between the principal officers concerned, and led to the removal from their commands of the Commander of the IXth Corps, one of the Divisional Commanders, and one of the Brigade Commanders.

The outline of Sir Ian Hamilton's plans for a landing at Suvla and subsequent operations is contained in a letter dated July 22nd, 1915, from the Chief of the General Staff of the Mediterranean Force to the General Officer Commanding the IXth Corps, which is annexed to this Report. In this letter the strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr was estimated at 30,000, 12,000 occupying trenches opposite the Anzac position and most of the remainder being in reserve at Boghali, Kojadere, and Eski-Keui. There were believed to be three battalions in the Anafarta villages, one battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe, one battalion on Chocolate Hill, and outposts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba. The ridge of Karakol Dag and Kiretch Tepe Sirt was understood to be held by gendarmerie. It was further stated that at or near Chocolate Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe there were one 9.2 inch gun, one 4.7 inch gun, and three field guns, protected by wire entanglements and infantry trenches. Three field guns were reported later as having been seen moving into Anafarta Sagir.

77. On July 29th further instructions, which appear among the appendices to Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, were issued to the General Officer Commanding the IXth Corps. Therein it was laid down that the primary objective would be to secure Suvla Bay as a base for all forces operating in the northern zone, and that, owing to the difficult nature of the terrain at Suvla, the attainment of this objective might possibly require the use of all the troops at Sir Frederick Stopford's disposal. If, however, troops could be spared, his next step should be to assist the General Officer Commanding at Anzac in the latter's attack on Koja Chemen Tepe by an advance on Buyuk Anafarta. Subject only to his final approval, Sir Ian Hamilton gave Sir Frederick Stopford a free hand in regard to the plan of operations at Suvla, and the latter was requested to submit a plan for approval as soon as possible. The plan was submitted in a letter dated July 31st, 1915, and met with Sir Ian Hamilton's full approval. In this letter Sir Frederick Stopford recorded his conviction that to secure the reasonable immunity of Suvla Bay from shell fire, the occupation of the high ground from Ejelmir Bay to Anafarta Sagir and thence to Koja Chemen Tepe was essential. He also laid stress on the improbability of his being able to spare troops to assist the Anzac force in the attack on Koja Chemen Tepe. On receipt of Sir Ian Hamilton's approval, Sir Frederick Stopford issued an Operation Order, dated August 3rd, 1915, in which the following task was assigned to General Hammersley:—

- (a) To safeguard the landing places.
- (b) To occupy the enemy posts of Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba, and to establish a footing along the ridge from Ghazi Baba through Karakol Dag and Kiretch Tepe Sirt to Hill 156, immediately overlooking Ejelmer Bay.
- (c) To occupy Chocolate Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe.
- (d) To seize Baka Baba and establish connexion northwards between that point and the troops advancing on Hill 156.

This was an extremely ambitious programme for one division, and only part of it was carried into effect. It is noticeable in this operation order that, although the two brigades of the 10th Division were mentioned in the list of available troops, no reference was made to the divisional commander, Sir Bryan Mahon, a Lieutenant-General of considerable seniority, nor was any duty assigned to these brigades.

78. General Braithwaite's letter and instructions of July 22nd and 29th, and Sir Frederick Stopford's Operation Order of August 3rd, give the following information in regard to the units detailed for the Suvla operations. According to the letter of July 22nd the force placed at Sir Frederick Stopford's disposal for the landing was to consist of the 11th Division under General Hammersley, the 10th Division (less the 29th Brigade) under Sir Bryan Mahon, two batteries of Highland Mountain Artillery, and the 1/4th Lowland

Howitzer Brigade. The table appended to the letter includes among the Divisional troops of the 11th Division two out of three Brigades of Field Artillery and one Heavy Battery, the third Brigade of Field Artillery having been landed at Helles. No mention is made in the table of the Divisional Artillery of the 10th Division.

In the instructions of July 29th the Lowland Howitzer Brigade was omitted, and three squadrons of the R.N. Armoured Car Division, R.N.A.S., each armed with six machine guns, were added. It was stated that the following units were being despatched from Alexandria: the three squadrons of the R.N. Armoured Car Division, three Brigades of Field Artillery belonging to the 10th Division, one Brigade of Field Artillery belonging to the 11th Division, and two Brigades of Field Artillery belonging to the 13th Division. As one Brigade of Field Artillery belonging to the 11th Division had been landed at Helles, it would appear that only one Brigade of Field Artillery was actually attached at the time to that Division.

In the Operation Order of August 3rd it was stated that one Brigade of Field Artillery belonging to the 11th Division and one Heavy Battery with their horses would land at Anzac, and proceed thence along the beach to join the Division on its landing at Suvla. The two Highland Mountain Batteries and one squadron of the R.N. Armoured Car Division (motor cycles) were to land at Suvla. There is no record of the date and place of landing of the other two squadrons of the R.N. Armoured Car Division, which consisted of Ford cars and armoured cars.

The question of the artillery actually available at Suvla is discussed in paragraph 9 of a "Statement in connection with Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch of 11th December, 1915." This statement was drawn up by Sir Frederick Stopford by direction of the Adjutant-General, and is dated February 16th, 1916. The paragraph is as follows: "As regards other points in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch which affect the IXth Corps, the description of the troops at my disposal is incorrectly stated. He states that at my disposal 'was placed the IXth Army Corps, less the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of the 10th Division.' He should have stated that the 10th Division had no artillery, and that of the artillery of the 11th Division only one brigade of artillery was available until 12th August, and of it only one battery was available for the fighting of August 7th-8th."

Further information on the subject is given in General Braithwaite's instructions which were handed to General de Lisle on August 15th, when the latter called at Imbros on his way to replace Sir Frederick Stopford in the command of the IXth Corps. It would appear that at that date the artillery actually available at Suvla consisted of two mountain and two heavy batteries, and one brigade of field artillery.

Sir Frederick Stopford's contention as to the paucity of artillery is in substance supported by the evidence of General De Lisle.

79. And here it may be convenient to attempt some description of the ground in the vicinity of Suvla Bay. The area bordering the Salt Lake is low, and doubtless swampy in wet weather. In the dry season it is bare and open until the ground begins to rise. Then high grass and bush appear, the bush being mostly a prickly variety of ilex, very hard and tough. The bush in many cases increases in density and height as the hills get higher. The country can hardly be described as well watered during the dry season, but a moderate amount of water is procurable by those who know where to look for it and how to get it.

The following remarks by Sir Ian Hamilton on the nature of the ground at and near Suvla are of interest. In a letter to Lord Kitchener, dated August 12th, 1915, he wrote: "The whole of the flattish plain east of Suvla Bay is covered with thick trees up high above your head, small and big dongas, long grass, etc. In these a very considerable number of Turkish snipers are concealed, sometimes up in the trees, sometimes down in hollows among the grass. . . . Supposing the Essex (161st Brigade of the 54th Division) make good their footing on the high hills north of Anafarta, there will always remain the problem of getting their mule convoys through this dense bush without being too much harried or losing too many mules." Again, in a letter to Lord Kitchener, dated September 1st, 1915, he described the Suvla Bay country as "a jungle ringed round by high mountains." Again in his despatch of December 11th, 1915, he referred to Ismail Oglu Tepe as follows: "The hill rises 350 feet from the plain with steep spurs jutting out to the west and south-west, the whole of it covered with dense holly oak scrub, so nearly impenetrable that it breaks up an attack and forces troops to move in single file along goat tracks between the bushes." In the same despatch, describing an attack on August 12th by the 163rd Brigade on Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, about 2,000 yards north-east of the north-east corner of the Salt Lake, he records the mysterious disappearance of the commanding officer, 16 officers, and 250 men of the 1/5th Norfolk Regiment, who charged into the forest, were lost to sight or sound, and never reappeared.

Q. 7479.

In his evidence before us Sir Ian Hamilton gave the following description: "The actual heights to get up were difficult. They were hills very thickly clothed with scrub and jungle with paths, but rather difficult for a man with his pack on to force his way through; but all the background of the bay was too open and too flat. It had one great advantage, that that was the only part of the Peninsula where the guns of the ships could really command the ground."

Taking into consideration this and other evidence bearing on the subject, it may, we think, be concluded that the country in the vicinity of Suvla Bay must seriously have impeded military operations, more particularly in the way of breaking up concerted movements, and rendering night operations hazardous if not almost impracticable. The ground east of Anzac was more intricate and more broken, but the natural difficulties at Suvla were of a formidable character.

80. The impression conveyed by the Intelligence reports which were communicated to Sir Frederick Stopford and Major-General Hammersley was that little opposition would be met with on landing except perhaps at Lala Baba, until the occupation of Chocolate Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe was attempted. The time of landing was fixed for the evening of August 6th, and in drafting his divisional orders Major-General Hammersley had to consider whether Chocolate Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe should be attacked from the north-west or south-west. He decided in favour of the former alternative. His orders to the three brigades of his division were as follows:—

The 34th Brigade on the left to land at the original A Beach 800 yards west of Hill 10; one battalion to move north towards Kiretch Tepe Sirt and occupy Suvla Point; one battalion to occupy Hill 10; the remaining two battalions to concentrate at Hill 10. These three battalions at Hill 10 then to move to the assault of Chocolate Hill, and if successful, to the assault of Ismail Oglu Tepe.

The 32nd Brigade in the centre to land at C Beach; to assault and occupy Lala Baba, and then move north along the sand-spit in support of the 34th Brigade.

The 33rd Brigade on the right to land at B Beach about a mile south-east of Nibrunesi Point; two battalions to hold the line from the south-east corner of the Salt Lake south-westerly to the shore. Two battalions to follow the 32nd Brigade along the sand-spit to a point 800 yards east of Hill 10, there to form the divisional reserve with the divisional Pioneer Battalion (6th East Yorkshire Regiment).

The artillery to concentrate at Lala Baba, where the divisional report centre was to be established.

81. For the transport of the division from Imbros ten destroyers and ten lighters were allotted—three of each for each brigade, and one of each for divisional headquarters, signal section, cyclists, and engineers. From 500 to 550 men were embarked on each destroyer and lighter, and there was much congestion, especially on the lighters. The men went on board on the afternoon of the 6th, and were on board with no room to move about from six to eight hours before disembarking. Some reserve ammunition and water were carried on the lighters, but, for reasons mentioned in that portion of our Report which deals with the water arrangements, the water was not distributed, and on the disembarkation of the men the lighters at once left the shore. The flotilla was ready and started at 6.30 p.m. The Pioneer Battalion, one battery Royal Field Artillery, and the 4th Highland Mountain Brigade of two batteries followed later. At 10.30 p.m. the flotilla arrived opposite the points of disembarkation. The disembarkation of the 34th Brigade did not work smoothly. The original "A" beach proved unsuitable for landing owing to reefs, and the Brigade actually landed towards the south end of the sand spit instead of opposite Hill 10, the lighters grounding some 100 yards from shore. The landing was opposed by shrapnel fire from Hill 10 and rifle fire from Lala Baba and the sand spit. The 11th Manchester Regiment moved along the beach towards Suvla Point and Karakol Dag, and carried out the task assigned to it.

Brigadier-General Sitwell, commanding the 34th Brigade, landed about 3.30 a.m. on the 7th and directed the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers to assault Hill 10. The battalion proceeded after some delay and confusion in that direction, and occupied the highest sand dune north of the Cut, under the impression that this dune was Hill 10. The remaining two battalions of the 34th Brigade began to land on the sand spit about 2.30 a.m. on the 7th and their landing was completed by 5 a.m.

At 11 p.m. on the 6th the two leading battalions of the 32nd Brigade landed at a point between B and C beaches, and after considerable resistance Lala Baba was occupied. The remaining two battalions followed and concentrated at Lala Baba. This Brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Haggard.

Immediately after landing on the 7th Brigadier-General Sitwell asked for assistance from Brigadier-General Haggard, who sent a detachment from Lala Baba along the sand spit towards the Cut.

The 33rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Maxwell, landed at B beach without opposition. Two battalions took up and entrenched a line from the S.E. corner of the Salt Lake south-westerly to the shore. The remaining two battalions proceeded to Lala Baba with a view to occupying subsequently their assigned position east of Hill 10 as divisional reserve.

Shortly before daylight much desultory fighting took place between the Cut and Hill 10. Several isolated attempts to capture Hill 10 failed and the troops engaged fell back towards the Cut. Meanwhile, General Haggard had joined General Sitwell, the latter being the senior Brigade Commander in the division. By 6 a.m. a fresh attack on Hill 10 was organised, the force being drawn from the 32nd and 34th Brigades. This attack succeeded, the Turks retiring in a north-easterly direction.

At 6.30 a.m. General Sitwell reported to the Divisional Commander that his troops could not move eastward, this message apparently not reaching General Hammersley before 8 a.m.

82. We must now turn to the landing of the 10th Division, less one brigade detached to Anzac, this division being commanded by Lt.-General Sir Bryan Mahon.

It was originally intended that the two available brigades, the 30th and 31st, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Nicol and Hill, together with the divisional Pioneer Battalion, should land at A beach due west of Hill 10. This beach proved impracticable for landing, and a suitable place called New A beach was eventually found in a cove about a mile east of Suvla Point and about 1,000 yards east of Ghazi Baba. On the arrival of the 10th Division from England between July 16th and 21st six battalions, namely, two battalions of the 30th Brigade and the whole of the 31st Brigade, had been sent to Mitylene under General Hill, the remaining two battalions of the 30th Brigade under General Nicol, plus the divisional Pioneer Battalion, being at Mudros, where also was the divisional Commander with his head quarters. Sir Bryan Mahon received instructions about the Suvla landing on July 28th or 29th, but having failed to obtain a vessel to convey him to Mitylene he was unable to give any personal orders regarding disembarkation and subsequent action to General Hill, and his endeavour to communicate orders by cypher telegram failed. None of the artillery of the 10th Division landed until August 10th. General Hill, followed by his six battalions, arrived at Suvla from Mitylene at daylight on August 7th, and was at once summoned to the "Jonquil," where he saw Sir Frederick Stopford about 6 a.m. He was directed by the latter to land at C beach, to get into touch with the General Officer commanding the 11th Division, and to act under his orders. If he failed to get into touch, he was to advance and support the troops of the 11th Division and also to make good the occupation of Ghazi Baba and Karakol Dag. Having selected a place west of Lala Baba for his troops to form up, General Hill went to the headquarters of the 11th Division and saw General Hammersley about 8 a.m., who directed him, as soon as his troops were landed and concentrated, to move out along the sand-spit to the north-west corner of the Salt Lake, and thence to make an attack on Chocolate Hill, his right resting on the Salt Lake and his left being covered by troops of the 32nd and 34th Brigades, which would operate towards Ismail Oglu Tepe. QQ. 11312-11314.

It must here be mentioned that only five out of the six battalions from Mitylene actually landed on August 7th at C Beach. One of the battalions of the 31st Brigade arrived too late on the 7th to join the force under General Hill and was sent across the bay to New Beach A, where it landed on the afternoon of the 7th or the morning of the 8th and came for the time being under the orders of General Nicol commanding the 30th Brigade. Q. 11391. Sir Bryan Mahon with the headquarters of the 10th Division, General Nicol with his brigade staff, two battalions of the 30th Brigade, and the divisional Pioneer Battalion landed early on the morning of August 7th at New Beach A. Previous to landing Sir Bryan Mahon saw Sir Frederick Stopford, who ordered him to push on as far as possible along the ridge of Karakol Dag and Kiretch Tepe Sirt in the direction of Ejelmer Bay. These orders were carried out so far as the small force at Sir Bryan Mahon's disposal would permit. The 11th Manchester Regiment, which was a battalion of the 34th Brigade, and which after occupying Suvla Point had advanced up Karakol Dag before Sir Bryan Mahon's landing, took part in the movement along the ridge.

83. From the foregoing account it will be seen that on the morning of August 7th the force at Suvla was allocated as follows by the Corps Commander:—At the disposal of Major-General Hammersley, the whole of the 11th Division, less one battalion of the

34th Brigade (11th Manchester Regiment), plus 5 battalions of the 10th Division under Brigadier-General Hill. At the disposal of Lieutenant-General Sir Bryan Mahon two battalions of one of his brigades (the 30th Brigade) plus his divisional Pioneer Battalion, plus one battalion of the 34th Brigade of the 11th Division (the 11th Manchester Regiment). It will also be observed that the change in the scheme for distributing the troops when landed at Suvla on August 6th and 7th was largely due to the impracticability of disembarkation at the original Beach A and the unavoidable delay which occurred in finding the new Beach A.

It will further be noticed that the advance up Karakol Dag and Kiretch Tepe Sirt, which had been assigned by the Corps Commander to Major-General Hammersley, was in fact undertaken by Sir Bryan Mahon.

84. At 8.45 a.m. General Sitwell, whose report centre was south of Hill 10, received orders from General Hammersley for the 32nd and 34th Brigades to push on towards Chocolate Hill on the arrival of the 31st Brigade, which would operate on the left, moving with its own right on Ismail Oglu Tepe. This message apparently emanated from the divisional report centre at Lala Baba, at 8 a.m., at which hour General Hammersley had seen General Hill and told him to operate on the right of the 32nd and 34th Brigades with Chocolate Hill as his objective. At 8.55 a.m. General Sitwell communicated the order he had just received to the commanders of three battalions of his own Brigade, but gave no instructions to the 32nd Brigade, possibly because General Hammersley's orders had been repeated to General Haggard, the commander of that brigade.

Shortly afterwards General Sitwell, on his own initiative, directed two battalions of the 32nd Brigade to form an entrenchment from Hill 10 to the Cut. Their employment in this manner seems to us to have been inconsistent with General Hammersley's order, and to have shown on General Sitwell's part a lack of the offensive spirit necessary to success.

85. Meanwhile about 10 a.m. three battalions out of the five under General Hill's command had landed and concentrated near Lala Baba. Having given instructions to the commanding officers of these battalions, General Hill preceded them along the sand spit for the purpose of arranging with General Haggard for the joint advance on Chocolate Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe. He met General Haggard, who pointed out that he was under General Sitwell's orders and could only act under instructions from that officer. He next met General Sitwell to whom he explained the orders he had received from General Hammersley.

General Sitwell replied that he had himself received different orders from General Hammersley and, according to General Hill's account, that it was impossible for him to co-operate in the proposed advance on Chocolate Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe. General Sitwell, however, states that he informed General Hill that he could only spare two battalions out of the 32nd and 34th Brigades in support of General Hill's three battalions. Be this as it may, General Hill, believing that he could get no support from General Sitwell, decided to return to General Hammersley's headquarters at Lala Baba and report the situation. About this time General Haggard was severely wounded and General Sitwell for the time being assumed the direct command of the 32nd Brigade in addition to that of the 34th Brigade. After General Hill had left, General Sitwell detailed two battalions of the 32nd Brigade and one battalion of the 34th Brigade to be in readiness to support General Hill's battalions as soon as they came up. On his way back to divisional headquarters General Hill met his three battalions advancing along the sand spit north of Lala Baba and ordered them to halt and await further orders. On reaching headquarters he found that General Hammersley was away, but a General Staff Officer of the division informed him that the instructions previously given him by General Hammersley were correct, and that General Sitwell would be so informed. General Hill thereupon returned to his troops and again set them in motion towards and across the Cut and thence to the east of Hill 10, with a view to an advance on Chocolate Hill. This was about 12.45 p.m. General Hill did not personally accompany his first three battalions, but followed with his two remaining battalions which by that time had landed and were concentrating near Lala Baba. On arrival in the vicinity of Hill 10 at about 2.45 p.m. General Hill found that his three leading battalions had circled round the north-east corner of the Salt Lake and were ready to move on Chocolate Hill, but that no battalions of the 32nd or 34th Brigade had been sent to co-operate on his left towards Ismail Oglu Tepe. At 3 p.m. he telephoned to divisional headquarters to that effect, adding that he had seen General Sitwell, who told him that two battalions would be sent forward. Just before the despatch of this message an order, timed 2.40 p.m., was issued from divisional headquarters to the effect that the advance would be suspended for the present and resumed at 5.30 p.m. Two

battalions of the 33rd Brigade with the Brigade Commander, General Maxwell, would leave their position near Lala Baba and move with their right flank immediately north of the Salt Lake, so as to come on the right of General Hill's troops. The general direction of the advance was to be on Chocolate Hill. The advance was to be supported by all the troops of the 32nd and 34th Brigades who had not suffered heavy casualties. General Sitwell was to command the attack, and these brigades, as well as the troops under General Hill, would act under General Sitwell's orders. The divisional artillery near Lala Baba would cover the attack, their fire beginning at 5.15 p.m. This order, which was addressed to the 31st, 32nd and 34th Brigades, reached General Hill shortly after 3.15 p.m., and was no doubt received by General Sitwell and General Maxwell about the same time. General Hill states that General Sitwell supported the advance on the right flank with the two battalions of the 33rd Brigade under General Maxwell about 4 p.m. and that the 32nd and 34th Brigades took no part in the attack on Chocolate Hill and Hill 70. On the other hand, General Sitwell states that one battalion of the 32nd Brigade and one battalion of the 34th Brigade followed General Hill's troops in support and a second battalion of the 32nd Brigade in reserve, and that he saw these three battalions engaged with the enemy. General Maxwell states that two battalions of the 34th Brigade operated on the left of General Hill's troops. The advance began somewhat earlier than had been ordered, but the artillery opened fire at the prescribed time, 5.15 p.m. Chocolate Hill was captured, but no attempt was made to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe. It is not clear at what time and by what troops the capture of Chocolate Hill was effected. In the War Diary of the 31st Brigade it is recorded that Chocolate Hill was in the possession of that brigade at 5.30 p.m. while General Hill, who commanded the brigade, states that Chocolate Hill was taken about dusk, and that in his opinion there was no reason why Ismail Oglu Tepe should not have been taken also, had the available battalions of the 32nd and 34th Brigades advanced more promptly on his left. He describes the Turkish opposition as not being very formidable. General Maxwell, who commanded the 33rd Brigade, ascribes the capture of Chocolate Hill solely to the action of his two battalions, and gives the time of its being taken as 7.20 p.m. General Sitwell states that he was in telephonic communication with one of the two battalions of the 33rd Brigade, which reported at 11.30 p.m. that Chocolate Hill had been carried at 9.30 p.m.

Q. 12999.

Q. 10706.

Q. 12861

2.

Q. 10702.

3.

Q. 10706.

10719.

86. None of the three Brigadier-Generals concerned in the attack on Chocolate Hill, Generals Sitwell, Hill and Maxwell, accompanied the troops. They established their report centres to the south of Hill 10, about two miles distant from Chocolate Hill, and remained there. In view of the distance and the nature of the country they can have seen but little of what was going on, and though no doubt they may occasionally have been in telephonic communication with some of their battalion commanders, the latter's outlook was limited and their responsibility was confined to what concerned their respective battalions. In the absence of superior military control and guidance on the spot, a force of inexperienced troops, unacquainted with local conditions and consisting of a number of battalions drawn from five brigades—namely, two from the 30th, three from the 31st, two from the 32nd, two from the 33rd and one from the 34th—must have been lacking in cohesion and co-operation, and the evidence discloses the confusion and delay which resulted from this cause.

Apparently Brigadier-Generals Sitwell, Hill, and Maxwell remained near each other at their several report centres until just before midnight on August 7th. General Sitwell then decided that General Hill should proceed to Chocolate Hill in order personally to ascertain the situation, and the latter set out at the time mentioned. On his own initiative General Sitwell directed General Hill to send back the following battalions which had been employed in the attack on Chocolate Hill with a view to their rejoining their respective brigades: the two battalions of the 32nd Brigade to the sand dunes south of Hill 10; the two battalions of the 33rd Brigade to Lala Baba; and the one battalion of the 34th Brigade to the brigade reserve south of Hill 10. At 7.30 a.m. on August 8th General Hammersley visited General Sitwell at the latter's report centre, informed him that there was no enemy in the direction of Baka Baba, and suggested his joining General Hill on Chocolate Hill. The suggestion, however, was not pressed, and General Sitwell remained where he was.

It may here be mentioned that in his account of the attack on Chocolate Hill, which differs in some respects from the accounts of the three brigade commanders concerned, General Hammersley states that when he issued his order for the attack at 2.40 p.m. on August 7th, it was his intention that Ismail Oglu Tepe as well as Chocolate Hill should be captured, though no reference was made in the order to the former objective. He also

states that the battalion of the 34th Brigade which took part in the operation was seriously engaged and its commanding officer severely wounded ; that Chocolate Hill was captured by 7.30 p.m. ; that up to 700 yards from the Turkish position all the fighting was done by General Hill's troops ; and that in the final stage of the attack the two battalions of the 33rd Brigade advanced with great steadiness.

87. On August 7th Sir Frederick Stopford remained with Admiral Christian on board the "Jonquil," where he considered himself to be in the best position to communicate with General Headquarters and with his subordinate commanders on shore.

88. The distribution of the troops of the 11th Division on the morning of August 8th is described by General Hammersley as follows. One field battery and two mountain batteries were at Lala Baba. The 32nd Brigade was concentrated near Hill 10, except a detachment of two companies on the southern slopes of Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Two battalions of the 33rd Brigade were south of the Salt Lake and two at Lala Baba. Two battalions of the 34th Brigade were near Hill 10, one battalion was east of Hill 10, and one (the 11th Manchester Regiment) was on Kiretch Tepe Sirt. The divisional pioneer battalion (6th East Yorkshire Regiment) was at Lala Baba.

At this time the five Irish battalions under General Hill, which had been left in their advanced position when the other troops were withdrawn to the neighbourhood of the beach, appear to have been still holding Chocolate Hill and the ground in its vicinity.

The troops generally were much exhausted by the heat, thirst, and fighting of the previous day, besides which many men and parties were scattered owing partly to the mixing up of brigades and units in the attack on Chocolate Hill, and partly to straying in search of water, carrying and accompanying the wounded to the rear, and so on. We have, in fact, reason to believe that a considerable number of stragglers had collected at or near the shore.

The following movements took place on August 8th. One battalion of the 32nd Brigade, the 6th Yorkshire Regiment, owing to the losses which it had sustained, was replaced by the divisional Pioneer Battalion, the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment, and this brigade under the command of Colonel Minogue was ordered to take up a line running north and south through Sulajik, so as to get into touch on the north with a battalion of the 34th Brigade (the 5th Dorset Regiment), and on the south with the troops under General Hill. In the course of the afternoon Hill 70 was occupied by the Pioneer Battalion, and the huts at Sulajik were put in a state of defence, with trenches surrounding them, by the 67th Field Company, R.E.

The 5th Dorset Regiment and the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers, also belonging to the 34th Brigade, were put under the orders of Sir Bryan Mahon, and so remained until August 12th, when they rejoined the 11th Division.

The 11th Manchester Regiment of the 34th Brigade, which on the 7th was acting under Sir Bryan Mahon, rejoined its brigade from Kiretch Tepe Sirt.

The 7th South Staffordshire Regiment of the 33rd Brigade was sent to reinforce the troops under General Hill.

89. On August 8th, Sir Frederick Stopford had been anxious to push on, and had informed his two divisional commanders that he regarded it as being of the greatest importance to forestall the enemy on the high ground north of Anafarta Sagir and on the spur running thence to Ismail Oglu Tepe. The divisional commanders, however, represented that, though they would do what they could, they doubted the possibility of a further advance on that day, the troops being much exhausted by continuous fighting and lack of water. Sir Frederick Stopford was also influenced by the fact that the artillery at his disposal consisted of only one field battery and two mountain batteries, and that the troops of the 10th and 11th Divisions had been much scattered in the operations of August 7th. He decided therefore to postpone the attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta Sagir ridge until dawn on the 9th. It was arranged to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe from Chocolate Hill, and the Anafarta Sagir ridge from the north-west between Baka Baba and Chocolate Hill, the 33rd Brigade with one battalion of the 31st Brigade on the right, the 32nd Brigade on the left, and two battalions of the 34th Brigade in reserve. It appears from Sir Frederick Stopford's report to Sir Ian Hamilton of the operations of the 9th Corps, dated October 26th, 1915, that on August 8th the former informed his two divisional commanders that, in view of the inadequate artillery support, he did not want them to let their men make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but they were to push on as far as possible and try to turn any trenches they came across. In his despatch to the Secretary of State for War, dated December 11th, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton drew special attention to this passage in Sir Frederick Stopford's report and paraphrased it as follows :—

"General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them, so far as was possible, to try and turn any trenches that were met with." He added: "Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of August 8th." It is obvious that in one material respect the paraphrase differs from the instruction which embodied three injunctions. First, to abstain from frontal attacks on entrenched positions; secondly, to push on as far as possible; and, thirdly, to try to turn any trenches which were encountered in pushing on. The second injunction is not mentioned by Sir Ian Hamilton, and the expression "as far as possible," which formed part of that injunction, is tacked on to the third.

Sir Ian Hamilton explains that in writing his despatch he had before him two documents from Sir Frederick Stopford—one, a memorandum to the Military Secretary, dated August 28th,* written by Sir Frederick Stopford on board ship after he had been relieved of his command; the other, the report sent to Sir Ian Hamilton himself by General Stopford, dated October 26th—and that he inadvertently took up the former instead of the latter and quoted from it this sentence, which occurs textually in it as quoted, without the addition of "push on as far as possible." But in the early part of the paragraph in which the sentence occurs there is emphatic mention that Sir Frederick Stopford instructed his divisional generals to push on, and the sentence itself ends with a reiteration of the supreme importance of forestalling the enemy.

We think these facts show that there was some misunderstanding on the part of Sir Ian Hamilton as to the purport of the memorandum of August 28th and the report of October 26th, and we are of opinion that his criticism is so worded as to obscure Sir Frederick Stopford's specific intention and injunction that the troops should push on as far as possible.

In the despatch Sir Ian Hamilton also referred to naval gunfire as compensating for the paucity of the available field and mountain artillery. Sir Frederick Stopford appears to have considered that in the absence of a preparatory bombardment the frontal attack of Turkish entrenchments would probably prove fruitless and entail heavy losses, and that as the trenches were not continuous the better course would be to push on between or past them, thus taking them in flank or reverse. As regards naval gunfire, Sir Frederick Stopford probably concurred with Admiral de Robeck in regarding such fire with its low trajectory as being ineffective against the deep trenches of the modern type, though effective enough against troops in the open or occupying shallow trenches. This view accords with much of the evidence which has been laid before us, while the importance of preparatory bombardment before making frontal attacks on deep entrenchments is confirmed not only by what repeatedly occurred on the Gallipoli Peninsula, but by the experience of our troops on the Western Front, where, the German trenches being continuous, attacks other than frontal are impossible.

Sir Ian Hamilton, who was at Imbros, received telegraphic reports of what was taking place at Suvla on August 7th from the commander of the 9th Corps. In particular there was a message despatched at 10 a.m. on August 8th, reporting the position of the troops of the 11th Division at the time of despatch, and remarking that Major-General Hammersley and the force under his command deserved great credit for the results achieved. Presumably the capture of Chocolate Hill had been previously reported. The following message, despatched from Imbros at noon on August 8th, was sent by Sir Ian Hamilton to Sir Frederick Stopford:—"You and your troops have indeed done splendidly. Please tell Hammersley how much we hope from his able and rapid advance. Ian Hamilton." With regard to this message, Sir Frederick Stopford informed us that the result of the operations on the night of the 6th and day of the 7th was not as satisfactory as he would have liked, but he gathered from Sir Ian Hamilton's congratulations that his dispositions and orders had met with the latter's approval.

90. Reverting to Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch of December 11th, 1915, we find it stated that the General Staff officer who had been sent from General Headquarters to Suvla early in the morning of the 8th reported by telegraph unfavourably as to the failure of our troops to take full advantage of the opportunities which were presenting themselves. But before this telegram was received, Sir Ian Hamilton had made up his mind from Sir Frederick Stopford's reports that all was not going well at Suvla, and he resolved himself to proceed thither, which he did, starting from Imbros at 4 p.m. and reaching Suvla an hour later. Sir Ian Hamilton's congratulatory telegram to Sir Frederick Stopford is hardly consistent with his conviction as recorded in the despatch, QQ. 7480-2

* This document, in the copy furnished to us, is dated August 18th, but we have ascertained from Sir Frederick Stopford that August 28th is the correct date.

that all was not well at Suvla. It may, perhaps, have been written by Sir Ian Hamilton (as he said in his evidence) late on the 7th, or early on the 8th, as soon as the news of the capture of Chocolate Hill reached him; but if so we do not understand why its despatch from Imbros should have been delayed until noon on the 8th.

It is difficult to be certain as to the true explanation of this, but we do not consider the matter of great importance, as it is clear that for some reason Sir Ian Hamilton became dissatisfied on August 8th with the progress of operations, and consequently left Imbros for Suvla in the afternoon.

On arrival at Suvla Sir Ian Hamilton at once saw Sir Frederick Stopford on board H.M.S. "Jonquil," where, up to that time, the headquarters of the 9th Corps had been accommodated, pending their establishment on shore near Ghazi Baba. After a brief interview on the "Jonquil," Sir Ian Hamilton's account of which is inconsistent with that of Sir Frederick Stopford, Sir Ian Hamilton proceeded to visit Major-General Hammersley at Lala Baba. Sir Frederick Stopford did not accompany Sir Ian Hamilton to Lala Baba, and a good deal of conflicting evidence has been laid before us by these two officers with reference to his not doing so. The probable explanation of the incident is that Sir Frederick Stopford had only just returned from personally giving instructions to Major-General Hammersley for the proposed operations at dawn on the 9th, and his attendance on shore not being requested by Sir Ian Hamilton, he saw no object in again visiting Major-General Hammersley.

91. Sir Ian Hamilton arrived at Major-General Hammersley's headquarters about 6 p.m., and in his despatch of December 11th, 1915, he describes the conversation which took place, and the extent to which he modified the orders previously given by Sir Frederick Stopford for the attack next morning. Sir Frederick Stopford and Major-General Hammersley had decided against a night attack, but Sir Ian Hamilton thought that the advantages of such an attack in the matter of forestalling the enemy outweighed its disadvantages, and hearing that the 32nd Brigade was more or less concentrated and ready to move he gave General Hammersley a direct order that, even if it were only with this brigade, the advance should begin at the earliest possible moment instead of at dawn the next morning as previously arranged. Sir Ian Hamilton further directed that the 32nd Brigade should endeavour to occupy the heights north of Anafarta Sagir, presumably Tekke Tepe, but beyond giving these orders he states that he did nothing and said not a word calculated to affect the attack as originally planned. In his despatch he speaks of the thirteen battalions detailed for the attack, but the correct number appears to be eleven, namely, four battalions of the 33rd Brigade, together with one from the 31st Brigade, on the right, with Ismail Oglu Tepe as the objective; four battalions of the 32nd Brigade on the left, with Anafarta Sagir as the objective; and two battalions of the 34th Brigade in reserve. It will be remembered that the remaining two battalions of the 34th Brigade had been placed at Sir Bryan Mahon's disposal on the morning of August 8th.

92. Sir Ian Hamilton's description of the nature and scope of his intervention is not fully corroborated by Sir Frederick Stopford and General Hammersley. Thus Sir Frederick Stopford points out in his report of October 26th, 1915, that his intention had been to make a concentrated attack upon the front stretching from Ismail Oglu Tepe to Anafarta Sagir, a distance of 4,100 yards, while under Sir Ian Hamilton's direct orders the front to be attacked was extended northward from Anafarta Sagir to Tekke Tepe, lengthening the front by an additional 2,200 yards. Moreover, the advance on this northern extension was through extremely difficult ground covered with dense bush, which had not been reconnoitred, and this greatly militated against the success of a night operation. Sir Frederick Stopford says in his report that, in view of the radical changes made by Sir Ian Hamilton in his plans and dispositions for the attack at dawn on the 9th, he repudiates any responsibility for the results of the action.

General Hammersley states that Sir Ian Hamilton's personal instructions quite upset the pre-arranged plans, and obliged him to re-issue his divisional orders late in the evening. Difficulty was experienced in communicating with the battalions of the 32nd Brigade, which were less concentrated than General Hammersley had supposed, and in the result only one battalion together with a section of engineers advanced in the direction of Tekke Tepe before 4 a.m. on the 9th.

The change in the plan of operations approved by Sir Frederick Stopford was not communicated to him either by Sir Ian Hamilton or by General Hammersley. Sir Ian Hamilton states that he thought it would be reported by General Hammersley, and General Hammersley states that it did not occur to him at the time that he

ought to report it. Later on, he imagines, the change was reported by some member of his staff to some member of the corps staff. We think that this was an unfortunate omission. Sir Frederick Stopford might have expected to hear from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and was entitled to hear from his divisional commander, in what respects his scheme of attack had been modified by direction of superior authority. If, however, Sir Frederick Stopford had accompanied Sir Ian Hamilton to Lala Baba, and been present at the latter's interview with General Hammersley, the alteration in the plan could not have been made without his knowledge.

93. At the end of the interview between Sir Ian Hamilton and Major-General Hammersley, the latter sent a General Staff officer to the commander of the 32nd Brigade with instructions to concentrate the brigade at Sulajik as soon as possible, and thence to occupy the high ground about Tekke Tepe before daybreak, at least one battalion being used for the purpose—preferably the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment. One battalion of the brigade was already at Sulajik; a second battalion reached that place without difficulty or delay; the third battalion, the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment, only got its orders to move from Hill 70 to Sulajik at 11 p.m., and did not arrive until 3 a.m. on the 9th; while the fourth battalion, the 9th West Yorkshire Regiment, had got out of touch in the thick bush near Abrikja at nightfall, never received the order to concentrate, and remained where it was. At 3.30 a.m. on the 9th the brigade commander sent on the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment with the 67th Field Company, Royal Engineers (less one section), to secure Tekke Tepe, supporting the advance with another battalion, and retaining the third at Sulajik. On reaching a point about 1,000 yards south of Tekke Tepe, the head of the column was attacked by the Turks in superior strength; the Commanding Officers of the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment and the 67th Field Company, Royal Engineers, were killed; and many officers and men were killed or wounded. Shortly afterwards two machine guns were lost. Meanwhile the battalion in support, pushing up on the left of the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment, lost its commanding officer and suffered heavy loss. Eventually the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment and the battalion supporting it, the 8th West Riding Regiment, fell back, and continued their retirement until about noon they reached a point about 1,000 yards westward of Sulajik near the north-east corner of the Salt Lake. Here General Sitwell with two battalions of the 34th Brigade had taken up his position at 6 a.m. and this served as a rallying point for the two retreating battalions of the 32nd Brigade.

The battalion of the 32nd Brigade left at Sulajik was joined at daybreak by the 9th West Yorkshire Regiment, which during the night had got out of touch near Abrikja. At 8 a.m. the Turks made a strong attack against our left at Sulajik which was held by these two battalions, and continued all day to press this attack, endeavouring to work round the left flank. Their attempts were repulsed.

94. It will be remembered that according to the original plan the attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe was to be carried out by the four battalions of the 33rd Brigade with one battalion of the 31st Brigade under General Maxwell. In General Hammersley's revised written orders, which were issued after the interview with Sir Ian Hamilton, certain changes were made. One battalion of the 33rd Brigade, the 9th Sherwood Foresters, was directed to take up the long line from Chocolate Hill to Damakjelic Bahr, so as to connect the extreme left of the Anzac troops with the force under General Hill. The 33rd Brigade being thus reduced to three battalions, General Hill was directed to place two instead of one of his five battalions at General Maxwell's disposal, and the objective of General Maxwell's force of five battalions was enlarged so as to include not only Ismail Oglu Tepe but the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir.

General Maxwell had reconnoitred the ground during the afternoon of the 8th, and observed that Hill 70 was occupied by the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment. He determined to place three of his battalions in front line, with one battalion in support of the centre and one in reserve. About 4.45 a.m. on the 9th the battalions were concentrated, and moved off to their several points of deployment. As soon as this movement began a heavy rifle fire broke out from the direction of Abrikja, and Chocolate Hill was shelled by the enemy. The right and centre battalions, however, pushed on towards the ridge near Ismail Oglu Tepe. The left battalion, on approaching Hill 70, found it occupied by the Turks instead of our own men, the 6th East Yorkshire not having been replaced when ordered away the previous evening. In aggravation of this mishap a considerable Turkish force from the north-east attacked the battalion at close quarters. From Hill 70 the centre battalion was taken in enfilade, and lost heavily. General Maxwell's advance was brought to a standstill and his left seriously threatened. It now became a question not of pushing the attack, but of holding on at all costs.

95. A reference must now be made to the 53rd Division, under the command of Major General Lindley, which on arrival at Mudros had been kept there as a general reserve for the combined operations which began on August 6th. This division was ordered to Suvla on August 8th. It consisted of three brigades—the 158th under Brigadier-General Cowans, the 159th under Brigadier-General Lloyd, and the 160th under Brigadier-General Hume. It had no artillery, only one Field Company R.E. without any stores, and only one Field Ambulance. The divisional Signal Company did not arrive until five or six days after the landing of its division, and when it did arrive it was attached to another division. The headquarters of the division with one battalion of the 159th Brigade were the first to arrive at Suvla, and landed at 7 p.m. on the 8th. The rest of the division landed during the night of the 8th and morning of the 9th. At 8.30 p.m. on the 8th Major-General Lindley received orders that two of his brigades, less one battalion for beach duty, were to be attached to the 11th Division for operations under General Hammersley on the following day. As soon as the troops became available they were pushed forward in the following order :—

At 7 a.m. one battalion, 160th Brigade, in support of the 33rd Brigade near Chocolate Hill.

At 9 a.m. two battalions, 159th Brigade, to report to General Sitwell at Hill 10.

At 9.20 a.m. one battalion, 160th Brigade, to reinforce the battalion already sent to Chocolate Hill.

At 10.55 a.m. the remaining two battalions, 159th Brigade, under General Lloyd, to report to General Sitwell at Hill 10.

At 6.35 p.m. one battalion of the 158th Brigade, the 1/1 Hereford Regiment, to strengthen the right flank of the 9th Sherwood Foresters, who had been pushed back with heavy loss to a position between Kazlar Chair and Hetman Chair.

96. After the reinforcements from the 53rd Division had joined the troops already in action the fight continued in a somewhat desultory fashion during the rest of the day, no serious reverse being sustained and no appreciable success being achieved. In the afternoon the bush caught fire behind three battalions under General Maxwell's command near Hill 70, and these battalions had to fall back towards Hill 50 and Sulajik.

At nightfall on the 9th the distribution of the troops was as follows :—

The 9th Sherwood Foresters and 1/1 Hereford Regiment near Hetman Chair.

Five battalions of the 10th Division under General Hill, with one field and one mountain battery on Chocolate Hill and Hill 50.

The 33rd Brigade, less the 9th Sherwood Foresters, plus two battalions of the 160th Brigade, under General Maxwell, from Hill 50 to the vicinity of Sulajik.

The 32nd Brigade, less one battalion, plus two battalions of the 159th Brigade at and to the north of Sulajik.

Two battalions of the 34th Brigade, with one battalion of the 32nd Brigade, further to the north.

The remaining two battalions of the 34th Brigade at point 28, west of Kuchuk Anafarta Ova under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the 10th Division.

Two battalions of the 159th Brigade, presumably under General Lloyd, near the north-east corner of the Salt Lake.

The 6th East Yorkshire Regiment (the Pioneer Battalion of the 11th Division), two field batteries and one mountain battery, at Lala Baba.

97. It will be observed that the units were as much mixed up on the evening of the 9th as they had been on the previous evening, and organisation by brigades was practically non-existent. It would also appear that in the plan of operations for August 9th, which was initiated by Sir Frederick Stopford, more or less modified by Sir Ian Hamilton, and finally elaborated by General Hammersley, no reference was made to the troops of the 53rd Division, nor was any specific place or duty assigned to them. Yet presumably it must have been anticipated by each of these officers that the 53rd Division, or part of it, would have landed by the morning of the 9th, because General Lindley, who was the first to land, got an order from the 9th Corps at 8.30 p.m. on the 8th that he was to place two of his brigades, less one battalion, at General Hammersley's disposal for the operations on the 9th. Uncertainty as to the exact time of their landing may perhaps have led to the exclusion of these seven battalions from the plan of operations for August 9th, while the unfortunate repulse on both flanks on the morning of that day caused them to be hurried to the scene of action as soon as they could be got ready. They were much scattered in consequence, and removed from the control of their own divisional and brigade organisations, and this cannot have conduced to their fighting

efficiency, especially as hardly any of their officers had been trained in the regular army or possessed previous war experience.

On August 8th and 9th Sir Bryan Mahon, commanding the 10th Division, but having with him of his own troops only two battalions of the 30th Brigade, one of the 31st Brigade, and his divisional Pioneer Battalion, supported by two battalions of the 34th Brigade which had been put under his orders, continued to push forward along Karakol Dag and Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and entrenched a north and south line through a point marked on the map by a bench mark on the latter. Sir Frederick Stopford states that, taking into account the small force at his disposal and the lack of artillery support, the progress of Sir Bryan Mahon was as satisfactory as could be expected.

We think that it was unfortunate that the 10th Division had no opportunity of acting as a division under its own commander at the critical stages of these operations.

98. Sir Ian Hamilton had spent the night of the 8th on board ship at Suvla and had watched General Hammersley's attack the next morning. After landing at Gaza Baba at about 8 a.m. he walked up the Karakol Dag ridge as far as the headquarters of the 30th Brigade. He then appears to have returned to Imbros. About 5 p.m. on the 9th Sir Frederick Stopford received a letter from General Braithwaite expressing the confident opinion that, if an attack of six or eight battalions could be organised under the command of a selected officer, and directed on Ismail Oglu Tepe and the ridge thence to Anafarta Sagir, the troops would attain their objective. The letter laid stress on the need for Sir Frederick Stopford's personal influence and driving power to get the operation driven through.

Sir Frederick Stopford regarded this letter as tantamount to an order from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. At the same time he was aware that the troops of the 11th Division and the seven battalions of the 53rd Division had lost heavily during the day's fighting and were considerably disorganised. There was, however, one brigade of the 53rd Division in reserve at Lala Baba which had not been engaged. Sir Frederick Stopford determined, therefore, to make the attack not with six or eight battalions only, as suggested in General Braithwaite's letter, but with the whole of the 53rd Division, less one battalion which had not yet landed, supported by the whole of the 11th Division.

At 7.50 p.m. on the 9th General Lindley received his orders for the attack which was to take place at 5 a.m. on the following day. He found great difficulty in collecting his scattered battalions. In fact, two battalions of the 160th Brigade seem to have remained with the 33rd Brigade near Hill 50. There were three battalions of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (158th Brigade) at Lala Baba, and these, with five other battalions (four of the 159th Brigade and one of the 160th Brigade) were eventually concentrated as two brigades near the position occupied by the 32nd Brigade at Sulajik. The right of this force moved south on Hill 70, but swung round to the west when about 200 yards from the top of the hill. It thus came under flank and reverse fire from the Turkish guns on Ismail Oglu Tepe and retreated, subsequently re-forming behind the 33rd Brigade. The centre and left of the force were at first more successful, but about 10.30 a.m. the left was rapidly driven back, and with the retirement of the centre the attack came to an end. Under the orders of the Corps Commander the attack was renewed, after some artillery preparation, at 5 p.m., but the opposition being greater than in the morning no headway was made, and the troops fell back to the alignment held the previous evening.

99. On August 10th Sir Frederick Stopford received orders from General Headquarters to take up and entrench a line across the whole front extending from Azmak Dere on the south through the knoll east of Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the 10th Division on Kiretch Tepe Sirt. In giving effect to this order on August 11th he took the opportunity of reorganising his divisions and brigades. The entrenchment of the line from Kazlar Chair to 600 yards south of Sulajik was assigned to the 11th Division, thence to the west of Kuchuk Anafarta Ova to the 53rd Division, and thence to Kiretch Tepe Sirt to the 10th Division. The length of this line was over 5 miles.

During this day the 54th Division arrived at Suvla and began to disembark at A beach. It had no artillery, no divisional signal company, no field ambulances, no ammunition, and no mules. The division was commanded by Major-General F. S. Inglefield, and consisted of the 161st Brigade under Brigadier-General Daniell, the 162nd Brigade under Brigadier-General De Winton, and the 163rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Brunner. Sir Frederick Stopford was directed not to employ the division without instructions from General Headquarters.

100. On the morning of August 12th General Stopford received orders from General Headquarters that the 54th Division was to make a night march that night and at dawn the next day to attack the heights of Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe and thence to Anafarta Sagir. The feasibility of a night march through an intricate and wooded country depends upon the absence of opposition along the route to be traversed, but in this case Sir Frederick Stopford had reason to believe that from Kuchuk Anafarta Ova eastward the ground was held by the enemy. He therefore decided to send forward the 163rd Brigade in the afternoon for the purpose of occupying Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and securing an unopposed night march for the remainder of the Division, at any rate as far as that place. In spite of serious opposition the 163rd Brigade succeeded in establishing itself at the desired point in very difficult and enclosed country. It was on this occasion that the officer commanding the 1/5th Norfolk Regiment with 16 officers and 250 men pursued the enemy into the forest, from which none of them ever emerged.

Sir
Frederick
Stopford's
Report,
dated 26th
October,
1915, para.
12.

In the course of the same afternoon General Headquarters enquired whether Sir Frederick Stopford was satisfied that the 54th Division could be supplied with food, water, ammunition, etc., if the troops succeeded in gaining the high ground which was their objective. Sir Frederick Stopford replied that he foresaw grave difficulty in supplying the division, as in such difficult and densely wooded country the convoys would be attacked and the mules shot or stampeded. Thereupon the orders for the night march and the attack on the heights were cancelled by General Headquarters.

101. On August 13th Sir Ian Hamilton informed Sir Frederick Stopford that, as soon as Sir William Birdwood was ready to co-operate, a simultaneous attack was to be made by the latter on Sari Bahr and by the 11th and 54th Divisions on Ismail Oglu Tepe. Sir Frederick Stopford prepared plans accordingly. As it appeared, however, that Sir William Birdwood could not then undertake a fresh attack on Sari Bahr the project was abandoned, and Sir Frederick Stopford was directed to confine his attention to strengthening the entrenched line across his front.

To straighten out the left of this line Sir Frederick Stopford on August 14th directed Sir Bryan Mahon to advance on the following day and gain possession of the whole of the top of Kiretch Tepe Sirt. The 54th Division was ordered to co-operate. On the morning of the 15th the two brigades of the 10th Division, the 30th and 31st, made a frontal attack along the ridge, while the 162nd Brigade of the 54th Division supported on the right. Gunfire from two men-of-war in the Gulf of Saros and from one mountain battery, one field battery, and one heavy battery was brought to bear on the Turkish position. At first the attack succeeded and the top of the ridge was captured by the 6th Dublin Fusiliers. The Turks, however, made a counter-attack, and after severe fighting and heavy casualties our troops had to fall back to their original alignment.

102. On the evening of August 15th Sir Frederick Stopford was relieved of the command of the 9th Corps and replaced for the time being by Major-General de Lisle. On his way from Cape Helles to Suvla Major-General de Lisle had called at Imbros, seen Sir Ian Hamilton, and received formal instructions from Major-General Braithwaite. In these instructions he was informed that his immediate and most urgent concern was to reorganise the 9th Corps, and to prepare as large a proportion of it as possible for a fresh attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe, and the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir. The force placed at his disposal consisted of the 10th Division, less the 29th Brigade, the 11th, 53rd and 54th Divisions, and the 2nd Mounted Division, composed of about 4,000 dismounted men, which was expected to reach Suvla from Egypt by August 18th. As regards artillery, two mountain batteries, two heavy batteries and one field artillery brigade had been landed at Suvla. One field artillery brigade and two batteries of 5-inch howitzers had been landed at Anzac and were at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the 9th Corps as soon as horses could be provided to mobilise them. Three more field artillery brigades and two batteries of 4-5 inch howitzers were at Mudros, ready to be brought up as soon as they could be landed, but they would have to be landed without horses and taken into position by the horses of other units.

103. On assuming command of the 9th Corps, Major-General de Lisle investigated the situation at Suvla and represented to General Headquarters the desirability of strengthening the force at his disposal by bringing over the 29th Division from Helles. This proposal commended itself to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the 29th Division landed at Suvla on August 20th. The 2nd Mounted Division under Major-General Peyton had landed two days before. The attack was fixed for August the 21st and Major-General de Lisle's plan, which met with Sir Ian Hamilton's approval, was as follows :—The 53rd and

54th Divisions to hold the enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt; the 11th Division on the right and the 29th Division on the left to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe and the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir. In support the 2nd Mounted Division of Yeomanry, and in reserve what remained of the two Brigades of the 10th Division. It was arranged with Sir William Birdwood that a force of nine battalions should co-operate by advancing from Damakjelic Bair so as to connect with the southern end of the outpost line of the 9th Corps near Kazlar Chair. It had been decided to attack in the afternoon, and it so happened that a fog came on which seriously interfered with the preliminary bombardment of the enemy's position from 2.30 p.m. to 3 p.m. The advance was begun at 3 p.m. by the 11th Division, the 34th Brigade rushing the Turkish trenches between Hetman Chair and Aire Kevak. In his despatch Sir Ian Hamilton states that this was done practically without loss, but Major-General Hammersley does not agree. He has informed us that one battalion lost five out of its seven officers before reaching the Turkish trenches and that by the end of the day the losses of this and of another battalion were extremely heavy. The 32nd Brigade, moving direct against Hetman Chair and the communication trench thence eastward to Ismail Oglu Tepe, lost its proper direction by inclining too much to the north and came under a heavy enfilade fire. The brigade swung round to attack the communication trench from the north, but the attempt failed although successive lines advanced with conspicuous gallantry. Major-General Hammersley attributes this brigade's loss of direction to the fact that its right battalion lost all its officers within the first few hundred yards. The 33rd Brigade, which was in divisional reserve, started from Lala Baba shortly after 3 p.m. towards Hetman Chair in support of the 34th and 32nd Brigades. During this movement some confusion arose from the 2nd Mounted Division, which was marching from Lala Baba to Chocolate Hill, cutting across the line of advance of the 33rd Brigade and temporarily separating the two battalions in front from the two battalions in the rear. The confusion was increased by a fierce bush fire which had started north of Hetman Chair. In the result the 33rd Brigade lost direction, part of it moving south-east towards Susak Kuyu and part to the north of the Turkish communication trench. So far as the 11th Division was concerned the operation had failed.

Meanwhile at 3.30 p.m., the 29th Division attacked Hill 70. The trenches on the hill were carried by the 87th Brigade on the left, but the 86th Brigade was brought to a standstill by the bush fire. Moreover its right was not supported owing to the 32nd Brigade having deviated from the proper direction. Later on the 86th Brigade fell back to a point south-west of Hill 70, where a little cover was obtainable, and eventually the division withdrew to its previous position.

Later on in the afternoon the 2nd South Midland Brigade of the 2nd Mounted Division was sent forward from its position behind Chocolate Hill in the hope that some substantial success might yet be achieved. The bush fire and the enemy's opposition retarded the brigade's advance and it was almost nightfall before it reached the valley between Hill 70 and Hill 100 on Ismail Oglu Tepe. A knoll near the centre of this valley was captured by one of the regiments of the brigade as soon as it was dark, but as this knoll was commanded by the enemy's trenches and could not be held in the day-time unless we were in possession of Ismail Oglu Tepe, the regiment and the brigade to which it belonged were ordered back to Chocolate Hill. It appears therefore that so far as the 29th Division and 2nd Mounted Division were concerned the operation had failed.

The casualties in the 9th Corps on August 21st were approximately as follows:—In the 11th Division, 58 out of 129 officers and 2,300 other ranks out of 6,400. In the 29th Division a little under 5,000 officers and men. In the 2nd Mounted Division which was about 4,000 strong, 1,200 officers and men, or 30 per cent.

The force under Major-General Cox, which had been detailed to co-operate with the 9th Corps on August 21st, advanced in three sections, the left to establish connection with the outpost line of the 11th Division near Kazlar Chair, the centre on Kabak Kuyu where there was a good supply of water, and the right on the Turkish trenches at Kaiajik Aghala. The advance of the left and central sections was successful. The right section met with obstinate resistance, but effected a lodgment on Kaiajik Aghala before nightfall and held on during the night against superior force. The next morning an additional battalion reinforced this section, and after several attacks and counter-attacks a line from Kaiajik Aghala northward to Susak Kuyu was taken up and strengthened and subsequently connected with the right of the 9th Corps.

104. On August 27th, Sir William Birdwood again detailed a force under Major-General Cox to complete the capture of Hill 60, immediately north of Kaiajik Aghala. The troops consisted of detachments from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and the 5th Connaught Rangers. The advance was made

at 5 p.m. and after severe fighting lasting through the night, the next day, and up to 1 a.m. on August 29th, the hill was captured. Our casualties on this occasion amounted to 1,000.

This was the last engagement of any serious importance at or in the vicinity of Suvla up to its evacuation.

105. We have already mentioned that Sir Frederick Stopford vacated the command of the IXth Corps on August 15th, and that Major-General Lindley resigned the command of the 53rd Division on August 17th. On August 18th Brigadier-General Sitwell was relieved of the command of the 34th Brigade on account of an adverse report on his capacity for command by Major-General Hammersley. Under orders from the War Office Major-General Hammersley was relieved of the command of the 11th Division on August 23rd. He received at the time a telegram from General Headquarters to the effect that no communication on the subject of his relief had emanated from Sir Ian Hamilton, but that presumably the War Office considered his age a bar. Major-General Hammersley was then nearly 57. On August 24th Major-General de Lisle vacated the temporary command of the IXth Corps and reverted to the command of the 29th Division, being replaced by Lieutenant-General the Hon. J. Byng. The reason for Lord Kitchener's action in regard to Sir Frederick Stopford and Major-General Hammersley appears to be as follows. In a telegram to Lord Kitchener, dated August 14th, Sir Ian Hamilton reported that the result of his visit to the IXth Corps had bitterly disappointed him. He remarked: "There is nothing for it but to allow them (the troops at Suvla) time to rest and re-organize, unless I force Stopford and his Divisional Commanders to undertake a general action for which, in their present frame of mind, they have no heart. In fact, they are not fit for it." Lord Kitchener replied on the same date inquiring whether Sir Ian Hamilton had any competent Generals to take the place of Sir Frederick Stopford, Sir Bryan Mahon and Major-General Hammersley. He added: "From your report I think Stopford should come home. This is a young man's war, and we must have commanding officers who will take full advantage of opportunities which occur but seldom. If, therefore, any Generals fail, do not hesitate to act promptly. Any Generals I have available I will send you." Sir Ian Hamilton answered the foregoing telegram on the same date to the effect that the one man on the spot who could pull the IXth Corps together again was Major-General de Lisle. He remarked: "Unfortunately Mahon is senior to de Lisle, but I could not put him in command of the Corps at present, though as Divisional General he has done better than others, and I would ask him to accept the position. . . . I hope you will agree to this and give de Lisle the temporary rank of Lieutenant-General." Lord Kitchener again telegraphed on the same date to the effect that he was asking Sir John French to supply one Corps Commander and two Divisional Generals, and had suggested the name of Lieutenant-General Byng for the Corps Command, and that it was better not to act definitely until he had heard what Sir John French could do.

It will be observed that this telegraphic correspondence between Sir Ian Hamilton and Lord Kitchener hardly bears out the telegram received by Major-General Hammersley from General Headquarters when he was relieved of his Divisional Command.

106. Sir Ian Hamilton has urged us to investigate and express our opinion on certain incidents which occurred in connection with Sir Frederick Stopford's removal from his command.

Sir Frederick Stopford was replaced by Major-General de Lisle on August 15th, and left forthwith for England. He thereupon ceased to be under Sir Ian Hamilton's orders, and on his way home he wrote a memorandum, dated August 28th, in which he gave an account of the operations at Suvla from the landing up to the day of his departure. On reaching London he forwarded this memorandum to the Military Secretary at the War Office for Lord Kitchener's information. On August 14th the telegraphic correspondence mentioned in the preceding paragraph had taken place between Sir Ian Hamilton and Lord Kitchener. This was followed by a telegram from Sir Ian Hamilton, dated August 17th, in which the operations at Anzac and Suvla were described and commented on. A telegram, dated August 22nd, was then sent by Lord Kitchener to Sir Ian Hamilton, desiring him to transmit the operation orders and other instructions relating to the Suvla operations; and Sir Ian Hamilton replied on the same date that these documents had been forwarded by the last King's Messenger, who had left three days before.

On receipt of the documents a synopsis was prepared, and Lord Kitchener decided to assemble a Committee of senior General Officers at the War Office for the purpose of considering them, together with Sir Ian Hamilton's telegrams of August 14th and 17th and Sir Frederick Stopford's memorandum.

Q. 10467.

War Office
telegram
No. 1814.

War Office
telegram
No. 1815.

War Office
telegram
No. 1822.

War Office
telegram
No. 1816.

War Office
telegram
No. 1853.

War Office
telegram
No. 7231.

M.F.
No. 577.

A copy of the memorandum was forwarded by the War Office to Sir Ian Hamilton on his return to England, and he does not appear to have taken exception to it at that time.

We understand Sir Ian Hamilton's present contention to be that Sir Frederick Stopford was not entitled to forward the memorandum of August 28th to the Military Secretary, except through himself as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force; and that the memorandum, being an irregular and *ex parte* statement, should have been debarred from consideration until he had been furnished with a copy and given an opportunity of expressing his views thereon.

The question raised by Sir Ian Hamilton being one of military discipline, and of administrative action on the part of Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War, its consideration appears to us to lie outside the scope of our enquiry.

107. Sir Beauvoir de Lisle attributes the failure on August 21st chiefly to the want of artillery. He states that there was not as much artillery on shore at Suvla as is normally assigned to a single division. About three-quarters of the artillery of one division had to support the attack of three divisions. Secondly, he is of opinion that the troops landed at Suvla before the date of his assuming command of the IXth Corps had gone through a very trying experience, and that hardship, heat and thirst, coupled with futile attacks and repeated failures, had for the time being worn them out, shaken their self-reliance, and dulled their fighting spirit. Thirdly, he considers that the staff work generally had been indifferent and that consequently the troops had suffered more than they ought to have done. Sir Beauvoir de Lisle gives no specific instance of this indifferent staff work as coming under his own observation, while he speaks in high terms of the professional qualifications of the Brigadier-General, General Staff, of the IXth Corps, Brigadier-General Reed, V.C. He had no confidence in the fitness of Major-Generals Lindley and Hammersley for divisional commands in the field, and he thought that Major-General F. S. Inglefield, who at the time was 60, was too old for the command of the 54th Division. He was in favour of the evacuation of Suvla, which he regarded as the only thing to do when we had the factor of surprise no longer in our favour, and for the same reason he would have evacuated Helles and Anzac and abandoned the enterprise in June, as by that time there was no prospect of ultimate success. He described the operations planned by him for August 21st as having a defensive rather than an offensive object. He attacked in order to prevent the Turks from attacking.

Q. 16223.

Q.Q. 16185-16250.

Q. 16241.

108. Sir Beauvoir de Lisle has spoken of the staff work in the IXth Corps as not being up to the proper standard, and certain incidents have come to our notice which support this allegation. General Hammersley put forward in his evidence a *précis* of the more important messages received at and issued from the headquarters of the 11th Division at Lala Baba, from 5 a.m. to 5.40 p.m., on August 7th. A message was sent by General Sitwell at 6.30 a.m. that his troops were unable to move eastward from the vicinity of Hill 10, the order having been that they should so move for the capture of Chocolate Hill. To this message no reply was sent, but at 8 a.m. another order was issued to General Sitwell that his troops and those of the 32nd Brigade were to advance on Chocolate Hill, supported on the left by the force under General Hill, which was to advance on Ismail Oglu Tepe. About the same time General Hill was told by General Hammersley that, when he reached the 32nd and 34th Brigades in the vicinity of Hill 10, he with the five battalions under his command was to operate on the right towards Chocolate Hill, the battalions of the 32nd and 34th Brigades operating on the left towards Ismail Oglu Tepe. Up to this time General Sitwell had shown no inclination to move forward, and the discrepancy between these orders, so far as concerned the tasks assigned to the several brigades, led to his neither taking action himself nor co-operating with General Hill. Again, when the final order for the combined attack on Chocolate Hill under General Sitwell's command was issued at 2.40 p.m., no mention was made in it of Ismail Oglu Tepe as one of the objectives, though General Hammersley has informed us that he intended an attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe to form part of the operation. So far as we can judge, the orders emanating from General Hammersley's headquarters on August 7th were lacking in coherence and precision.

Q. 10340.

Q. 11032-7.

General Hammersley's Statement, p. 7.

109. The unfortunate incident of the withdrawal of the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment from Hill 70 on the evening of August 8th, without its being replaced, also appears to indicate defective staff work. General Hammersley's account of this incident is far from clear. He tells us that he sent the 7th South Staffordshire Regiment belonging to

the 33rd Brigade to reinforce General Hill at Chocolate Hill on the morning of the 8th, that General Hill ordered it forward at noon with directions to picket Hill 70 and entrench, but that Hill 70 was already occupied by the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment. Later on he tells us that the latter regiment advanced, under considerable fire to the western slopes of Hill 70, that the fire became so intense that the Commanding Officer resolved to wait until dusk before occupying the hill, and that after dusk the hill was carried, and the troops began to entrench themselves. Later on, he tells us that after his interview with Sir Ian Hamilton, he sent instructions to the Officer Commanding the 32nd Brigade at Sulajik, nominating the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment for the advance by night to Tekke Tepe, because he thought the battalion in question had been the least used so far, and was therefore the freshest. The battalion got orders to move from Hill 70 to Sulajik at 11 p.m., and owing to the darkness and thick bush did not arrive there until 3 a.m. No battalion was directed to replace the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment on its vacating Hill 70, which the Turks promptly re-occupied. In our opinion, General Hammersley did not know on August 8th that Hill 70 had been occupied, though this must have been known to General Hill, and is stated in evidence to have been observed by General Maxwell when he reconnoitred the ground east of Chocolate Hill. It would seem that these subordinate commanders or their staff took no steps to acquaint the divisional commander or his staff with what had occurred in regard to Hill 70.

Q. 10573.

The failure to replace the 6th East Yorkshire Regiment when ordered from Hill 70 to Sulajik entailed many fruitless attempts to recapture the hill and much unnecessary loss of life.

110. Again, it will be seen on reference to para. 78 of this Report that on July 29th the General Officer Commanding IXth Corps was led to expect that he would be supplied with a considerable force of artillery, including seven brigades of field artillery—namely, the three brigades belonging to the 10th Division, two out of the three brigades belonging to the 11th Division, and two out of the three brigades belonging to the 13th Division. Up to August 8th only one field battery was available at Suvla, from August 9th to August 15th only one brigade of field artillery was available, and for the operations of August 21st Major-General de Lisle states that he had at his disposal only about three-quarters of the artillery of a division to support the attack of three divisions.

We think that the absence of the artillery and horses available at Alexandria and Mudros must have materially contributed to the failure at Suvla.

111. We have already mentioned Sir Ian Hamilton's personal intervention on the afternoon of August 8th and the consequent alteration in the scheme of attack which Sir Frederick Stopford had previously decided on. We regard the intervention as well-intentioned but injudicious. In the modified scheme the scope of the operations was enlarged so as to include the high ground near Tekke Tepe, but the difficulties of reaching and holding this ground were not appreciated, and in the result the attack in that direction was repulsed with heavy loss. Moreover, the withdrawal of troops for the movement on Tekke Tepe prejudicially affected the attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe, which also failed. We cannot say whether the original scheme would have succeeded, but we think that it had more chance of success than the scheme which took its place.

112. The combined operations so carefully planned were a failure, and the losses incurred at Helles, Anzac, and Suvla had been extremely heavy. As regards Anzac, Sir Ian Hamilton remarks in his despatch: "The grand coup had not come off. The Narrows were still out of sight, and beyond field-gun range. But this was not the fault of Sir William Birdwood, or any of the officers and men under his command." As regards Suvla, he remarks that the units of the 10th and 11th Divisions had shown their mettle in the act of landing, when they stormed Lala Baba, when they tackled Chocolate Hill, and when they drove the enemy from Hill 10. He continues: "Then had come hesitation. The advantage had not been pressed. The senior commanders at Suvla had had no personal experience of the new trench warfare; of the Turkish methods; of the paramount importance of time. Strong, clear leadership had not been promptly enough applied." He concludes by stating that for these reasons he had replaced Sir Frederick Stopford by Major-General de Lisle.

113. It must be remembered that a great part of the fighting at both Anzac and Suvla was not trench warfare, but hill warfare. Hill warfare is not an easy business for troops unaccustomed to it, even when the hills are bare and the slopes normal, but its difficulties are greatly increased when the hills are covered with forest or dense

bush, and the slopes are precipitous. The difficulties are further intensified if the operations are undertaken at night. Certain general principles for the guidance of commanders who may propose to undertake night operations have been authoritatively set forth in Field Service Regulations, 1914, Part I, Chapter IX, particular stress being laid on the importance of a complete preliminary reconnaissance. Local conditions at Anzac and Suvla did not admit of the thorough reconnaissance prescribed in this Chapter. Exceptional conditions may justify a departure from established tactical rules, and we do not doubt that Sir Ian Hamilton carefully balanced the advantages of surprise and immunity from hostile fire against the risk of misdirection, confusion, and delay. In the opinion of Sir William Birdwood and Sir Frederick Stopford night attacks were justified by the special circumstances. Still, having regard to the results, the history of the operations at Anzac and Suvla seems to us to substantiate the soundness of the Regulations on this subject.

It may be mentioned, that in the telegram set out in para. 24 of this Report, Lord Kitchener had referred to night attacks without confessing any opinion thereon.

114. In his despatch, Sir Ian Hamilton describes Koja Chemen Tepe as the dominating point, the acquisition of which would necessarily lead to the capture of Maidos and Kaba Tepe, would enable the bulk of the Turkish Army to be cut off from land communication with Constantinople, and would give our artillery such a command as to stop all sea traffic between the Turkish Army and Constantinople or Asia. We suggest that these objects would not have been attained without a protracted struggle, the result of which cannot confidently be predicted.

115. After the failure at Suvla on August 6th and following days, the same question presented itself to the Dardanelles Committee and the Cabinet as in May, *i.e.*, whether the Dardanelles operations were to be continued or abandoned, and, if continued, in what way.

The question was raised in a memorandum prepared by Colonel Swinton, the Assistant-Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and laid before the meeting of the Dardanelles Committee on the 19th August, 1915.

"There appear to be only two alternative courses to be adopted:—

- (a) Not to send out the additional troops asked for by the Commander-in-Chief, and, therefore, to abandon the attempt to force the Straits, for there appears to be no prospect of success in a further offensive if the troops out in Gallipoli are not so increased, and without advancing it appears to be impracticable to continue to occupy the portions of the Peninsula already gained.
- (b) To send out the troops asked for and to dispatch them with the least possible delay so that the attempt which has just failed may be renewed. These reinforcements should be sent out at the earliest possible moment in view of the broken weather to be expected in the last half of September, which will render landing and supply impossible for considerable periods."

This was not quite exhaustive, for it was possible to send out smaller reinforcements which would enable Sir Ian Hamilton to maintain his position till a final decision was reached, and this was the plan adopted.

The reinforcements asked for were those which had been mentioned by Sir Ian Hamilton in a telegram of August 17th in which he stated that the Turks had 110,000 rifles on the Peninsula to his 95,000; that his British Divisions were 45,000 under establishment, exclusive of about 9,000 promised or on the way, and that he required, to give him the necessary superiority if the Turks were not largely reinforced, that this deficit should be made up and that new formations, totalling 50,000 rifles, should be sent.

The matter was discussed at many meetings of the Dardanelles Committee. Sir Ian Hamilton's views were considered, and appreciations were submitted by the General Staff, which had been reconstituted under Sir Archibald Murray, and afterwards under Sir William Robertson. The final decision was not reached until December, 1915.

116. The position when Sir Ian Hamilton's telegram of August 17th was received was broadly this. It had been agreed at a joint Conference between the French and British authorities held at Calais in July, 1915, that no important offensive should be undertaken in the West until the Spring of 1916. This would reduce the demands from the Western front for men and munitions and might make it possible to move troops thence to the East.

It had become clear that no help could be looked for from Bulgaria, and that that country had become definitely hostile, and would probably join the Central Powers, as in fact she did very soon. It was likely that if Bulgaria joined the Central Powers an attack would be made on Serbia with the object of crushing that country and opening up communication with Constantinople. If this were done, the Turks could be supplied with guns and ammunition which they were known to want. The Russian reverses were still continuing.

It seemed to be agreed that it would not be wise to abandon the operations in the Dardanelles unless some operations in the Balkans or other operations against Turkey in some direction were undertaken, and there was undoubtedly a difference of opinion as to the course to be adopted.

On August 20th, Lord Kitchener pointed out that, owing to the situation in Russia, he could no longer maintain the attitude which was agreed upon in conjunction with the French at Calais (in July), viz., that a real serious offensive on a large scale in the West should be postponed until all the Allies were quite ready; and that the large divisional reinforcements asked for could not be sent to the Dardanelles, as they had been promised to France and could not be diverted. He said his inclination was to help Sir Ian Hamilton as far as was possible without interfering with the operations in France, at any rate till after the contemplated offensive there had taken place.

War Office
telegram
No. 1895.

War Office
telegram
No. 1915.

War Office
telegram
No. 1940.

This was agreed to, and Sir Ian Hamilton was so informed. He replied that he would do the best he could with the forces at his disposal; and after giving an account of some fighting that had taken place, and pointing out that casualties, both from wounds and sickness, were very large, he said: "Keeping these conditions in view, it appears inevitable that within the next fortnight I shall be compelled to relinquish either Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove, and must further envisage the possibility of a still further reduction of my front in the near future." Later on, he reported that if Suvla or Anzac had to be given up, he thought it must be Suvla.

In answer, Lord Kitchener desired him to discuss the matter with his Corps Commanders, and referred to 47,000 drafts and reinforcements which had been sent since August 6th.

War Office
telegram
No. 1945.

War Office
telegram
No. 1950.

War Office
telegram,
No. 7337;
1954.

117. Sir Ian Hamilton replied that he did not understand the allusion to 47,000, as he had not been advised of any such number, and, in answer, Lord Kitchener said that he was sending the details. On this, Sir Ian Hamilton telegraphed that the welcome news of 47,000 reinforcements altered the whole situation, and that such a number would do much to complete his diminished cadres, and should materially lessen the sickness rate by giving more chance of taking tired troops out of the trenches. In fact, Sir Ian Hamilton appears to have received reinforcements amounting to 29,000, but of these 9,000 were not sufficiently trained for active service and had to be sent to Egypt, reducing the effective total to 20,000.

118. On August 27th, the Dardanelles Committee, after discussion, decided that no line of future policy could be framed for the present, but that Sir Ian Hamilton should do his best to hold the ground which he had gained, and be asked for his appreciation as to future policy and the requirements to carry it out. On the same date Lord Kitchener telegraphed to Sir Ian Hamilton accordingly.

War Office
telegram
No. 2024.

Sir Ian Hamilton's appreciation was sent on Sept. 2nd, and in it he pointed out that the drafts and reinforcements promised did not make up his deficit, and that he could not launch any grand attack unless or until his divisions could be brought up to establishment and new formations up to 50,000 were sent out. He also asked for reinforcements up to 20 per cent. to be available in the theatre of operations to meet wastage. He concluded: "To sum up, there is, in my opinion, no better alternative than to make fresh effort at Suvla and Anzac. You will understand that any appreciation I can send must inevitably alter from day to day, and that it must be again modified by any accession to my strength in the shape of fresh Allied troops or an alteration in the political situation in the Balkans. Meanwhile, all preparations are being made for a winter campaign."

When this came before the Dardanelles Committee on September 3rd, they were informed by Lord Kitchener that the French Government had decided to send four Divisions against Turkey to the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles and wished their two Divisions on the European side to be replaced by British troops. Lord Kitchener said that he proposed to instruct Sir John French to send two Divisions from France for the purpose. This enterprise, if carried out by the French, might have materially assisted the operations in the Dardanelles, and in any case was inconsistent with the abandonment of the Gallipoli Expedition.

Preparations were made for carrying out this scheme, but the French troops could not be sent from the Western Front until the result of the contemplated offensive in that theatre was known. This offensive began on September 25th, and in the meantime the Bulgarians had mobilized, and evidently an attack on Serbia was probable. Another element was thus introduced into the problem, namely, the consideration whether an Allied force should be sent to Salonica or elsewhere to help the Serbians. On September 23rd the Secretary of State for War was directed to prepare a military appreciation of the situation to be placed before the Dardanelles Committee on the morning of September 24th on the following lines:—

“The possibility of sending a British or Allied force to Salonica or farther in order to support Greece, if Greece should go to the assistance of Serbia in resisting an attack by the Austro-Germans and possibly the Bulgarians.”

On September 24th Sir Ian Hamilton was asked what force could be spared from Gallipoli for Salonica. At the same time the attention of the Admiralty and War Office was to be drawn to the importance of pushing on arrangements for a winter campaign in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

119. The circumstances which led to the despatch of forces to Salonica do not come within the scope of our enquiry. It is sufficient to say that for a long time questions were raised and discussions took place about the matter, and eventually the British Government was committed to sending a large force to co-operate with the French in that theatre. The possibility of having to send this force again raised the question of the evacuation of Gallipoli.

There was a considerable division of opinion on the subject among the members of the Dardanelles Committee, and on October 11th, it was decided that immediate instructions should be given for the despatch, as soon as the pending operations on the Western Front were over, of an adequate force from France to Egypt, without prejudice to its ultimate destination, and that a specially selected General should proceed without delay to the Near East to consider and report as to the particular sphere and the particular objective to which we should direct our attention. Sir Charles Monro was the General selected, and he left England on October 22nd, and arrived at Gallipoli on October 31st.

Conclusions
of Meeting,
11th
October,
1915.

THE DECISION TO EVACUATE.

120. On October 14th the Government decided to recall Sir Ian Hamilton, and on October 20th General Sir Charles Monro was ordered to take over the command of the forces in the Mediterranean, and received written instructions from Lord Kitchener to report “fully and frankly” on the military position. He was instructed to consider the best means of removing the existing deadlock, and to report “whether, in his opinion, on purely military grounds, it was better to evacuate Gallipoli or to make another attempt to carry it.” He was also asked to give his estimate of the loss which would be incurred in the course of an evacuation.

Sir Charles
Monro.
QQ. 7-8.
Q. 2.

121. Sir Charles Monro left on October 22nd, arriving at Mudros on the 27th. After an inspection of the Peninsula he came to the conclusion that the forces should be withdrawn. He never swerved from this opinion, which he communicated to Lord Kitchener in the following telegram on October 31st:—

Q. 13.

“With the exception of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps the troops on the Peninsula are not equal to a sustained effort, owing to inexperienced officers, the want of training of the men, and the depleted condition of many of the units.

War Office
telegram
No. 2628
(A).

“We merely hold the fringe of the shore, and are confronted by the Turks in very formidable entrenchments, with all advantages of position and power of observation of our movements. The beaches are exposed to observed artillery fire, and in the restricted areas all stores are equally exposed. We can no longer count upon any action by surprise as the Turks are in considerably stronger force than they were, and have had ample time to provide against surprise landings.

“Since the flanks of the Turks cannot be attacked, only a frontal attack is possible, and no room is afforded on any of the beaches for the distribution of additional divisions should they be sent, nor is there sufficient space for the deployment of an adequate force of artillery, the action of which would be impaired by poverty of observation and good positions for searching or counter battery effects. Naval guns could only assist to a partial degree.

"In fact an attack could only be prosecuted under the disadvantages of serious lack of depth, and of absence of power of surprise, seeing that our line is throughout dominated by the Turks' position. The uncertainty of weather might also seriously hinder the landing of reinforcements and regularity in providing the artillery ammunition to the amount which would be required.

"It is therefore my opinion that another attempt to carry the Turkish lines would not offer any hope of success; the Turkish positions are being actively strengthened daily. Our information leads to the belief that heavy guns and ammunition are being sent to the Peninsula from Constantinople. Consequently by the time fresh divisions, if available, could arrive, the task of breaking the Turkish line would be considerably more formidable than it is at present.

"On purely military grounds, therefore, in consequence of the grave daily wastage of officers and men which occurs, and owing to the lack of prospect of being able to draw the Turks from their entrenched positions, I recommend the evacuation of the Peninsula."

After adding that he was unable at that moment to give any definite estimate of the losses which would be incurred in a withdrawal, Sir Charles Monro concluded his telegram by saying:—

"I have endeavoured in the expression of my opinion to give full weight to the effect which will be created in the East by our evacuation, and I consider that the force now in the Peninsula, or such portion of it as we may be able to evacuate, would be more favourably placed in Egypt. This force stands in need of rest, re-organisation, and especially of training, before it can be usefully employed. The Corps and Divisional Commanders have done splendid work in the Peninsula, but they do not possess the opportunity or time, as they now stand, to create the force into a reliable fighting machine. Hence I think loss of prestige caused by withdrawal would be compensated for in a few months by increased efficiency."

QQ. 87 and 92.

War Office
telegram
No. 1915.

Sir Ian
Hamilton's letters
to Lord Kitchener,
29th September,
1915.

War Office
telegram
No. 2331.

122. Sir Charles Monro told us that his opinion was strengthened by the state of health of the troops. The rate of sickness had been alarmingly high in the hot months of August and September. On August 23rd Sir Ian Hamilton had reported to Lord Kitchener that the average net wastage, even when there were no serious engagements, amounted, owing to sickness, to 24 per cent. a month. In September the medical officers had reported that 50 per cent. of the men in seven battalions of the old troops examined at Anzac had feeble hearts with shortness of breath, that 78 per cent. of these had diarrhoea, and 64 per cent. had sores on the skin. On the first three days of October over 1,800 sick were evacuated from the IXth Corps at Suvla, and at times the number of such evacuations from Suvla, Anzac, and Cape Helles amounted to 1,000 a day. In August, September and October, the number of sick evacuated from the Peninsula amounted to [*].

In addition the troops were continuously under fire, the beaches and rest trenches being shelled as much as the front lines. The men in reserve had to spend the night in getting up stores to the front and in making communications. Fatigue parties had to be constantly occupied in unloading the contents of the transports into lighters and from the lighters to the shore. Although there was a notable decline in the sick rate shortly after Sir Charles Monro's arrival, Sir William Birdwood on November 4th telegraphed to Lord Kitchener as follows:—

"Byng and Davies and all their Divisional Commanders have very little faith in their troops' present power of endurance, and reply that with few exceptions none are at present capable of more than 24 hours of sustained offensive effort. The same applies to most of the Australians owing to amount of sickness we have had, from which they have by no means recovered."

War Office
telegram
No. 2675 (d).

War Office
telegrams
No. 2633 (a),
No. 2647 (a).

123. On November 1st General Monro was asked by Lord Kitchener if his Corps Commanders were of the same opinion as himself. Sir Charles Monro accordingly consulted Sir William Birdwood, Sir Julian Byng and Sir Francis Davies, and asked them to submit their views in writing. He urged them "earnestly to give their opinions without paying any heed to his."

General Birdwood wrote:—

"I agree with General Monro regarding the grave disadvantages of our position and the extreme difficulty of making any progress. But I consider that the Turks would look upon our evacuation as a complete victory. From Indian experience I fear the result on Mahometan world in India, Egypt, Persia. I am therefore opposed to evacuation. I am of opinion that, if we leave the Peninsula, it is essential that the whole force must be launched immediately against the Turks elsewhere, and I fail to see where this can be done with confident hope of success. I am adverse to withdrawal which would enable

* This figure was not available at the time the Report was signed.

Turkish forces to proceed to Caucasus or Mesopotamia ; landing elsewhere than in Turkey would not have the same effect. I also fear that the moral effect on our troops of withdrawal would be bad, while the Turkish morale would proportionately rise. Season being so late and bad weather at hand, I think actual withdrawal fraught with difficulty and danger, as ample time and continuous fine weather essential. All embarkations must be done at night, and only four or five nights a week can now be counted on. Heavy loss might be caused by the advent of any continuous bad weather after withdrawal has been partially carried out."

General Byng replied :—

"I consider evacuation desirable. As regards Suvla, a voluntary and not very costly retirement is feasible at the present time, but it seems possible that with German help to the enemy a compulsory and therefore costly retreat may be necessitated."

General Davies replied :—

"I agree with General Monro."

The opinions of these three officers were then fully communicated to Lord Kitchener by Sir Charles Monro in a telegram on November 2nd, in which he repeated his opinion as to the necessity of evacuating, and as a "rough estimate" stated that Admiral de Robeck and his corps commanders thought a loss of 30 to 40 per cent. in personnel and material might be incurred, and that he was "inclined to agree with their estimate."

124. Sir Charles Monro's opinion in favour of evacuation made it necessary for the authorities at home to come to a decision of great gravity. On October 7th the War Committee had replaced the Dardanelles Committee, and on November 3rd both the War Committee and the Cabinet invited Lord Kitchener to go out to the Mediterranean in order to assist them in arriving at a final decision.

Lord Curzon's
Memorandum.
P. 4.

On the same day Lord Kitchener telegraphed to Sir William Birdwood :—

"Very secret.

War Office
Telegram
No. 2666 (a).

"You know the report sent in by Monro. I shall come out to you ; am leaving to-morrow night. I have seen Captain Keyes, and I believe the Admiralty will agree to making naval attempt to force the passage of the Straits. We must do what we can to assist them, and I think that as soon as our ships are in the Sea of Marmora we should seize the Bulair isthmus and hold it so as to supply the Navy if the Turks still hold out.

"Examine very carefully the best position for landing near the marsh at the head of the Gulf of Xeros, so that we could get a line across the isthmus, with ships at both sides. In order to find the troops for this undertaking we should have to reduce the numbers in the trenches to the lowest possible, and perhaps evacuate positions at Suvla. All the best fighting men that could be spared, including your boys from Anzac and everyone I can sweep up in Egypt, might be concentrated at Mudros ready for this enterprise.

"There will probably be a change in the naval command, Wemyss being appointed in command to carry through the naval part of the work.

"As regards the military command, you would have the whole force, and should carefully select your commanders and troops. I would suggest Maude, Fanshawe, Marshall, Peyton, Godley, Cox, leaving others to hold the lines. Please work out plans for this, or alternative plans as you may think best. We must do it right this time.

"I absolutely refuse to sign orders for evacuation, which I think would be the gravest disaster and would condemn a large percentage of our men to death or imprisonment.

"Monro will be appointed to the command of the Salonika force."

125. In order to explain the telegram quoted in the last paragraph, it is necessary to state that after the failure of the military operations in August, a section of responsible naval officers, foremost among whom were Admiral Wemyss and Sir John de Robeck's Chief of the Staff, Commodore Keyes, held very strongly that the fleet should renew the attempt to force the Straits in order to relieve the army. A plan of operations had been worked out, with the assent of Sir John de Robeck. It was thought by these officers that, if three or four battleships and six or eight destroyers could pass through the Straits, they would be able, in combination with the submarines, to dominate the Sea of Marmora, thus cutting the main Turkish lines of communication and supply, which ran from the Asiatic side of the Peninsula.

Q. 27339.

Sir John de Robeck was not in favour of this project, which he thought underestimated the dangers and difficulties of the operation, and overrated the effect that a successful naval attack would produce. But he felt, nevertheless, that the contrary view should be fully put before the Admiralty, and towards the end of October he allowed Commodore Keyes to return home to do this. On arriving in England, Commodore Keyes discussed his plan of operations fully with Mr. Balfour and the Sea Lords. He

Commodore
Keyes' State-
ment P. 1.

QQ. 27340-3.

also had two interviews with Lord Kitchener on November 3rd and 4th. When he left for the Mediterranean on November 4th Commodore Keyes told us he was under the impression that his suggestion had been regarded with favour.

Q 27349.
War Office
telegram
No. 2675 (c).

Between November the 3rd and 4th Lord Kitchener's proposal to seize the Bulair Isthmus had been considered and adversely criticised by the Admiralty, by Sir William Birdwood, and by Commodore Keyes. On November 4th Lord Kitchener again telegraphed to Sir William Birdwood, intimating that a renewal of the naval attack might not be approved, and adding :—

"I am coming as arranged, and shall be at Alexandria Monday night or Tuesday morning. Shall stay there one day without landing and without my presence being known. After seeing Maxwell and Macmahon, shall come on to you, leaving in the evening.

"The more I look at the problem the less I see my way through, so you had better very quietly and secretly work out any scheme for getting the troops off the Peninsula."

War Office Tele-
grams
No. 2758 (a),
No. 2760 (b),
No. 2790 (a).

War Office
telegrams
Nos. 2774 (a),
No. 2827.
No. 2890.

War Office
telegram
No. 2807.

Lord Kitchener left for the Mediterranean on the evening of November 4th. In the course of the following days he discussed the position with Sir John Maxwell, Sir Henry Macmahon and Sir Charles Monro, at Alexandria and Mudros. The telegrams which then passed between him and the Prime Minister show that Lord Kitchener was greatly concerned as to the difficulty of defending Egypt, in the event of an evacuation of the Peninsula; and that he advocated a landing at Ayas Bay, in the neighbourhood of Alexandretta, with the object of cutting the Turkish railway communications. This project necessitated the withdrawal of forces from both Salonica and France, and the diversion of Indian Divisions then on their way to Mesopotamia. It did not commend itself to the General Staff at the War Office, and was ultimately rejected at a joint conference between representatives of the British and French Governments held at Paris on November 17th.

126. On November 15th Lord Kitchener reported to the Prime Minister the result of his personal inspection of the positions on the Peninsula in the following telegram :—

"To gain what we hold has been a most remarkable feat of arms. The country is much more difficult than I imagined, and the Turkish positions at Achi Baba and Kilid Bahr are natural fortresses of the most formidable nature, which, if not taken by surprise at first, could be held against very serious attack by larger forces than have been engaged, even if these forces had proper lines of communication to support them. This latter want is the main difficulty in carrying out successful operations on the Peninsula.

"The landings are precarious and often impossible through rough sea and want of harbours, and the enemy's positions are peculiarly suitable for making our communications more dangerous and difficult. The base at Mudros is too far detached from our forces in the field, and the proper co-ordination of the administrative services of a line of communications is prevented by distance and sea voyages dependable on the weather. This state of things, in my judgment, is the main cause of our troops not having been able to do better, and to attain really strategic points on Peninsula, which would have turned Kilid Bahr, and unless this were done I do not consider that the Fleet ever could have passed the Straits. Everyone has done wonders, both on sea and land, when the natural difficulties that have had to be surmounted are considered. Our present positions, in my opinion, can be held against the Turks even if they received increased ammunition.

"The trenches have been well dug, and bomb-proof covering has been afforded for the men; supplies and water are on shore, and officers and men are confident that they can hold out against the Turks, but they are somewhat depressed at not being able to get through. I consider, however, the lines are not deep enough, if Germany sent a German force to attack, to allow of proper arrangements for supports, and if the front line trenches were taken, these difficulties would increase. I consider that advances from our present positions are very difficult, particularly from Helles and Anzac. Suvla gives some opportunity for improving our positions, but it seems very doubtful whether this would enable us to push through.

"About 125,000 Turks are immobilised by our occupation of the Peninsula, and they are caused considerable loss, and, until the recent German operations in Serbia opened communications with Turkey and changed the situation, practically the whole Turkish Army had to be held in readiness to defend the capital if we succeeded on the Peninsula. In present circumstances the *raison d'être* of our forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula is no longer as important as it has been hitherto, and if another position in the neighbourhood of Alexandretta were occupied, where Turkish movements eastward could be effectively stopped, the realisation of the German objective against Egypt and the East would be prevented.

"Careful and secret preparations for the evacuation of the Peninsula are being made. If undertaken it would be an operation of extreme military difficulty and danger; but I have hopes that, given time and weather, which may be expected to be suitable until about the end of December, the troops will carry out this task with less loss than was previously estimated. My reason for this is that the distance they had to go to embark, and the contraction of the lines of defence to be held by a smaller force, gives them a better chance than I thought previously.

"The Admiral and Generals Monro and Birdwood, to whom I have read the above, all agree."

War Office
telegram
No. 2812.

Later in the same day Lord Kitchener telegraphed further to the Prime Minister that Admiral de Robeck would like to retain Cape Helles, even if Suvla and Anzac were evacuated.

127. On November 19th the Prime Minister telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that "His Majesty's Government had decided against the proposed expedition to Ayas Bay as a result of their conference in Paris with the French Government, and Naval and Military authorities, and after consideration of the maritime position in the Mediterranean," and requested Lord Kitchener to give his "considered opinion as to the evacuation of the Peninsula, in whole or in part," on the basis of the Ayas Bay scheme having been withdrawn.

War Office
telegram
No. 2890.

In reply, Lord Kitchener telegraphed on November 22nd to the effect that, while our offensive had up to the present held up the Turkish Army, German assistance was now practically available, that this assistance would make our positions untenable, and that evacuation, therefore, seemed inevitable. He therefore recommended that the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac should be proceeded with, while Cape Helles should be held for the present. The retention of Cape Helles would enable the Navy to maintain the advantages already gained, still threaten the seizure of the Straits, and also give greater facilities for the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac.

War Office
telegram
No. 2927 (a).

128. On November 23rd the War Committee came to the decision that:—

"Having regard to the opinions expressed by Lord Kitchener in his telegram dated November 22nd, 1915, and by the General Staff in their memorandum dated November 22nd, 1915, the War Committee feel bound to advise the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula on military grounds, notwithstanding the grave political disadvantages which may result from the decision. They have carefully examined the naval considerations in favour of the retention of Cape Helles as stated in a note by the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, printed with the General Staff Memorandum referred to above. They are of opinion, however, that the naval advantages to be gained by this course are not commensurate with the military disadvantages involved."

Conclusions of
War Committee,
November 23rd.

The proposal to evacuate was then discussed at a Cabinet Council on the following day. At this Council Lord Curzon told us that he "and several of his colleagues, anxious at least that the opposite side should be heard, and fearful of a decision fraught with such fearful possibilities, pleaded for a few hours' consideration," and that he "undertook to state the case to the best of his ability."

Lord Curzon's
Statement, p. 6.

The case against evacuation was then elaborated by Lord Curzon in two memoranda dated November 25th and 30th, in which the military and political reasons in favour of and against evacuation were fully discussed. Lord Curzon's arguments were replied to by Mr. Bonar Law in a memorandum circulated on December 4th, which ended as follows:—

"So far I have considered the question from a military point of view, and my conclusions may be disputed, but there is another aspect of it which is not military, and which is not open to dispute. Recognising the seriousness of the position at the Dardanelles, the Government decided to send a military expert to report on the question of evacuation. For this purpose Sir Charles Monro was chosen. On the 31st October he reported in the strongest possible terms in favour of evacuation. He sent us also the opinions of three of the Generals on the spot—Generals Birdwood, Byng and Davies. Of these three General Birdwood alone was opposed to evacuation, but the reasons given by him for his opposition were entirely political, and he agreed with General Monro regarding the 'great disadvantages of our position and extreme difficulty of making any progress.' Afterwards he concurred in a telegram sent by Lord Kitchener on the 22nd November which contained these words: 'Our offensive on the Peninsula has, up to the present, held up the Turkish Army, but with German assistance, which is now practically available, our positions there cannot be maintained, and evacuation seems inevitable.' Not satisfied with General Monro's report, the Government decided to send Lord Kitchener. In a telegram sent from Paris, on his way, Lord Kitchener showed clearly that he was entirely opposed to evacuation, and he has since told us that he held that view when he started for the Dardanelles. The actual examination of the situation, on the spot, however, changed his opinion, and he telegraphed to the Prime Minister in favour of evacuation in words which I have just quoted. We also consulted our General Staff on the subject. They gave us an opinion as definite as that of the other Generals in favour of evacuation. It is the fact, therefore, that every military authority, without a single exception, whom we have consulted, has reported in favour of evacuation."

"But this is not all. Some time ago the Cabinet unanimously came to the conclusion that the war could not be carried on by a body so large as the Cabinet. A War Committee was therefore appointed. The views of the military authorities came before this Committee, two of whose members, the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, were opposed in the strongest possible way to evacuation; yet this Committee reported unanimously in favour of acting upon the advice of our military advisers."

Their recommendation was brought before the Cabinet, with the result that on a matter in regard to which delay must be dangerous and may be fatal, no decision has been reached.

"I hope that my colleagues will agree with me that the war cannot be carried to a successful issue by methods such as these."

Q. 20920.

Surgeon-General
Babbie's State-
ment.

129. Meanwhile the condition of the forces on the Peninsula was aggravated by a blizzard of exceptional severity which raged on November 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th. Two hundred and eighty men were drowned in the trenches at Suvla and many were frozen to death as they stood. Sixteen thousand cases of frost bite and exposure had to be evacuated, 12,000 from Suvla, where the positions were most exposed, and 2,700 and 1,200 from Anzac and Helles respectively. On December 1st Sir Charles Monro telegraphed to Lord Kitchener pressing for a decision and adding :—

War Office
telegram
No. 3055.

"There is, however, much to be done, and late season makes time a matter of great urgency. Detailed plans approach completion, but intricate arrangements have still to be made with regard to collection and clearing of shipping, distribution of small craft, embarkation and disposition of troops and material, accommodation on islands, disposal of reinforcements, etc., to say nothing of tactical arrangements. Experience of recent storms indicates that there is no time to lose. General Birdwood telegraphed yesterday that if evacuation is to be made possible it is essential to take advantage of every fine day from now. If decision cannot be reached very shortly, it may be equivalent to deciding against evacuation."

130. It must here be mentioned that on November 25th Sir John de Robeck left the Mediterranean on sick leave, and his command was taken over by Vice-Admiral Wemyss. From November 25th to December 8th Vice-Admiral Wemyss, with remarkable pertinacity, advocated a renewal of the naval attack in a series of telegrams to the First Lord of the Admiralty.

On his return home Sir John de Robeck attended a meeting of the War Council on December 2nd, and his views as to the difficulties of a naval attack were placed before the members of the Council. The decision as to the policy to be pursued was then reserved for the Cabinet which met on the same day. Lord Kitchener, as the result of this Cabinet meeting, telegraphed to Sir Charles Monro :—

War Office tele-
gram No. 3065.

"Private and secret.—The Cabinet has been considering the Gallipoli situation all to-day. Owing to the political consequences there is a strong feeling against evacuation, even of a partial character. It is the general opinion that we should retain Cape Helles.

"If the Salonika troops are placed at your disposal up to four divisions for an offensive operation to improve the position at Suvla, could such operations be carried out in time with a view to making Suvla retainable by obtaining higher positions and greater depth? The Navy will also take the offensive in co-operation."

131. On December 3rd Sir Charles Monro telegraphed in reply to this proposal as follows :—

War Office tele-
gram No. 3078.

"I fully recognise the complexity of the situation which has arisen. I do not, however, think that the proposal to employ four fresh divisions in order to gain a more secure position at Suvla can be regarded as an operation offering a reasonable chance of success. We cannot expect the element of surprise which is so essential to make up for the disadvantages of position under which we labour. The Salonika Divisions could not be ready for active operations on the Peninsula until storm weather sets in. . . .

"In respect of naval co-operation, the character of the terrain on the Peninsula is such that naval guns cannot search the Turkish positions. The fire of howitzers would be needed to do so effectively. The many deep ravines and gullies are very favourable for the concealment and protection of the Turkish reserves, and for their rapid transference in case of bombardment. Nor do I think the supply of the Turks on the Peninsula by the two lines of supply available to them could be prevented by naval action."

Lord Curzon's
Statement.

132. On December 7th the Cabinet decided to evacuate the positions at Suvla and Anzac only and to retain that at Cape Helles. This decision, Lord Curzon told us, was taken mainly on the advice of Lord Kitchener, who had then returned.

War Office
telegram
No. 3152.
Q. 27361.

133. The decision of the Cabinet was communicated to Sir Charles Monro on December 7th, and to Vice-Admiral Wemyss on December 8th. The Vice-Admiral, in reply, persisted in recommending that the naval attack should be attempted, and in the course of his telegram to the First Lord of the Admiralty on December 8th stated :—

Q. 27362.

"The Navy is prepared to force the Straits and control them for an indefinite period, cutting off all Turkish supplies which now find their way to the Peninsula either by sea from the Marmora or across the Dardanelles from Asiatic to European shore. The only line of communications left would be the road along the Isthmus of Bulair, which can be controlled almost entirely from the Sea of Marmora and the Gulf of Xeros. What is offered the Army, therefore, is the practical, complete severance of all Turkish lines of communication, accompanied by the destruction of the large supply depôts on the shore of the Dardanelles.

"In the first instance I strongly advocated that the naval attack should synchronize with an army offensive, and if the Army will be prepared to attack in the event of a favourable opportunity presenting itself, nothing more need be required of them. The Navy here is prepared to undertake this operation with every assurance of success. If the units as described in your letter of 24th November can be provided, these hopes of success are greatly increased, and the possible losses greatly diminished.

"The unanimous military opinion referred to in Admiralty telegram No. 422, has, I feel certain, been greatly influenced, and naturally so, by the military appreciations of Sir Charles Monro. These I have not seen, but their purport I have gathered in course of conversations. The Corps Commanders, I know, view the evacuation with the greatest misgiving. The forcing of the Dardanelles, as outlined in my telegrams, has never been put before them, and I am convinced that, after considering the certain results which would follow a naval success, they would favour an attack on the lines indicated, especially in view of the undoubted low morale of the Turkish Peninsula army, of which we have ample evidence.

* * * * *

"The very extensive German propaganda being pursued all over the Near East, accompanied by the expenditure of vast sums of money, is not, I feel convinced, being undertaken merely as a side issue to the European war.

"A position of stalemate on both fronts of the principal theatres of war appears the natural outcome of present situation. This opinion is freely expressed in the higher military circles in Greece, and would therefore appear to be fostered by the Germans—a significant point.

"By surrendering our position here, when within sight of victory, we are aiding enemy to obtain markets the possession of which may enable her to outlast the Allies in the war of exhaustion now commencing.

"A successful attack would once and for all disperse those clouds of doubt, a large amount of shipping would be released, and the question of Greece and Egypt settled.

"I do not know what has been decided about Constantinople, but if the Turks could be told that we were in the Marmora to prevent its occupation by the Germans, such a course would inevitably lead to disruption, and therefore weakness amongst them.

"I fear the effect on the Navy would be bad.

"Although no word of attack has passed my lips except to my immediate staff and admirals, I feel sure that every officer and man would feel that the campaign had been abandoned without sufficient use having been made of our greatest force, viz., the Navy.

"The position is so critical that there is no time for standing on ceremony, and I suggest that General Birdwood, the officer who would now have to carry out the attack or evacuation which is now ordered, be asked for his appreciation.

"The logical conclusion, therefore, is the choice of evacuation or forcing the Straits. I consider the former disastrous tactically and strategically, and the latter feasible, and, so long as troops remain at Anzac, decisive.

"I am convinced that the time is ripe for a vigorous offensive, and I am confident of success."

134. To this strongly worded representation Mr. Balfour, then First Lord of the Admiralty, replied on December 10th that, as the Admiralty were not prepared to authorise the Navy, single-handed, attempting to force the Narrows and acting in Sea of Marmora, cut off from supplies, the decision of the Government to evacuate Suvla and Anzac would not be further questioned by the Admiralty in view of the individual and combined appreciation of the responsible Generals, and the great strain thrown on naval and military resources by the operations in Greece. The retention of Cape Helles and the mouth of the Straits would enable another attack to be started later, working on a different plan, should the Government decide to undertake it. And on the same day the then First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, telegraphed to Vice-Admiral Wemyss as follows:—

"Your telegram has been very carefully considered. I personally agree with your appreciation of German designs in the East, and I view with deepest regret the abandonment of Suvla and Anzac. But the military authorities, including Birdwood, are clear that they cannot be made tenable against an increased artillery fire, while the Admiralty hold that the naval arguments against forcing the Straits are overwhelming. Naval authorities here are convinced that, while success is most doubtful, very heavy losses are certain, and it must be remembered that nothing would have a worse effect on our Eastern position than a serious check to the Government."

135. The evacuation of Suvla and Anzac was at once proceeded with, men, guns, and stores being gradually withdrawn. The final embarkation was fixed for Saturday and Sunday, December 18th and 19th. On the Sunday a covering attack was made by the forces at Cape Helles, at a cost of 283 casualties. By 5.30 a.m. on Monday, December 20th, the last man had quitted the trenches. That night the weather broke. A heavy gale blew from the south, accompanied by torrents of rain. Water rushed through the trenches at Suvla and Anzac, and the landing stages at Suvla, Anzac, and Cape Helles were washed away by heavy seas.

136. On December 20th Sir Charles Monro telegraphed to Lord Kitchener urging the evacuation of Cape Helles on the ground that this "would greatly facilitate the reorganisation of the Dardanelles army, would lead immediately to reduced expenditure, and would liberate a large quantity of freight"; and that this army, "when rested and reorganised, would constitute a valuable asset in a central position, ready to strike either in

C.M. No. 99.
Appended to Sir William Robertson's Memorandum of December 23rd, 1915.

France or wherever demanded by the situation." On December 22nd evacuation was also recommended by the General Staff in a memorandum, in which they pointed out that: "The arrival of gun ammunition and of fresh guns to help the enemy will, moreover, greatly add to the difficulties in the way of holding on to Helles at all. Not only have munitions arrived from Germany, but artillery which had been previously opposed to Suvla and Anzac will be moved to act against our forces cooped up in the thoroughly bad position they now occupy at the southern end of the Peninsula. Wastage, heavy before, will become greater. The troops, furthermore, are perfectly well aware that the Dardanelles undertaking has definitely failed, and, realising that they have no hope of advancing or of causing the enemy any serious injury, will become dispirited. There will be serious risk that the enemy will make a successful attack, and may, under the circumstances cause us a disaster. The necessity of concentration of effort, if this war is to be brought to a successful conclusion, has been drawn attention to in recent papers prepared by the General Staff, and there is no object in labouring this point afresh; retention of Helles means dispersion, not concentration of effort." The General Staff therefore "recommend that the Gallipoli Peninsula should be entirely evacuated, and with the least possible delay." We have indicated that the retention of Cape Helles had been advocated mainly on naval grounds. Vice-Admiral Wemyss and Commodore Keyes held a different opinion, which was strengthened after the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac by the consideration of the heavy wastage occurring daily in the VIIIth Army Corps. From December 20th to January 7th the casualties incurred amounted to 345 killed and 1,178 wounded, a total of 1,523, or a daily average of 18 killed and 62 wounded. Vice-Admiral Wemyss therefore advised evacuation unless the Achi Baba position could be captured, and this Sir Charles Monro considered impracticable.

Q. 27366.

On December 23rd the War Committee decided to evacuate Cape Helles, and their decision was approved by the Cabinet on the 27th. The evacuation was completed on January 8th.

137. It is not, we think, necessary to give details of the evacuation, these being embodied in Sir Charles Monro's despatch of March 6th, 1916.

In the course of this despatch Sir Charles Monro wrote:—

"The entire evacuation of the Peninsula had now been completed. It demanded for its successful realisation two important military essentials, viz., good luck and skilled disciplined organisation; and they were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Our luck was in the ascendant by the marvellous spell of calm weather which prevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage these accidents of fortune.

"Lieutenant-General Sir Wm. Birdwood and his Corps Commanders elaborated and prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence, and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we had a further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck, K.C.B., Vice-Admiral Wemyss, and a body of naval officers whose work remained throughout this anxious period at that standard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the power of criticism or cavil.

"The line of communication staff, both military and naval, represented respectively by Lieutenant-General E. A. Altham, C.B., C.M.G., Commodore M. S. Fitzmaurice, R.N., principal Naval Transport Officer, and Captain H. V. Simpson, R.N., Superintending Transport Officer, contributed to the success of the operation by their untiring zeal and conspicuous ability.

"The members of the Headquarters Staff showed themselves, without exception, to be officers with whom it was a privilege to be associated; their competence, zeal, and devotion to duty were uniform and unbroken."

In these words of well-deserved commendation of officers and men the name of Sir Charles Monro himself should be included.

138. Our narrative of events would be incomplete without a reference to the important part taken by the French troops in the operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

On the afternoon of April 24th a regiment of the French division was disembarked at Kum Kale under the guns of the French fleet, and remained ashore till the morning of the 26th, when it re-embarked. The French captured 500 prisoners, and their landing diverted the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto Bay and V Beach to Kum Kale, thus contributing to the success of the British landings. On the evening of April 26th the main disembarkation of the French division was begun at V Beach, our Allies occupying the right of the Helles front. Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, dated May 20th, 1915, describes the landings and subsequent operations up to May 6th. Therein he referred to the loyal and energetic support afforded him by General d'Amade, who commanded the French force, and added:—"During the fighting which followed the landing of the French division at Sedd-el-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances and under very heavy losses than those working under the orders of M. le Général d'Amade."

In May a second French division reinforced the first, General Gouraud relieving General d'Amade on May 14th and assuming command of the whole of the French force. One brigade of this second division arrived at Helles on May 8th, and the other on May 12th. On the latter date Sir Ian Hamilton telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that the French casualties from April 25th to date amounted to 246 officers and 12,364 men out of a total strength engaged of 334 officers and 22,116 men.

War Office
telegram
No. 841.

There was severe fighting at Helles from June 4th to the end of the month, during which the French troops were conspicuous for their dash and gallantry. In one action on June 21st their losses amounted to 2,500. On June 30th General Gouraud was wounded, and the command of the French force devolved upon General Bailloud. In his despatch of August 26th, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton referred to General Gouraud in the following terms:—"General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing has added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger and of calm in crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has earned their respect and affection."

On July 12th and 13th the French troops again distinguished themselves in an attack on the enemy's trenches, capturing a machine gun and 200 prisoners. At this time General Masnou, commanding the First Division, was mortally wounded.

During the operations early in August the French troops do not appear to have been seriously engaged.

In October one French division was transferred from the Peninsula to Salonika, the other division being withdrawn soon afterwards.

While we do not think that the conduct of these troops comes within the scope of our enquiry, we feel bound to record their loyal and generous co-operation, their heavy losses, and their conspicuous gallantry.

WATER SUPPLY.

139. The importance of sea-borne water was recognised by the authorities early in March, when it was known there was little or no water for the troops at Mudros, and provision was then made for supplying it, and also for providing distilling apparatus.

1. The Headquarters Staff were responsible for providing the tanks to be placed on the beaches to receive the water; also for the necessary pumps and hoses for pumping out the lighters and for providing mules and water receptacles for carrying the water to the troops.
2. Naval and Military Officers were appointed in charge of the beaches, responsible for the landing of all stores, including the water.

Sir William Birdwood had from the first realised the importance of water, and in March he sent Brigadier-General de Lotbinière from Egypt to Mudros to investigate the question of supply at that place. General de Lotbinière, who was the Chief Engineer of the Australian and New Zealand Division in Egypt, came to the conclusion, when the idea of the military expedition was contemplated in March, that sea-borne water would be a necessity. He also realised that piers would be required for landing on the Peninsula at Anzac, and made arrangements, with the approval of Sir Ian Hamilton, to hire in Egypt four special steel pontoons to form a pier, and these were ballasted with water stowed in petrol tins.

Unfortunately three of these pontoons were lost on the voyage from Alexandria to Mudros. They were placed in charge of Commander Mitchell, R.N., who was attached to the Australian forces, and he arranged to have them towed by the transports carrying the troops. The weather was bad, and the pontoons, which were difficult to tow, broke adrift, and only one arrived at Mudros. This upset the arrangement so far as a landing pier was concerned, but as regards water supply General de Lotbinière, with the assistance of Admiral Wemyss, obtained at Mudros two large wooden lighters and had them filled with fresh water from the ships.

140. The arrangements for the supply of water during the operations of April 25th for the troops at Helles and Anzac were organised by General Headquarters in concert with the Generals commanding at Helles and Anzac.

At Helles a moderate supply of water was found on landing and subsequently there does not appear to have been any difficulty with the supply.

Q. 27672.

At Anzac the supply seems to have been barely sufficient. Surgeon-General Howse, V.C., the Assistant Director of Medical Services of the 2nd Australian Division, gave evidence that the health of the men was very greatly impaired by the shortage of water. He thought that a great deal of the illness was attributable to the fact that the average ration of water, for many months at least, was not more than half a gallon a day. His evidence that there was a scarcity of water is corroborated by Lieutenant-Colonel Begg, commanding the New Zealand Field Ambulance, but he differs from General Howse as to the effect on the men's health. Sir William Birdwood had a special officer told off to look after the water, Major Williams, of the Australian forces, as well as General de Lotbinière. Search on shore was started immediately on landing, and by the evening three wells were found, yielding a small supply. Elaborate arrangements had to be made at Anzac for the supply of sea-borne water, as shore water was scarce. We think it may be stated that the actual operations at Anzac did not fail for want of water; but during the fighting early in August it is stated in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch of December 11th, 1915, that all ranks were reduced to one pint a day, which is obviously an inadequate allowance for troops operating in a hot climate and difficult country. After the failure to take the heights at Sari Bahr, when Sir Ian Hamilton thought of sending his reserve troops to Sir William Birdwood, to make a second attempt, he had to give up the idea on account of the shortage of water.

Q. 29092.

Q.Q. 7494, 21371.
21372-21374.

The water for the use of the troops at the first landing at Helles and Anzac was brought to the beaches by the Royal Navy. When it had been discharged on the beaches the responsibility for its storage and distribution rested with the military authorities.

141. For the landing at Suvla detailed orders concerning the arrangements for water were issued by General Headquarters. The following additional information and directions were given to Sir Frederick Stopford, IXth Army Corps :—

“Water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley, but pending the disembarkation of water carts, a number of mules with special 8-gallon water bags will be attached to the units of your command.” General Staff outline of plan, 22.7.15.

“G.O.C. IXth Army Corps will arrange for parties to pump water on shore from water lighters. Copy of the Director of Works memo. on this subject is attached.” General Staff 1.8.15.

“Two military landing officers and their assistant military landing officers will be placed at your disposal from units other than those under your command.”

“The strictest economy must be exercised in regard to drinking water. Under arrangements made by G.H.Q. receptacles filled with water will be landed as early as possible from the ships carrying the mule corps, and will be conveyed to the troops as transport becomes available.”

“Waterproof tanks of 2,300 gallons capacity, lift and force pumps, will be available on the ‘Prah’—R.E. Store Ship—in Kephalos Harbour, and will be forwarded by D.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., on request of G.O.C. Corps.”

In his despatch of December 11th, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton mentions that the War Office were asked to send with each Division of the IXth Corps and with the 53rd and 54th Territorial Divisions water receptacles for pack transport at the rate of half a gallon per man. He also states that 3,700 mules, together with 1,750 water carts, were provided for the August operations at Anzac and Suvla—this in addition to 950 mules already at Anzac. We understand that no water carts were landed at Suvla, the ground being unsuitable for their use. No pack mules with water bags appear in the landing tables, but some mules were in fact sent.

142. In Sir Frederick Stopford’s operation order of August 3rd the water question was dealt with as follows :—“It is anticipated that sufficient water for drinking purposes will be found throughout the Anafarta Valley. This will be supplemented by tanks on shore, and water bags, but supply by these methods is limited. The General Officers commanding will issue instructions as regards the picketing of wells and springs, as may be found, the prevention of waste of water therefrom, and for the examination by Medical Officers before its issue. Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of warning all ranks to observe the greatest care against waste of ammunition, food, or water.”

For the landing at Suvla on the night of August 6th-7th provision was made for 450 tons of sea-borne fresh water to arrive during the early hours of August 7th as follows :—

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| (a) The steam water tank “Krini” with a naval water lighter in tow | 250 tons. |
| (b) Four wooden water lighters equipped with small wooden troughs, pumps and hoses provided by the Army and handed over to the Navy for transport to Suvla, 50 to 60 tons each | 200 tons. |
| | 450 tons. |

The motor lighters in which the troops landed had also a certain amount of water on board in bulk, supplemented by water in petrol tins, with the idea that the troops should on landing, if necessary, refill their water bottles. QQ. 16643-6,
QQ. 16652,
16758.

The troops, before embarking in the destroyers and motor lighters at Imbros on the evening of the 6th, had their water bottles (1½ pints) filled, and were told to husband the water.

Arrangements were made for the troops to have tea from the destroyers before landing.

143. The failure of the troops to attain their objectives on August 7th, and especially on the 8th, is thought by some witnesses to be due to a large extent to the exhaustion of the troops from want of water, and on the 9th and 10th there was still difficulty in supplying sufficient water. QQ. 9731, 9744.

But the failure to obtain Hill 112, Ismail Oglu Tepe, on the 7th, the most favourable day for a surprise attack, was not primarily due to want of water, but is attributable to other causes, and is dealt with in another portion of the Report.

General Hammersley, commanding the 11th Division, states: “The first water obtained from the water lighters was about 3 p.m. on the 8th. The want of water added very much to the exhaustion of the troops. They had nothing but their water bottles with them. A certain quantity of water was found, but nothing like enough to assuage their thirst, and the troops were badly exhausted.” QQ. 10330-2.

QQ. 10479-83.

General Hammersley states he realised the great importance of water before the operations began, but did not take any steps to see where water was to be obtained. He knew that water was being sent ashore in lighters, but he was not informed and did not enquire as to the system of distribution of water when landed. He gathered that the men would have to depend on their water bottles for 24 hours and upon any local supplies he might find.

QQ. 11012-4.

General Sitwell, commanding 34th Brigade, stated that before he left Imbros on the evening of the 6th he did not know what the arrangements were for providing water. He informed us that he discovered two wells on August 7th and 8th, from which he watered his Brigade, and a considerable number after that date. From these a good supply of water was forthcoming. The position of the wells and springs seemed to him to be accurately marked on the map issued to the troops.

General Sitwell expressed the opinion that if proper search had been made for water, sufficient would have been found to enable the attack to be pushed forward on the 8th.

QQ. 10558,
10562, 10731.

General R. P. Maxwell, commanding 33rd Brigade, in his evidence states: "The want of water did not interfere with the operations up to the night of the 7th. The water-bottles were not touched before midday on the 7th." On the 8th, even with a proper supply of water, he does not think his brigade could have done more, because they were so scattered. "My own men wanted water to recuperate, nothing worse than that."

QQ. 12559,
12562, 12565.

General Haggard, commanding 32nd Brigade, states: "I have read Sir Ian Hamilton's dispatch about the wonderful arrangements made for water, but nothing was ever communicated to me. The only thing on the subject of water that I remember is that either the Divisional Commander or his Chief Staff Officer told me I must particularly warn the men that they must husband the water in their water-bottles, because they probably would not get any for 48 hours." He further stated there was no shortage up to the time he was wounded, which appears to have been in the forenoon of the 7th. He did not know whose duty it was to see that water was supplied.

QQ. 11361,
11362, 11363-71.

Sir Bryan Mahon, commanding 10th Division, stated that the men had their water bottles full when they started. On the morning of the 7th they tried without success to get a further supply. Some was given to them by a destroyer which came inshore on the afternoon of that day. On the morning of the 8th they obtained a further quantity. A good well was discovered on the 8th about halfway down to the sea, but there was a difficulty in distributing it owing to the want of mules. The troops could not have operated on the 8th, but after that they could have gone on so far as water was concerned.

QQ. 12875,
12876, 12877-79,
12892, 12895.

General Hill, commanding 31st Brigade, states that his men got no water except what they had had in their water-bottles from the time that they landed about 8 a.m. on the 7th until 3 p.m. on the 8th, and they suffered very badly, and they could not advance on the 8th owing to that. The Dublin Fusiliers brought them up some water, about half a bottle per man. They found two wells, but the Turks were sniping most of the time. They had to get water under fire, and could not organise any good system of getting it. It was impossible to do more on the 8th, but they could have done more on the 7th. The men went out at night to the two wells and got a certain amount of water, enough to enable them to do some cooking, but it was not a big supply. If they had pushed on on the 7th they might very likely have reduced the sniping.

144. We think that want of water was not the sole cause of the failure of the troops to advance further on the 7th; but on the 8th, with the exception of the 34th Brigade, the troops had been so long without water that they could hardly have been expected to undertake any serious operation. There is some reason to suppose that if the objectives had been gained on the 7th more water would have been obtainable from wells and springs, and the sniping of the known wells would have been much reduced, if not stopped altogether.

Q. 9664.

145. The failure of the supply of sea-borne water for the troops is attributed by Sir Frederick Stopford and other military officers to the fact that only two of the five water lighters arrived on August 7th, that they grounded on a sandbank between eighty to one hundred yards from the shore, and that the hoses provided not being long enough to reach the beach no water was available for use from them until the morning of the 8th. Colonel Western, the Principal Military Landing Officer, at 5.30 p.m. on August 7th, sent the following telegram to Sir Frederick Stopford: "Water for troops essential to success of undertaking. None has been landed. Can you arrange with the Admiral that this be landed at 'A' Beach?" "G.H.Q. directs 1,000 water bags containing 8 gallons each be sent to Anzac. Suggest help (sic) (half?) be sent here and ship's balance be sent to Anzac. Casualty clearing station now at 'C' Beach." "I would add nothing has

yet been landed except small arm ammunition." In a statement produced by Admiral Keyes, Commander Ashby, Naval Transport Officer, informed us that the last water lighter left Kephalos at 4 a.m. on the 7th, and should have arrived by 7 a.m. Further, Rear-Admiral Keyes stated, "I cannot exactly say when the lighters reached the beaches, and I can produce no evidence to show that they were beached before the afternoon of the 7th. I can state quite definitely from my own observation that water lighters were delivering water to the shore at three different places on the afternoon of the 7th—namely, at one of the northern beaches (probably A west), under Mount Falcon (Lala Baba) in the south-east corner of Suvla Bay, and at C Beach, south of Nebrunesi Point." This evidence is confirmed by statements by Captain Lambart, R.N., and other Naval officers. No doubt one lighter stranded on a rocky ledge under Lala Baba, as Admiral Keyes states: "The water lighter was some little distance from the shore, which its hose would not reach. I boarded it and used the picket boat I was in to tow it into a position from which its hose would reach the shore. I remarked that the water was being wasted, as water bottles were being filled direct from the hose, and there was no proper control over the shore end of the hose." Probably this stranded lighter may account for part of the evidence on this subject given by military witnesses, but we think the evidence of the naval officers is correct, and that on the afternoon of the 7th water was being discharged from three lighters to the beaches. This is confirmed by Colonel Western, Principal Military Landing Officer, who states: "I think the supply was fairly right, but it was getting the water from the beach to the troops where the block occurred. There were not sufficient receptacles."

Admiral Keyes' written answer to Q.Q. 1 and 2.

Q.Q. 14717-8.

From the evidence of Major White, commanding the 68th Field Company Royal Engineers, which was detailed to receive the water lighters, it appears possible that some of the lighters discharging water on August 7th were supplied by the Navy.

Q.Q. 30280-1.

146. The original project as described by Sir Frederick Stopford was to use water carts as receptacles on the beach, but as none of these were landed this could not be done. Wooden tanks were provided by General de Lotbinière in each of the four water lighters. They were too small and leaked badly; eventually, naval carpenters made them water-tight, and the Navy supplied tanks and baths. In one instance the Commander of a Destroyer, "The Foxhound," ordered one of his tanks to be cut out and taken ashore and it was used for the storage of water.

Q. 27152.

The evidence shows there was a great deal of confusion on the beaches. The men not being able to get water quickly enough, owing to the absence of receptacles, took out their knives and pricked holes in the hoses. Colonel Western considers there was a serious want of discipline, and a lack of power of command on the part of the regimental commanders and officers, and this is confirmed by naval officers, especially by Captain Carver, R.N., who acted for a time as beachmaster.

Q.Q. 14761-2.

Q.Q. 20457.

147. Major-General Poett, as Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, had the general responsibility for provision of water to the troops, but he states that with regard to sea-borne water he had no responsibility until it reached the beaches, because General Headquarters were, with the Navy, responsible for landing water and mules. He should have ascertained when the water was likely to be landed, and made arrangements for its reception and distribution. Sir Frederick Stopford states that General Poett did not write any appreciation in detail as to how the water was to be distributed and that he did not discuss the question verbally with General Poett. He said: "I find it difficult to say exactly what was in my mind, knowing what has happened since, but my impression is that the water there did not cause me any anxiety because I was informed there was plenty of water. I was informed there were four lighters and mules coming, and I rather thought the mules would be wanted for getting it up country. When I found that water had failed, and had not been landed, to my great astonishment, I sent for General Poett and asked: 'How do we stand with regard to food?' He said: 'We have one day to go on with,' and I said: 'Very well, we must stop everything else for water.' My anxiety till then was more in connection with food, because I did not anticipate there would be any difficulty about water." With regard to the distribution of water he said: "I did not go into it personally; perhaps I ought to have done." Water carts were brought by the ships which carried the mules, but they were not landed and Sir Frederick Stopford, in his evidence, stated that they could not have been used by reason of the nature of the country.

Q.Q. 22222-3.

148. The arrangements made by General Headquarters for landing mules with water bags for the supply of troops in the first instance were impeded by the delay in landing

the 10th Division and by the necessity of sending mules to Anzac owing to the urgent signal received from General Headquarters on the afternoon of August 7th. Sir Frederick Stopford and Admiral Christian think this was the chief cause for the want of mules on that day.

Q. 27441.

According to Admiral Christian's evidence, only one ship with pack mules and 8-gallon water bags on board—the "Dundrennan"—arrived at Suvla Bay on August 7th. Admiral Keyes gives as the reason for this that big ships had to be berthed near the net to avoid the risk of being torpedoed. Consequently, as the protected area was limited, it was arranged not to have at Suvla more ships than could be unloaded at the time.

The result was that sufficient mules were not landed, but Captain Unwin, R.N., V.C., who was in charge, states that they commenced to land mules about 10 a.m. on the 7th at A (New Beach), and they were hard at it the whole time; he was not able to give an estimate of the total number of mules landed on the 7th, but Sir Frederick Stopford says that 500 were landed. No effort, apparently, was made to organise fatigue parties to supplement the paucity of mules.

149. Water in bulk and in petrol tins was provided in the motor lighters, but we have been unable to ascertain whether orders were issued by the battalion and company officers to the men to refill their water bottles before landing. In some cases the naval officers in the lighters warned the N.C.O.'s to have the water bottles filled, but apparently nothing was done. There is no evidence, however, that the water bottles were not full when the men landed.

Q. 9661.

Sir Frederick Stopford said that the lighters were ordered away at once before the water could be used for refilling the bottles. He said: "The water, I think, in those lighters was not intended to be used on shore, but was intended for the troops while they were on board. It was never intended for a shore supply, that is my impression, or I never heard of it."

150. The steps to be taken to explore the local resources for water were entrusted to the Chief Engineer of the Corps. General Painter informed us in a telegram that he detailed parties to search and dig for water in the neighbourhood of the beaches, but we have no evidence as to what was done on August 7th by these parties.

Q. 16268.

Sir Beauvoir de Lisle, who relieved Sir Frederick Stopford on the 15th, states that there he experienced no trouble about water. "There were wells within a quarter of a mile of the shore, which I had opened out. On the hill Keritch Tepe Sirt, there were two wells 400 feet higher than the sea. But on this side, between Keritch Tepe Sirt and the Salt Lake, there were as many wells as you liked to dig. You had not to go more than 15 feet before you got as much water as you wanted. Inside the area which they occupied on the first day they had only to scratch the sand to get as much water as they wanted. On the shore, within 100 yards of high-water mark, you had only to dig the sand 4 feet down to get water. All that means bad staff work, because the Royal Engineers could have found that out as easily as I could. At one place, if they had only taken a mess tin and scraped it with their hands they would have come to water. The difficulties about water were very much exaggerated."

This is confirmed also by General Sitwell, who found sufficient water for his brigade (the 34th).

The discovery of water was, however, a gradual process, and we doubt whether on August 7th and 8th sufficient water could have been found from local resources alone to make good the deficiency of the sea-borne supply.

151. The failure to supply sea-borne water to the troops is attributable to the fact that (1) the landing of the mules which were to supply the troops with water was much delayed. (2) No arrangements had been made for the distribution of water in case of the failure of the mules to land in time. (3) Suitable receptacles had not been provided on the beaches to receive the water from the lighters. (4) No fatigue parties were organised to distribute such water as might be available in case of scarcity of mules.

152. We think that the Corps Commander and his Administrative Staff did not sufficiently realise the absolute importance of water, until Colonel Western sent a telegram to Sir Frederick Stopford at 5.15 p.m. on the 7th to say troops were short of water. This is corroborated by General Poett, who states: "When I left Sir Frederick Stopford about 11 o'clock in the morning of the 7th he was not anxious about water, because he had been told definitely that water was plentiful, but he was most anxious that I should get the munitions on shore." Possibly they may have been misled by the information they had received from the Headquarters Staff.

Q. Q. 9643,
22034.

General Stopford says: "As regards the supply of water which came, till it was landed I had nothing to do with it, and I assumed that the necessary arrangements had been made by the Commander-in-Chief, who was responsible for the plans." He explains that when at Imbros he made enquiries about the water, and found the Headquarters Staff was responsible for the water coming to Imbros and the Navy was responsible for getting it ashore. "The General Officer who made the plan of the campaign was responsible for telling the Navy when and where the water was required. If I had been told it was a matter of duty to know what water I required, and get the mules and lighters, I should have done so, but I understood it was to be done by the Headquarters Staff." He said that two lighters left Imbros with the troops and that he did not know whether Admiral Christian had any orders as to when he was to land the water, and did not talk it over with him. In another answer he said: "According to my recollection the sole instructions I received about the water supply were in the secret instructions, 22nd July, that water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley. I was never informed that water would be scarce, and the responsibility, according to the paper and instructions you get for such a supply of water as came from the sea, rested with the General Headquarters Staff."

Q.Q. 10126
10129,
10130,
10134,
10136,
10140,
10185,
10209,
10210.

General Poett stated: "The orders for the landing of the personnel, the ammunition, the supplies, and the arrangement for providing sea-borne water were made by the General Headquarters Staff, presumably after consultation with the Admiral, and with his full approval. These orders were in great detail, and appear to cover the ground, assuming them to be carried out. Not only did General Headquarters assume all responsibility for the landing orders, but they appointed a special staff to assist in carrying them out. I am inclined to think the inaccurate information in General Headquarters' Orders that water was plentiful misled everybody. It must not be lost sight of that the food and ammunition had also to be considered. To the best of my recollection I received the detailed Orders, I think, on the 5th, but I will not be sure. We got them some days before the landing." General Poett understood that the Navy were responsible for bringing the water to the beaches, but he did not take any steps before the landing to get into communication with the Naval authorities in order to ascertain exactly what was going to be done. He took it for granted that as the orders were drafted by General Headquarters in concert with the Navy, and as they had their own Principal Military Landing Officer and the Beach Master, all details would be arranged between those two officers. He considered that his responsibility would begin with the distribution of the water."

Q.Q. 21946,
22120,
22121,
22122,
22123.

153. We think that Sir Frederick Stopford and his staff failed to realise the importance of having sea-borne water ready for issue to the troops early on the 7th; they may have been misled by General Headquarters saying that water was plentiful in the Anafarta Valley, but it was evident that until the valley was captured water would not be obtainable there.

The supply of sea-borne water was, however, specifically undertaken by General Headquarters in concert with the Navy, and it rested with them to place the lighters in positions from which water could be delivered on to the beaches and to land the pack mules and filled water bags as required by the Officer Commanding the IXth Corps.

FOOD.

QQ. 24515-6 154. The circumstances in which the supply had to be made are described by Sir John Cowans, the Quartermaster-General to the Forces, as abnormal and peculiar. The details of the arrangements for the supply of stores, the amount shipped and the scale of daily rations are set out in the statement of Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. P. Percival, Assistant Director of Supplies. This will be found among the Appendices. A large proportion of the meat supplied was preserved or tinned, and the precautions taken to secure that it was of good quality are described by Brigadier-General Long, then Director of Supplies and Transport.

Q. 24374. These provided for an inspection of the meat before being shipped, and in order to secure a proper examination by competent persons it was arranged, with the consent of the Local Government Board, that it should be made by or with the assistance of the local authorities and their medical staff.

Q. 24376. In the case of purchases from South America, the Local Government Board sent out some of their inspectors, who were at the factories during the whole of the time at the War Office expense, supervising the packing of meat and satisfying themselves as to its quality.

155. The only serious complaints which were brought to our notice are with regard to the absence of canteens, the deficient supply of condiments, and the quality of a certain brand of South American tinned meat.

When the hot weather began in Gallipoli there was a great deal of sickness, chiefly of the type of diarrhoea or dysentery, and a continued diet of tinned meat, even if of good quality, became distasteful. If it were salt and stringy, as was the case with some of the meat, it was still more distasteful, and, if eaten, made the men more liable to these diseases. As will be seen by the scale of rations set out in Appendix E to Lieutenant-Colonel Percival's statement, provision was made for the variation of the ration by giving equivalents, and these equivalents were provided. But this could only be done within limits, and a wider variation of the diet could only be attained by the establishment of canteens. If canteens had been established and this variation obtained at an earlier date there would have been a reduction of the sickness.

Q. 25446. The first request for canteens was made on May 27th, and it was suggested that they should be provided by the Canteen and Mess Co-operative Society.

It was proposed to finance them by using some money of the South African Garrison Institute Fund. Any money used would only be a loan, as it would be recouped from the sum paid by the men for supplies. It was alleged in evidence before us that obstacles were put in the way of supplying canteens by Sir Charles Harris, the Assistant Financial Secretary at the War Office, but we find there was no foundation for such statement.

At first Lord Kitchener was disinclined to send canteens, but after pressure from Sir John Cowans he consented to the use of £10,000. The Treasury later on advanced £50,000 for the same purpose. In the result ten ships carrying canteen stores to the value of about £90,000 went out to the Peninsula between the 16th July and the 4th November, 1915. Sir John Cowans also told us that the troops were not getting the ordinary but a varied ration. He said: "It was a very good ration, and we had in addition fresh vegetables from Bulgaria and Greece and Egypt." There was also a complaint that more condiments and sauces were not supplied for the use of the Australian and New Zealand troops. Colonel Percival gave evidence that these articles would have been supplied if asked for by the Deputy Quartermaster-General of the force. They were not asked for, and we have no evidence that any request for them was ever conveyed to him.

156. The only complaint of the quality of food that we have had before us is in respect of a certain brand of South American tinned meat spoken of as "Fray Bentos." Two other brands of tinned meat were mentioned as not satisfactory, but there was not sufficient evidence about them to enable us to come to a conclusion.

QQ. 15606-9 The "Fray Bentos" meat is described by Sir Alexander Godley in the following terms: "It was very, very salt, and very stringy bully. I think it was of inferior quality. I have eaten very much worse bully beef than that in previous campaigns. I have been campaigning and I have eaten much worse beef. Still it was not good, and certainly the men did not like it." This agrees with all the other evidence in describing the meat as salt and stringy. When the weather was hot and the men inclined to suffer from diarrhoea and dysentery such meat was very distasteful, and they would not eat it. Many of them, while in hospital in England, stated that they could trace an increase of illness on the days when this brand and the other two mentioned were served out, and a decrease when they got other meat. No evidence except this was given as to the

Q.Q. 26733-9.

quality of the other two brands. Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, the Assistant Director of Medical Services to the New Zealand forces, who took these statements from the men, was of opinion that they would be able to trace such increase and diminution. Sir Alexander Godley, speaking, not, of course, as a medical witness, said that he did not notice any difference in the health of the men if they had Fray Bentos one day and fresh meat the next; and Captain Ritchie, a medical officer with the New Zealand force, on being asked if he had noticed the change, said "the only marked change that I saw in that way was at Headquarters. Everyone of us had diarrhoea very bad the day after we were given fresh meat for the first time." When asked if he had noticed anything of the ill-effects to the men's health from the Fray Bentos, he said: "No, it may not have been due to the meat that the men had diarrhoea, it may have been the combination of the meat, the method of living, and water; but the meat was not nice, it was a bit salt." He was serving as a sanitary officer and had not to attend to the medical treatment of the men. Fray Bentos is a well-known brand, and we have ascertained from Colonel Percival that it has been issued to all troops in all theatres of war (including France) since the beginning of the War.

Q. 15610.

Q. 17336.

QQ. 20986-7

Letter
from Col.
Percival,
20th April,
1915.

157. We think the result of this to be that there was nothing actively injurious to health in the meat; but it was of poor quality, and from being salt and stringy it caused some intestinal irritation, and so conduced to diarrhoea.

It must be remembered that the Australian and New Zealand troops had been some months at Anzac when the hot weather began, continually in the trenches, and without proper opportunities of rest, and that their energy and activity had been overtaxed. They were, therefore, probably very liable to ill-effects from food unsuitable to such weather.

158. We have no evidence that any complaint was made by the responsible military or medical authorities in Gallipoli while the meat was being issued, but a complaint was made to the Quartermaster-General's department in November, 1915, by the High Commissioner for New Zealand, and samples of that brand of meat were examined by experts, including the Principal Medical Officer of the inspection department of the Local Government Board, and found satisfactory.

In December, 1915, the complaint was renewed from the office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, and it was stated that when preserved meat from New Zealand or Australia was supplied the health of the men improved. The Quartermaster-General's department agreed to consider offers of New Zealand meat, and also proposed a conference between representatives of the New Zealand Government, the Food inspection department of the Local Government Board, and representatives of the War Office to examine all brands of meat and discuss the whole question. In reply the War Office were informed by the High Commissioner for New Zealand that the only form of conference which could serve any useful purpose would be one at which actual samples of the meat buried by the troops or thrown overboard from the transports could be examined. It was, of course, impossible to get these samples, and so no conference was held.

After the examination in November, 1915, an alteration was made in the specification of the meat and the percentage of salt reduced.

These were the only complaints received about this meat, and since the alteration in the specification no complaints have been received by the Quartermaster-General's department.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

159. The medical arrangements for the Dardanelles expedition were at first under the control of Surgeon-General Birrell, who was selected for the position by Sir Alfred Keogh, the Director-General of the Army Medical Service. Sir Alfred Keogh described the course adopted in such appointments as follows: When it became necessary to appoint a Director of Medical Services for a foreign expedition he examined the list of officers eligible for the position, and from his knowledge of their qualifications selected the one whom he considered most fitted for the position. This was the course adopted in the case of Surgeon-General Birrell, who had considerable experience of active service.

QQ. 19328-
405.

He was appointed Director of Medical Services on the 15th March, 1915, and arrived at Alexandria on April 1st, 1915. The Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff left in two or three days for Mudros, but the Director of Medical Services together with the rest of the Administrative Staff who were then at Alexandria were left behind. Lieutenant-Colonel Keble, one of Surgeon-General Birrell's subordinates, went with the General Staff to Mudros. There were matters connected with the provision of hospital

Q.Q. 23983-7. accommodation in Egypt which had to be settled between Surgeon-General Birrell and Surgeon-General Ford, the Director of Medical Services in Egypt, under whose control they were to be.

Q. 23949. On the whole we think it would have been better if Surgeon-General Birrell had gone to Mudros with the General Staff and left a subordinate to deal with hospital questions in Alexandria; but Colonel Keble, who went to Mudros, and from whose notes the scheme for dealing with the casualties was drafted, is spoken of by Sir Ian Hamilton as a very competent officer.

Q. 25336. Before the Deputy Adjutant-General and Director of Medical Services arrived at Mudros a scheme prepared by one of the officers of the General Staff, based upon an estimate of 3,000 casualties, was shown to Lieutenant-Colonel Keble, who declined to consider it, as he thought that it was the duty of the Director of Medical Services and his Staff to prepare such a scheme and not that of the General Staff. He prepared notes of a scheme of evacuation based upon an estimate of 10,000 casualties. He had not been able before the arrival of the Administrative Staff to submit these notes to the Chief of the General Staff; and he handed them to the Deputy Adjutant-General and Director of Medical Services as soon as they arrived. There is some conflict of evidence as to whether the estimate of 10,000 was made in the first instance by the General Staff or by Lieutenant-Colonel Keble. We do not think that this is material, as the estimate was accepted by both the General and the Administrative Staffs, and Surgeon-General Birrell was so informed by an officer of the General Staff.

Q. 23949. 160. The Director of Medical Services arrived on April 18th, and Colonel Keble's notes were examined by him and the Deputy Adjutant-General. From these notes a draft scheme was made out and passed by the Chief of the General Staff on April 19th. This document is as follows:—

C.G.S.

The medical arrangements in connection with the landing of the British Force are at present as follows:—

1. With each covering force the bearer sub-division of a field ambulance and one tent sub-division, with as much medical and surgical material as can be manhandled by the personnel; giving a total of 150 medical personnel with each covering force.

2. At 2 p.m. on the day of landing the personnel of the casualty clearing station (one for the 29th Division, one for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) will be landed with as much medical and surgical material as can be manhandled.

3. When the remainder of the Division lands the rest of the field ambulance and the equipment of the casualty clearing station will be put on shore as soon as it can be disembarked.

4. Two hospital ships will be available:—

With the 29th Division, "Sicilia"; accommodation, 400 serious cases.

With the Australian and New Zealand A.C., "Gascon"; accommodation, 300 serious cases. The latter ship is expected here on Tuesday.

5. I understand from the Senior Naval Transport Officer that the Navy will commence the transport of wounded from the shore to the ships about 2 p.m. The means of evacuation are as follows:—

Three launches, each capable of holding 12 cots, are available for the 29th Division, and the same number for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These launches are to be towed to the hospital ships and other ships in which the men are to be accommodated.

6. This provision for the evacuation of casualties from the Force appears to be altogether inadequate, and I would strongly urge that the following proposals should be sanctioned:—

(i) B 2 "Caledonia"	..	..	..	..	..	..	470 serious cases
B 7 "Aragon"	..	..	..	..	..	..	200 " "
B 9 "Dongola"	..	..	..	..	..	..	200 " "

should be allotted to the 29th Division for the accommodation of their wounded.

I recommend :—

- | | | | |
|-------|--|-----|---------------|
| (ii) | That the A 25 "Lutzow" | 200 | serious cases |
| | A 1 "Ionian" | 100 | " " |
| | some other ship ("Southland"?) | 420 | " " |
| | be allotted to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. | | |
| (iii) | That two more tows of three launches each—equals 72 additional cots—should be provided for the 29th Division and a similar number for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. | | |

7. It has previously been proposed to provide the personnel and medical and surgical equipment for the above transports of the 29th Division from Nos. 15 and 16 Stationary Hospitals, and the personnel for the transports of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps from No. 2 Australian Stationary Hospital. These Stationary Hospitals have been wired for.

(Sd.) E. M. WOODWARD,
D.A.G.

G.H.Q., M.E.F.,
19th April, 1915.

161. This scheme, which was signed by General Woodward, mentions only one hospital ship, the "Sicilia," for Helles, and one, the "Gascon," for Anzac; and it will be observed that the number of serious cases for which accommodation was provided amounted to 2,290. No mention is made of the provision for slight cases. Surgeon-General Birrell, in a report to Sir Alfred Keogh, dated April 22nd, gives a fuller account of the arrangements.

REPORT ON MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS IMPENDING OPERATIONS, GALLIPOLI PENINSULA.

Hospital Ships.

- (a) With Naval Division which at the outset is not undertaking serious operations is the "Somali."

- (b) With the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps is the H.S. "Gascon."

- (c) With the 29th Division is the H.S. "Sicilia."

This does not provide accommodation for anything like the expected casualties, and as for many days it may be impossible to open stationary hospitals ashore, I have, for the 29th Division, caused to be taken over, after evacuation by the fighting troops, the transports "Caledonia," "Aragon" and "Dongola," and have staffed them from the personnel of the 15th Stationary Hospital. The medical and surgical equipment has been divided equally between these three ships additional to the normal equipment carried. For the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps I have caused the "Lutzow," "Ionian," "Clan McGillivray," and "Seang-Chung" to be taken over. They will be staffed by the personnel of the 2nd Australian Stationary Hospital when it arrives. It sailed from Alexandria on board the "Hindu" on the 20th inst.

All these ships can make Alexandria in 48 hours and Malta in four days.

They can accommodate together with the regular hospital ships 1,995 serious cases, and at a pinch an additional 414 cases, or in all 2,409 cases, and 7,300 slightly wounded cases, or a grand total of 9,709 wounded.

If more transports are needed they are available and can be staffed by the 16th Stationary Hospital which sailed on 20th inst. on "Hindu," and which is being held in reserve.

The hospital ship "Guildford Castle" has been wired for to Alexandria, and she sailed on 21st inst. ; on arrival she will be used to evacuate the No. 1 Australian Stationary Hospital which is opened at Lemnos, and which is filled to overflowing.

Medical Stores.—No. 4 advanced depot of medical stores goes with the A. and N.Z. Corps on the "Hymettus," which, however, is ashore and may not be got off.

No. 5 advanced depôt of medical stores sailed from Alexandria on 20th inst. on "Hindu," and is for the supply of the 29th Division.

Evacuation.—Evacuation of casualties will be direct to Egypt and Malta.

Casualty Clearing Stations.—No. 11 Casualty Clearing Station goes ashore with the 29th Division, and operates near the beach, as does the Australian C.C.S. with the A. and N.Z.A. Corps.

Future proposals.—After the initial operations the three hospital ships, "Sicilia," "Gascon," "Guildford Castle" and one other which is asked for, will act as ferry boats for sick and wounded between the three stationary hospitals which will be established

according to regiments on the Gallipoli Peninsula and the bases at Alexandria and Malta. It is impossible to move the No. 1 Australian Stationary Hospital at Lemnos owing to the number of infectious cases therein, viz., small pox, 2; scarlet fever, 3; diphtheria, 1; measles, 14; mumps, 2.

Evacuation as affected by Military operations.—During the landing and the actions immediately subsequent thereto, the wounded may have to suffer hardships as it will be impossible to evacuate from shore to ships till the fighting troops have been landed, and even when they have been got aboard it may not be expedient to send the ships away to the bases till our foothold is secure, as during the first two or more days no wheeled transport can go ashore, the strain on the whole medical personnel will be exceedingly great.

Requirements.

1. I think the supply of dressings will not prove to be adequate if fighting is sustained, and therefore recommend that 100 boxes of reserve dressings be sent out.
2. As the water on the Gallipoli Peninsula is not above suspicion filter water carts should be provided for the stationary hospitals at the rate of two per hospital. Eight will be required.
3. One more hospital ship will be required to maintain the ferry service.
4. To provide for casualties and to meet unexpected requirements, at least six Medical Officers should be sent here for attachment to the stationary hospitals.

(Signed) W. G. BIRRELL,

*Surgeon-General,
D.M.S., M.E. Force.*

Lemnos, April 22nd, 1915.

This report mentions a larger number of hospital ships as available in the first two or three days and states the accommodation provided in all the ships mentioned to be :
Q.Q. 9258-60. serious cases, 2,409; slight cases, 7,300; making a total of 9,709.

According to Surgeon-General Birrell's evidence the "Somali" and the "Sudan" were available at or immediately after the landing; while the "Guildford Castle" arrived on April 26th and the "Delta" on April 27th, making six hospital ships in all. In addition to these hospital ships, there were seven transports which were allotted, four to Anzac and three to Helles. If any further accommodation were required for the wounded, it had to be obtained by using other transports which had brought the troops to the Peninsula.

This report states that the transports mentioned therein were taken up because it might be impossible to open stationary hospitals ashore for many days, and specifies the accommodation on the transports for serious cases. Both Surgeon-General Birrell and Lieutenant-Colonel Keble, however, gave evidence that, although there was accommodation for the estimated number of serious cases, the transports were not provided with the appliances necessary for the treatment of such cases, and also that such appliances could not be obtained at the time. It seems clear that, although this accommodation was provided, it was not expected that it would be required, as the Medical Staff shared the anticipation of all the military authorities that, if the landing were successfully effected, a rapid advance would be made and hospitals would soon be established on land.

In the actual circumstances of the landing the supply of hospital ships was insufficient, and if a landing in force on the Peninsula had been contemplated when the Expedition left England we think it would have been the duty of the Director of Medical Services to have arranged for a more ample supply. It has, however, been already pointed out that the instructions given to Sir Ian Hamilton by the Secretary of State for War did not contemplate such a landing, and the Director of Medical Services had no information before leaving England upon which he could base his requirements. In his evidence he stated that, if he had received earlier information that heavier casualties were expected, he could have made better preparation. We think that, if the Administrative Staff had accompanied General Headquarters to Mudros, the Director of Medical Services would have been in a better position to inform himself of the probable operations and to estimate the consequent requirements.

The Director of Medical Services, however, did make arrangements in Egypt for the provision of hospital accommodation for a large number of casualties, and we think that with a little more forethought he might have arranged for the supply of some of the equipment which was afterwards found to be wanting on the transports.

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Keble's evidence, each of the transports which were sent to Helles for the evacuation of the wounded was provided with at least four medical officers. Those which were sent to Anzac were not so provided on their leaving

Mudros because the medical personnel intended for them was not available at the time. This personnel came to Mudros on a ship called the "Hindu," which was unfortunately delayed. When she arrived a request was sent for a boat to transfer the Medical Staff to the transports, but one could not be obtained, and the transports left without the intended provision of medical officers. Colonel Keble said, however, that there was no reason why the number should not have been made up at Anzac, as the "Hindu" followed them there; and there were also medical officers of the units which could not be landed available for service on the transports.

162. At the time of the landing the bearer divisions and the field ambulances landed with the troops, and later the casualty clearing stations and a part of the tent divisions of the field ambulance. With the covering division one tent sub-division landed with the bearer divisions. The intention was that the stationary hospitals should be landed as soon as possible, and that from the first the cases should be sorted, the serious ones going to the hospital ships and the slighter ones to the seven allotted transports and the other transports which it was found necessary to employ. Q. 9042.

163. Three classes of ships were employed for transporting the wounded to the main bases, Alexandria, Malta and England, viz. :—

Hospital ships.

Hospital carriers.

Transports, generally called black ships.

In addition, sweepers and other craft were used to convey the wounded from the beaches to the ships.

The hospital ships were well equipped and gave every satisfaction, and took about five weeks to fit out.

The hospital carriers were hastily improvised; they were used because there was not time to fit them properly as hospital ships. Undoubtedly they were not adapted for the conveyance of serious cases for long distances, but they were fairly satisfactory for short distances. None of these vessels were available at the first landing.

The transports (black ships) which were only intended for the conveyance of light cases, were not properly equipped for serious cases. Many of them were used immediately after the troops had disembarked, and in some cases the horses were left on board. As a rule there were four Medical Officers on board, with some attendants and stores, but they had no arrangements for dealing with serious cases and were not meant to carry them. Unfortunately, owing to the difficulty of sorting the light from the serious cases, many of the latter were put on board these ships, and this entailed a great deal of suffering.

164. On the first days of the landing, April 25th, 26th and 27th, the Administrative Staff were again separated from the General Staff. The Commander-in-Chief and the greater part of the General Staff were on board the "Queen Elizabeth," and the Administrative Staff, including the Director of Medical Services, were left on board the "Arcadian." According to the evidence this was done because there was not room for the whole Staff on board the "Queen Elizabeth," but the result was that the Director of Medical Services, who was on the "Arcadian," and was not allowed to use her wireless installation, was unable to give any directions as to the operations for evacuating the wounded. These directions were in consequence given by the General Staff. We think that this was unfortunate and should have been avoided, but we do not attach much importance to the incident, as Surgeon-General Birrell and Colonel Keble say that the General Staff were carrying out Surgeon-General Birrell's scheme, and that the fact of its being carried out by them, and not by himself, did not substantially interfere with the evacuation and the comfort of the wounded, or prejudicially affect the situation. Q. 13361. Q. 24004.

Q. 24003.

Q.Q. 24006-9.

Q. 24061.

165. Hardly any advance was made after the landing, and it was found impossible to carry out the evacuation as intended. It therefore became necessary that all casualties should be evacuated by sea as soon as possible. The casualties began at the very outset of the landing, and many of them occurred in the boats before the men had disembarked. It was impossible to sort the cases as had been intended, and they could not be left on the beaches, which were under shell fire. The selection of serious cases for the hospital ships and lighter cases for the transports could not be carried out. The hospital ships received many slight cases, and what was more serious, many severe cases had, in consequence, to be taken to the transports. Q. 19949.

According to General Woodward and Surgeon-General Birrell there were at one time 300 slight cases on the "Gascon," a hospital ship intended for serious cases, and General Woodward's statement, p. 9.

General
Birrell's
statement,
28th March,
1917, p. 5.
Despatch
26th March,
1915.
Q. 27807.
Q. 27372.

this probably occurred in other instances. The result was that much suffering was occasioned to the severely wounded men, who were carried on the partially fitted transports. These ships were not fitted or staffed for such cases, and there were no appliances for the surgical treatment or attendance required. Additional hardship sometimes was occasioned by reason of delay in transferring wounded men from the small craft which took them from the beach into a transport. Surgeon-General Howse said that he was informed that in one case the wounded were taken to four or five transports before one was found which could receive them, and a similar instance was mentioned by Admiral Keyes on the report of Admiral Phillimore.

Q. 7389.
Q. 13376.
Q. 6971.

Q. 9064.
Q. Q. 9053-9.

166. There is a conflict of evidence as to whether the number of casualties was greater than was expected. Sir Ian Hamilton and General Braithwaite say they were much greater, although the latter gave evidence that the General Staff estimated them at 10,000. Sir John Maxwell, speaking of course from hearsay, expresses the same opinion, and there is other evidence to the same effect. On the other hand, Surgeon-General Birrell says that in the first few days the casualties were not more than he had expected, and the estimate contained in his report to Sir Alfred Keogh bears out this statement. It may be that it was not the number of the casualties alone which was important, but that the number combined with the necessity of transporting them by sea, and the impossibility of sorting them into slight and serious cases, caused an unexpected confusion and crowding of the hospital ships and transports.

Q. 27765.

The conditions stated above prevailed at both Helles and Anzac during the early days following the landing. Throughout the months of May, June and July the evacuation of casualties continued, though, except in the attacks of May 5th and 6th, and June 4th and 28th, the number evacuated was much fewer, and the use of the transports much less. According to the evidence matters began to improve after the first ten days.

There is no doubt that great difficulties were experienced in the first few days of the operations, and that the wounded suffered in consequence. To what extent this was due to bad arrangements and to what extent it was unavoidable is a difficult question to determine, the evidence being contradictory and too voluminous to be set out in full. The real substance of the complaints, in our opinion, is the want of medical and nursing attendance and equipment upon the transports. There is evidence as to the want of boats and barges in which to take the wounded from the beach and of tugs or pinnaces to tow these craft when loaded to the hospital ships and transports, and also as to a want of organisation in ordering them to different hospital ships; but the real complaint seems to us to be the broad fact that men wounded on the Peninsula were often many hours or days before their wounds were re-dressed, and did not receive proper medical attention in the meantime.

Q. Q. 29701-
2.

We think that during the first few days after the landing in April difficulty and confusion in collecting the wounded and removing them from the beaches were unavoidable, owing to the failure to push inland and the fact that the beaches and the small craft approaching or leaving the shore were under the enemy's fire. At Anzac, where the confusion appears to have been more pronounced than at Helles, the military situation immediately after the landing was so unfavourable that the withdrawal of the force at nightfall was contemplated by Sir William Birdwood and consequently orders were given to get every wounded man away at once. Surgeon-General Birrell and Lieutenant-Colonel Keble think that some of the confusion might have been avoided if the senior medical officers of the Australian and New Zealand Corps had remained with the headquarters of their Divisions, leaving their subordinates to land and do the work on the beaches; and Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, D.A.D.M.S. of the Australian and New Zealand Division, expresses that opinion in regard to his Division. Possibly if they had done so they might have been able to exercise better control by being more in touch with the hospital ships, but we do not think that this would have materially affected the situation. In our opinion, the circumstances made confusion inevitable.

The difficulty and confusion mentioned above rapidly decreased after the first few days, and in the operations in August there were few complaints of the arrangements for the removal of the wounded from the beaches and their conveyance to the hospital ships, except on the first day of the fighting at Anzac, when, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Corbin, Medical Officer of the 1st Australian Clearing Station, and Lieutenant-Colonel Begg, Officer Commanding the New Zealand Field Ambulance, there were difficulties from want of transport from the beaches and from the delay in the arrival of two clearing stations which had been provided for that service. This delay was explained by Lieutenant-Colonel Corkery, Officer Commanding the 16th Casualty Clearing Station, one of the two under reference. It does not seem to have been occasioned by any fault in the arrangements of the Medical Staff.

167. At the end of May, Surgeon-General Sir William Babbie was appointed Principal Director of Medical Services in the Mediterranean, and exercised a general supervision over all the medical arrangements for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, as well as for Egypt and Malta, Surgeon-General Birrell continuing in the position of Director of Medical Services of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force until the latter part of August, when he was relieved by Surgeon-General Bedford.

168. In July, Surgeon-General Sir James Porter was sent out by the Admiralty to superintend the naval and military resources in respect of the sea hospital transport in the Mediterranean, under the title of Principal Hospital Transport Officer (Mediterranean). Up to this time this duty had been performed by Surgeon-General Birrell and Surgeon-General Ford, under the supervision of Surgeon-General Babbie, though all the movements of the vessels and other craft at sea were under the control of the Naval Authorities. In consequence of complaints received by Sir Arthur May, the Medical Director-General of the Navy, as to the condition of the wounded afloat and the defective arrangements for the direction of the transports, he represented to Sir Alfred Keogh that it would be well if a naval medical officer were sent out to supervise the shipping arrangements for the sick and wounded. Sir Alfred Keogh agreed to this, and Sir James Porter was accordingly sent out. Sir Ian Hamilton considered that the result would be a dual control and consequent confusion, and represented his views to the War Office. Surgeon-General Babbie considered the appointment unnecessary, but he and Sir James Porter worked very well together. Sir James Porter remained there until December, 1915, when his appointment was terminated at the request of the War Office. There is a difference of opinion as to whether any benefit resulted from the appointment. Sir Arthur May thinks that there was an improvement. Sir Alfred Keogh thinks there was not. Vice-Admiral Wemyss told us that from the naval point of view there was a great improvement.

Q.Q. 19444-8.
Q.Q. 19876-8.
Q.Q. 8853-8.
Q. 19150.
W.O. telegrams,
No. 1360,
No. 1374.
Q.Q. 19886-9.

169. The question of dealing with casualties became very important in July, in view of the contemplated operations at Helles, Anzac and Suvla, and on July 13th Sir Ian Hamilton informed the War Office that he would need more medical assistance. He pointed out that 20,000 casualties was not an extravagant estimate judging from the results of fighting in the Dardanelles up to that date, and that such a number would require thirty transports converted into temporary hospital ships and 200 extra medical officers, with R.A.M.C. rank and file and nurses in proportion. The contemplated operations first came to the notice of the Director of Medical Services and General Woodward and General Winter about the same time. Surgeon-General Birrell explained that it was only by an accident that he heard of the operations, and that he repeated what he had heard to the other two officers. From another part of his evidence it seems that the telegram above mentioned was sent by Sir Ian Hamilton at his request; and as it did not entirely express what he wanted, another telegram, increasing the demand for orderlies and nurses, was sent. This demand was complied with.

W.O. telegram,
No. 1494.

Q. 24059.
Q.Q. 9149-53.
W.O. telegram,
M.F.A. 2052.
Q. 9151.

There is the same conflict of evidence as to whether the estimate of the casualties on this occasion was made in the first instance by the General or by the Administrative Staff, but we do not think it necessary to investigate the matter.

170. Surgeon-General Birrell informed us that his final scheme for the evacuation of casualties from Helles, Anzac, and Suvla was based upon an estimate of 30,000 casualties; and this was also the estimate of Sir Ian Hamilton, after further considering the question. The scheme provided for the use of six hospital ships and thirty transports used as temporary hospital ships. The hospital ships were to take the serious cases and, when full, carry them to the bases and return to the Peninsula. Sir James Porter disapproved of sending the hospital ships away from the battle area, and made out a plan of his own for the movement of the ships and other craft which is set out in his statement. This plan aimed at reserving the hospital ships more exclusively for serious cases and providing greater facilities for separating the light from the serious cases. The cases were then transferred from the hospital ships into transports for carriage to the bases and the hospital ships returned to the beaches.

Surg.-Gen. Birrell's statement, 28 March, 1917.
Q. 13496.

Appendix "D" to Sir James Porter's statement, 13 Feb., 1917.

The evacuation was carried out in accordance with Sir James Porter's dispositions and, on the whole, the cases were better sorted than in the original landing, but there was still considerable confusion. This was increased, not only during these operations but throughout the whole time, by the difficulty of communication with, and inspection of, the hospital ships and transports when they arrived at Mudros. The Lines of Communication Staff,

Q. 18864.

Q.Q. 18091-6.

Q.Q. 8861-
69.

including the Deputy Director of Medical Services, were with the Naval Staff upon the ss. "Aragon," and for the purpose of communication with the shore or with any vessel in the bay, steam or motor launches or boats of some kind were necessary. Of these there was a great deficiency. The Military Staff on board the "Aragon" were in close touch with the naval authorities, and this advantage would have been lost without any compensating improvement in their means of communication with the vessels in harbour, had their headquarters been established on shore. Evidence to this effect was given by

Q.Q. 8294-
8.

Major-General Altham, the Inspector-General of Communications, and we accept it. Sir Frederick Treves in his evidence stated that great difficulty was occasioned because the Deputy Director of Medical Services at Mudros had no means of communication with Alexandria or Malta, and therefore did not know what accommodation there was at each place for the wounded, with the result that ships were sent to Alexandria, and then, finding no accommodation there, had to go on to Malta. We think that there is some misunderstanding about this. The statement is inconsistent with the evidence of Vice-Admiral Wemyss, Surgeon-General Birrell, Colonel Keble, Colonel Ryan, and other officers, and with the information given to us by Colonel Maher. Surgeon-General Ford also stated that he could at all times accommodate the wounded sent to him, though at times he sent on slight cases to Malta in order to keep beds available for serious cases.

Q.Q. 28160-
2.

Q.Q. 28672-
3.

171. In addition to the casualties arising from wounds, there was much sickness, chiefly a form of dysentery and diarrhoea, and large numbers of men had to be removed from the Peninsula to hospital. This was especially the case in the height of the summer. At the end of November, 1915, a very severe blizzard occurred, producing numerous cases of frost-bite, and also gangrene from the men's clothing being frozen to their bodies. There was much suffering during this time, and the storm came so suddenly and was so exceptional that no special provision had been made for it.

Q.Q. 9357-
61.

172. We have had much evidence as to the treatment of the sick and wounded during the operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Some of it favourable to the medical organisation and arrangements, and some the reverse. The main complaints related to the condition of the wounded on the black ships, and the evidence as to them is contradictory.

Evidence as to the deficiencies of these ships and the consequent suffering of the wounded was given to us by many witnesses, amongst them Rear-Admiral Keyes, Surgeon-General Howse, Lieutenant-Colonel Begg, Fleet-Surgeon Levick, Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, Major Kent Hughes, Lieutenant-Colonel Corbin and Lieutenant-Colonel Ryan. Some of the information given to us by these witnesses was given from personal observation and some from reports and communications received by them. It is a subject on which hearsay information should be received with caution, as a natural sympathy with the sufferings of the wounded may lead to some exaggeration.

We think, too, that some of the witnesses have not made sufficient allowance for the inevitable hardships that must attend the evacuation and treatment of casualties under conditions such as existed at Gallipoli.

Colonel Warren Low said that in four or five days at Mudros and Anzac more big operations were performed than the total number performed in the twelve large hospitals in London in a week, and added: "If you are going to expect to have at a place like Anzac all the arrangements one expects at St. Thomas's Hospital, you will not get them, and I cannot understand anyone expecting them." Sir Arthur May also said that where there is a very large number of casualties hospital ships cannot be provided for all, and black ships or carriers must be used to a certain extent, and that whenever these are used there must be a large amount of unnecessary suffering. The word "unnecessary" seems to mean suffering which would not result from the wound if treated under favourable conditions.

Q.Q. 19557-8.

Q. 19994.

We think that great importance is to be attached to the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Ryan as to the condition of the transports, both because he had had experience of war before this campaign, and because he was Consulting Surgeon and Principal Medical Adviser to General Birdwood at Anzac, and for about a month, from April 25th, was constantly at work on the transports. This is the time during which the state of the transports was at its worst. According to his evidence, he was on board about ten transports, and in half of them the supply of medical officers was insufficient and there was a want of equipment, such as bed pans, dressings, and clothing for the men. He also describes many of the transports as very dirty, because they had been carrying troops

Q.Q. 27665-8.
Q. 28791.
Q.Q. 28696-
28701.

to the Peninsula and there was not time to clean them properly. Great difficulty and discomfort was caused in some transports by the fact of horses having been carried on them to Gallipoli. When these ships were selected for the accommodation of wounded it was expected that the horses would have been disembarked before the wounded were put on board, but it was found impossible to disembark them, and on some occasions they were taken several times between Alexandria and Gallipoli. To carry horses and wounded on the same ship must occasion suffering to the latter. Lieutenant-Colonel Ryan stated that he did not think there was much loss of life, but that if all these transports had been fitted up as hospital ships more lives, but not a great many, would have been saved.

We think that this is in substance a fair account of the condition of the transports in the first days of the operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Ryan was only on board one of these transports for a second time and in that case he found a distinct improvement.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ryan also agrees with the evidence of many other witnesses that there was no possibility of separating the wounded into different classes on the beach, and that the cases had to be evacuated as they came without being sorted, according to the nature of their wounds.

Sir John Maxwell and Sir Charles McGrigor described the state of the wounded when they arrived at Alexandria as most distressing, and ascribed it to want of medical and nursing attendance; and Lady Carnarvon, who was working amongst the sick at Alexandria, said that the black ships were deficient in nursing staff, and, she believed, in medical staff all the time. General Haggard and Corporal Ross speak to the want of attention and consequent hardships they themselves experienced, and there was other evidence to the same effect.

On the other hand, in answer to a telegram from the War Office of May 10th, 1915:—"Representations made here regarding inadequacy of arrangements for wounded. Insufficient doctors, nurses and dressings," Sir John Maxwell answered, on May 11th, 1915:—"Please state the source of representations, which I believe to be unfounded. The rush of wounded could not be dealt with in fitted hospital ships, well supplied with everything, and, therefore, we had to use, and will have to use, ordinary transports. Under most difficult circumstances, the best possible surgical arrangements were made. Of course, as troops had to disembark, and the wounded embark on the same day, the transports could not be cleaned. More than 11,000 cases have been brought from the Dardanelles, all with their wounds dressed. With the exception of 2,000 sent to Malta all of these were made comfortable in hospital, and within 80 hours of being wounded they were all attended to. The wounded arrived under circumstances well attended to, according to the report of the surgeons in all the hospitals." Again, on May 23rd, 1915, he telegraphed:—"The wounded were all dressed on being put on board, and on arrival were reported by all the Medical Officers in charge of the hospitals as in a satisfactory condition, taking into consideration the military circumstances under which they were embarked."

This telegram was, apparently, sent after inquiry had been made by Surgeon-General Ford. Surgeon-General Birrell and Surgeon-General Babbie told us that adequate staffs were provided, and, so far as they knew, were on board the ships, though Surgeon-General Birrell admitted that in May the staffs were not sufficient at one time. It is remarkable that this is the time covered by Sir John Maxwell's telegrams. Lieutenant-Colonel Thom, speaking of the time after July 1st, 1915, when he took over the office work of attending to the staffing of the hospital ships and black ships, said that there were always sufficient staffs available at Mudros, and that, so far as he knew, they were on board. Colonel Mayo Robson explained the deficiency of medical and nursing staffs by the fact that serious cases intended for hospital ships were put on the black ships, and he also explained some evidence which was given as to men arriving practically naked by saying that in the summer they fought in that way, and that the sunburnt condition in which they arrived was due to that cause and not to their having been exposed after being wounded, as was supposed by some of the witnesses. Colonel Warren Low also ascribed the condition of the black ships to the difficulties under which the work was done, but he had not much practical experience of those ships. Colonel Sir Courtauld Thomson, Chief Commissioner of the Red Cross Society for Malta, Egypt and the Near East, had the opportunity of seeing many of the black ships, and travelled in some of them. He expressed the opinion that under the exceptional conditions the available resources were utilised to the best advantage.

173. In some instances transports were used as temporary hospital ships for the reception of wounded at Mudros when the hospital accommodation on shore was fully

Q. 28790.
Q. 28739.
Q. 28697.
Q. 29122.

Q. 28702.

Q. 28767.

Q. 28811.

Q.Q. 28781-2.

Q.Q. 6973-6.

Q.Q. 7146-50.

Q.Q. 17141-50.

Q.Q. 12551-5.

Q.Q. 20487-90.

W.O. tele-
gram, 8593,
A.M.D.

W.O. tele-
gram,
1072 E.

W.O. tele-
gram,
1141 E.

Q.Q. 8843-4,
Q. 8343.

Q.Q. 17565
-73

Q. 18091.

Q. Q. 18142
-4.

Q. 19558

Q. 19567.

occupied. This occurred in the case of the "Saturnia," described by Rear-Admiral Keyes, Fleet-Surgeon Levick and Major Purchas.

According to the evidence given by Major Purchas, Royal Army Medical Corps, he heard on June 29th, soon after his arrival at Mudros from Egypt, that there were a large number of wounded on board the "Saturnia" without sufficient medical attendance. He obtained this information from overhearing a conversation between the Captain of the "Minnewaska," the vessel on which he had come from Egypt, and the Captain of another transport. He at once asked for a boat and boarded the "Saturnia," which he found filled with wounded. At this time, according to his evidence, the only medical officers on board were an Australian medical officer, who had arrived just before him, and Fleet-Surgeon Levick. The latter officer had boarded the "Saturnia" in consequence of a report made to him by a Roman Catholic Chaplain that there were a large number of wounded on board the "Saturnia" and only one medical officer. Soon after Fleet-Surgeon Levick went on board, surgeons from all the ships of the Fleet then lying in harbour were sent to the "Saturnia" in consequence of a general signal. Rear-Admiral Keyes, who took his information from a statement made by Naval Surgeon Lorimer and Fleet-Surgeon Levick, were under the impression that the "Saturnia" had brought these wounded men into Mudros and that the state of their wounds as described by them resulted from neglect on board of her. We see no reason to doubt the evidence of Fleet-Surgeon Levick and Major Purchas that there were a large number of wounded on board the "Saturnia" whose bandages had not been removed since the first dressing and were putrid, and that many of the wounds were in a very foul state and needed prompt attention.

It was not the fact that the "Saturnia" brought the wounded to Mudros from Helles. She was one of four transports taken up in anticipation of the fighting at Helles on June 28th to receive such wounded as could not be accommodated on shore. The other transports were the "Seeang Bee," the "Minnewaska" and the "Nile." The "Saturnia" was partly laden with ammunition and could not be used to carry wounded to Egypt, but only for their temporary accommodation at Mudros. The condition of the men's wounds was not produced by neglect on the "Saturnia," but according to the evidence of Major Purchas was the result of the impossibility of bringing them to the dressing stations for some time after they were wounded and their consequent exposure. Major Purchas, however, stated that the condition was aggravated by the want of attention on the "Saturnia," which he said was quite unprepared and unfitted for their reception. Major Purchas also stated in his evidence that he was informed that the wounded were put on board the "Saturnia" in consequence of a mistaken signal.

On June 30th Colonel Aspinall, who was serving on the General Staff under General Braithwaite, happened to be at Mudros and reported to General Headquarters at Imbros as follows:—"I was informed at Mudros yesterday that 1,350 wounded, including a large proportion of stretcher cases, had arrived there in fleet sweepers and trawlers, including Isle of Man paddle steamers. 250 additional cases arrived during the day in similar ships. There was insufficient accommodation for these men on arrival, with the result that 600 cases were yesterday morning transferred to the ammunition ship "Saturnia." Yesterday afternoon it was reported to the naval authorities by the Roman Catholic Chaplain that there were 800 sick and wounded on the "Saturnia" and only two doctors to look after them. Admiral Wemyss accordingly ordered each man-of-war in harbour to send a surgeon on board."

This report on receipt at General Headquarters was referred to Surgeon-General Birrell, who the next day, July 1st, sent Colonel Keble to Mudros to enquire into the matter. Colonel Maher was at that time Deputy Director of Medical Services on the Lines of Communication at Mudros, and was responsible under the Director of Medical Services, who was at Imbros, for the medical arrangements at Mudros. Colonel Keble stated in evidence that on reaching Mudros he was informed by Colonel Maher that the wounded had been put on board the "Saturnia" by the mistake of the master of a fleet sweeper, and that they had been removed as soon as Colonel Maher heard of it. Colonel Keble did not make any further enquiry. Having regard to the specific allegations in Colonel Aspinall's report it appears to us that Colonel Keble's enquiry was perfunctory and insufficient.

We think that the evidence establishes that the wounded were put on board at some time on June 29th and that they were removed, some on June 30th to the "Nile" and the remainder on July 1st to the "Minnewaska," both of which were properly fitted to receive them.

Major Purchas stated that on June 30th he was not in want of more medical assistance.

It is difficult to be certain as to the number of wounded on the "Saturnia," but we think Major Purchas's evidence is probably correct. He stated the number as about 800, and as he was in charge of their removal from the "Saturnia" to the "Nile" and the "Minnewaska," and was afterwards in charge of the "Minnewaska" while taking those transferred to that ship from Mudros to Alexandria, he had good opportunities of estimating the number.

After hearing the evidence of Fleet Surgeon Levick and Major Purchas we at once communicated with Colonel Maher. He is at present on duty with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and has not given evidence before us, but we caused enquiries to be made from him by cable as to circumstances connected with the "Saturnia." His answer is in direct contradiction of most of the evidence stated above. It is in substance as follows:—When the fighting on June 28th was anticipated he was told to expect a certain number of wounded, and took up and got ready the transports already mentioned for their reception. It was intended that the more serious cases should be put on board the hospital ships at Helles, only the less serious being brought to Mudros. By some mistake at Helles, many cases intended for the hospital ships were not put on board of them, but were brought to Mudros, and more accommodation than had been contemplated was required at that place. When the accommodation on shore was exhausted it was necessary to put the wounded on board the transports mentioned, and he ordered some of them to be put on board the "Saturnia." Only 300 cases were put on board of her, and eight military medical officers and other medical personnel with medical and surgical equipments were put on board at once. The wounded were not left without sufficient medical attention, and help was given on this, as on many other occasion, by naval surgeons. On June 30th all the serious cases were transferred to the "Nile," and on July 1st the remainder were transferred to the "Minnewaska." Colonel Maher also stated that on June 29th and 30th he went on board the "Saturnia" and satisfied himself that the sick were well cared for.

Towards the end of August, 1915, in consequence of a complaint made to the War Office about the treatment of the wounded on board the "Saturnia," Colonel Maher sent a report to Surgeon-General Babbie, the Principal Director of Medical Services in the Mediterranean, in which he gave substantially the same account of the circumstances as that contained in his cable sent in answer to our enquiry. He also stated that Major Purchas, an Australian surgeon of wide experience, was in charge and was assisted by several other competent surgeons. Major Purchas, in fact, comes from New Zealand and not from Australia. It appears from War Office records that Surgeon-General Babbie informed the War Office on August 31st that he had personally visited the "Saturnia" on July 1st, and that on that day there were eight medical officers on board, while a number of naval medical officers were also assisting as voluntary helpers. He stated that the number of wounded on board was about 500 and that the "Saturnia" was quite a suitable ship for the purpose to which she was put, but could not be used as a carrier, as she was loaded with ammunition.

We must point out, however, that on July 1st all the more serious cases had been removed to the "Nile" and medical and other assistance had been obtained, so that Surgeon-General Babbie's statement is no guide to the state of things on June 29th. His statement of the number of cases then on board as 500 is more consistent with Major Purchas's estimate of number than with Colonel Maher's statement that only 300 were put on board.

We are of opinion that no definite conclusion can be formed on this matter in the absence of the evidence of Colonel Maher and any witnesses whom he might wish to be called. Colonel Maher is at present on active service with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. We have communicated with the War Office and are informed that for military reasons the Army Council strongly deprecate the recall of Colonel Maher to England at the present time. Under these circumstances, in order fully to investigate the matter, it would be necessary to postpone the presentation of our report for an indefinite period. We do not feel justified in taking such a course, as a decision upon this particular incident would not affect the general conclusions at which we have arrived on the medical arrangements.

In view, however, of the serious nature of the evidence recorded in the present case, especially as affecting the conduct and capacity of Colonel Maher, we recommend that, as soon as the exigencies of the public service permit, steps should be taken by the Army Council definitely to ascertain with whom the responsibility rests for the deplorable state of things which has been represented to us as existing on board the "Saturnia" on June 29th.

19619.

19997.

174. As regards the medical arrangements generally, although the evidence in several material respects is conflicting, we consider that a fair inference to be drawn from it is that much suffering was caused to the wounded during their evacuation from the Peninsula, and that some part of it might have been avoided. Much of this suffering and discomfort was occasioned by the use of the black ships for serious cases. This, in our opinion, arose not so much from a miscalculation of the actual number of casualties as from a miscalculation of the circumstances under which they would be handled. All arrangements were made on the assumption that much more ground would be gained, that the hospitals would be landed, and that there would be an opportunity of sorting the casualties which did not exist on beaches constantly under fire. The difficulties which arose in evacuating the wounded were largely due to an under-estimate of the opposition which would be encountered, and too confident an anticipation of rapid and substantial success. The conditions on shore were, as we have said, aggravated by the impossibility of any proper inspection and regulation of the ships at Mudros by reason of the want of facilities of communication.

Though a great deal of discomfort, amounting in many cases to actual suffering, was occasioned to the wounded by the deficiency in medical attendance and the want of proper appliances on board the transports, we think that the result of the evidence is that the loss of life in consequence was small.

In our opinion, most of the suffering was due to the causes here mentioned, but we also think that there was, in some instances, a lack of organisation and supervision. Evidence of this was given by Admiral Keyes, Major Kent Hughes, and Surgeon-General Howse. The last-named witness described the conditions as "extremely difficult" and exceptional, and said: "We were in the unfortunate position of having no history to guide us of a previous landing on such a large scale in modern times, so that we could get no idea of what medical arrangements should have been made." We think that many of the difficulties might have been avoided if a general plan of the operations had been carefully worked out before the expedition was undertaken.

175. Many of the wounded after evacuation were taken to hospitals in Egypt and at Malta, and others were sent to England, Australia, New Zealand, or India. We consider the hospitals in England, Australia, New Zealand, and India to be outside the scope of our enquiry. We had some evidence laid before us as to the condition of the hospitals in Egypt and Malta, but we do not propose to discuss it at any length. Our conclusion is that, though there may have been some difficulties at first, especially in Egypt, which were the inevitable result of the large development of hospital accommodation, the provision and management of the hospitals were, under the circumstances, satisfactory. At times stores were not readily obtainable, but this resulted from the general difficulties of transport, and not from anything specially connected with the medical arrangements.

Q. 8977.

Q. 19635.

Q.Q. 8870-9.

There were also hospitals for the lighter cases established at Mudros and Imbros. At Mudros their establishment was hampered by the want of piers and roads and other facilities of a port; and at one time, in order to be near the landing places and the water supply, the hospitals were placed too near to the general camp, but this was afterwards rectified. There was also evidence that the ground on which the hospitals stood became infected, and that they should have been moved on that account. On this subject there seems to be a difference of opinion. On the whole, we think that the position of the hospitals at Mudros is fairly described by Surgeon-General Babbie. The effect of his evidence is that at first there was not sufficient accommodation, and, owing to the absence of water, roads and piers, its provision was very difficult; but that, as the size of the force increased, the supply of medical officers and attendants increased in proportion. It is possible that from time to time there was a shortage of medical attendance, but we do not think it existed to any serious extent.

Q.Q. 8917-27.

Q.Q. 9123-43.

Q.Q. 9169-77.

Q.Q. 15590-9.

Statement
of Surgeon-
GeneralBabbie, 30
November,

1916.

176. When the weather became hot, there was a great increase of sickness, chiefly dysentery, diarrhoea, and para-typhoid, and these diseases were carried by the enormous number of flies. It was, therefore, very important that the sanitation of the camps and trenches should be properly carried out. On the whole, so far as conditions permitted, we think this was done. Surgeon-General Babbie states that the difficulties in remedying defects were almost insuperable owing to the cramped positions held and the lack of materials, such as wood and corrugated iron to enclose the latrines and make them fly-proof and to provide fly-proof kitchen-shelters. Some materials sent for the purpose were lost or damaged by accident of war, but one of the main causes of the deficiency was the anticipation that the operations would be very short, and the consequent omission to make provision for a long occupation of the Peninsula.

Effective sanitation of the whole area was made impossible by the fact that our trenches were very near to those of the Turks, who took no sanitary measures at all. In July, a Sanitary Advisory Committee was appointed, which arrived in the Peninsula after the fighting in August. The members of this Committee were all men of acknowledged scientific position, and their reports were of great service. A bacteriological laboratory was established at Mudros, and did good work. Q. 19616.

We attach a copy of Surgeon-General Babbie's statement, which we consider to be accurate. It gives more details than we think necessary to embody in this report.

172. There does not seem to be any complaint as to the supply of medicine, except in the case of Australian and New Zealand troops, who were said to have been short of the ordinary medicines, especially castor oil, and of the variety of food required for men suffering from illness. There is no dispute as to the fact that, at one time, the supply of castor oil ran short, the explanation put forward being that the supply was sufficient to meet ordinary demands, but that for some reason these troops required and consumed more drugs than the normal supply. This is probably correct, for there are no complaints of a lack of drugs in any other quarter. Q.Q. 21022-4.
Q. 27681.
Q.Q. 21283-5
Q.Q. 21326-9.
Q.Q. 17388-93.
Q. 9167.

POSTAL ARRANGEMENTS.

178. The postal arrangements for letters and parcels sent to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force were complicated, and increased in difficulty as the number of troops increased. The arrangements also changed from time to time. The statements of Lieutenant-Colonel Williamson, Director of Army Postal Service, Major McClintock, Director Army Postal Service Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and Captain McCurdy, Officer Commanding New Zealand Base Post Office, set out all the details of the system, and will be found in the Appendix.

179. Various complaints as to the service were brought before us. They were chiefly concerned with the non-delivery or late delivery of letters and parcels to the New Zealand troops, but we think what happened with regard to them may be taken as fairly representing the facts as to the whole of the force. The only material difference is that the mails for the New Zealand troops were passed through a very efficient New Zealand Post Office under Captain McCurdy, but they remained always under the control of the General Post Office.

Complaints were made by General R. P. Maxwell, General Cox and Colonel Mayo Robson.

The two former complained that parcels regularly despatched from England were only delivered in rare instances, and the latter that letters addressed to him were delivered on board the "Aragon," where the Naval and part of the Administrative Staff were quartered. Colonel Mayo Robson on more than one occasion went on board and asked for his letters, and was told there were none for him, and eventually they were all found in the hold in another part of the "Aragon." He said they consisted of letters and newspapers extending over a period from July to October, 1915, and contained several orders which had been sent to him by Surgeon-General Babbie and others. We have not been able to get any explanation of this incident. The letters had been carried and delivered at the place to which they were addressed and, in the absence of explanation, we can only conclude that it was owing to the negligence or stupidity of some postal clerk on board the "Aragon" that they were not given to Colonel Mayo Robson. Q. 18155.

180. It must be remembered that the Post Office was not the only agency by which parcels were sent to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. A great many were sent by the Army Service Corps Parcels Transit Service, and the Post Office was sometimes held responsible for the delay or non-delivery of parcels which were not entrusted to them. Speaking generally, parcels up to 11 lbs. were sent by post and parcels above that weight by the Military forwarding office. There was a good deal of looting of parcels sent by the Military forwarding office, probably because they were not sent in sealed bags, as the Post Office parcels were. Q. 18452.

181. Still it cannot be doubted that there were delays and failures in the delivery of letters and parcels which were sent by the Post Office. In considering the amount of blame, if any, to be attached to the department, it is necessary not to lose sight of two main considerations.

- (1) The number of letters and parcels was, as shown by the annexed statements of Lieutenant-Colonel Williamson, Major McClintock and Captain McCurdy, very large, and increased very rapidly, and a failure to deliver a very small percentage of the letters and parcels would amount to a formidable figure. Q. 16946.

- and give rise to many complaints. The amount of letters is stated to have grown to 1,000,000 a week, and the parcels are variously stated as from 40,000 or 90,000 a week. The difference is probably accounted for by a difference in the estimate of the number of parcels to a bag.
- QQ.16946-7.
- QQ.18460-1. (2) The service was performed under circumstances of great difficulty, which are also described in those statements, and for this reason the delivery of mails cannot fairly be compared with delivery in ordinary circumstances or to the troops in France.
- Q. 16883. The system of checking the bags was elaborate and efficient, as is shown by the fact that every bag except one could be traced and accounted for, and that cases in which the bags had been tampered with were also discovered. This checking continued up to the time when the mails were delivered to the Post Orderlies of the different units. After they had been so delivered the responsibility of the Post Office ceased.
- Q. 16891.
182. In consequence of complaints as to the postal service, Colonel Williamson was sent out specially to make inquiries and report, which he did in October, 1915. His report, which he confirmed in evidence before us, will be found in the Appendices to this Report. It is substantially in accordance with the evidence of the other witnesses mentioned above.
- From this report it appears that the Post Office probably had to bear some of the responsibility which properly attached to the Army Service Corps Parcels Transit Service as well as its own.
- Q. 5. The Post Office sent the letters via Marseilles and the parcels by P. & O. packets from the Thames. The result was that a letter advising the despatch of a parcel often arrived a considerable time before the parcel, and complaints were made of its non-arrival because the addressee of the letter did not appreciate that they were not sent together.
- Q. 20038.
- P. 2.
183. In cases where the addressee had become a casualty or for some other reason was not with his unit, there were great difficulties in finding where he was and in delivering his letters or parcels, even if they arrived safe and were not distributed to other men. The names of several men whose letters were not delivered were supplied to us by the Office of the High Commissioner of New Zealand. These cases were investigated so far as was possible by Captain McCurdy, and the result is given by him in his statement. They illustrate the difficulty experienced in delivering mails when the addressees were not with their unit.
- Captain McCurdy's statement.
P. 2.
QQ.20072-8
184. Many parcels were destroyed through insufficient packing. The bags were handled and transhipped several times, and could not always be carefully handled, the result being that parcels were burst open and their contents crushed so as to be quite indistinguishable. Colonel Williamson described in his evidence the state of a large number of bags of parcels which had been sent up to the front and returned to Alexandria because they could not be delivered.
- Q. 16896. He says: "The state in which these parcels arrived was absolutely deplorable. It was a deplorable sight. There was hardly a vestige of a resemblance to a parcel left. The contents were often ground to powder. The packing was all gone, the address was illegible, and one would simply get a bagful of *disjecta membra* of a parcel which it was impossible to reassemble and send on. That must have accounted for a very large proportion." It is improbable that all this damage was done on their return from the front to Alexandria, and it may therefore be concluded that many parcels arrived at the front in the state described by Colonel Williamson.
- Q. 16902.
- Q. 16899. 185. In many cases where the addressee was not present with his unit, the parcels right or wrongly, were treated as common property, and distributed amongst his comrades.
- QQ.20068-90.
186. In the case of letters which arrived at intervals over a considerable period and were not delivered as they arrived, but all together at a later date, the fault may have been that of the unit to which the addressee belonged and not that of the Post Office, whose duty was discharged when the letter was delivered to the Post Orderly. In one case that was investigated by Captain McCurdy this proved to have been the case. It does not seem to have been so in the case of Colonel Mayo Robson.
- QQ.16913-5
- QQ.20073-4
187. Parcels sent to General Cox were packed by the Army and Navy Stores and forwarded by Parcel Post. Presumably, they would be properly packed. We have not been able to ascertain anything further with regard to this case or that of General Maxwell.
188. The causes mentioned above account for a very large proportion of the complaints, but they do not explain them all. There must have been cases in which the Post Office was at fault. Considering the difficulties of the service and the amount of letters and parcels which had to be handled, we think that some miscarriage was inevitable, and we are of opinion that, on the whole, no blame attaches to those who had the organization and conduct of the service.

THE ZION MULE CORPS.

189. The Zion Mule Corps was raised in Alexandria from a number of Jewish refugees from Syria. They or their fathers had gone to Syria following the principle of Zionism and at the outbreak of war they came to Egypt and were under the charge of a Mr. Hornblower, Inspector of Refugees in the Ministry of the Interior, Egypt. The corps, when raised, was put under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, and did good work in Gallipoli as a transport corps. Q.Q. 15068 -73.

190. The only question raised before us was as to the terms of service and pension on which they were engaged. We doubt if this question is strictly within our reference, but we think it well to represent the facts as stated to us. Evidence was given to us by Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson and Captain Trumpeldor. Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson spoke in a great measure from hearsay, and the important evidence was that of Captain Trumpeldor. We consider him quite a trustworthy witness.

Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson said that there were two meetings held at which officials of the British Government addressed the men and told them that they would be treated in all respects in the same way as British soldiers and would receive the same pay and everything else, and that the men agreed to serve in the corps on those terms. Q. 8686.

191. Captain Trumpeldor said that they wished to raise a fighting unit to fight for Palestine and the Zion ideal, and did not want to serve as a transport unit because they did not think it so honourable. He said that he and a committee of prominent Israelites saw Sir John Maxwell and discussed the question of forming a fighting or a transport unit, and that afterwards a meeting of the men was held at which they were addressed by Mr. Hornblower and a staff officer who spoke in Sir John Maxwell's name. This staff officer was Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) H. V. Holdich, D.S.O. Q. 11579.

According to Captain Trumpeldor's evidence the men were told by Mr. Hornblower and Captain Holdich that a transport and a fighting unit in the British Army were equally honourable and served on the same conditions. Some of the men who were married and had families asked what would happen to their families if they were killed or wounded, and in answer they were told that like the families of soldiers they would receive a pension and allowance. Captain Trumpeldor said that he did not remember the expression "pensions" being used, as Mr. Hornblower and Captain Holdich spoke in English and he did not understand it very well, but that what they said was translated into Hebrew by Mr. Gordon, a clerk in Mr. Hornblower's office. Captain Trumpeldor spoke English fairly well and gave his evidence in English.

192. Lieutenant-Colonel Holdich is on active service in Egypt. We made inquiries from him by telegraph, and received an answer that to the best of his recollection no mention specifically was made of any gratuities or pensions, as it was understood that any question as to them would be settled later by the General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Mediterranean Force, according to the nature of the work on which the corps was employed; and that he believes an agreement was made between Sir J. Maxwell and the General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Mediterranean Force. He also stated that the terms, so far as he made them, were defined in writing to the War Office in a letter at the beginning of April, 1915, as 1s. a day and khaki uniform, without any other conditions. The letter mentioned is one from Sir John Maxwell, of April 10, 1915. The War Office have not been able to find it, but we are informed by General Headquarters in Egypt that it contained no mention of gratuities or pensions. Telegram 17 June, 1914.

We referred Captain Trumpeldor's evidence to Sir John Maxwell and received in answer a letter in which he stated: "My staff officer was Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Holdich, D.S.O., and drew up the terms of service. As far as my recollection goes Colonel Patterson has correctly stated the case. The terms of service of the men must be available in Egypt; they accepted the conditions and were taken on the strength of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force." On receiving this letter we communicated with Lieutenant-Colonel Holdich, and received the answer mentioned above.

193. Some of the corps were killed and wounded, and a question as to the payment of pensions arose. In August, 1915, Sir John Maxwell wrote to the War Office: "Although no promise or agreement of any sort was made regarding pensions the men were evidently quite under the impression that in case of their death, pensions or compensation of some sort would be granted to their widows." He recommended the payment of a gratuity in lieu of a pension, owing to the difficulties that might arise in the payment of pensions. Statement of Sir Charles Harris, 16 April, 1917.

In September, 1915, he again wrote to the War Office and explained that the men were not attested, but had entered into a voluntary agreement to serve at the pay of 1s. a day, their families being maintained in refuge camps during their absence. He concluded: "No authorised mention of pension was made to them before joining, but they undoubtedly consider themselves eligible for the same consideration as soldiers,"—and again recommended gratuities rather than pensions.

Sir
Reginald
Brade's
letter,
20 June,
1917.

194. Authority has been obtained from the Treasury to issue gratuities to the Zion Mule Corps men if disabled or to their dependants if they die.

Some of the men sent a petition to Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson complaining that they only received gratuities instead of pensions, and said that it was not fair after what had been said to them when they joined.

195. We suggest for the favourable consideration of the War Office the question whether, under the circumstances, the men of this corps should not be treated as to pensions similarly to British soldiers regularly enlisted.

GENERAL REVIEW.

196. Before setting out the conclusions to which we have come, it seems desirable briefly to review the salient features of the Dardanelles Expedition in their broad military aspect. We would first refer to the paper on the possibility of a joint naval and military attack upon the Dardanelles, drawn up by the General Staff at the War Office for the consideration of the Committee of Imperial Defence and dated December 19th, 1906, in paragraph 8 of which the following statement appears:—"The successful conclusion of a military enterprise directed against the Gallipoli Peninsula must hinge upon the ability of the fleet not only to dominate the Turkish defences with gun fire, and crush their field troops during that period of helplessness which exists while an army is in actual process of disembarkation, but also to cover the advance of the troops once ashore until they could gain a firm foothold, and establish themselves upon the high ground in rear of the coast defences of the Dardanelles. However brilliant as a combination of war and, however fruitful in its consequences such an operation would be, were it crowned with success, the General Staff, in view of the risks involved, are not prepared to recommend its being attempted."

Q 4337.

Admiralty
Telegrams
No. 211.

These words were written before the recent development of deep trenches flanked by hidden machine guns, concealed howitzer batteries, and the other appliances of modern defensive warfare. Sir John de Robeck pointed out to Sir Ian Hamilton at their first interview on March 17th, 1915, that the peninsula was rapidly being fortified, that all the landing places were now defended by lines of trenches and effectively commanded by field guns and howitzers which could not be located from the sea, that the Turks possessed searchlights of the latest pattern which were skilfully handled, and that their troops were so ably disposed and heavily entrenched that they had not much to fear from the flat trajectory guns of the Navy. Sir John de Robeck subsequently sent a telegram on May 9th, 1915, to the Admiralty, in which he remarked: "The Navy is of small assistance when it is a matter of trenches and machine guns, and the check of the Army is due to these factors." It will be seen that the condition which the General Staff had laid down in 1906 as being essential to the success of a military enterprise on the Gallipoli Peninsula was incapable of fulfilment; and though Sir John de Robeck's views about naval gunfire were of great importance, we cannot find that they were taken into serious consideration or communicated to the War Office.

197. Landings took place at Helles and Anzac with disappointing results. The troops not only suffered heavy loss during disembarkation, but subsequently were unable to advance beyond a short distance from the beach, or to establish themselves on the high ground which the Turks had occupied and entrenched. Our forces on the Peninsula were in the position of isolated garrisons confined to small areas on the fringe of the shore, and engaged in trench warfare against an enemy possessing freedom of movement, advantages of ground, and the power of concentration and rapid reinforcement. Our garrisons fought bravely and lost heavily, but were unable to make any substantial advance.

198. Sir Ian Hamilton made an effort to extricate his troops from the trench warfare in which they were entangled by means of the combined operations at the beginning of August. These operations failed, partly because the Turks were too strong, partly

because some of our troops and their leaders were unequal to the task assigned them, partly through shortage of water, and partly because the plan was defective. The descriptions of the ground on the northern and north-western slopes of Sari Bahr, and of the hills to the north and east of Suvla Bay, lead us to the conclusion that in the plan of operations too little importance was attached to natural difficulties. We doubt whether it was prudent or advantageous to order night advances through so difficult a country, especially when no complete preliminary reconnaissance had been or could have been made. In hardly any case either at Anzac or Suvla were the troops able to reach the specified objectives at or near the time mentioned in the plan. Thus from the beginning the execution of the plan was delayed, and this delay caused a loss of cohesion and co-operation among the attacking units. In spite of heat, want of water and difficulties of ground, the troops with very few exceptions appear to have fought well and in some instances heroically; but after successive nights and days of strenuous effort they became exhausted and in urgent need of rest and reorganisation. The losses, too, had been so heavy that without large reinforcements nothing further could be attempted. Even with large reinforcements it had become increasingly evident that no substantial success could be achieved without an overwhelming preponderance of high angle and high explosive fire upon the Turkish entrenchments which confronted our positions on the shore.

199. Viewed as a military enterprise which was undertaken not as a surprise, but after ample warning had been given to the enemy of the probability of a land attack, we are of opinion that from the outset the risks of failure attending the expedition outweighed its chances of success. The conditions of the problem, so far as we can judge, were not fully investigated in the first instance by competent experts, and no correct appreciation of the nature and difficulties of the task involved was arrived at. In the absence of such appreciation the authorities responsible for the expedition confidently expected that military action on the Peninsula would be short and decisive, and that after the Turkish defences had been destroyed and the Turkish guns dismounted the force which had been landed would be available for such operations in the vicinity of Constantinople as might then seem appropriate. The strength of the opposition to our landing on the Peninsula and the failure of our troops to make any material impression on the Turkish entrenchments which hemmed them in came, therefore, as a surprise. The heavy losses and the repeated checks that were experienced up to the end of July caused the authorities considerable anxiety, but they were naturally reluctant to abandon a project, the realisation of which would have had such far-reaching effects. The failure of the combined attack early in August, from which much had been hoped and for which large reinforcements had been despatched from England, was a severe disappointment to the Government and the country. Doubts arose as to the ultimate success of the expedition, and alternative courses of action came under consideration. It was open to the Government, if the requisite resources in the way of men, guns, and munitions were forthcoming, promptly to strengthen the Expeditionary Force to such an extent as would enable it to drive the Turks out of the Peninsula, or at least to attempt to do so. Or our garrisons on the shore of the Peninsula might be maintained in the positions they were then occupying until the spring of 1916, provided that the Turks did not bring heavy guns into play and render these positions untenable; or steps might be taken for the evacuation of the Peninsula before the winter set in. There was much divergence of opinion in regard to these different courses, the General Staff at the War Office, which by this time was in process of resuscitation, being strongly in favour of evacuation. To Sir Ian Hamilton such a step as evacuation was unthinkable, and he informed Lord Kitchener accordingly. On October 11th Lord Kitchener also told the Dardanelles Committee that in his opinion the abandonment of the Gallipoli Peninsula would be disastrous. On the other hand, Sir Charles Monro strongly urged its expediency and feasibility, and this view, though at first distasteful to Lord Kitchener, was afterwards accepted by him. At last the Government resolved to withdraw from the Peninsula. We think that this was a wise and courageous decision. It was generally recognised that the evacuation would in all probability involve heavy loss in men and material. Besides this, stress had been laid on the irreparable damage to our prestige in the Eastern world which would attend our abandonment of the expedition. Fortunately, however, in the result our losses proved to be inappreciable and hitherto our prestige appears to have remained unimpaired.

200. It has been represented in some of the evidence which has come before us that from a military point of view the Dardanelles Expedition, even if unsuccessful, was justified by the fact that it neutralised or contained a large number of Turkish troops who otherwise

would have been free to operate elsewhere. Lord Kitchener estimated this number as being nearly 300,000. But in containing the Turkish force we employed on the Peninsula and at Lemnos and Imbros 385,700 officers and soldiers, beside Indian soldiers—a total of at least 400,000. Our casualties amounted to 31,389 killed, 78,749 wounded and 9,708 missing, making a total of 119,846. The expedition also involved heavy financial expenditure and the employment of a considerable naval force and of a large amount of merchant shipping.

Taking these factors into consideration, we do not think that from a military standpoint our gain in one direction compensated for our losses in other directions. On the other hand, as stated in our Interim Report, certain important political advantages were secured.

201. Our attention has been called to the fact that in paragraph 83 of our First Report, we quoted an extract from a statement made to us by Mr. Churchill in which he referred to the changed attitude of Lord Fisher towards the operations at the Dardanelles. Mr. Churchill's statement was in fact given as relating not to the period "shortly after January 13th" but to a much later period.

While we gladly make this correction, we wish to add that the conclusions stated in the paragraph are in our opinion established by the evidence and are in no way vitiated by this correction.

202. We regret that the official duties of Mr. Fisher as High Commissioner of Australia became latterly so exacting as to deprive us to a large extent of his help. For this reason, as explained in his separate memorandum, he considers it inadvisable to sign the Report.

It will be noticed that Sir Thomas Mackenzie has added a memorandum dealing with certain aspects of the Enquiry on which he takes a stronger view than the general body of the Commissioners.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

1. We think that, when it was decided to undertake an important military expedition to the Gallipoli Peninsula, sufficient consideration was not given to the measures necessary to carry out such an expedition with success. We have already pointed out in paragraph 15 that it had been apparent in February, 1915, that serious military operations might be necessary. Under these circumstances we think that the conditions of a military attack on the Peninsula should have been studied and a general plan prepared by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir James Wolfe Murray, special attention being paid to the probable effect of naval gun fire in support of the troops; and that it was the duty of the Secretary of State for War to ensure that this was done.

2. We think that the difficulties of the operations were much underestimated. At the outset all decisions were taken and all provisions based on the assumption that, if a landing were effected, the resistance would be slight and the advance rapid. We can see no sufficient ground for this assumption. The short naval bombardment in November, 1914, had given the Turks warning of a possible attack, and the naval operations in February and March of 1915 led naturally to a great strengthening of the Turkish defences. The Turks were known to be led by German officers, and there was no reason to think that they would not fight well, especially in defensive positions. These facts had been reported by Admiral de Robeck and Sir Ian Hamilton.

3. We think that the position which, in fact, existed after the first attacks in April and the early days of May should have been regarded from the outset as possible and the requisite means of meeting it considered. This would have made it necessary to examine and decide whether the demands of such extended operations could be met consistently with our obligations in other theatres of war. In fact those obligations made it impossible in May, June, and July to supply the forces with the necessary drafts, gun ammunition, high explosives and other modern appliances of war.

4. We are of opinion that, with the resources then available, success in the Dardanelles, if possible, was only possible upon condition that the Government concentrated their efforts upon the enterprise and limited their expenditure of men and material in the Western theatre of war. This condition was never fulfilled.

5. After the failure of the attacks which followed the first landing there was undue delay in deciding upon the course to be pursued in the future. Sir Ian Hamilton's

appreciation was forwarded on May 17th, 1915. It was not considered by the War Council or the Cabinet until June 7th. The reconstruction of the Government which took place at this most critical period was the main cause of the delay. As a consequence the despatch of the reinforcements asked for by Sir Ian Hamilton in his appreciation was postponed for six weeks.

6. We think that the plan of attack from Anzac and Suvla in the beginning of August was open to criticism. The country over which the attack had to be made was very difficult, especially at Anzac. In order to obtain if possible the element of surprise, the main advance of the Anzac force up the north-western spurs of Sari Bahr was undertaken at night, the risk of misdirection and failure being much increased thereby. The plan, however, was decided upon after a consideration of other plans, and with the concurrence of the commander of the Anzac Corps, who had been in command since the first landing.

7. The operations at Suvla were a severe trial for a force consisting of troops who had never been under fire, but we think that after taking into consideration and making every allowance for the difficulties of the attack and the inexperience of the troops, the attack was not pressed as it should have been at Suvla on the 7th and 8th August, and we attribute this in a great measure to a want of determination and competence in the Divisional Commander and one of his Brigadiers. The leading of the 11th Division and the attached battalions of the 10th Division, which constituted the main body of the attack, was not satisfactory. As explained in paragraphs 108 and 109, the orders given by General Hammersley were confused and the work of his staff defective. Major-General Hammersley's health had in the past been such that it was dangerous to select him for a divisional command in the field, although he seemed to have recovered. We think that the defects that we have mentioned in his leading probably arose from this cause. General Sitwell, the senior Brigade Commander, did not, in our opinion, show sufficient energy and decision.

8. Sir Frederick Stopford was hampered by the want of effective leading above referred to, and the inexperience of his troops, but we do not think he took sufficient means to inform himself of the progress of operations. On August 7th, when he became aware that the troops had not advanced as rapidly as had been intended, we think that he should have asked for some explanation from General Hammersley. In that case he would have been informed of the difference which had arisen between General Sitwell and General Hill, and of General Sitwell's lack of vigour and energy in leading. We think that at this point his intervention was needed.

We think that he and his staff were partly responsible for the failure to supply the troops with water on August 7th and 8th. Our detailed conclusions on the water supply will be found below.

We cannot endorse Sir Ian Hamilton's condemnation of the orders given by Sir Frederick Stopford on the morning of August 8th, 1915, whether the account of them given in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch or that in Sir Frederick Stopford's report to him be accepted. According to the evidence of Sir Bryan Mahon and General Hammersley they were not deterred from advancing by those orders.

On the evening of August 8th we think that Sir Frederick Stopford's difficulties were increased by the intervention of Sir Ian Hamilton. Sir Ian Hamilton seems to have considered Sir Frederick Stopford lacking in energy in the operations between August 9th and August 15th. As this opinion is based more upon general conduct than upon any specific acts or omissions, we are not in a position to pronounce upon it. We realise, however, that importance attaches to the impressions of a Commander-in-Chief on such a subject.

9. As regards Sir Ian Hamilton it is inevitable that the capabilities of a commander in war should be judged by the results he achieves, even though, if these results are disappointing, his failure may be due to causes for which he is only partially responsible.

In April, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton succeeded in landing his troops at the places which he had chosen; but the operations that were intended immediately to follow the landing were abruptly checked owing to a miscalculation of the strength of the Turkish defences and the fighting qualities of the Turkish troops. This rebuff should have convinced Sir Ian Hamilton that the Turkish entrenchments were skilfully disposed and well armed, and that naval gun fire was ineffective against trenches and entanglements of the modern type. We doubt, however, whether the failure of these operations sufficiently impressed

Sir Ian Hamilton and the military authorities at home with the serious nature of the opposition likely to be encountered.

During May, June, and July severe fighting took place, but its results were not commensurate with the efforts made and the losses incurred.

During July a plan of combined operations was elaborated, which was carried into effect early in August. Sir Ian Hamilton was confident of success, but was again baffled by the obstinacy of the Turkish resistance. Moreover, the failure of night advances in a difficult and unexplored country, which formed part of the plan, led to heavy casualties and temporarily disorganised the forces employed.

Sir Ian Hamilton was relieved of his command on October 15th.

We recognise Sir Ian Hamilton's personal gallantry and energy, his sanguine disposition, and his determination to win at all costs. We recognise also that the task entrusted to him was one of extreme difficulty, the more so as the authorities at home at first misconceived the nature and duration of the operations, and afterwards were slow to realise that to drive the Turks out of their entrenchments and occupy the heights commanding the Straits was a formidable and hazardous enterprise which demanded a concentration of force and effort. It must further be borne in mind that Lord Kitchener, whom Sir Ian Hamilton appears to have regarded as a Commander-in-Chief rather than as a Secretary of State, pressed upon him the paramount importance, if it were by any means possible, of carrying out the task assigned to him.

Though from time to time Sir Ian Hamilton represented the need of drafts, reinforcements, guns and munitions, which the Government found it impossible to supply, he was nevertheless always ready to renew the struggle with the resources at his disposal, and to the last was confident of success. For this it would be hard to blame him; but viewing the Expedition in the light of events it would, in our opinion, have been well had he examined the situation as disclosed by the first landings in a more critical spirit, impartially weighed the probabilities of success and failure, having regard to the resources in men and material which could be placed at his disposal, and submitted to the Secretary of State for War a comprehensive statement of the arguments for and against a continuance of the operations.

10. The failure at Anzac was due mainly to the difficulties of the country and the strength of the enemy. The failure at Suvla also prevented any pressure being put upon the Turkish force in that direction, and success at Suvla might have lessened the resistance at Anzac.

11. We think that after the attacks ending on August 9th had failed, the operations contemplated could not have been successfully carried out without large reinforcements. The fighting after General de Lisle replaced Sir Frederick Stopford was really of a defensive character.

12. We think that after the advice of Sir Charles Monro had been confirmed by Lord Kitchener the decision to evacuate should have been taken at once. We recognise, however, that the question of evacuation was connected with other questions of high policy which do not appear to us to come within the scope of our enquiry.

13. We think that the decision to evacuate when taken was right.

14. We think that the operations were hampered throughout by the failure to supply sufficient artillery and munitions, and to keep the original formations up to strength by the provision of adequate drafts as well as reinforcements. In our opinion this was not owing to any neglect on the part of the Heads of Departments charged with such provision, but to the demands proving much larger than was expected when the operations were undertaken and to demands which had to be met in other theatres of war.

On the other hand, a considerable amount of artillery was available in Egypt and at Mudros for the Suvla operations, but it was not utilised.

15. Many minor frontal attacks were made without adequate artillery preparation, which produced little or no material advantage. Evidence was given that these attacks entailed an unnecessary loss of life. Without a more intimate knowledge of the locality and conditions than it is possible for us to obtain, we cannot express an opinion as to whether it was right to undertake such attacks. We think that the evidence disproves the allegation made before us that useless attacks were made because of the neglect on the part of superior Commanders and Staff Officers to visit and inspect the trenches and positions.

16. There was full co-operation between the Navy and Army and the two services worked well and harmoniously together.

CONCLUSIONS AS REGARDS WATER SUPPLY.

17. As regards the landings at Helles and Anzac in April, 1915, and the subsequent operations up to the end of July, we consider that the water arrangements at Helles were satisfactory, but that the daily allowance at Anzac was barely sufficient.

18. As regards the operations at Anzac in August, 1915, we find that, owing in some measure to the breakdown of a pumping engine and the collision of a vessel carrying 80,000 gallons of water with another vessel, there was a serious shortage of water, the allowance to each man being restricted to one pint a day. This may not have checked the action of the troops, but, as stated in paragraph 140 of the Report, it precluded the sending of reserves when the attack was brought to a standstill.

19. As regards the landing at Suvla in August, 1915, we consider that:—

1. General Headquarters undertook the responsibility of arranging for the supply of sea-borne water and for the necessary equipment for its storage and distribution
2. Sufficient attention was not paid by Sir Frederick Stopford and his Administrative Staff to these arrangements, which should have been more thoroughly discussed between the Administrative Staff at General Headquarters and the Corps Administrative Staff before the landing. For the absence of such adequate consultation neither Staff can be exonerated from responsibility.
3. Besides the foregoing arrangements the questions which demanded special consideration on the part of Sir Frederick Stopford and his Administrative Staff were the action to be taken on the spot for the reception, storage and distribution of sea-borne water, including the provision of working parties to pump the water from the lighters; the expedients to be adopted in the event of delay in the landing of the pack mules, together with the filled water bags which they were to carry; and the instructions to be given for the discovery and development of local sources of supply.

It appears to us that these questions were not sufficiently considered, and that Major-General Poett, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General of the IXth Corps, must be held to be primarily responsible for the lack of due consideration.

4. The water shortage at Suvla abated after August 8th, but this fact does not excuse the want of organisation and provision which was apparent during the first two days, and which largely contributed to the inaction of the troops on the second day, and to the failure of the operations.

20. We are of opinion that throughout the operations the Navy carried out their duties with regard to the supply of sea-borne water in an efficient manner, and were always ready to render any assistance in their power.

21. As regards the operations generally, and having in view the vital importance of water on the Gallipoli Peninsula, we consider that the question of water supply would have been more efficiently handled throughout if, following the analogy of food supply, a staff officer with the requisite qualifications had been appointed Director of Water Supply under the Quartermaster-General at General Headquarters, with a Deputy Director on the staff of each Corps Commander and an Assistant Director on the staff of each Divisional Commander.

FOOD.

22. We think that, on the whole, the supply of food to the troops in Gallipoli was satisfactory.

MEDICAL.

23. The provision for the evacuation of the wounded, especially in the matter of hospital ships, proved insufficient to meet the emergencies which actually arose. We think that, if the operations to be undertaken in landing on the Peninsula had been considered before the Expedition started and a general plan prepared, further provision of hospital ships might, and probably would, have been made.

24. We do not think that the Director of Medical Services, Surgeon-General Birrell, before leaving England had any opportunity of estimating the number of hospital ships required, as he did not know what operations were contemplated.

25. We think that the separation of the Administrative Staff, including the Deputy Adjutant-General and Director of Medical Services, from the rest of the Headquarters Staff during the time immediately preceding the landing was a mistake, and that it would have been better if the Director of Medical Services had been kept more fully informed of the operations which were proposed. The time was very short in which to make preparations, and we doubt if it was then possible to obtain a sufficient number of hospital ships to accommodate the casualties which actually occurred. If Surgeon-General Birrell had been able to discuss matters with the General Staff he might have seen the necessity of, and been able to obtain, a fuller supply of appliances and equipment for the transports.

We think, however, that it would have been well if while in Egypt, where he was arranging for hospital accommodation on a large scale, he had made requisition for appliances such as would probably be required for even the less serious cases on the transports, such as bed pans, blankets, pillows, and clothing. We recognise, however, that at that time he was separated from General Headquarters, and therefore not possessed of adequate information as to the intended operations.

26. The scheme of evacuation drawn up by the Director of Medical Services was based on an estimate of casualties which was approximately correct, and would probably have worked satisfactorily if the anticipation of a rapid advance after the landing had been fulfilled. The failure of the scheme was mainly due to the fact that no substantial advance was effected, and that no hospitals could therefore be established on the land. This necessitated the immediate evacuation by sea of all casualties without any possibility of separating the serious cases from those of a slighter nature. The transports or black ships were therefore used for cases for which they were not intended, and for which they were not adequately staffed or equipped.

In these circumstances the greater part of the sufferings of the wounded in the first days after the landing seem to us to have been inevitable, but there appears to have been some want of organisation in the control of the boats and barges carrying wounded to the hospital ships and transports, which occasioned delay in their embarkation.

27. For the dislocation of the arrangements for evacuation, owing to the non-fulfilment of the expectations of the military authorities, the Director of Medical Services cannot be held responsible. He could not do otherwise than be guided by the views entertained by the Commander-in-Chief, and conveyed to the latter's subordinates in the operation orders and instructions for the landings issued by General Headquarters. It may indeed be contended that a prudent administrator, even though assured by superior military authority of the probability of success, would do well not to leave out of account the possibility of failure; but to be prepared alike for either contingency demands a flexibility of organisation and an adaptability of resources, which in war are seldom attainable.

28. After the first two or three weeks, until the heavy fighting in August, there was an improvement in the condition of the transports, though some of them continued to be unsatisfactory. The transports required close supervision, which was, however, much hampered by the want of means of communication between the several ships and the ships and shore.

29. The scheme for the evacuation of the wounded in the August operations was based upon an approximately correct estimate of casualties, and the supply of hospital ships was much larger than at the first landing. On the whole, this scheme worked well, though again there were cases in which the transports were not satisfactory and the organisation for transferring the wounded to the ships was imperfect.

30. After the middle of May the evacuation was made more difficult by the presence of enemy submarines. The transports were then unable to come to the beaches, the wounded being conveyed to them on trawlers and mine-sweepers, some of which were not suitable for their accommodation.

31. The field ambulances and clearing-stations were, on the whole, efficient, considering the great difficulties under which the work in them had to be done.

32. The executive work of the medical officers and staff of the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Dominion Forces, and of the physicians and surgeons who placed their services at the disposal of the War Office, was performed with great energy, courage, and skill under very trying conditions.

33. The supply of medicines and other medical requisites was, on the whole, adequate, though at times there was a shortage of some drugs at some places. The food also was on the whole satisfactory, but at times it was not possible to give the sick and wounded all the variety of food which was desired, and at times the supply of water was insufficient.

34. The difficulties under which the evacuation of the wounded was carried out, especially in the early part of the operations, were exceptional and not easily surmountable. We think that in some cases there was a want of organisation and supervision. The Director of Medical Services, Surgeon-General Birrell, did his best; we are of opinion, however, that he was not equal to the task of grappling with the exceptional conditions which arose.

35. Great help was given by the naval surgeons on the transports as well as on the trawlers and sweepers, and they were always ready to do everything in their power. It was not, however, possible to employ them on the transports during their voyage to Alexandria or Malta, as they could not leave their ships for an indefinite time. The naval officers concerned in the evacuation of the wounded gave every assistance and rendered excellent service.

We have pleasure in recording our obligations to the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Secretarial staff of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who have given us full information and every assistance in their power.

Finally we wish to express our high appreciation of the services rendered by our Secretary, Sir Grimwood Mears, to whom we are greatly indebted for the ability, tact, and industry which he has displayed throughout the course of the enquiry.

GRIMWOOD MEARS,
Secretary.

December 4th, 1917.

W. PICKFORD.
NICHOLSON.
W. H. MAY.
THOMAS MACKENZIE.
STEPHEN L. GWYNN.
WALTER ROCHE.

MEMORANDUM OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE ANDREW FISHER.

I regret that the increasing demands of my official duties here made it impossible for me to give to the daily sittings of the Commission the attention demanded by the subject of the inquiry. I am unwilling to pass judgment without having seen, or heard the evidence of the witnesses. This I regret has been impracticable. Under these circumstances, I feel I would not be justified in attaching my name to the Report.

I am grateful to my fellow Commissioners for carrying out the work to which I was unable to attend.

ANDREW FISHER.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT

BY

THE HONOURABLE SIR THOMAS MACKENZIE, K.C.M.G.

It is to be regretted that, for diplomatic reasons, a full report of the evidence cannot be given to the public, as the narrative must necessarily be inadequate. For this reason, although I am substantially in agreement with the findings of the Commission, I desire to supplement some of the conclusions reached by my colleagues, and in addition I hold stronger views upon certain of the findings which I feel it my duty to put forward.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN.

In my opinion, which I express with all deference, the forcing of the Dardanelles was a practicable proposition had the Authorities approached the problem with a recognition of the nature and extent of the difficulties which confronted them, and made adequate provision and exhibited the necessary strength of purpose to carry the operations through to the desired end. History has demonstrated, and expert opinion supported, the view that a combined naval and military attack would ultimately offer the only chance of a favourable issue. The Authorities should, I consider, have launched this combined attack only after thorough preparation, and I regard the preliminary bombardment of the outer forts on November 3rd, 1914—ordered by the Admiralty without consultation with the War Council—as an almost irreparable mistake. Its effect was to draw the attention of the Turks to the possibility of an attack in force on the Peninsula, and there is no doubt it prompted them to make good use of the time which intervened between the November bombardment and the military landing on April 25th, 1915, in the way of improving their defences, &c.

Regarding the conduct of the military operations as a whole, it will be asked: "Was Sir Ian Hamilton the right man to command the expedition?" This question, in my opinion, we shall never be able to answer because he was hurriedly despatched, imperfectly instructed, and inadequately provided with men, artillery and munitions. Later on the deficiency in men was rectified, but although Lord Kitchener had said this was a young man's war, some Generals were sent out to Sir Ian Hamilton who were unequal to the task. In this connection, let us glance for a moment at the methods of the War Office. General Sir James Wolfe Murray was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He was also a member of the War Council, and though he attended their meetings he expressed no opinions and tendered no advice, nor did he clearly understand that a decision was arrived at on January 13th to prepare for a Naval attack on the Dardanelles in February.

Questioned later on as to whether it was not his duty, when the amphibious attack was decided on, to instruct the General Staff as to the preparation of plans, he admitted that under ordinary circumstances it was; and when asked to account for not doing so, he said in effect that he was overshadowed by Lord Kitchener.

Such a state of affairs at Headquarters did not presage a favourable inauguration or effective prosecution of the campaign, and the following statement of the position appears to me to be unassailable:—

The Cabinet having determined upon amphibious operations against Constantinople, necessarily left the preparations for and conduct of the Military attack to the War Department. That system seems to be at fault which permitted:—

- (a) The outbreak of war to find the Imperial General Staff unprepared for operations against the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus—always of vital strategic interest for the British Empire in the East.
- (b) The General Staff to remain inactive in that respect after August 4th, 1914.
- (c) The General Staff to allow Sir Ian Hamilton to proceed to the Mediterranean without either a worked-out plan of attack or such primary requirements as verified or complete maps of the Peninsula.
- (d) The General Staff, notwithstanding their knowledge of the difficulties and lack of preparation, to silently acquiesce in this state of affairs.

To this breakdown of the War Office system on the testing ground of war may, in my opinion, be traced some of the vital factors of the Gallipoli disaster.

THE ATTACK AT SUVLA.

The brief period from August 6th to 10th was, to my mind, the vital time in the history of the later Dardanelles operations, for on the wise and determined use of those few days depended the success or failure of the campaign. The objective was the range of hills controlling the Straits and the Narrows, the highest point of which was about 1,000 feet, three miles distant from the disembarkation point, the first two miles being easy, open country, the last mile rough and scrub-covered. Few Turks were then in the locality—estimates varied from 2,000 to 4,000—and prompt, decisive action was absolutely essential. By daylight on the 7th General Stopford had landed over 13,000 men, and by the evening of that day 26,750 men. But the golden opportunity was thrown away by him and some of his officers, and the necessary swift advance—which military and naval witnesses thought quite possible—was not delivered so that the Turks had time to bring up their reinforcements. During the first four days, but mainly on the 9th and 10th August, General Stopford suffered 400 officer casualties and about 8,000 men killed and wounded. The failure at Suvla he attributes, not to the initial opposition of the Turks, but largely to the lack of water. He maintains that he relied on arrangements made by General Headquarters for the supply of water; but while that might have relieved him of the administrative work, it did not, to my mind, free him from the responsibility of seeing that the arrangements were carried out, and there is no doubt that the responsibility of distributing the water to his troops, if not of having it landed, rested with General Stopford and his subordinates. Nevertheless, until August 8th he took no active personal interest in this all-important question. Captain Carver, of the Royal Navy, did his best to encourage prompt action, but this was regarded by the Military as undue interference, and he was withdrawn. No one seems to have been immediately answerable for supplying water, though undoubtedly General Poett's duties included its distribution. Except for General Sitwell's men, the troops were suffering severely from thirst, which impeded their operations. At the same time a barge of water was lying stranded within 100 yards of the beach, and the maps captured from the Turks showed that there were wells and springs within a quarter of a mile. We have General De Lisle's statement that: "There were wells within a quarter of mile of the shore, which I had opened out. On the hill Kiretch Tepe Sirt there were two wells 400 feet higher than the sea, but on this side, between Kiretch Tepe Sirt and the Salt Lake, there were as many wells as you liked to dig." Colonel Aspinall, too, states that he saw "a tremendous lot of water trickling down from the cliffs," and other witnesses declare that water was to be found. Yet General Poett neither made an attempt to procure water from the barge, nor to institute any search for water ashore. When questioned as to why he took no action, he disclaimed responsibility, contending that it was the duty of the Navy to get the water ashore, and of the Divisional Commanders to find it on land.

It is true that Sir Ian Hamilton cabled to General Stopford on the evening of August 7th–8th an appreciation of his work, but, as he afterwards explained, this cable was despatched before he visited Suvla, and when he was under the impression that everything was going well in connection with the operations.

OPERATIONS AT HELLES.

In reference to Helles, attention should, I think, be directed to the evidence of some of the witnesses as to the frittering away of life through frontal attacks repeatedly carried out by General Hunter-Weston, in spite, it is alleged, of the absence of adequate artillery preparation and the lack of promise of substantial results. Lord Nicholson questioned Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson upon this matter, saying, "I suggest that in order to evade, so to speak, the necessity for an adequate artillery preparation, or the provision of artillery and ammunition, lives had to be sacrificed." Colonel Wilson answered, "Yes." Lord Nicholson continued, "In order to make good the deficiency of artillery and ammunition—that is the upshot of it?" Colonel Wilson replied, "Yes, lives had to be sacrificed." Lord Nicholson asked, "And almost with futility?"—"Yes, that is what I mean," said Colonel Wilson.

General Cox, too, considered that these frontal attacks fulfilled no useful function whatever, as at Helles the situation was hopeless tactically; but in reply to this, General Hunter-Weston stated that such attacks as were made were made for some reason which may not have been known to General Cox.

General Sir Ian Hamilton admitted to Lord Nicholson that lives were used instead of shells. He said, "The vital thing was to make good, and to make good we ought to have had ample artillery, especially howitzers. We had not, and there was nothing for it but to try and get on, as you say, by a sacrifice of human life."

This matter is so serious that it seems to me to call for further inquiry, and this I recommend should be carried out by Military experts.

EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES.

With reference to the evidence tendered, whilst undoubtedly it was, in many respects, full and complete, yet one felt that some of the officers called as witnesses could have disclosed a great deal more than they did. Probably their reticence arose from a sense of loyalty to the Service and a disinclination to say anything against their comrades. As a consequence of this and the natural desire of the Commission to give those chiefly concerned the benefit of any doubt, some of the conclusions arrived at may be somewhat different from what they otherwise might have been.

TREATMENT OF WOUNDED.

Until August, 1915, the arrangements for dealing with the transport of the wounded were in a very unsatisfactory state, and, indeed, the medical side of the campaign does not seem to have ever been thoroughly thought out. The treatment of the wounded ashore on the Peninsula appears to have been as satisfactory as circumstances would permit, but in the transport of men to the ships and overseas many of the complaints were justifiable. The Medical Authorities contend that from the information supplied by the Military Commanders, they expected the Turks would be driven back and room would be made for establishing hospitals ashore. This, however, presupposed success, but better provision ought also to have been made for the contingency of failure. A great strain was imposed on the arrangements—hospital ships were insufficient, and troopships had to be rapidly converted into carriers and ambulance vessels; during the early days of the campaign undoubtedly a great deal of acute suffering resulted to the wounded from this cause. The extemporised hospital ships were insufficiently staffed, and there were not nearly enough medical officers of junior ranks, or female nurses, to attend to the patients. Although the medical personnel did their utmost, we hear of cases where men had to shift for themselves as best they could, and in fact some were left during the voyage to Alexandria in their first field dressings. General Maxwell testified that on some of the black ships the wounded were exposed to the sun and heat, with nothing to eat or drink, for 60 or 70 hours. Sir Frederick Treves gave evidence as to the absence of arrangements for the despatch of hospital ships, and the want of decision as to their destination.

There was also a general shortage of pillows, mattresses, fresh clothing, &c., and in some instances medical supplies and appliances were sadly lacking. In addition, the sanitary arrangements on the converted trawlers were lamentably deficient: the almost entire absence of such conveniences as bed-pans, for instance, reduced the wounded to a deplorable condition.

That the medical arrangements must have been lamentably inadequate and the organisation seriously defective is confirmed by the fact that Surgeon-General Howse, V.C., was impelled to give the following matured opinion: "That he personally would recommend his Government, when this war is over, under no conceivable conditions to trust to the medical arrangements that may be made by the Imperial Authorities for the care of the Australian sick and wounded."

This is doubtless a strongly expressed view, and I think it is beyond question that a great improvement has been brought about since that time; but it is impossible to hold Surgeon-General Birrell free from a great deal of the responsibility for the serious condition of affairs to which Surgeon-General Howse and other witnesses drew attention.

THE "SATURNIA" CASE.

Then we have the terrible story of the "Saturnia"—a most extraordinary indication of the absence of organisation. Father Barry first drew attention to the fact that 800 wounded men had been placed on that vessel, and the conditions which he brought to light as existing for a time, approximate to some of the revelations in connection with the Mesopotamian Medical Service. As the evidence stands I am unable to accept Colonel Maher's statement, sent by cable to the Committee, as giving an accurate description of

the circumstances surrounding the case. I believe that Admiral Keyes, Fleet-Surgeon Levick, and Major Purchas gave the Commission the correct account of the conditions prevailing, and I concur in the suggestion that this matter should be further investigated. In this connection I should like to refer to the excellent work done by Fleet-Surgeon Levick and Major Purchas, and to the straightforward manner in which the evidence of all these officers was tendered.

THE WORK OF THE ARMY.

Coming now to the work of the troops, I endorse the Majority Report that the men fought bravely and often heroically; and although there were certain phases of the conduct of the operations which led to misfortune and entailed great suffering, it is gratifying to know that there were in the Army on the Peninsula men whose actions have not been surpassed by any deeds performed by the British Army. This applies to officers, N.C.Os. and men. In my opinion, the outstanding figure in the campaign is General Birdwood, although many approached him in the excellence of their work, and shared with him in patient endurance the long and trying period of the Gallipoli operations. I should like to draw attention to the concluding work of General Birdwood and of those serving under him, in connection with the evacuation. The opinion of experts who had studied the situation was that the evacuation might cost anything from 20 to 40 per cent. in personnel and matériel. The total number of the force evacuated was 125,000 men, and the whole operation was successfully carried out without the loss of a single life, and with only three men wounded—an achievement surely unsurpassed in the annals of history.

CONCLUSION.

The Dardanelles campaign with all its distressing circumstances and disappointments is now past history, and, without doubt, under the vigorous direction of Sir William Robertson, the haphazard, uncertain methods have largely disappeared and a good deal of the inefficiency which formerly prevailed has been swept away. If, however, the result of our investigations should assist in the bringing about of such an improvement in organisation and management as will render impossible a recurrence of events as sad as those with which we have had to deal, the work of the Commission will not have been in vain.

THOS. MACKENZIE.

APPENDIX.

DESPATCH OF SIR IAN HAMILTON, 20th MAY, 1915.

From the General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
20th May, 1915.

MY LORD,—

I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula up to and including the 5th May.

In accordance with your Lordship's instructions I left London on 13th March with my General Staff by special train to Marseilles, and thence in H.M.S. "Phæton" to the scene of the naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, reaching Tenedos on the 17th March shortly after noon.

Immediately on arrival I conferred with Vice-Admiral de Robeck, Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet; General d'Amade, Commanding the French Corps Expéditionnaire; and Contre Amiral Guepratte, in command of the French Squadron. At this conference past difficulties were explained to me, and the intention to make a fresh attack on the morrow was announced. The amphibious battle between warships and land fortresses took place next day, the 18th of March. I witnessed these stupendous events, and thereupon cabled your Lordship my reluctant deduction that the co-operation of the whole of the force under my command would be required to enable the Fleet effectively to force the Dardanelles.

By that time I had already carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from its isthmus, where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Helles, at its extremest point. From Bulair this singular feature runs in a south-westerly direction for 52 miles, attaining near its centre a breadth of 12 miles. The northern coast of the northern half of the promontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain of hills, which extend as far as Cape Suvla. The precipitous fall of these hills precludes landing, except at a few narrow gullies, far too restricted for any serious military movements. The southern half of the peninsula is shaped like a badly-worn boot. The ankle lies between Kaba Tepe and Kalkmaz Dag; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kilid Bahr, whilst the toe is that promontory, five miles in width, stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr.

The three dominating features in this southern section seemed to me to be:—

(1) Saribair Mountain, running up in a succession of almost perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The whole mountain seemed to be a network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.

(2) Kilid Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortification artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to cover the forts of the Narrows from an attack from the Ægean.

(3) Achi Babi, a hill 600 feet in height, dominating at long field gun range what I have described as being the toe of the peninsula.

A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that from Achi Babi to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the sea. The inside of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nullahs and confused under-features.

Generally speaking the coast is precipitous, and good landing places are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small sandy bay (W), and half a mile north of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two miles further up the coast the mouth of a stream indents these same cliffs (Y 2), and yet another mile and a half up a scrub-covered gully looked as if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham, by Quebec (Y). Inside Sedd-el-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about 300 yards across, facing a semi-circle of steeply rising ground, as the flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old castle, on the other by a modern fort. By Eski Hissarlik, on the East of Morto Bay (S) was another small beach, which was however dominated by the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there are two good landing places on either side of Kaba Tepe. Further to the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous and difficult. In most of these landing-places the trenches and lines of wire entanglements were plainly visible from on board ship. What seemed to be gun emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made out through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and of the forces available to man them there was no possibility of judging except by practical test.

Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have described—a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such attempt—involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns, or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable if awkward contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the force.

The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly to give up the adventure. To land two or three

thousand men, and then to have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks of 34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an eventuality to belightly envisaged. Whatever happened the weather must always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the end of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.

Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the troops on the transports to suit the order of their disembarkation. The bulk of the forces at my disposal had, perforce, been embarked without its having been possible to pay due attention to the operation upon which I now proposed that they should be launched.

Owing to lack of facilities at Mudros redistribution in that harbour was out of the question. With your Lordship's approval, therefore, I ordered all the transports, except those of the Australian Infantry Brigade and the details encamped at Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian ports. On the 24th March I myself, together with the General Staff, proceeded to Alexandria, where I remained until 7th April, working out the allocation of troops to transports in minutest detail as a prelude to the forthcoming disembarkation. General d'Amade did likewise.

On the 1st April the remainder of the General Headquarters, which had not been mobilised when I left England, arrived at Alexandria.

Apart from the rearrangements of the troops, my visit to Egypt was not without profit, since it afforded me opportunities of conferring with the G.O.C. Egypt and of making myself acquainted with the troops, drawn from all parts of the French Republic and of the British Empire, which it was to be my privilege to command.

By the 7th April my preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable me to return with my General Staff to Lemnos, so as to put the finishing touches to my plan in close co-ordination with the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet.

Here, if I may, I will pause to indicate to your Lordship the nature of the reflections which gradually shaped themselves into a definite plan of campaign.

The primary object of the expedition being the forcing of the Dardanelles by the Fleet, the operations should have as their essence the reduction of the batteries at the Narrows. To achieve such an object three courses were open to me:—

- (1) A landing on the north coast of the Gulf of Xeros.
- (2) A landing on the Asiatic shore.
- (3) A landing upon the southern half of the peninsula.

The first of these courses carried with it two very tempting advantages; the initial landing was unlikely to be seriously opposed; at Enos I would be able to disembark the whole of my force simultaneously and easily. But against this must be set the fact that Bulair would lie between my army and its advance against the Narrows, and that during my operations against these lines, the rear of my force would be exposed to attack from the main Turkish forces in Thrace.

As to (2), a landing on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles outside the area of mines and beyond the range of the Turkish forts was only possible

at Kum Kale, and from this point my advance towards the Narrows would be impeded by the network of rivers which here enter the sea from the Plain of Troy. My right must have stretched into a difficult, mountainous country lending itself admirably to the guerilla tactics of the enemy, whilst my centre and left would have constantly worked under the shell of the big guns at Kilid Bahr. Indeed the capture of the forts on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles would not of itself solve the problem with which I was faced. The European shore completely dominates the neighbourhood of Chanak, and with the Kalid Bahr plateau still in the enemy's hands my position on the southern bank of the Narrows would be untenable.

To disembark farther south on the coast of Asia Minor would entail a land campaign on a continental scale as well as the forfeiture of all assistance which I expected to obtain from the Fleet, and I was of opinion that the limited size of my force, as well as your Lordship's views, debarred me from undertaking operations so far from the coast.

As to (3), a landing in the southern half of the peninsula, the main objection lay in the fact that here, manifestly, a much more complete preparation had been made to resist my disembarkation than elsewhere. To strike where the enemy was so ready for us was to take the bull by the horns, but here always I could count on the close co-operation of the Fleet; here my flanks would rest upon a friendly element, even if all the armies of the Sultan converged upon my modest force; here I was near (at least in mere distance) to the Kilid Bahr plateau which stood for my primary objective.

I resolved then to take this third alternative; to land the whole of my force in the southern half of the peninsula, and to concentrate all the resources at my disposal on the capture of Kilid Bahr.

I have referred already to the beach immediately south of Kaba Tepe. It was quite the best adapted to my requirements, but the whole of this portion of the coast was so heavily entrenched and so closely dominated by the batteries on Kilid Bahr that I had no option but to eliminate it from my plan.

There remained seven other possible landing places, namely, the five small beaches in the neighbourhood of Cape Helles, to which I have already briefly referred; (S, W, X, V, Y. 2.), the beach Y, three miles up the coast and one other beach to the north of Kaba Tepe, apparently of fair extent, but possessing no road, outlet or natural facility for penetration into the peninsula.

Undoubtedly the most favourable of these landings as regards their inland communications, their immunity from close range artillery fire and as regards also the support to be given by the Fleet, were the Cape Helles landings. On the other hand, so limited were the areas that no more than one division in all could be landed upon them in three days, during which time the enemy might mass very superior forces against us. Also the landings in the neighbourhood of Cape Helles were too far from the vitals of the peninsula to threaten the equanimity of the enemy's higher command. The broken cliff at Y seemed to offer a pivotal point whence Krithia might be taken and the Achi

Baba position be turned. The capture of the great mountain of Saribair (just above the ankle of the boot), threatened Maidos, dominated Kojadere as well as all the roads from the mainland and from the Straits, and, if fully successful would in itself go a very long way towards securing our main objective the Kilid Bahr Plateau.

I resolved therefore first upon using the whole group of beaches at the toe of the peninsula; secondly, upon landing a force at (Y) instead of (Y 2), which latter was neither in close support of the other attacks nor sufficiently far to the north to threaten the enemy's flank; thirdly, to disembark two divisions on the beach north of Kaba Tepe at the same time as I struck at the Achi Baba sector.

By means of this last landing I hoped to treble the number of troops thrown ashore in the initial stages and cause the enemy to disperse his forces. I had hopes also that, by landing an army corps to the north of Kilid Bahr, I should be ready to strike at the communications of the enemy at their most vital point. True, I should thus be dividing the main body of my force into two portions, ten miles apart, but my command of the seas assured my communications in fair weather and gave me the power of re-inforcing or diminishing the Saribair forces at will.

An important factor in the success of my operations would have been surprise. Owing, however, to the numerous and repeated references to the expedition and to its destination, which had appeared in the Egyptian press, this advantage had been denied to me, and the most that could be hoped for was to keep the enemy as long as possible in doubt as to the actual time and place of landing. Reports were accordingly spread of intending disembarkations at various points on the mainland, and it was arranged between the Vice-Admiral and myself that on the actual day of landing elaborate feints should be made in the neighbourhood of Bulair and in Besika Bay.

The Vice-Admiral found himself in complete agreement with my plans, and on the 13th April the naval and military orders and the instructions for the landing were communicated confidentially to subordinate commanders. The date fixed for the first day of landing was 23rd April, this being the earliest day on which the necessary naval and military staff work could be completed in that minute detail so essential for the success of the operation, and the earliest day on which the transports, tugs, lighters, horseboats and other small craft could be assembled at their respective rendezvous. For reasons of secrecy the actual date was not mentioned in orders, but was to be communicated to commanders 24 hours before the forward movement took place. None the less as was subsequently discovered by the enemy's orders, this date was duly cabled from Vienna to Constantinople and thence to the Turkish Commander at the Dardanelles.

Meanwhile, the redistribution of troops in their transports at Alexandria was rapidly nearing completion, and from now onwards the harbour at Mudros became daily more crowded with ships. Some fifty transports conveying the 29th Division and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, together with the British and French men-of-war, colliers, water, and ammunition ships, completely

filled all the available anchorage, and the naval authorities were obliged therefore to order the French Corps and the Royal Naval Division to rendezvous elsewhere.

This unavoidable dispersion increased the difficulties of inter-communication and of collecting the various divisions of transports at their allotted stations on the actual days of landing. Yet so carefully were all the arrangements worked out by the naval transport officers, and so close was the co-operation of the masters of the various transports, that no hitch of any kind occurred. I would submit that the successful marshalling of nearly 100 merchant ships without mishap or accident and strictly in accordance with the timetable, reflects very high credit on the combined Naval and Military Staffs.

The last days spent in Mudros harbour were of great value to the troops. No opportunity was lost of practising the men in getting in and out of boats and in landing with celerity and silence.

During all this period the weather was causing serious anxiety. As I have already informed your Lordship, a succession of calm days was essential for our success, as with even a moderate wind from any other quarter than the north the whole of our landing operations would have been brought to a standstill. Yet, since the Fleet arrived in these waters in February, there had scarcely been two consecutive calm days, and since leaving Egypt a week previously I had twice seen a flat calm at daybreak lashed into a tumbling sea by 10 a.m. When it is considered that, under the provisions of my scheme, it was necessary to begin the forward movement from Mudros two days antecedent to the landing, it will be understood that the whole edifice of my calculations was being based upon the most capricious of the elements.

On the 21st April my worst fears seemed about to be realised, for the state of the weather made it necessary for the Vice-Admiral to postpone the operation, first for 24 hours, and then for 48. On the morning of the 23rd, however, the day broke fine and clear, and though it was not without acute misgiving that we watched the first ships leave their anchorage, I am glad to report that from that day to the present time the weather has been more favourable than I had any right to expect.

In formulating my plan of disembarkation, one of the first questions to be decided was whether it should take place by day or by night. Personally I favoured the night, seeing that, although we should lose the backing of the guns of the Fleet, troops would run less danger of having to sit helpless in their boats under a well directed fire from the shore. Three considerations brought forward by the Naval authorities forced me to a partial departure from this principle. First, the difficulty of transferring heavily laden troops from transports into boats in the dark. Secondly, the difficulty of making the beaches in the dark, owing to their limited areas, which could not be marked out beforehand, especially as the strong current setting out of the Dardanelles was likely to carry the tows out of their course. Thirdly, the danger of uncharted rocks.

Weighing the pros against the cons, I decided to effect the Cape Helles disembarkation about

an hour after daybreak. But, north of Kaba Tepe, where the beach was extensive, the current weaker, and the rocks less likely, I hoped that it might be possible to throw the covering force ashore so that it might gain a firm footing before the break of dawn, and orders were issued accordingly.

As a result of all these cogitations, the following detailed plan took shape and was approved by the Vice-Admiral and myself.

(1) At 5.30 a.m., after a short bombardment of the beaches by the covering ships, the 29th Division was to land a covering force of seven-and-a-half battalions, with attached troops, on the five beaches in the neighbourhood of Cape Helles. For the sake of clearances and convenience I again enumerate these beaches :—

S. Beach.—A narrow strip of sand near Eski Hissarlik Point. At first it had been hoped to land a number of men near this point in Morto Bay, but reefs and the fact that the anchorage was under fire from the batteries on the Asiatic shore, restricted my attempt to one battalion.

V Beach.—A small bay some 300 yards long, immediately west of Sedd-el-Bahr fort.

W Beach.—A small bay also about 350 yards long, between Cape Helles and Tekke Burnu.

X Beach.—A narrow strip of sand, about 200 yards by 10 yards at the foot of a low cliff, about one mile north of Tekke Burnu.

Y Beach.—A similar strip of sand at the foot of a cliff some 200 feet high, immediately west of Krithia. This cliff was, with difficulty, climbable by infantry, and was naturally quite impracticable for horses.

(2) The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were, silently, to land a covering force of 4,000 men before daybreak on the same day, on the beach north of Kaba Tepe, known in operation orders as Beach Z.

(3) Simultaneously, the transports of the Royal Naval Division were to appear in the neighbourhood of Bulair and make a feint of landing on the northern coast of the Gulf of Xeros, whilst their escorting ships bombarded the Bulair forts.

(4) Simultaneously, also the French were to land a brigade of infantry, with guns, at Kum Kale, thus, it was hoped, neutralising the mobile batteries on the Asiatic shore in the neighbourhood of In Tepe. The remainder of their transports, escorted by French men-of-war, were to make a demonstration in Besika Bay. The French occupation of Kum Kale was from the first intended to be temporary. As soon as the 29th Division had completed its disembarkation, the whole Corps Expeditionnaire was to land on V or W as might seem most expedient, in support of the British troops.

No animals or vehicles were to accompany any of the covering forces. All ranks were to carry three days' rations. Infantry were to land with 200 rounds S.A.A. per rifle, and extra ammunition and seven days' rations for every man disembarked were to be dumped ashore during the first day to meet the dangers of stormy weather.

As soon as the covering forces of the 29th Division and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

had made good their footing on terra firma, the disembarkation of the remainder of these formations was to proceed with all possible despatch.

Owing, the danger of transports being sunk by hostile shell fire if they approached too close to the shore, owing also to the great delay that would occur if the men took to the boats beyond the range of the hostile guns, it was decided that the infantry of the covering force should be transferred to battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and fleet-sweepers on the previous evening. This class of vessel could take the risk of standing close in to shore at daybreak; the time taken to fill the ships' boats would be far less than from the high sides of a transport, and the distance to be traversed between ship and shore would be comparatively small. Finally, to make as sure as was humanly possible, that at least one weighty mass of men should reach the Turkish littoral, 2,000 infantry were concealed below decks of an apparently harmless collier, the "River Clyde," which was to be run ashore on V beach as if we were making the enemy a gift of it. This device, borrowed from the Iliad, was predestined to save my force from losses which hardly bear thinking about.

On the 24th, with some of my General Staff, I transferred from H.M.T. "Arcadian" to H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth," the flagship of the Vice-Admiral, and established my headquarters there until the 30th April, when, the success of the landing being assured, I re-embarked on board the "Arcadian," which had, in the interim, been in attendance on the flagship.

Having given the intention and the preparation I now pass to the execution.

The covering force of the 29th Division left Mudros Harbour on the evening of 23rd April for the five beaches, S, V, W, X, and Y. Of these, V, W, and X were to be main landings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The landing at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W, and X beaches should reach the shore simultaneously at 5.30 a.m. after half an hour's bombardment from the fleet.

The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on the morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to approach the shore. About midnight these ships, each towing a number of cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables and, escorted by the 3rd Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just before dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was no sign of life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung over the promontory, the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battleships and four cruisers which formed the 3rd Squadron at once took up the positions that had been allotted to them, and at 5 a.m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent bombardment of the enemy's defences was begun. Meanwhile the troops were being rapidly transferred to the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. Not a move on the part of the enemy; except for shells thrown from the Asiatic side of

the Straits the guns of the Fleet remained unanswered.

The detachment detailed for S beach (Eski Hissarlik Point) consisted of the 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company) under Lieut.-Colonel Casson. Their landing was delayed by the current, but by 7.30 a.m. it had been successfully effected at the cost of some 50 casualties, and Lieut.-Colonel Casson was able to establish his small force on the high ground near De Totts Battery. Here he maintained himself until the general advance on the 27th brought him into touch with the main body.

The landing on Y beach was entrusted to the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, Royal Naval Division, specially attached to the 29th Division for this task, the whole under command of Lieut.-Colonel Koe. The beach at this point consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to the west of Krithia.

A number of small gullies running down the face of the cliff facilitated the climb to the summit, and so impracticable had these precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps had been taken to defend them. Very different would it have been had we, as was at one time intended, taken Y 2 for this landing. There a large force of infantry, entrenched up to their necks, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss guns, were awaiting an attempt which could hardly have made good its footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the first instance to establish themselves on the heights, reserves of food, water and ammunition were hauled up to the top of the cliff, and, in accordance with the plan of operations, an endeavour was immediately made to gain touch with the troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, the enemy's strong detachment from Y 2 interposed, our troops landing at X were fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately to their front, and the attempt to join hands was not persevered with.

Later in the day a large force of Turks were seen to be advancing upon the cliffs above Y beach from the direction of Krithia, and Colonel Koe was obliged to entrench. From this time onward his small force was subjected to strong and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing to the configuration of the ground, which here drops inland from the edge of the cliff, the guns of the supporting ships could render him little assistance.

Throughout the afternoon and all through the night the Turks made assault after assault upon the British line. They threw bombs into the trenches, and, favoured by darkness, actually led a pony with a machine gun on its back over the defences and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted. The British repeatedly counter-charged with the bayonet, and always drove off the enemy for the moment, but the Turks were in a vast superiority and fresh troops took the place of those who temporarily fell back. Colonel Koe (since died of wounds) had become a casualty early in the day, and the number of officers and men killed and wounded

during the incessant fighting was very heavy. By 7 a.m. on the 26th only about half of the King's Own Scottish Borderers remained to man the entrenchment made for four times their number. These brave fellows were absolutely worn out with continuous fighting; it was doubtful if reinforcements could reach them in time, and orders were issued for them to be re-embarked. Thanks to H.M.S. "Goliath," "Dublin," "Amethyst," and "Sapphire," thanks also to the devotion of a small rearguard of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, which kept off the enemy from lining the cliff, the re-embarkation of the whole of the troops, together with the wounded, stores and ammunition, was safely accomplished, and both battalions were brought round the southern end of the peninsula. Deplorable as the heavy losses had been, and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good so much ground at the outset, yet, taking the operation as it stood, there can be no doubt it has contributed greatly to the success of the main attack, seeing that the plucky stand made at Y beach had detained heavy columns of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula during what it will be seen was a very touch-and-go struggle.

The landing place known as X beach consists of a strip of sand some 200 yards long by 8 yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. The troops to be landed here were the 1st Royal Fusiliers, who were to be towed ashore from H.M.S. "Implacable" in two parties, half a battalion at a time, together with a beach working party found by the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. H.M.S. "Implacable," with a boldness much admired by the Army, stood quite close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could bring to bear. Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their landing with but little loss. The battalion then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of the 87th Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending from half a mile round the landing-place and as far south as Hill 114. Here they were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach. Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had been wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command of the brigade.

The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the following lines:—

As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the fleet, three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier "River Clyde" (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details.

The "River Clyde" had been especially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of the

troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gang-plank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows had reached land the "River Clyde" was to be run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.

The remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battleships.

V beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr village and that which is crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly concave, so that the whole area contained within the limits of this natural amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be swept by the fire of a defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some 10 yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment about 4 feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours.

At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between the shore and the village, stands the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, a battered ruin with wide breaches in its walls and mounds of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as well as No. 1 Fort, had been long bombarded by the fleet, and the guns of the forts had been put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command the open beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theatre. On the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer bars than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran right across from the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr to the foot of the north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up the hill near the eastern end of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in one of which four pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire, while the debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover and concealment for a number of machine guns, which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from the ridge.

Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with regard either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.

As often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite correspond with the intentions of the Commander. The "River Clyde" came into position off Sedd-el-Bahr in advance of the towns, and, just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and the collier were approaching the landing place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the further side. None of the boats, however, were able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach.

Now came the moment for the "River Clyde" to pour forth her living freight; but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation began.

A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way; but, short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached the farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets which poured down upon them from both flanks and the front. As the second company followed, the extemporised pier of lighters gave way in the current. The end nearest to the shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought into position, and the third company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun fire.

For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade-Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on board. There was nothing for them all but to lie down on the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain Costeker were killed. At this time, between 10 and 11 a.m., about 1,000 men had left the collier, and of these nearly half had been killed or wounded before they could reach the little cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach. Further attempts to disembark were now given up. Had the troops all

been in open boats but few of them would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.

Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change in the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the machine guns on the "River Clyde," which did valuable service in keeping down the enemy's fire and in preventing any attempt on their part to launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had been landed at a camber just east of Sedd-el-Bahr village, was unable to work its way across to V beach, and by midday had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to Y beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach; but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the distance, and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing.

Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V beach in flank. The pressure on their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at night-fall the Turkish garrison still held their ground. Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way along the shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had fallen the remainder of the infantry from the collier were landed. A good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so accurate in the bright moonlight that all attempts to clear the fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned to the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day, except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.

Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The Brigadier and his Brigade-Major had been killed: Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment, had been killed and the adjutant had been wounded. The Adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing-party still crouched on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Lieutenant Colonel Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the "River Clyde," had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep all their comrades

in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless, imminent peril.

Now that it was daylight once more, Lieutenant-Colonels Doughty-Wylie and Williams set to work to organise an attack on the hill above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured to pull scattered units together after they have dominated for many consecutive hours by close and continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties. Fortunately, General Hunter Weston had arranged with Rear-Admiral Wemyss about this same time for a heavy bombardment to be opened by the ships upon the Old Fort, Sedd-el-Bahr Village, the Old Castle north of the village, and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover of this bombardment, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford, Brigade-Major, R.A., the troops gained a footing in the village by 10 a.m. They encountered a most stubborn opposition and suffered heavy losses from the fire of well-concealed riflemen and machine guns. Undeterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval gunfire, they pushed forward, and soon after midday they penetrated to the northern edge of the village, whence they were in a position to attack the Old Castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of the village, under a galling fire. And now, when, owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and occupied the Old Castle and Hill 141 before 2 p.m.

W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously, but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing-place into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully afforded a natural covered approach. A number of machine guns also were cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wire entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded by high ground to the north-west and south-east, and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about 20 feet

broad, and could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition, another separate entanglement ran down from these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible until these redoubts had been captured.

So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of 25th April.

The landing at W had been entrusted to the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to the complete lack of the senses of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a.m. the whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters. As soon as shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the beach, and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General Hare, commanding the 88th Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which escaped the cross fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire entanglements.

While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had been fired from the enemy's trenches, but as soon as the first boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally hurled themselves ashore and, fired at from right, left and centre, commenced hacking their way through the wire. A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe, but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the extreme left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the cliffs on either side of the beach. Here the companies were rapidly reformed, and set forth to storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find them.

In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill 114, whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape Helles side of the landing-place.

Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during the advance, but the determination of the troops was in no way affected. By 10 a.m. three lines of hostile trenches were in our hands, and our hold on the beach was assured.

About 9.30 a.m. more infantry had begun to disembark, and two hours later a junction was effected on Hill 114 with the troops who had landed on X beach.

On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could be made. The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland, Brigade Major of the 86th Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Woolly-Dod, General Staff 29th Division, was now sent ashore to take command at W beach and organise a further advance.

At 2 p.m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, the Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered, and by 4 p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured.

An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, who could make no headway at all against the dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out the 86th Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There is a limit however to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a vineyard. Again some of them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 fort grew hotter and hotter, until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night and by the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to rest on their laurels for a while.

When night fell, the British position in front of W beach extended from just east of Cape Helles lighthouse through Hill 138, to Hill 114. Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were the 2nd London Field Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which had been landed as a beach working party.

During the night several strong and determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile the disembarkation of the remainder of the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24th, escorted by the 2nd Squadron of the Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500 men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2,500 men of the covering force were transferred from their transports to six destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with the tows and the destroyers, proceeded to within some

four miles of the coast, H.M.S. "Queen" (flying Rear-Admiral's Thursby's flag) directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3.30 a.m. orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows, and at 4.10 a.m. the destroyers were ordered to follow.

All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the moon, which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.

A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation has been much better deflated from shell fire.

The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with exceedingly steep scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by the seaward face of the spur which forms the north-western side of the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled knot the under-features of Saribair, separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run north-west, west, south-west, and south to the coast.

The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept the lines of the boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken—everyone remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched land the Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.

This attack was carried out by the 3rd Australian Brigade, under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair

Maclagan, D.S.O. The 1st and 2nd Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 p.m., by which time 12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and forced the transports, which had been subjected to continuous shelling from his field guns, to stand further out to sea.

The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detachments post haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men who had pressed far further into the peninsula than had been intended—all these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semi-circular position with its right about a mile north of Kaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this period parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).

From 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort against the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd Brigade. This counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of H.M. ships. Between 5 and 6.30 p.m. a third most determined counter-attack was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made constant attacks, and the 8th Battalion repelled a bayonet charge; but in spite of all the line held firm. The troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24/25th; they had been fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.

It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine guns got on to them in close formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their dead of this date.

The reorganisation of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganisation could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water and supplies to the ridges—in itself a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on the 28th and 29th April.

On the night of May 2nd a bold effort was made to seize a commanding knoll in front of the centre of the line. The enemy's enfilading machine guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were

lost without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On May 4th an attempt to seize Kaba Tepe was also unsuccessful, the barbed-wire here being something beyond belief. But a number of minor operations have been carried out, such as the taking of a Turkish observing station; the strengthening of entrenchments; the re-organisation of units; and the perfecting of communication with the landing place. Also a constant strain has been placed upon some of the best troops of the enemy who, to the number of 24,000, are constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own game.

The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has been invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral Thursby's hands, and I trust I may be permitted to say what a trusty and powerful friend he has proved himself to be to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Concurrently with the British landings a regiment of the French Corps was successfully disembarked at Kum Kale under the guns of the French Fleet, and remained ashore till the morning of the 26th, when they were re-embarked. 500 prisoners were captured by the French on this day.

This operation drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto Bay and V beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed largely to the success of the British landings.

On the evening of the 26th the main disembarkation of the French Corps was begun, V beach being allotted to our Allies for this purpose, and it was arranged that the French should hold the portion of the front between the telegraph wire and the sea.

The following day I ordered a general advance to a line stretching from Hill 236 near Eski Hissarlik Point to the mouth of the stream two miles north of Tekke Burnu. This advance, which was commenced at midday, was completed without opposition, and the troops at once consolidated their new line. The forward movement relieved the growing congestion on the beaches, and by giving us possession of several new wells afforded a temporary solution to the water problem, which had hitherto been causing me much anxiety.

By the evening of the 27th the Allied forces had established themselves on a line some three miles long, which stretched from the mouth of the nullah, 3,200 yards north-east of Tekke Burnu, to Eski Hissarlik Point, the three Brigades of the 29th Division less two battalions on the left and in the centre, with four French Battalions on the right, and beyond them again the South Wales Borderers on the extreme right.

Owing to casualties this line was somewhat thinly held. Still, it was so vital to make what headway we could before the enemy recovered himself and received fresh reinforcements that it was decided to push on as quickly as possible. Orders were therefore issued for a general advance to commence at 8 a.m. next day.

The 29th Division were to march on Krithia, with their left brigade leading, the French were directed to extend their left in conformity with the British movements and to retain their right on the coast-line south of the Kereves Dere.

The advance commenced at 8 a.m. on the 28th, and was carried out with commendable vigour, despite the fact that from the moment of landing the troops had been unable to obtain any proper rest.

The 87th Brigade, with which had been incorporated the Drake Battalion, Royal Naval Division, in the place of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and South Wales Borderers, pushed on rapidly, and by 10 a.m. had advanced some two miles. Here the further progress of the Border regiment was barred by a strong work on the left flank. They halted to concentrate and make dispositions to attack it, and at that moment had to withstand a determined counter-attack by the Turks. Aided by heavy gun fire from H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth," they succeeded in beating off the attack, but they made no further progress that day, and when night fell entrenched themselves on the ground they had gained in the morning.

The Inniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right on the Krithia ravine, reached a point about three-quarters of a mile south-west of Krithia. This was, however, the farthest limit attained, and later on in the day they fell back into line with other corps.

The 88th Brigade on the right of the 87th progressed steadily until about 11.30 a.m., when the stubbornness of the opposition, coupled with a dearth of ammunition, brought their advance to a standstill. The 86th Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Casson, which had been held in reserve, were thereupon ordered to push forward through the 88th Brigade in the direction of Krithia.

The movement commenced at about 1 p.m., but though small reconnoitring parties got to within a few hundred yards of Krithia, the main body of the brigade did not get beyond the line held by the 88th Brigade. Meanwhile, the French had also pushed on in the face of strong opposition along the spurs on the western bank of the Kereves Dere, and had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right thrown back and their left in touch with the 88th Brigade. Here they were unable to make further progress; gradually the strength of the resistance made itself felt, and our Allies were forced during the afternoon to give ground.

By 2 p.m. the whole of the troops with the exception of the Drake Battalion had been absorbed into the firing line. The men were exhausted, and the few guns landed at the time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transport available did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from the landing places.

Hopes of getting a footing on Achi Babi had now perforce to be abandoned—at least for this occasion. The best that could be expected was that we should be able to maintain what we had won, and when at 3 p.m. the Turks made a determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the centre and right of our line, even this seemed exceedingly doubtful. Actually a partial retirement did take place. The French were also forced back, and at 6 p.m. orders were issued for our troops to entrench themselves as best they could in the positions they then held, with their right flank thrown back so as to maintain connection with our Allies. In this retirement the right

flank of the 88th Brigade was temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered severely.

Had it been possible to push in reinforcements in men, artillery and munitions during the day, Krithia should have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided.

Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same time, have received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have answered my purpose.

For, after all, we had pushed forward quite appreciably on the whole. The line eventually held by our troops on the night of the 28th ran from a point on the coast three miles north-west of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the French south-east to the coast.

Much inevitable mixing of units of the 86th and 88th Brigades had occurred during the day's fighting, and there was a dangerous re-entrant in the line at the junction of the 87th and 88th Brigades near the Krithia nullah. The French had lost heavily, especially in officers, and required time to re-organise.

The 29th April was consequently spent in straightening the line, and in consolidating and strengthening the positions gained. There was a certain amount of artillery and musketry fire, but nothing serious.

Similarly, on the 30th, no advance was made, nor was any attack delivered by the enemy. The landing of the bulk of the artillery was completed, and a readjustment of the line took place, the portion held by the French being somewhat increased.

Two more battalions of the Royal Naval Division had been disembarked, and these, together with three battalions of the 88th Brigade withdrawn from the line, were formed into a reserve.

This reserve was increased on the 1st May by the addition of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, which released the three battalions of the 88th Brigade to return to the trenches. The Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient had disembarked the whole of their infantry and all but two of their batteries by the same evening.

At 10 p.m. the Turks opened a hot shell fire upon our position, and half an hour later, just before the rise of the moon, they delivered a series of desperate attacks. Their formation was in three solid lines, the men in the front rank being deprived of ammunition to make them rely only upon the bayonet. The officers were served out with coloured Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to the Turkish guns that they were to lengthen their range; white that our front trenches had been stormed; green that our main position had been carried. The Turkish attack was to crawl on hands and knees until the time came for the final rush to be made. An eloquent hortative was signed Von Zowenstern and addressed to the Turkish rank and file who were called upon,

by one mighty effort, to fling us all back into the sea.

"Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him!

"We shall not retire one step; for if we do, our religion, our country and our nation will perish!

"Soldiers! The world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt!"

The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell upon the right of the 86th Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing all the officers thereabouts had already been killed or wounded. So when the Turks came right on without firing and charged into the trenches with the bayonet they made an ugly gap in the line. This gap was instantly filled by the 5th Royal Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and executed a brilliant bayonet charge against the enemy, and by the Essex Regiment detached for the purpose by the Officer Commanding 88th Brigade. The rest of the British line held its own with comparative ease, and it was not found necessary to employ any portion of the reserve. The storm next broke in fullest violence against the French left, which was held by the Senegalese. Behind them were two British Field Artillery Brigades and a Howitzer Battery. After several charges and counter-charges the Senegalese began to give ground and a company of the Worcester Regiment and some gunners were sent forward to hold the gap. Later, a second company of the Worcester Regiment was also sent up, and the position was then maintained for the remainder of the night, although, about 2 a.m., it was found necessary to despatch one battalion Royal Naval Division to strengthen the extreme right of the French.

About 5 a.m. a counter-offensive was ordered, and the whole line began to advance. By 7.30 a.m. the British left had gained some 500 yards, and the centre had pushed the enemy back and inflicted heavy losses. The right also had gained some ground in conjunction with the French left, but the remainder of the French line was unable to progress. As the British centre and left were now subjected to heavy cross fire from concealed machine guns, it was found impossible to maintain the ground gained, and therefore, about 11 a.m., the whole line withdrew to its former trenches.

The net result of the operations was the repulse of the Turks and the infliction upon them of very heavy losses. At first we had them fairly on the run, and had it not been for those inventions of the devil—machine guns and barbed wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Babi. As it was, all brigades reported great numbers of dead Turks in front of their lines, and 350 prisoners were left in our hands.

On the 2nd, during the day, the enemy remained quiet, burying his dead under a red crescent flag, a work with which we did not interfere. Shortly after 9 p.m., however, they made another attack against the whole allied

line, their chief effort being made against the French front, where the ground favoured their approach. The attack was repulsed with loss.

During the night 3rd/4th the French front was again subjected to a heavy attack, which they were able to repulse without assistance from my general reserve.

The day of the 4th was spent in reorganisation, and a portion of the line held by the French, who had lost heavily during the previous night's fighting, was taken over by the 2nd Naval Brigade. The night passed quietly.

During the 5th the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Division was disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left.

Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out next day, and these and the three days' battle which ensued, will be dealt with in my next despatch.

The losses, exclusive of the French, during the period covered by this despatch were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering:—

177 Officers and 1,990 other ranks killed,

412 Officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded,

13 Officers and 3,580 other ranks missing.

From a technical point of view it is interesting to note that my Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros by the time when the landings were finally arranged. All the highly elaborate work involved by these landings was put through by my General Staff working in collaboration with Commodore Roger Keyes, C.B., M.V.O., and the Naval Transport Officers allotted for the purpose by Vice-Admiral de Robeck. Navy and Army carried out these combined duties with that perfect harmony which was indeed absolutely essential to success.

Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realises how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.

Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le Général d'Amade has given

me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me, always, the most loyal and energetic support. The landing of Kum Kale planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention of the enemy was transformed by the Commander of the Corps Expéditionnaire de l'Orient into a brilliant operation, which secured some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the landing of the French Division at Sedd-el-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur le Général d'Amade.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., was in command of the detached landing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps above Kaba Tepe, as well as during the subsequent fighting. The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of these difficult and hazardous operations—operations which were crowned with a very remarkable success—speaks, I think, for itself.

Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B., D.S.O., was tried very highly, not only during the landings, but more especially in the day and night attacks and counter attacks which ensued. Untiring, resourceful and ever more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a Commander of troops in the field.

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., is the best Chief of the General Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can certainly say no less.

I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

IAN HAMILTON, General,
Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force.

DESPATCH OF SIR IAN HAMILTON, 26th AUGUST, 1915.

From the General Commanding, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
26th August, 1915.

MY LORD,—

At the close of the ten days and ten nights described in my first despatch our troops had forced their way forward for some 5,000 yards from the landing places at the point of the Peninsula. Opposite them lay the Turks, who since their last repulse had fallen back about half a mile upon previously prepared redoubts and entrenchments. Both sides had drawn heavily upon their stock of energy and munitions, but it seemed clear that whichever could first summon up spirit to make another push must secure at least several hundreds of yards of the debatable ground between the two fronts. And several hundred yards, whatever it might mean to the enemy, was a matter of life or death to a force crowded together under gun fire on so narrow a tongue of land. Such was the situation on the 5th of May, the date last mentioned in my despatch of the 20th of that month.

On that day I determined to continue my advance, feeling certain that even if my tired troops could not carry the formidable opposing lines they would at least secure the use of the intervening ground. Orders were forthwith issued for an attack.

The many urgent calls for reinforcements made during the previous critical fighting had forced me to disorganise and mix together several of the formations in the southern group, to the extent even of the French on our right having a British battalion holding their own extremest right. For the purposes of the impending fight it became therefore necessary to create temporarily a Composite Division, consisting of the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry Brigades (withdrawn for the purpose from the northern section), together with a Naval Brigade formed of the Plymouth and Drake battalions. The 29th Division was reconstituted into four brigades, i.e., the 87th and 88th Brigades, the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade (T.F.), and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. The French Corps Expéditionnaire was reinforced by the 2nd Naval Brigade, and the new Composite Division formed my General Reserve.

The 29th Division, whose left rested on the coast about three miles north-east of Cape Tekke, was ordered to direct, its right moving on the south-east edge of Krithia, while the Corps Expéditionnaire with the 2nd Naval Brigade had assigned to them for their first point of attack the commanding ridge running from north to south above the Kereves Dere. A foothold upon this ridge was essential, as its capture would ensure a safe pivot on which the 29th Division could swing in making any further advance. Communication between

these two sections of the attack was to be maintained by the Plymouth and Drake battalions.

During the three days (6th–8th May) our troops were destined to be very severely tried. They were about to attack a series of positions scientifically selected in advance which, although not yet joined up into one line of entrenchment, were already strengthened by works on their more important tactical features.

The 29th Division led off at 11 a.m., the French Corps followed suit at 11.30 a.m.; every yard was stubbornly contested; some Brigades were able to advance, others could do no more than maintain themselves. Positions were carried and held, other positions were carried and lost; but, broadly, our gunners kept lengthening the fuzes of their shrapnel, and by 1.30 p.m. the line had been pushed forward two to three hundred yards. Here and there this advance included a Turkish trench, but generally speaking the main enemy position still lay some distance ahead of our leading companies.

By 4.30 p.m. it became clear that we should make no more progress that day. The French Corps were held up by a strong field work. They had made good a point upon the crest line of the lower slope of the Kereves Dere ridge, but there they had come under a fire so galling that they were unable, as it turned out, to entrench until nightfall. The 88th Brigade could not carry a clump of fir trees to their front: company after company made the perilous essay, but the wood swept by hidden machine-guns proved a veritable deathtrap. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade also were only just barely holding on and were suffering heavy losses from these same concealed machine-guns. The troops were ordered to entrench themselves in line and link up their flanks on either side.

At night, save for rifle fire, there was quiet along the whole British line. On the right a determined bayonet charge was made upon the French, who gave ground for the moment, but recovered it again at dawn.

Next morning (the 7th May) we opened with shrapnel upon the enemy's trenches opposite our extreme left, and at 10 a.m., the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade began the attack. But our artillery had not been able to locate the cleverly sited German machine-gun batteries, whose fire rendered it physically impossible to cross that smooth glacis. Next to the right the 88th Brigade swept forward, and the 115th Royal Scots, well supported by artillery fire, carried the fir trees with a rush. This time it was discovered that not only the enfilading machine-guns had made the wood so difficult to hold. Amongst the branches of the trees Turkish snipers were perched, sometimes upon small wooden platforms. When these were brought down the surroundings became much healthier. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, of the 87th Brigade, were pushed up to support the left of the 88th, and all seemed well, when, at 1.20 p.m., a strong Turkish counter-attack drove us back out of the fir clump. As an off-set to this check the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers captured

three Turkish trenches and a second battalion of the 87th Brigade, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, was sent forward on the left to make these good.

At 3 p.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade again reported they were definitely held up by the accurate cross-fire of batteries of machine-guns concealed in the scrub on the ridge between the ravine and the sea, batteries which also enfiladed the left flank of the 88th Brigade as it endeavoured to advance in the centre. Unless we were to acquiesce in a stalemate the moment for our effort had arrived, and a general attack was ordered for 4.45 p.m., the whole of the 87th Brigade to reinforce the 88th Brigade, and the New Zealand Brigade to support it.

Despite their exhaustion and their losses the men responded with a will. The whole force, French and British, rose simultaneously and made a rush forward. All along the front we made good a certain amount of ground, excepting only on our extreme left. For the third time British bayonets carried the fir clump in our centre, and when darkness fell the whole line (excepting always the left) had gained from 200 to 300 yards, and had occupied or passed over the first line of Turkish trenches.

The troops were now worn out; the new lines needed consolidating, and it was certain that fresh reinforcements were reaching the Turks. Balancing the actual state of my own troops against the probable condition of the Turks, I decided to call upon the men to make one more push before the new enemy forces could get into touch with their surroundings.

Orders were therefore issued to dig in at sundown on the line gained; to maintain that line against counter-attack, and to prepare to advance again next morning. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade was withdrawn into reserve, and its place on the left was taken by the Brigade of New Zealanders.

General Headquarters were shifted to an entrenchment on a hill in rear of the left of our line. Under my plan for the fresh attack the New Zealand Brigade was to advance through the line held during the night by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia. Simultaneously the 87th Brigade was to threaten the works on the west of the ravine, whilst endeavouring, by means of parties of scouts and volunteers, to steal patches of ground from the areas dominated by the German machine-guns.

At 10.15 a.m. heavy fire from ships and batteries was opened on the whole front, and at 10.30 a.m. the New Zealand Brigade began to move, meeting with strenuous opposition from the enemy, who had received his reinforcements. Supported by the fire of the batteries and the machine-guns of the 88th Brigade, they pushed forward on the right and advanced their centre beyond the fir trees, but could make little further progress. By 1.30 p.m. about 200 yards had been gained beyond the previously most advanced trenches of the 88th Brigade.

At this hour the French Corps reported they could not advance up the crest of the spur west of Kereves Dere till further progress was made by the British.

At 4 p.m. I gave orders that the whole line, reinforced by the 2nd Australian Brigade, would fix bayonets, slope arms, and move on Krithia precisely at 5.30 p.m.

At 5.15 p.m. the ships' guns and our heavy artillery bombarded the enemy's position for a quarter of an hour, and at 5.30 p.m. the filed guns opened a hot shrapnel fire to cover the infantry advance.

The co-operation of artillery and infantry in this attack was perfect, the timing of the movement being carried out with great precision. Some of the companies of the New Zealand regiments did not get their orders in time, but acting on their own initiative they pushed on as soon as the heavy howitzers ceased firing, thus making the whole advance simultaneous.

The steady advance of the British could be followed by the sparkle of their bayonets until the long lines entered the smoke clouds. The French at first made no move, then, their drums beating and bugles sounding the charge, they suddenly darted forward in a swarm of skirmishers, which seemed in one moment to cover the whole southern face of the ridge of the Kereves Dere. Against these the Turkish gunners now turned their heaviest pieces, and as the leading groups stormed the first Turkish redoubt the ink-black bursts of high-explosive shells blotted out both assailant and assailed. The trial was too severe for the Senegalese tirailleurs. They recoiled. They were rallied. Another rush forward, another repulse, and then a small supporting column of French soldiers was seen silhouetted against the sky as they charged upwards along the crest of the ridge of the Kereves Dere, whilst elsewhere it grew so dark that the whole of the battlefield became a blank.

Not until next morning did any reliable detail come to hand of what had happened. The New Zealanders' firing line had marched over the cunningly concealed enemy's machine-guns without seeing them, and these, re-opening on our supports as they came up, caused them heavy losses. But the first line pressed on and arrived within a few yards of the Turkish trenches which had been holding up our advance beyond the fir wood. There they dug themselves in.

The Australian Brigade had advanced through the Composite Brigade, and, in spite of heavy losses from shrapnel, machine-gun, and rifle fire, had progressed from 300 to 400 yards.

The determined valour shown by these two brigades, the New Zealand Brigade, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, and the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General the Hon. J. W. McCay, are worthy of particular praise. Their losses were correspondingly heavy, but in spite of fierce counter-attacks by numerous fresh troops they stuck to what they had won with admirable tenacity.

On the extreme left the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, made a final and especially gallant effort to advance across the smooth, bullet-swept area between the ravine and the sea, but once more the enemy machine-guns thinned the ranks of the leading companies of the South Wales Borderers, and again there was nothing for it but to give ground. But when night closed in the men of the 87th Brigade of their

own accord asked to be led forward, and achieved progress to the extent of just about 200 yards. During the darkness the British troops everywhere entrenched themselves on the line gained.

On the right the French column, last seen as it grew dark, had stormed and still held the redoubt round which the fighting had centred until then. Both General d'Amade and General Simonin had been present in person with this detachment and had rallied the Senegalese and encouraged the white troops in their exploit. With their bayonets these brave fellows of the 8th Colonials had inflicted exceedingly heavy losses upon the enemy.

The French troops whose actions have hitherto been followed belonged, all of them, to the 2nd Division. But beyond the crest of the ridge the valley of the Kereves Dere lies dead to anyone occupying my post of command. And in this area the newly arrived Brigade of the French 1st Division had been also fighting hard. Here they had advanced simultaneously with the 2nd Division and achieved a fine success in their first rush, which was jeopardised when a battalion of Zouaves was forced to give way under a heavy bombardment. But, as in the case of the 2nd Division, the other battalions of the 1st Régiment de Marche d'Afrique, under Lieutenant-Colonel Nieger, restored the situation, and in the end the Division carried and held two complete lines of Turkish redoubts and trenches.

The net result of the three days' fighting had been a gain of 600 yards on the right of the British line and 400 yards on the left and centre. The French had captured all the ground in front of the Farm Zjimmerman, as well as a redoubt, for the possession of which there had been obstinate fighting during the whole of the past three days.

This may not seem very much, but actually more had been won than at first meets the eye. The German leaders of the Turks were quick to realise the fact. From nightfall till dawn on the 9th-10th efforts were made everywhere to push us back. A specially heavy attack was made upon the French supported by a hot cannonade and culminating in a violent hand-to-hand conflict in front of the Brigade Simonin. Everywhere the assailants were repulsed, and now for the first time I felt that we had planted a fairly firm foothold upon the point of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Meanwhile in the Northern Zone also, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps had strengthened their grip on Turkish soil. Whilst in the south we had been attacking and advancing they had been defending and digging themselves more and more firmly into those cliffs on which it had seemed at first that their foothold was so precarious.

On the 11th May, the first time for eighteen days and nights, it was found possible to withdraw the 29th Division from the actual firing line and to replace it by the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and by the 42nd Division, which had completed its disembarkation two days previously. The withdrawal gave no respite from shells, but at least the men were, most nights, enabled to sleep.

The moment lent itself to reflection, and during this breathing space I was able to realise we had now nearly reached the limit of what could be attained by mingling initiative with surprise. The enemy was as much in possession of my numbers

and dispositions as I was in possession of their first line of defence; the opposing fortified fronts stretched parallel from sea to straits; there was little scope left now, either at Achi Baba or at Kaba Tepe, for tactics which would fling flesh and blood battalions against lines of unbroken barbed wire. Advances must more and more tend to take the shape of concentrated attacks on small sections of the enemy's line after full artillery preparation. Siege warfare was soon bound to supersede manœuvre battles in the open. Consolidation and fortification of our front, improvement of approaches, selection of machine-gun emplacements and scientific grouping of our artillery under a centralised control must ere long form the tactical basis of our plans.

So soon, then, as the troops had enjoyed a day or two of comparative rest I divided my front into four sections. On the left was the 29th Division, to which the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was attached. In the left centre came the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, on the right centre stood the Royal Naval Division, and at my right was the Corps Expéditionnaire. Thus I secured organisation in depth as well as front, enabling each division to arrange for its own reliefs, supports, and reserves, and giving strength for defence as well as attack. Hitherto the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements had forced a hand-to-mouth procedure upon headquarters; now the control became more decentralised.

Already, before the new system of local efforts had come into working order, the 29th Indian Brigade had led the way towards it by a brilliant little affair on the night of the 10th/11th May. The Turkish right rested upon the steep cliff north-east of "Y" Beach, where the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion, Royal Naval Division, had made their first landing. Since those days the enemy had converted the bluff into a powerful bastion, from which the fire of machine-guns had held up the left of our attacks. Two gallant attempts by the Royal Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers to establish a footing on this cliff on the 8th and 9th May had both of them failed.

During the night of the 10th/11th May the 6th Gurkhas started off to seize this bluff. Their scouts descended to the sea, worked their way for some distance through the broken ground along the shore, and crawled hands and knees up the precipitous face of the cliff. On reaching the top they were heavily fired on. As a surprise the enterprise had failed, but as a reconnaissance it proved very useful. On the following day Major-General H. V. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, submitted proposals for a concerted attack on the bluff (now called Gurkha Bluff), and arrangements were made with the Navy for co-operation. These arrangements were completed on 12th May; they included a demonstration by the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division and by our artillery and the support of the attack from the sea by the guns of H.M.S. "Dublin" and H.M.S. "Talbot." At 6.30 p.m. on the 12th May the Manchester Brigade and the 29th Divisional artillery opened fire on the Turkish trenches, and under cover of this fire a double company of the 1/6th Gurkhas once more crept along the shore and assembled below the bluff.

Then, the attention of the Turks being taken up with the bombardment, they swiftly scaled the cliffs and carried the work with a rush. The machine-gun section of the Gurkhas was hurried forward, and at 4.30 a.m. a second double company was pushed up to join the first.

An hour later these two double companies extended and began to entrench to join up their new advanced left diagonally with the right of the trenches previously held by their battalion.

At 6 a.m. a third double company advanced across the open from their former front line of trenches under a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire and established themselves on this diagonal line between the main ravine on their right and the newly captured redoubt. The fourth double company moved up as a support, and held the former firing line.

Our left flank, which had been firmly held up against all attempts on the 6th-8th was now, by stratagem, advanced nearly 500 yards. Purchased as it was with comparatively slight losses (21 killed, 92 wounded) this success was due to careful preparation and organisation by Major-General H. V. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. C. G. Bruce, commanding 1/6th Gurkhas, and Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) F. A. Wynter, R.G.A., commanding the Artillery Group supporting the attack. The co-operation of the two cruisers was excellent, and affords another instance of the admirable support by the Navy to our troops.

On May 14th General Gouraud arrived and took over from General d'Amade the command of the Corps Expeditionnaire. As General d'Amade quitted the shores of the Peninsula he received a spontaneous ovation from the British soldiers at work upon the beaches.

The second division of the Corps Expeditionnaire, commanded by General Bailloud, had now completed disembarkation.

From the time of the small local push forward made by the 6th Gurkhas on the night of the 10th-11th May until the 4th of June the troops under my command pressed against the enemy continuously by sapping, reconnaissance and local advances, whilst, to do them justice, they (the enemy) did what they could to repay us in like coin. I have given the escalade of Gurkha Bluff as a sample; no 48 hours passed without something of the sort being attempted or achieved either by the French or ourselves.

Turning now to where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were perched upon the cliffs of Sari Bair, I must begin by explaining that their rôle at this stage of the operations was—first, to keep open a door leading to the vitals of the Turkish position; secondly, to hold up as large a body as possible of the enemy in front of them, so as to lessen the strain at Cape Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast to play second fiddle to Cape Helles, a part out of harmony with the dare-devil spirit animating those warriors from the South, and so it has come about that, as your Lordship will now see, the defensive of the Australians and New Zealanders has always tended to take on the character of an attack.

The line held during the period under review by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps formed a rough semi-circle inland from the beach

of Anzac Cove, with a diameter of about 1,100 yards. The firing line is everywhere close to the enemy's trenches, and in all sections of the position sapping, counter-sapping and bomb attacks have been incessant. The shelling both of the trenches and beaches has been impartial and liberal. As many as 1,400 shells have fallen on Anzac within the hour, and these of all calibres, from 11 inches to field shrapnel. Around Quinn's Post, both above and below ground, the contest has been particularly severe. This section of the line is situated on the circumference of the Anzac semi-circle at the furthest point from its diameter. Here our fire trenches are mere ledges on the brink of a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the valley below. The enemy's trenches are only a few feet distant.

On 9th May a night assault, supported by enfilade fire, was delivered on the enemy's trenches in front of Quinn's Post. The trenches were carried at the point of the bayonet, troops established in them, and reinforcements sent up.

At dawn on the 10th May a strong counter-attack forced our troops to evacuate the trenches and fall back on Quinn's Post. In opposing this counter-attack our guns did great execution, as we discovered later from a Turkish officer's diary that two Turkish regiments on this date lost 600 killed and 2,000 wounded.

On the night of 14th-15th May a sortie was made from Quinn's Post with the object of filling in Turkish trenches in which bomb-throwers were active. The sortie, which cost us some seventy casualties, was not successful.

On May 14th Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood was slightly wounded, but, I am glad to say, he was not obliged to relinquish the command of his Corps.

On 15th May I deeply regret to say Major-General W. T. Bridges, commanding the Australian Division, received a severe wound, which proved fatal a few days later. Sincere and single-minded in his devotion to Australia and to duty, his loss still stands out even amidst the hundreds of other brave officers who have gone.

On the 18th May Anzac was subjected to a heavy bombardment from large calibre guns and howitzers. At midnight of the 18th-19th the most violent rifle and machine-gun fire yet experienced broke out along the front. Slackening from 3 a.m. to 4 a.m. it then broke out again, and a heavy Turkish column assaulted the left of No. 2 section. This assault was beaten with loss. Another attack was delivered before daylight on the centre of this section; it was repeated four times and repulsed each time with very serious losses to the enemy. Simultaneously a heavy attack was delivered on the north-east salient of No. 4 section, which was repulsed and followed up, but the pressing of the counter-attack was prevented by shrapnel. Attacks were also delivered on Quinn's Post, Courtney's Post, and along the front of our right section. At about 5 a.m. the battle was fairly joined, and a furious cannonade was begun by a large number of enemy guns, including 12-inch and 9.2-inch, and other artillery that had not till then opened. By 9.30 a.m. the Turks were pressing hard against the left of Courtney's and the right of Quinn's Post. At 10 a.m. this attack, unable to face fire from the right, swung

round to the left, where it was severely handled by our guns and the machine-guns of our left section. By 11 a.m. the enemy, who were crowded together in the trenches beyond Quinn's Post, were giving way under their heavy losses.

According to prisoners' reports 30,000 troops, including five fresh regiments, were used against us. General Liman Von Sanders was himself in command.

The enemy's casualties were heavy, as may be judged from the fact that over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of our trenches. A large proportion of these losses were due to our artillery fire. Our casualties amounted to about 100 killed and 500 wounded, including 9 officers wounded.

The next four days were chiefly remarkable for the carrying through of the negotiations for the suspension of arms, which actually took place on 24th May. About 5 p.m. on 20th May white flags and Red Crescents began to appear all along the line. In No. 2 section a Turkish staff officer, two medical officers, and a company commander came out and were met by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding the Australian Division, half-way between the trenches. The staff officer explained that he was instructed to arrange a suspension of arms for the removal of dead and wounded. He had no written credentials, and was informed that neither he nor the General Officer Commanding Australian Division had the power to arrange such a suspension of arms, but that at 8 p.m. an opportunity would be given of exchanging letters on the subject, and that meanwhile hostilities would recommence after 10 minutes' grace. At this time some stretcher parties on both sides were collecting wounded, and the Turkish trenches opposite ours were packed with men standing shoulder to shoulder two deep. Matters were less regular in front of other sections, where men with white flags came out to collect wounded. Meanwhile it was observed that columns were on the march in the valley up which the Turks were accustomed to bring up their reinforcements.

On hearing the report of these movements, General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, ordered his trenches to be manned against a possible attack. As the evening drew in the enemy's concentration continued, and everything pointed to their intention of making use of the last of the daylight to get their troops into position without being shelled by our artillery. A message was therefore sent across to say that no clearing of dead or wounded could be allowed during the night, and that any negotiations for such a purpose should be opened through the proper channel and initiated before noon on the following day.

Stretcher and other parties fell back, and immediately fire broke out. In front of our right section masses of men advanced behind lines of unarmed men holding up their hands. Firing became general all along the line, accompanied by a heavy bombardment of the whole position, so that evidently this attack must have been pre-arranged. Musketry and machine-gun fire continued without interruption till after dark, and from then up to about 4 a.m. next day.

Except for a half-hearted attack in front of Courtney's Post, no assault was made till 1.20 a.m., when the enemy left their trenches and advanced

on Quinn's Post. Our guns drove the Turks back to their trenches, and beat back all other attempts to assault. By 4.30 a.m. on 21st May musketry fire had died down to normal dimensions.

As the Turks seemed anxious to bury their dead, and as human sentiment and medical science were both of one accord in favour of such a course, I sent Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my Chief of the General Staff, on 22nd May to assist Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding the Army Corps, in coming to some suitable arrangements with the representative sent by Essad Pasha. The negotiations resulted in a suspension of arms from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. on 24th May. The procedure laid down for this suspension of arms was, I am glad to inform your Lordship, correctly observed on both sides.

The burial of the dead was finished about 3 p.m. Some 3,000 Turkish dead were removed or buried in the area between the opposing lines. The whole of these were killed on or since the 18th of May. Many bodies of men killed earlier were also buried.

On the 25th May, with the assistance of two destroyers of the Royal Navy, a raid was carried out on Nibrunesi Point. A fresh telephone line was destroyed and an observing station demolished.

On 28th May, at 9 p.m., a raid was made on a Turkish post overlooking the beach 1,200 yards north of Kaba Tepe, H.M.S. "Rattlesnake" co-operating. A party of 50 rifles rushed the post, killing or capturing the occupants. A similar raid was made against an enemy trench to the left of our line which cost the Turks 200 casualties, as was afterwards ascertained.

From 28th May till 5th June the fighting seemed to concentrate itself around Quinn's Post. Three enemy galleries had been detected there, and work on them stopped by counter-mines, which killed 20 Turks and injured 30. One gallery had, however, been overlooked, and at 3.30 a.m. on 29th May a mine was sprung in or near the centre of Quinn's Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy bomb attack, before which our left centre subsection fell back, letting in a storming party of Turks. This isolated one subsection on the left from the two other subsections on the right.

At 5.30 a.m. our counter-attack was launched, and by 6 a.m. the position had been retaken with the bayonet by the 15th Australian Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn, who was unfortunately killed. All the enemy in the trench were killed or captured, and the work of restoration was begun.

At 6.30 a.m. the Turks again attacked, supported by artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire and by showers of bombs from the trenches. The fine shooting of our guns and the steadiness of the Infantry enabled us to inflict upon the enemy a bloody repulse, demoralising them to such an extent that the bomb throwers of their second line flung the missiles into the middle of their own first line.

At 8.15 a.m. the attack slackened, and by 8.45 a.m. the enemy's attacks had practically ceased.

Our casualties in this affair amounted to 2 officers, 31 other ranks killed, 12 officers and 176 other ranks wounded. The enemy's losses must have been serious, and were probably equal to those

sustained on 9th/10th May. Except for the first withdrawal in the confusion of the mine explosion, all ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage.

On 30th May preparations were made in Quinn's Post to attack and destroy two enemy saps, the heads of which had reached within 5 yards of our fire trench. Two storming parties of 35 men went forward at 1 p.m., cleared the sap heads and penetrated into the trenches beyond, but they were gradually driven back by Turkish counter-attacks, in spite of our heavy supporting fire, our casualties being chiefly caused by bombs, of which the enemy seem to have an unlimited supply.

During 31st May close fighting continued in front of Quinn's Post.

On 1st June, an hour after dark, two sappers of the New Zealand Engineers courageously crept out and laid a charge of guncotton against a timber and sandbag bomb-proof. The structure was completely demolished.

After sunset on the 4th of June three separate enterprises were carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These were undertaken in compliance with an order which I had issued that the enemy's attention should be distracted during an attack I was about to deliver in the southern zone.

(1) A demonstration in the direction of Kaba Tepe the Navy co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches.

(2) A sortie at 11 p.m. towards a trench 200 yards from Quinn's Post. This failed, but a second sortie by 100 men took place at 2.55 a.m. on 5th June and penetrated to the Turkish trench; demolished a machine-gun emplacement which enfiladed Quinn's Post, and withdrew in good order.

(3) At Quinn's Post an assault was delivered at 11 p.m. A party of 60 men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party on either flank, stormed the enemy's trench. In the assault many Turks were bayoneted and 28 captured. A working party followed up the attack and at once set to work. Meanwhile the Turkish trenches on the left of the post were heavily assailed with machine-gun fire and grenades, which drew from them a very heavy fire. After daybreak a strong bomb attack developed on the captured trench, the enemy using a heavier type of bomb than hitherto.

At 6.30 a.m. the trench had to be abandoned, and it was found necessary to retire to the original fire trench of the post and the bomb-proof in front of its left. Our casualties were 80; those of the enemy considerably greater.

On 5th June a sortie was made from Quinn's Post by 2 officers and 100 men of the 1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a machine-gun in a trench known as German Officer's Trench. A special party of 10 men with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion (New South Wales) Australian Imperial Force) made a dash for the machine-gun; one of the 10 men managed to fire three rounds into the gun at a range of 5 feet and another three at the same range through a loophole. The darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of the trench as possible was dismantled.

The party suffered some casualties from bombs, and was enfiladed all the time by machine-guns from either flank. The aim of this gallant assault being attained the party withdrew in good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were 36.

I now return to the southern zone and to the battle of the 4th of June.

From 25th May onwards the troops had been trying to work up within rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches. On the 25th May the Royal Naval and 42nd Divisions crept 100 yards nearer to the Turks, and on the night of 28th/29th May the whole of the British line made a further small advance. On that same night the French Corps Expeditionnaire was successful in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left west of the Kereves Dere.

All Turkish counter-attacks during 29th May were repulsed. On the night of 30th May two of their many assaults effected temporary lodgment. But on both occasions they were driven out again with the bayonet.

On every subsequent night up to that of the 3rd/4th June assaults were made upon the redoubt and upon our line, but at the end of that period our position remained intact.

This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack upon the enemy's front line of trenches which ran from the west of the Kereves Dere in a northerly direction to the sea.

Taking our line of battle from right to left the troops were deployed in the following order:—The Corps Expeditionnaire, the Royal Naval Division, the 42nd (East Lancs) Division and the 29th Division.

The length of the front, so far as the British troops were concerned, was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry available amounted to 24,000 men, which permitted the General Officer Commanding 8th Army Corps to form a corps reserve of 7,000 men.

My General Headquarters for the day were at the command post on the Peninsula.

At 8 a.m. on 4th June our heavy artillery opened with a deliberate bombardment which continued till 10.30 a.m. At 11 a.m. the bombardment recommenced and continued till 11.20 a.m., when a feint attack was made which successfully drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles. At 11.30 a.m. all our guns opened fire and continued with increasing intensity till noon.

On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range and along the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and advanced.

The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French 1st Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French 2nd Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry captured a strong redoubt called the "Haricot," from which they had already had three desperate contests. Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue.

The 2nd Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division rushed forward with great dash; the "Anson" Battalion captured the southern face of a Turkish redoubt which formed a salient in the enemy's line, the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12.15 p.m. the whole Turkish line forming their first objective

was in their hands. Their consolidating party went forward at 12.25 p.m.

The Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division advanced magnificently. In five minutes the first line of Turkish trenches were captured, and by 12.30 p.m. the Brigade had carried with a rush the line forming their second objective, having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The working parties got to work without incident, and the position here could not possibly have been better.

On the left the 29th Division met with more difficulty. All along the section of the 88th Brigade the troops jumped out of their trenches at noon and charged across the open at the nearest Turkish trench. In most places the enemy crossed bayonets with our men and inflicted severe loss upon us. But the 88th Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder of the 88th Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had fairly made good the whole of the Turkish first line.

Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here the Turkish front trench was so sited as to have escaped damage from our artillery bombardment, and the barbed wire obstacle was intact. The result was that, though the 14th Sikhs on the right flank pushed on despite losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of the Brigade could make no headway. A company of the 6th Gurkhas on the left, skilfully led along the cliffs by its commander, actually forced its way into a Turkish work, but the failure of the rest of the Brigade threatened isolation, and it was as skilfully withdrawn under fire. Reinforcements were therefore sent to the left so that, if possible, a fresh attack might be organised.

Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morning were being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack had developed against the "Haricot." The Turks poured in masses of men through prepared communication trenches, and, under cover of accurate shell fire, were able to recapture that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back, uncovered in doing so the right flank of the Royal Naval Division. Shortly before 1 p.m. the right of the 2nd Naval Brigade had to retire with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing in their turn the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions to enfilade, that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire.

By 1.30 p.m. the whole of the captured trenches in this section had been lost again, and the Brigade was back in its original position, the "Collingwood" Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been practically destroyed.

The question was now whether this rolling up of the newly captured line from the right would continue until the whole of our gains were wiped out. It looked very like it, for now the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which was firmly consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had so brilliantly won. After 1.30 p.m. it became increasingly difficult for this gallant Brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred; the Brigadier and many other officers

were wounded or killed; yet it continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to sustain the Brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire and reinforcements were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal Naval Division. But, ere long, it became clear that unless the right of our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found themselves.

Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh attack, and reinforcements were despatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success. By 6.30 p.m., therefore, the 42nd Division had to be extricated with loss from the second line Turkish trenches, and had to content themselves with consolidating on the first line which they had captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the spirit displayed by this Brigade that there was great difficulty in persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered nothing would have made them loosen their grip.

No further progress had been found possible in front of the 88th Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made by their reserve battalions to advance on the right and left flanks respectively, but in both cases heavy fire drove them back.

At 4 p.m. under support of our artillery the Royal Fusiliers were able to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches, but the fact that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable.

As the reserves had been largely depleted by the despatch of reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information was to hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh troops to the enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation of the line then held.

Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the ground gained in the first rush, the net result of the day's operations was considerable—namely, an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of our centre, a front of nearly 3 miles. That the enemy suffered severely was indicated, not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his attempting no counter-attack during the night, except upon the trench captured by the French 1st Division on the extreme right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.

The prisoners taken during the day amounted to 400, including 11 officers: amongst these were 5 Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from the "Goeben." Their commanding officer was killed and the machine-gun destroyed. The majority of these captures were made by the 42nd Division under Major-General W. Douglas.

From the date of this battle to the end of the month of June the incessant attacks and counter-attacks which have so grievously swelled our lists of casualties have been caused by the determination of the Turks to regain ground they had lost, a determination clashing against our firm resolve to continue to increase our holding. Several of these

daily encounters would have been the subject of a separate despatch in the campaigns of my youth and middle age, but, with due regard to proportion, they cannot even be so much as mentioned here. Only one example each from the French, British and Australian and New Zealand spheres of action will be most briefly set down so that your Lordship may understand the nature of the demands made upon the energies and fortitude of the troops.

(1) At 4.30 a.m. on June the 21st the French Corps Expeditionnaire attacked the formidable works that flank the Kereves Dere. By noon their 2nd Division had stormed all the Turkish first and second line trenches to their front, and had captured the "Haricot" redoubt. On their right the 1st Division took the first line of trenches, but were counter-attacked and driven out. Fresh troops were brought up and launched upon another assault, but the Turks were just as obstinate and drove out the second party before they had time to consolidate. At 2.45 p.m. General Gouraud issued an order that full use must be made of the remaining five hours of daylight, and that, before dark, these trenches must be taken and held, otherwise the gains of the 2nd Division would be sacrificed. At 6 p.m. the third assault succeeded: 600 yards of trenches remained in our hands, despite all the heavy counter-attacks made through the night by the enemy. In this attack the striplings belonging to the latest French drafts specially distinguished themselves by their forwardness and contempt of danger. Fifty prisoners were taken, and the enemy's casualties (mostly incurred during counter-attacks) were estimated at 7,000. The losses of the Corps Expeditionnaire was 2,500.

(2) The Turkish right had hitherto rooted itself with special tenacity into the coast. In the scheme of attack submitted by Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter Weston, commanding VIIIth Army Corps, our left, pivoting upon a point in our line about one mile from the sea, was to push forward until its outer flank advanced about 1,000 yards. If the operation was successful then, at its close, we should have driven the enemy back for a thousand yards along the coast, and the trenches of this left section of our line would be facing east instead of, as previously, north-east. Obviously the ground to be gained lessened as our line drew back from the sea towards its fixed or pivotal right. Five Turkish trenches must be carried in the section nearest the sea; only two Turkish trenches in the section furthest from the sea. At 10.20 a.m. on the 28th June our bombardment began. At 10.45 a.m. a small redoubt known as the Boomerang was rushed by the Border Regiment. At 11 a.m. the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, captured three lines of Turkish trenches. On their right the 4th and 7th Royal Scots captured the two Turkish trenches allotted to them, but further to the east; near the pivotal point the remainder of the 156th Brigade were unable to get on. Precisely at 11.30 a.m. the second attack took place. The 86th Brigade, led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, dashed over the trenches already captured by their comrades of the 87th Brigade, and, pushing on with great steadiness, took two more lines of trenches, thus achieving the five successive lines along the coast. This success was further improved upon by the Indian Brigade, who managed

to secure, and to place into a state of defence, a spur running from the west of the furthest captured Turkish trench to the sea. Our casualties were small; 1,750 in all. The enemy suffered heavily, especially in the repeated counter-attacks, which for many days and nights afterwards they launched against the trenches they had lost.

(3) On the night of the 29th/30th June the Turks acting, as we afterwards ascertained, under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha, to drive us all into the sea, made a big attack on the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, principally on that portion of the line which was under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley. From midnight till 1.30 a.m. a fire of musketry and guns of greatest intensity was poured upon our trenches. A heavy column then advanced to the assault, and was completely crumpled up by the musketry and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour later another grand attack took place against our left and left centre, and was equally cut to pieces by our artillery and rifle fire. The enemy's casualties may be judged by the fact that in areas directly exposed to view between 400 and 500 were actually seen to fall.

On the evening of this day, the 30th of June, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force suffered grievous loss owing to the wounding of General Gouraud by a shell. This calamity, for I count it nothing less, brings us down to the beginning of the month of July.

The command of the Corps Expeditionnaire francais d'Orient was then taken over by General Bailloud, at which point I shall close my despatch.

During the whole period under review the efforts and expedients whereby a great army has had its wants supplied upon a wilderness have, I believe, been breaking world records.

The country is broken, mountainous, arid and void of supplies; the water found in the areas occupied by our forces is quite inadequate for their needs; the only practicable beaches are small, cramped breaks in impracticable lines of cliffs; with the wind in certain quarters no sort of landing is possible; the wastage, by bombardment and wreckage, of lighters and small craft has led to crisis after crisis in our carrying capacity, whilst over every single beach plays fitfully throughout each day a devastating shell fire at medium ranges.

Upon such a situation appeared quite suddenly the enemy submarines. On 22nd May all transports had to be despatched to Mudros for safety. Thenceforth men, stores, guns, horses, etc., etc., had to be brought from Mudros—a distance of 40 miles—in fleet sweepers and other small and shallow craft less vulnerable to submarine attack. Every danger and every difficulty was doubled.

But the Navy and the Royal Engineers were not to be thwarted in their landing operations either by nature or by the enemy, whilst the Army Service Corps, under Brigadier-General F. W. B. Koe, and the Army Ordnance Corps, under Brigadier-General R. W. M. Jackson, have made it a point of honour to feed men, animals, guns and rifles in the fighting line as regularly as if they were only out for manœuvres on Salisbury Plain.

I desire, therefore, to record my admiration for the cool courage and unflinching efficiency with which the Royal Navy, the beach personnel, the

engineers and the administrative services have carried out these arduous duties.

In addition to its normal duties the Signal Service, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold, Director of Army Signals, has provided the connecting link between the Royal Navy and the Army in their combined operations, and has rapidly readjusted itself to amphibious methods. All demands made on it by sudden expansion of the fighting forces or by the movements of General Headquarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The working of the telegraphs, telephones and repair of lines, often under heavy fire, has been beyond praise. Casualties have been unusually high, but the best traditions of the Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole of their work. As an instance, the central telegraph office at Cape Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high explosive shell. The officer on duty and 12 other ranks were killed or wounded and the office entirely demolished. But No. 72003 Corporal G. A. Walker, Royal Engineers, although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within 39 minutes reopened communication by apologising for the incident and by saying he required no assistance.

The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual and very trying conditions. There are no roads, and the wounded who are unable to walk must be carried from the firing line to the shore. They and their attendants may be shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches, on the jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their way out in lighters to the hospital ships. Under shell fire it is not as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imagine to keep all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I can only express my own opinion that efficiency, method and even a certain quiet heroism have characterised the evacuations of the many thousands of our wounded.

In my three Commanders of Corps I have indeed been thrice fortunate.

General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger and of calm in

crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has earned their affection and respect.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the soul of Anzac. Not for one single day has he ever quitted his post. Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each 24 inspiring the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is known to his Chief.

Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter Weston possesses a genius for war. I know no more resolute Commander. Calls for reinforcements, appeals based on exhaustion or upon imminent counter-attack are powerless to divert him from his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be responsible for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that wisdom which comes from close study in peace combined with long experience in the field.

In my first despatch I tried to express my indebtedness to Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again, however inadequately, place on record the untiring, loyal assistance he has continued to render me ever since.

The thanks of every one serving in the Peninsula are due to Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell. All the resources of Egypt and all of his own remarkable administrative abilities have been ungrudgingly placed at our disposal.

Finally, if my despatch is in any way to reflect the feelings of the force, I must refer to the shadow cast over the whole of our adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and true-hearted comrades. Some of them we shall never see again; some have had the mark of the Dardanelles set upon them for life, but others, and, thank God, by far the greater proportion, will be back in due course at the front.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

IAN HAMILTON,

*General, Commanding Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force.*

DESPATCH OF SIR IAN HAMILTON, 11th DECEMBER, 1915.

*From the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
To the Secretary of State for War, War Office,
London, S.W.*

1, HYDE PARK GARDENS,
LONDON, W.

11th December, 1915.

MY LORD,—

For the understanding of the operations about to be described I must first set forth the situation as it appeared to me early in July.

The three days' battle of the 6th–8th May had shown that neither of my forces, northern or southern, were strong enough to fight their way to the Narrows. On the 10th of May I had cabled asking that two fresh divisions might be sent me to enable me to press on and so prevent my attack degenerating into trench warfare. On the 17th of May I again cabled, saying that if we were going to be left to face Turkey on our own resources we should require two Army Corps additional to my existing forces at the Dardanelles. The 52nd (Lowland) Division had been sent me, but between their dates of despatch and arrival Russia had given up the idea of co-operating from the coast of the Black Sea. Thereby several Turkish divisions were set free for the Dardanelles, and the battle of the 4th June, locally successful as it was, found us just as weak, relatively, as we had been a month earlier.

During June Your Lordship became persuaded of the bearing of these facts, and I was promised three regular divisions plus the infantry of two Territorial divisions. The advance guard of these troops was due to reach Mudros by the 10th of July; by the 10th of August their concentration was to be complete.

Eliminating the impracticable, I had already narrowed down the methods of employing these fresh forces to one of the following four:—

- (a) Every man to be thrown on to the southern sector of the Peninsula to force a way forward to the Narrows.
- (b) Disembarkation on the Asiatic side of the Straits, followed by a march on Chanak.
- (c) A landing at Enos or Ebrije for the purpose of seizing the neck of the isthmus at Bulair.
- (d) Reinforcement of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, combined with a landing in Suvla Bay. Then with one strong push to capture Hill 305, and, working from that dominating point, to grip the waist of the Peninsula.

As to (a) I rejected that course—

(1) Because there were limits to the numbers which could be landed and employed in one confined area.

(2) Because the capture of Krithia could no longer be counted upon to give us Achi Baba, an entirely new system of works having lately appeared upon the slopes of that mountain—works so

planned that even if the enemy's western flank was turned and driven back from the coast the central and eastern portions of the mountain could still be maintained as a bastion to Kilid Bahr.

(3) Because, if I tried to disengage myself both from Krithia and Achi Baba by landing due west of Kilid Bahr, my troops would be exposed to artillery fire from Achi Baba, the Olive Grove, and Kilid Bahr itself; the enemy's large reserves were too handy; there were not fair chances of success.

As to (b), although much of the Asiatic coast had now been wired and entrenched, the project was still attractive. Thereby the Turkish forces on the Peninsula would be weakened; our beaches at Cape Helles would be freed from Asiatic shells; the threat to the enemy's sea communications was obvious. But when I descended into detail I found that the expected reinforcements would not run to a double operation. I mean that, unless I could make a thorough, whole-hearted attack on the enemy in the Peninsula I should reap no advantage in that theatre from the transference of the Turkish Peninsula troops to reinforce Asia, whereas, if the British forces landed in Asia were not strong enough in themselves seriously to threaten Chanak, the Turks for their part would not seriously relax their grip upon the Peninsula.

To cut the land communications of the whole of the Turkish Peninsula army, as in (c), was a better scheme on paper than on the spot. The naval objections appeared to my coadjutor, Vice-Admiral de Robeck, well-nigh insurmountable. Already, owing to submarine dangers, all reinforcements, ammunition and supplies had to be brought up from Mudros to Helles or Anzac by night in fleet-sweepers and trawlers. A new landing near Bulair would have added another 50 miles to the course such small craft must cover, thus placing too severe a strain upon the capacities of the flotilla. The landing promised special hazards owing to the difficulty of securing the transports and covering ships from submarine attack. Ibrije has a bad beach, and the distance to Enos, the only point suitable to a disembarkation on a large scale, was so great that the enemy would have had time to organise a formidable opposition from his garrisons in Thrace. Four divisions at least would be required to overcome such opposition. These might now be found; but, even so, and presupposing every other obstacle overcome, it was by no manner of means certain that the Turkish army on the Peninsula would thereby be brought to sue for terms, or that the Narrows would thereby be opened to the Fleet. The enemy would still be able to work supplies across the Straits from Chanak. The swiftness of the current, the shallow draft of the Turkish lighters, the guns of the forts, made it too difficult even for our dauntless submarine commanders to paralyse movements across these land-locked waters. To achieve that purpose I must bring my artillery fire to bear both on the land and water communications of the enemy.

This brings me to (d), the storming of that dominating height, Hill 305, with the capture of Maidos and Gaba Tepe as its sequel.

From the very first I had hoped that by landing a force under the heights of Sari Bair we should be able to strangle the Turkish communications to the southwards, whether by land or sea, and so clear the Narrows for the Fleet. Owing to the enemy's superiority, both in numbers and in position; owing to under-estimates of the strength of the original entrenchments prepared and sited under German direction; owing to the constant dwindling of the units of my force through wastage; owing also to the intricacy and difficulty of the terrain, these hopes had not hitherto borne fruit. But they were well founded. So much at least had clearly enough been demonstrated by the desperate and costly nature of the Turkish attacks. The Australians and New Zealanders had rooted themselves in very near to the vitals of the enemy. By their tenacity and courage they still held open the doorway from which one strong thrust forward might give us command of the Narrows.

From the naval point of view the auspices were also favourable. Suvla Bay was but one mile further from Mudros than Anzac, and its possession would ensure us a submarine-proof base and a harbour good against gales, excepting those from the south-west. There were, as might be expected, some special difficulties to be overcome. The broken, intricate country—the lack of water—the consequent anxious supply questions. Of these it can only be said that a bad country is better than an entrenched country, and that supply and water problems may be countered by careful preparation.

Before a man of the reinforcements had arrived my mind was made up as to their employment, and by means of a vigorous offensive from Anzac, combined with a surprise landing to the north of it, I meant to try and win through to Maidos, leaving behind me a well-protected line of communications starting from the bay of Suvla.

Another point which had to be fixed in advance was the date. The new troops would gain in fighting value if they could first be given a turn in the trenches. So much was clear. But the relief of the troops already holding those trenches would have been a long and difficult task for the Navy, and time was everything, seeing that everywhere the enemy was digging in as fast as he possibly could dig. Also, where large numbers of troops were to be smuggled into Anzac and another large force was to land by surprise at Suvla, it was essential to eliminate the moon. Unless the plunge could be taken by the second week in August the whole venture must be postponed for a month. The dangers of such delay were clear. To realise them I had only to consider how notably my prospects would have been bettered had these same reinforcements arrived in time to enable me to anticipate the moon of July.

Place and date having shaped themselves, the intervening period had to be filled in with as much fighting as possible. First, to gain ground; secondly, to maintain the moral ascendancy which my troops had by this time established; thirdly, to keep the enemy's eyes fixed rather upon Helles than Anzac.

Working out my ammunition allowance, I found I could accumulate just enough high explosive shell to enable me to deliver one serious attack per each period of three weeks. I was thus limited to a single effort on the large scale, plus a prescribed unceasing offensive routine, with bombing, sniping and mining as its methods.

The action of the 12th and 13th of July was meant to be a sequel to the action of the 28th June. That advance had driven back the Turkish right on to their second main system of defence just south of Krithia. But, on my centre and right, the enemy still held their forward system of trenches, and it was my intention on the 12th July to seize the remaining trenches of this foremost system from the sea at the mouth of the Kereves Dere to the main Sedd-el-Bahr—Krithia road, along a front of some 2,000 yards.

On our right the attack was to be entrusted to the French Corps; on the right centre to the 52nd (Lowland) Division. On the 52nd Division's front the operation was planned to take place in two phases: our right was to attack in the morning, our left in the afternoon. Diversions by the 29th Division on the left of the southern section and at Anzac were to take place on the same day, so as to prevent the enemy's reserves from reinforcing the real point of attack.

At 7.35 a.m., after a heavy bombardment, the troops, French and Scottish, dashed out of their trenches and at once captured two lines of enemy trenches. Pushing forward with fine *elan* the 1st Division of the French Corps completed the task assigned to it by carrying the whole of the Turkish forward system of works, namely, the line of trenches skirting the lower part of the Kereves Dere. Further to the left the 2nd French Division and our 155th Brigade maintained the two lines of trenches they had gained. But on the left of the 155th Brigade the 4th Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers, pressed on too eagerly. They not only carried the third line of trenches, but charged on up the hill and beyond the third line, then advanced indeed until they came under the "feu de barrage" of the French artillery. Nothing could live under so cruel a cross fire from friend and foe, so the King's Own Scottish Borderers were forced to fall back with heavy losses to the second line of enemy trenches which they had captured in their first rush.

During this fighting telephone wires from forward positions were cut by enemy's shell fire, and here and there in the elaborate network of trenches numbers of Turks were desperately resisting to the last. Thus though the second line of captured trenches continued to be held as a whole, much confused fighting ensued; there were retirements in parts of the line, reserves were rapidly being used up, and generally the situation was anxious and uncertain. But the best way of clearing it up seemed to be to deliver the second phase of the attack by the 157th Brigade just as it had originally been arranged. Accordingly, after a preliminary bombardment, the 157th Brigade rushed forward under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and splendidly carried the whole of the enemy trenches allotted as their objective. Here, then, our line had advanced some 400 yards, while the 155th Brigade and the 2nd French Division had advanced between 200 and 300 yards.

At 6 p.m. the 52nd Division was ordered to make the line good ; it seemed to be fairly in our grasp.

All night long determined counter-attacks, one after another, were repulsed by the French and the 155th Brigade, but about 7.30 a.m. the right of the 157th Brigade gave way before a party of bombers, and our grip upon the enemy began to weaken.

I therefore decided that three battalions of the Royal Naval Division should reinforce a fresh attack to be made that afternoon, 13th July, on such portions of our original objectives as remained in the enemy's hands. This second attack was a success. The 1st French Division pushed their right down to the mouth of the Kereves Derc ; the 2nd French Division attacked the trenches they had failed to take on the preceding day ; the Nelson Battalion, on the left of the Royal Naval Division attack, valiantly advanced and made good, well supported by the artillery of the French. The Portsmouth Battalion, pressing on too far, fell into precisely the same error at precisely the same spot as did the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers on the 12th, an over-impetuosity which cost them heavy losses.

The 1/5th Royal Scots Fusiliers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Pollok-McCall ; the 1/7th Royal Scots, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Peebles ; the 1/5th King's Own Scottish Borderers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Millar ; and the 1/6th Highland Light Infantry, commanded by Major J. Anderson, are mentioned as having specially distinguished themselves in this engagement.

Generally, the upshot of the attack was this. On our right and on the French left two lines had been captured, but in neither case was the third, or last, line of the system in their hands. Elsewhere a fine feat of arms had been accomplished, and a solid and enduring advance had been achieved, giving us far the best sited line for defence with much the best field for machine-gun and rifle fire we had hitherto obtained upon the Peninsula.

A machine-gun and 200 prisoners were captured by the French ; the British took a machine-gun and 329 prisoners. The casualties in the French Corps were not heavy, though it is with sorrow that I have to report the mortal wound of General Masnou, commanding the 1st Division. Our own casualties were a little over 3,000 ; those of the enemy about 5,000.

On 17th July Lieutenant-General Hunter Weston, commanding the 8th Corps, left the Peninsula for a few days' rest, and, to my very deep regret, was subsequently invalided home. I have already drawn attention to his invincible self-confidence ; untiring energy and trained ability.

As I was anxious to give the Commander of the new troops all the local experience possible I appointed Lieutenant-General Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford, whose own Corps were now assembling at Mudros, temporarily to succeed Lieutenant-General Hunter Weston, but on July 24th, when General Stopford had to set to work with his own Corps, Major-General W. Douglas, General Officer Commanding 42nd Division, took over temporary command of the 8th Corps ; while Major-General W. R. Marshall, General Officer Commanding 87th Brigade, assumed temporary command of the 42nd Division.

Only one other action need be mentioned before coming to the big operations of August. On the extreme right of Anzac the flank of a work called Tasmania Post was threatened by the extension of a Turkish trench. The task of capturing this trench was entrusted to the 3rd Australian Brigade. After an artillery bombardment, mines were to be fired, whereupon four columns of 50 men each were to assault and occupy specified lengths of the trench. The regiment supplying the assaulting columns was the 11th Australian Infantry Battalion.

At 10.15 p.m. on 31st July the bombardment was opened. Ten minutes later and the mines were duly fired. The four assaulting parties dashed forward at once, crossed our own barbed wire on planks, and were into the craters before the whole of the débris had fallen. Total casualties : 11 killed and 74 wounded ; Turkish killed, 100.

By the time this action was fought a large proportion of my reinforcements had arrived, and, on the same principle which induced me to put General Stopford in temporary command at Helles, I relieved the war-worn 29th Division at the same place by the 13th Division under Major-General Shaw. The experiences here gained, in looking after themselves, in forgetting the thousand and one details of peace soldiering and in grasping the two or three elementary rules of conduct in war soldiering, were, it turned out, to be of priceless advantage to the 13th Division throughout the heavy fighting of the following month.

And now it was time to determine a date for the great venture. The moon would rise on the morning of the 7th at about 2 a.m. A day or two previously the last reinforcements, the 53rd and 54th Divisions, were due to arrive. The first day of the attack was fixed for the 6th of August.

Once the date was decided a certain amount of ingenuity had to be called into play so as to divert the attention of the enemy from my main strategical conception. This—I repeat for the sake of clearness—was :—

(1) To break out with a rush from Anzac and cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from land communication with Constantinople.

(2) To gain such a command for my artillery as to cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from sea traffic whether with Constantinople or with Asia.

(3) Incidentally, to secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for Anzac and all the troops operating in the northern theatre.

My schemes for hoodwinking the Turks fell under two heads : First, strategical diversions, meant to draw away enemy reserves not yet committed to the Peninsula. Secondly, tactical diversions meant to hold up enemy reserves already on the Peninsula. Under the first heading came a surprise landing by a force of 300 men on the northern shore of the Gulf of Xeros ; demonstrations by French ships opposite Mitylene along the Syrian coast ; concentration at Mitylene ; inspections at Mitylene by the Admiral and myself ; making to order of a whole set of maps of Asia in Egypt, as well as secret service work, most of which bore fruit. Amongst the tactical diversions were a big containing attack at Helles. Soundings, registration of guns, etc., by Monitors between

Gaba Tepe and Kum Tepe. An attack to be carried out by Anzac on Lone Pine trenches, which lay in front of their right wing and as far distant as the local terrain would admit from the scene of the real battle. Thanks entirely to the reality and vigour which the Navy and the troops threw into them, each one of these ruses was, it so turned out, entirely successful, with the result that the Turks, despite their excellent spy system, were caught completely off their guard at dawn on the 7th of August.

Having settled upon the manner and time of the diversions, orders had to be issued for the main operation. And here I must pause a moment to draw your Lordship's attention to the extraordinary complexity of the staff work caused by the unique distribution of my forces. Within the narrow confines of the positions I held on the Peninsula it was impossible to concentrate even as much as one-third of the fresh troops about to be launched to the attack. Nor could Mudros and Imbros combined absorb the whole of the remainder. The strategic concentration which precedes a normal battle had in my case to be a very wide dispersion. Thus of the forces destined for my offensive, on the day before the battle, part were at Anzac, part at Imbros, part at Mudros, and part at Mitylene. These last three detachments were separated respectively by 14, 60 and 120 miles of sea from the arena into which they were simultaneously to appear. To ensure the punctual arrival of all these masses of inexperienced troops at the right moment and spot, together with their material, munitions, stores, supplies, water, animals and vehicles, was a prodigious undertaking demanding not only competence, but self-confidence; and I will say for my General Staff that I believe the clearness and completeness of their orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter be studied as models in military academies. The need for economy in sea transport, the awkwardness and restriction of open beaches, the impossibility of landing guns, animals or vehicles rapidly—all these made it essential to create a special, separate organisation for every single unit taking part in the adventure. A pack mule corps to supply 80,000 men had also to be organised for that specific purpose until such time as other transport could be landed.

As to water, that element of itself was responsible for a whole chapter of preparations. An enormous quantity had to be collected secretly, and as secretly stowed away at Anzac, where a high-level reservoir had to be built, having a holding capacity of 30,000 gallons, and fitted out with a regular system of pipes and distribution tanks. A stationary engine was brought over from Egypt to fill that reservoir. Petroleum tins, with a carrying capacity of 80,000 gallons, were got together, and fixed up with handles, etc., but the collision of the "Moorgate" with another vessel delayed the arrival of large numbers of these just as a breakdown in the stationary engine upset for a while the well-laid plan of the high-level reservoir. But Anzac was ever resourceful in face of misadventures, and when the inevitable accidents arose it was not with folded hands that they were met.

Turning to Suvla Bay, it was believed that good wells and springs existed both in the Biyuk Ana-

farta Valley and in Suvla Plain. But nothing so vital could possibly be left to hearsay, and although, as it turned out, our information was perfectly correct, yet the War Office were asked to despatch with each reinforcing division water receptacles for pack transport at the rate of half a gallon per man.

The sheet-anchor on which hung the whole of these elaborate schemes was the Navy. One tiny flaw in the perfect mutual trust and confidence animating the two services would have wrecked the whole enterprise. Experts at a distance may have guessed as much; it was self-evident to the rawest private on the spot. But with men like Vice-Admiral de Robeck, Commodore Roger Keyes, Rear-Admiral Christain and Captain F. H. Mitchell at our backs, we soldiers were secured against any such risk, and it will be seen how perfect was the precision the sailors put into their job.

The hour was now approaching, and I waited for it with as much confidence as is possible when to the inevitable uncertainties of war are to be added those of the weather. Apart from feints, the first blow was to be dealt in the southern zone.

In that theatre I had my own Poste de Commandement. But upon the 6th of August attacks in the south were only to form a subsidiary part of one great concerted attack. Anzac was to deliver the knock-down blow; Helles and Suvla were complementary operations. Were I to commit myself at the outset to any one of these three theatres I must lose my sense of proportion. Worse, there being no lateral communication between them, as soon as I landed at one I was cut off from present touch with both of the others. At Imbros I was 45 minutes from Helles, 40 minutes from Anzac, and 50 minutes from Suvla. Imbros was the centre of the cable system, and thence I could follow each phase of the triple attack and be ready with my two divisions of reserve to throw in reinforcements where they seemed most to be required. Therefore I decided to follow the opening moves from General Headquarters.

At Helles the attack of the 6th was directed against 1,200 yards of the Turkish front opposite our own right and right centre, and was to be carried out by the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division. Two small Turkish trenches enfilading the main advance had, if possible, to be captured simultaneously, an affair which was entrusted to the 42nd Division.

After bombardment the infantry assaulted at 3.50 p.m. On the left large sections of the enemy's line were carried, but on our centre and right the Turks were encountered in masses, and the attack, pluckily and perseveringly as it was pressed, never had any real success. The 1st Battalion, Essex Regiment, in particular forced their way into the crowded enemy trench opposite them, despite the most determined resistance, but, once in, were subjected to the heaviest musketry fire from both flanks, as well as in reverse, and were shattered by showers of bombs. Two separate resolute attacks were made by the 42nd Division, but both of them recoiled in face of the unexpected volume of fire developed by the Turks.

After dark officer's patrols were sent up to ascertain the exact position of affairs. Heavy Turkish counter-attacks were being pressed against such portions of the line we still retained. Many of our

men fought it out where they stood to the last, but by nightfall none of the enemy's line remained in our possession.

Our set-back was in no wise the fault of the troops. That ardour which only dashed itself to pieces against the enemy's strong entrenchments and numerous, stubborn defenders on the 6th of August would, a month earlier, have achieved notable success. Such was the opinion of all. But the *moral*, as well as the strength of the Turks, had had time to rise to great heights since our last serious encounters with them on the 21st and 28th of June and on the 12th of July. On those dates all ranks had felt, as an army feels, instinctively, yet with certitude, that they had fairly got the upper hand of the enemy, and that, given the wherewithal, they could have gone on steadily advancing. Now that self-same, half-beaten enemy were again making as stout a resistance as they had offered us at our original landing!

For this recovery of the Turks there were three reasons: one moral, one material, and one fortuitous.

(1) The news of the Russian reverses had come to hand and had been advertised to us on posters from the Turkish trenches long before we heard anything about them from home.

(2) Two new divisions had come down south to Helles to replace those we had most severely handled.

(3) The enemy trenches selected for our attack were found to be packed with troops and so were their communication trenches, the reason being, as explained to us by prisoners, that the Turkish Commander had meant to launch from them an attack upon us. We had, in fact, by a coincidence as strange as it was unlucky, anticipated a Turkish offensive by an hour or two at most!

Sure enough, next morning, the enemy in their turn attacked the left of the line from which our own troops had advanced to the assault. A few of them gained a footing in our trenches and were all killed or captured. The remainder were driven back by fire.

As the aim of my action in this southern zone was to advance if I could, but in any case to contain the enemy and prevent him reinforcing to the northwards, I persevered on the 7th with my plans, notwithstanding the counter-attack of the Turks which was actually in progress. My objective this time was a double line of Turkish trenches on a front of about 800 yards between the Mal Tepe Dere and the west branch of the Kanli Dere. After a preliminary bombardment the troops of the 125th Brigade on the right and the 129th on the left made the assault at 9.40 a.m. From the outset it was evident that the enemy were full of fight and in great force, and that success would only be gained after a severe struggle. On the right and on the centre the first enemy line was captured, and small parties pushed on to the second line, where they were unable to maintain themselves for long. On the left but little ground was gained, and by 11 a.m. what little had been taken had been relinquished. But in the centre a stiff battle raged all day up and down a vineyard some 200 yards long by 100 yards broad on the west of the Krithia road. A large portion of the vineyard had been captured in the first dash, and the East Lancashire men in this part of the field

gallantly stood their ground here against a succession of vigorous counter-attacks. The enemy suffered very severely in these counter-attacks, which were launched in strength and at short intervals. Both our Brigades had also lost heavily during the advance and in repelling the fierce onslaughts of the enemy, but, owing to the fine endurance of the 6th and 7th Battalions of the Lancashire Fusiliers, it was found possible to hold the vineyard through the night, and a massive column of the enemy which strove to overwhelm their thinned ranks was shattered to pieces in the attempt.

On 8th August Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Davies took over command of the 8th Army Corps, and Major-General W. Douglas reverted to the command of the 42nd Division. For two more days his troops were called upon to show their qualities of vigilance and power of determined resistance, for the enemy had by no means yet lost hope of wresting from us the ground we had won in the vineyard. This unceasing struggle was a supreme test for battalions already exhausted by 48 hours' desperate fighting and weakened by the loss of so many good leaders and men; but the peculiar grit of the Lancastrians was equal to the strain, and they did not fail. Two specially furious counter-attacks were delivered by the Turks on the 8th August, one at 4.40 a.m. and another at 8.30 p.m., where again our bayonets were too much for them. Throughout the night they made continuous bomb attacks, but the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers and the 4th East Lancashire Regiment stuck gamely to their task at the eastern corner of the vineyard. There was desperate fighting also at the northern corner, where the personal bravery of Lieutenant W. T. Forshaw, 1/9th Manchester Regiment who stuck to his post after his detachment had been relieved (an act for which he has since been awarded the V.C.), was largely instrumental in the repulse of three very determined onslaughts.

By the morning of the 9th August things were quieter, and the sorely tried troops were relieved. On the night of the 12th/13th the enemy made one more sudden, desperate dash for their vineyard—and got it! But, on the 13th, our bombers took the matter in hand. The Turks were finally driven out; the new fire trenches were wired and loop-holed, and have since become part of our line.

These two attacks had served their main purpose. If the local successes were not all that had been hoped for, yet a useful advance had been achieved, and not only had they given a fresh, hard fighting enemy more than he had bargained for, but they had actually drawn down Turkish reinforcements to their area. And how can a Commander say enough for the troops who, aware that their task was only a subsidiary one, fought with just as much vim and resolution as if they were storming the battlements of Constantinople.

I will now proceed to tell of the assault on Chunuk Bair by the forces under General Birdwood, and of the landing of the 9th Corps in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay. The entire details of the operations allotted to the troops to be employed in the Anzac area were formulated by Lieutenant-General Birdwood, subject only to my final approval. So excellently was this vital business worked out on the lines of the instructions

issued that I had no modifications to suggest, and all these local preparations were completed by August 6th in a way which reflects the greatest credit, not only on the Corps Commander and his staff, but also upon the troops themselves, who had to toil like slaves to accumulate food, drink and munitions of war. Alone the accommodation for the extra troops to be landed necessitated an immense amount of work in preparing new concealed bivouacs, in making interior communications, and in storing water and supplies, for I was determined to put on shore as many fighting men as our modest holding at Anzac could possibly accommodate or provision. All the work was done by Australian and New Zealand soldiers almost entirely by night, and the uncomplaining efforts of these much-tried troops in preparation are in a sense as much to their credit as their heroism in the battles that followed. Above all, the water problem caused anxiety to the Admiral, to Lieutenant-General Birdwood and to myself. The troops to advance from Suvla Bay across the Anafarta valley might reckon on finding some wells—it was certain, at least, that no water was waiting for us on the crests of the ridges of Sari Bair! Therefore, first, several days' supply had to be stocked into tanks along the beach and thence pumped up into other tanks half-way up the mountains; secondly, a system of mule transport had to be worked out, so that in so far as was humanly possible, thirst should not be allowed to overcome the troops after they had overcome the difficulties of the country and the resistance of the enemy.

On the nights of the 4th, 5th and 6th August the reinforcing troops were shipped into Anzac very silently at the darkest hours. Then, still silently, they were tucked away from enemy aeroplanes or observatories in their prepared hiding places. The whole sea route lay open to the view of the Turks upon Achi Baba's summit and Battleship Hill. Aeroplanes could count every tent and every ship at Mudros or at Imbros. Within rifle fire of Anzac's open beach hostile riflemen were looking out across the Ægean no more than 20 ft. from our opposing lines. Every modern appliance of telescope, telegraph, wireless was at the disposal of the enemy. Yet the instructions worked out at General Headquarters in the minutest detail (the result of conferences with the Royal Navy, which were attended by Brigadier-General Skeen, of General Birdwood's Staff) were such that the scheme was carried through without a hitch. The preparation of the ambush was treated as a simple matter by the services therein engaged, and yet I much doubt whether any more pregnant enterprise than this of landing so large a force under the very eyes of the enemy, and of keeping them concealed there three days, is recorded in the annals of war.

The troops now at the disposal of General Birdwood amounted in round numbers to 37,000 rifles and 72 guns, with naval support from two cruisers, four monitors and two destroyers. Under the scheme these troops were to be divided into two main portions. The task of holding the existing Anzac position, and of making frontal assaults therefrom, was assigned to the Australian Division (plus the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades and two battalions of the 40th Brigade); that of

assaulting the Chunuk Bair ridge was entrusted to the New Zealand and Australian Division (less the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades), to the 13th Division (less five battalions), and to the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and to the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade. The 29th Brigade of the 10th Division (less one battalion) and the 38th Brigade were held in reserve.

The most simple method of developing this complicated series of operations will be first to take the frontal attacks from the existing Anzac position, and afterwards to go on to the assault on the more distant ridges. During the 4th, 5th and 6th of August the works on the enemy's left and centre were subjected to a slow bombardment, and on the afternoon of the 6th August an assault was made upon the formidable Lone Pine entrenchment. Although, in its essence, a diversion to draw the enemy's attention and reserves from the grand attack impending upon his right, yet, in itself, Lone Pine was a distinct step on the way across to Maidos. It commanded one of the main sources of the Turkish water supply, and was a work, or, rather, a series of works, for the safety of which the enemy had always evinced a certain nervousness. The attack was designed to heighten this impression.

The work consisted of a strong *point d'appui* on the south-western end of a plateau, where it confronted, at distances varying from 60 to 120 yards, the salient in the line of our trenches named by us the Pimble. The entrenchment was evidently very strong; it was entangled with wire, and provided with overhead cover, and it was connected by numerous communication trenches with another *point d'appui* known as Johnston's Jolly on the north, as well as with two other works on the east and south. The frontage for attack amounted at most to some 220 yards, and the approaches lay open to heavy enfilade fire, both from the north and from the south.

The detailed scheme of attack was worked out with care and forethought by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding 1st Australian Division, and his thoroughness contributed, I consider, largely to the success of the enterprise.

The action commenced at 4.30 p.m. with a continuous and heavy bombardment of the Lone Pine and adjacent trenches, H.M.S. "Bacchante" assisting by searching the valleys to the north-east, and east, and the Monitors by shelling the enemy's batteries south of Gaba Tepe. The assault had been entrusted to the 1st Australian Brigade (Brigadier-General N. M. Smyth), and punctually at 5.30 p.m. it was carried out by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Australian Battalions, the 1st Battalion forming the Brigade reserve. Two lines left their trenches simultaneously, and were closely followed up by a third. The rush across the open was a regular race against death, which came in the shape of a hail of shell and rifle bullets from front and from either flank. But the Australians had firmly resolved to reach the enemy's trenches, and in this determination they became for the moment invincible. The barbed wire entanglement was reached and was surmounted. Then came a terrible moment, when it seemed as though it would be physically impossible to penetrate into the trenches. The overhead cover of stout pine beams resisted all individual efforts to move it, and the

loopholes continued to spit fire. Groups of our men then bodily lifted up the beams and individual soldiers leaped down into the semi-darkened galleries amongst the Turks. By 5.47 p.m. the 3rd and 4th Battalions were well into the enemy's vitals, and a few minutes later the reserves of the 2nd Battalion advanced over their parados, and driving out, killing or capturing the occupants, made good the whole of the trenches. The reserve companies of the 3rd and 4th Battalions followed, and at 6.20 p.m. the 1st Battalion (in reserve) was launched to consolidate the position.

At once the Turks made it plain, as they have never ceased to do since, that they had no intention of acquiescing in the capture of this capital work. At 7.0 p.m. a determined and violent counter-attack began, both from the north and from the south. Wave upon wave the enemy swept forward with the bayonet. Here and there a well-directed salvo of bombs emptied a section of a trench, but whenever this occurred the gap was quickly filled by the initiative of the officers and the gallantry of the men.

The enemy allowed small respite. At 1.30 that night the battle broke out afresh. Strong parties of Turks swarmed out of the communication trenches, preceded by showers of bombs. For seven hours these counter-attacks continued. All this time consolidation was being attempted, although the presence of so many Turkish prisoners hampered movement and constituted an actual danger. In beating off these desperate counter-attacks very heavy casualties were suffered by the Australians. Part of the 12th Battalion, the reserve of the 3rd Brigade, had therefore to be thrown into the *mêlée*.

Twelve hours later, at 1.30 p.m. on the 7th, another effort was made by the enemy, lasting uninterruptedly at closest quarters till 5 p.m., then being resumed at midnight and proceeding intermittently till dawn. At an early period of this last counter-attack the 4th Battalion were forced by bombs to relinquish portion of a trench, but later on, led by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel McNaghten, they killed every Turk who had got in.

During the 8th of August advantage was taken of every cessation in the enemy's bombing to consolidate. The 2nd Battalion, which had lost its commanding officer and suffered especially severely, was withdrawn and replaced by the 7th Battalion, the reserve to the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

At 5 a.m. on 9th August the enemy made a sudden attempt to storm from the east and south-east after a feint of fire attack from the north. The 7th Battalion bore the brunt of the shock, and handled the attack so vigorously that by 7.45 a.m. there were clear signs of demoralisation in the enemy's ranks. But, although this marked the end of counter-attacks on the large scale, the bombing and sniping continued, though in less volume, throughout this day and night, and lasted till 12th August, when it at last became manifest that we had gained complete ascendancy. During the final grand assault our losses from artillery fire were large, and ever since the work has passed into our hands it has been a favourite daily and nightly mark for heavy shells and bombs.

Thus was Lone Pine taken and held. The Turks were in great force and very full of fight, yet one

weak Australian brigade, numbering at the outset but 2,000 rifles, and supported only by two weak battalions, carried the work under the eyes of a whole enemy division, and maintained their grip upon it like a vice during six days' successive counter-attacks. High praise is due to Brigadier-General N. M. Smyth and to his battalion commanders. The irresistible dash and daring of officers and men in the initial charge were a glory to Australia. The stout-heartedness with which they clung to the captured ground in spite of fatigue, severe losses, and the continual strain of shell fire and bomb attacks may seem less striking to the civilian; it is even more admirable to the soldier. From start to finish the artillery support was untiring and vigilant. Owing to the rapid, accurate fire of the 2nd New Zealand Battery, under Major Sykes, several of the Turkish onslaughts were altogether defeated in their attempts to get to grips with the Australians. Not a chance was lost by these gunners, although time and again the enemy's artillery made direct hits on their shields. The hand-to-hand fighting in the semi-obscurity of the trenches was prolonged and very bitterly contested. In one corner eight Turks and six Australians were found lying as they had bayoneted one another. To make room for the fighting men the dead were ranged in rows on either side of the gangway. After the first violence of the counter-attacks had abated, 1,000 corpses—our own and Turkish—were dragged out from the trenches.

For the severity of our own casualties some partial consolation may be found in the facts, first, that those of the enemy were much heavier, our guns and machine-guns having taken toll of them as they advanced in mass formation along the reverse slopes; secondly, that the Lone Pine attack drew all the local enemy reserves towards it, and may be held, more than any other cause, to have been the reason that the Suvla Bay landing was so lightly opposed, and that comparatively few of the enemy were available at first to reinforce against our attack on Sari Bair. Our captures in this feat of arms amounted to 134 prisoners, seven machine-guns and a large quantity of ammunition and equipment.

Other frontal attacks from the existing Anzac positions were not so fortunate. They fulfilled their object in so far as they prevented the enemy from reinforcing against the attack upon the high ridges, but they failed to make good any ground. Taken in sequence of time, they included an attack upon the work known as German Officer's Trench, on the extreme right of our line, at midnight on August 6th-7th, also assaults on the Nek and Baby 700 trenches opposite the centre of our line, delivered at 4.30 a.m. on the 7th. The 2nd Australian Brigade did all that men could do; the 8th Light Horse only accepted their repulse after losing three-fourths of that devoted band who so bravely sallied forth from Russell's Top. Some of the works were carried, but in these cases the enemy's concealed machine-guns made it impossible to hold on. But all that day, as the result of these most gallant attacks, Turkish reserves on Battleship Hill were being held back to meet any dangerous development along the front of the old Anzac line, and so were not available to meet our main enterprise, which I will now endeavour to describe.

The first step in the real push—the step which above all others was to count—was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair ridge. The crest line of this lofty mountain range runs parallel to the sea, dominating the underfeatures contained within the Anzac position, although these fortunately defilade the actual landing-place. From the main ridge a series of spurs run down towards the level beach, and are separated from one another by deep, jagged gullies choked up with dense jungle. Two of these leading up to Chunuk Bair are called Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere; another deep ravine runs up to Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 305), the topmost peak of the whole ridge, and is called the Aghyl Dere.

It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success.

1. The right covering force was to seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere ravines. If this enterprise succeeded it would open up the ravines for the assaulting columns, whilst at the same time interposing between the right flank of the left covering force and the enemy holding the Sari Bair main ridge.

2. The left covering force was to march northwards along the beach to seize a hill called Damajelik Bair, some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. If successful it would be able to hold out a hand to the 9th Corps as it landed south of Nibrunesi Point, whilst at the same time protecting the left flank of the left assaulting column against enemy troops from the Anafarta valley during its climb up the Aghyl Dere ravine.

3. The right assaulting column was to move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines to the storm of the ridge of Chunuk Bair.

4. The left assaulting column was to work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe), the summit of the whole range of hills.

To recapitulate, the two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damajelik Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the 9th Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sari Bair from any forces of the enemy which might be assembled in the Anafarta valley.

The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division. The two covering and the two assaulting columns were organized as follows:—

Right Covering Column, under Brigadier-General A. H. Russell.—New Zealand Mounted Rifles

Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.

Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

Left Covering Column, under Brigadier-General J. H. Travers.—Headquarters 40th Brigade, half the 72nd Field Company, 4th Battalion, South Wales Borderers, and 5th Battalion, Wiltshire Regiment.

Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox.—29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

Divisional Reserve.—6th Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment, and 8th Battalion, Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the 39th Infantry Brigade and half 72nd Field Company at Aghyl Dere.

The right covering column, it will be remembered, had to gain command of the Sazli Beit Dere and the Aghyl Dere ravines, so as to let the assaulting column arrive intact within striking distance of the Chunuk Bair ridge. To achieve this object it had to clear the Turks off from their right flank positions upon Old No. 3 Post and Table Top.

Old No. 3 Post, connected with Table Top by a razor back, formed the apex of a triangular piece of hill sloping gradually down to our No. 2 and No. 3 outposts. Since its recapture from us by the Turks on 30th May working parties had done their best with unstinted material to convert this commanding point into an impregnable redoubt. Two lines of fire trench, very heavily entangled, protected its southern face—the only one accessible to us—and, with its head cover of solid timber baulks and its strongly revetted outworks, it dominated the approaches of both the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere.

Table Top is a steep sided, flat-topped hill, close on 400 feet above sea level. The sides of the hill are mostly sheer and quite impracticable, but here and there a ravine, choked with scrub, and under fire of enemy trenches, gives precarious foothold up the precipitous cliffs. The small plateau on the summit was honeycombed with trenches, which were connected by a communication alley with that underfeature of Sari Bair, known as Rhododendron Spur.

Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S. "Colne," had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at 9 p.m., H.M.S. "Colne" threw the beam of her searchlight on to the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly 10 minutes. Then, after a 10 minutes' interval, came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9.20 and ending precisely at 9.30 p.m.

The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the enemy would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until the shelling was at an end. But on the eventful night of the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud cannonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes a searchlight's beam—came the right covering

column. At 9.30 the light switched off, and instantly our men poured out of the scrub jungle and into the empty redoubt. By 11 p.m. the whole series of surrounding entrenchments were ours!

Once the capture of Old No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering column carried on with their attack upon Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 p.m. the northernmost point, with its machine-gun, was captured, and by 1 o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hill, a maze of ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of stormers found themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of unexampled height, depth and solidity, which completely closed the river bed—that is to say, the only practicable entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a strongly-held enemy trench running right across the opening of the Chailak Dere. Here that splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and their best, but in the end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah. Thus was the mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of the right assaulting column.

Simultaneously the attack on Table Top had been launched under cover of a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. "Colne." No General on peace manoeuvres would ask troops to attempt so break-neck an enterprise. The flanks of Table Top are so steep that the height gives an impression of a mushroom shape—of the summit bulging out over its stem. But just as faith moves mountains, so valour can carry them. The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent is recognised in our regulations as "impracticable for infantry." But neither Turks nor angles of ascent were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. There are moments during battle when life becomes intensified, when men become supermen, when the impossible becomes simple—and this was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only; magazines were empty by order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired. Some 150 prisoners were captured as well as many rifles and much equipment, ammunition and stores. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brigadier-General Russell and his men. There are exploits which must be seen to be realised.

The right assaulting column had entered the two southerly ravines—Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere—by midnight. At 1.30 a.m. began a hotly-contested fight for the trenches on the lower part of Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed steadily up the valley against the enemy.

The left covering column, under Brigadier-General Travers, after marching along the beach to No. 3 Outpost, resumed its northerly advance as soon as the attack on Bauchop's Hill had developed. Once the Chailak Dere was cleared the column moved by the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, disregarding the enfilade fire from sections of Bauchop's Hill still uncaptured. The rapid success of this movement was largely due to Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie, a very fine man, who commanded the advance guard consisting of his own regiment, the 4th South Wales Borderers, a corps worthy of such a leader. Every trench encountered was instantly rushed by the Borderers until, having reached the predetermined spot, the whole column was unhesitatingly launched at Damakjelik Bair. Several Turkish trenches were captured at the bayonet's point, and by 1.30 a.m. the whole of the hill was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole of the Anzac attack.

Here was an encouraging sample of what the New Army, under good auspices, could accomplish. Nothing more trying to inexperienced troops can be imagined than a long night march exposed to flanking fire, through a strange country, winding up at the end with a bayonet charge against a height, formless and still in the starlight, garrisoned by those spectres of the imagination, worst enemies of the soldier.

The left assaulting column crossed the Chailak Dere at 12.30 a.m., and entered the Aghyl Dere at the heels of the left covering column. The surprise, on this side, was complete. Two Turkish officers were caught in their pyjamas; enemy arms and ammunition were scattered in every direction.

The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations in cliff climbing even to officers and men who had graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night, the density of the scrub, hands and knees progress up the spurs, sheer physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated hair-breadth escapes from the hail of random bullets—all these combined to take the edge off the energies of our troops. At last, after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split up into two parts. The 4th Australian Brigade struggled, fighting hard as they went, up to the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere, making for Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade scrambled up the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the spurs north of it to the attack of a portion of the Sari Bair ridge known as Hill Q.

Dawn broke and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although, considering all things, the left assaulting column had made a marvellous advance. The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asma Dere (the next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere) and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade held the ridge west of the Farm below Chunuk Bair and along the spurs to the north-east. The enemy had been flung back from ridge to ridge; an excellent line for the renewal of the attack had been secured, and (except for the exhaustion of the troops) the auspices were propitious.

Turning to the right assaulting column, one battalion, the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, clambered slowly up the Sazli Beit Dere. The

remainder of the force, led by the Otago Battalion, wound their way amongst the pitfalls and forced their passage through the scrub of the Chailak Dere, where fierce opposition forced them ere long to deploy. Here, too, the hopeless country was the main hindrance, and it was not until 5.45 a.m. that the bulk of the column joined the Canterbury Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur. The whole force then moved up the spur, gaining touch with the left assaulting column by means of the 10th Gurkhas, in face of very heavy fire and frequent bayonet charges. Eventually they entrenched on the top of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile short of Chunuk Bair—i.e., of victory.

At seven a.m. the 5th and 6th Gurkhas, belonging to the left assaulting column, had approached the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, whilst, on their left, the 14th Sikhs had got into touch with the 4th Australian Brigade on the southern watershed of the Asma Dere. The 4th Australian Brigade now received orders to leave half a battalion to hold the spur, and, with the rest of its strength, plus the 14th Sikhs, to assault Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). But by this time the enemy's opposition had hardened, and his reserves were moving up from the direction of Battleship Hill. Artillery support was asked for and given, yet by 9 a.m. the attack of the right assaulting column on Chunuk Bair was checked, and any idea of a further advance on Koja Chemen Tepe had to be, for the moment, suspended. The most that could be done was to hold fast to the Asmak Dere watershed whilst attacking the ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, an attack to be supported by a fresh assault launched against Chunuk Bair itself.

At 9.30 a.m. the two assaulting columns pressed forward whilst our guns pounded the enemy moving along the Battleship Hill spurs. But in spite of all their efforts their increasing exhaustion as opposed to the gathering strength of the enemy's fresh troops began to tell—they had shot their bolt. So all day they clung to what they had captured and strove to make ready for the night. At 11 a.m. three battalions of the 39th Infantry Brigade were sent up from the general reserve to be at hand when needed, and, at the same hour, one more battalion of the reserve was dispatched to the 1st Australian Division to meet the drain caused by all the desperate Lone Pine fighting.

By the afternoon the position of the two assaulting columns was unchanged. The right covering force were in occupation of Table Top, Old No. 3 Post and Bauchop Hill, which General Russell had been ordered to maintain with two regiments of Mounted Rifles, so that he might have two other regiments and the Maori Contingent available to move as required. The left covering force held Damakjelik Bair. The forces which had attacked along the front of the original Anzac line were back again in their own trenches. The Lone Pine work was being furiously disputed. All had suffered heavily and all were very tired.

So ended the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair ridge. Our aims had not fully been attained, and the help we had hoped for from Suvla had not been forthcoming. Yet I fully endorse the words of General Birdwood when he

says: "The troops had performed a feat which is without parallel."

Great kudos is due to Major-Generals Godley and Shaw for their arrangements; to Generals Russell, Johnston, Cox, and Travers for their leading; but most of all, as every one of these officers will gladly admit, to the rank and file for their fighting. Nor may I omit to add that the true destroyer spirit with which H.M.S. "Colne" (Commander Claude Seymour, R.N.) and H.M.S. "Chelmer" (Commander Hugh T. England, R.N.) backed us up will live in the grateful memories of the Army.

In the course of this afternoon (7th August) reconnaissances of Sari Bair were carried out and the troops were got into shape for a fresh advance in three columns, to take place in the early morning.

The columns were composed as follows:—

Right Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand Infantry Brigade, two battalions. 13th Division, and the Maori Contingent.

Centre and Left Columns.—Major-General H. V. Cox.—21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Infantry Brigade (less one battalion), with 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

The right column was to climb up the Chunuk Bair ridge; the left column was to make for the prolongation of the ridge north-east to Koja Chemen Tepe, the topmost peak of the range.

The attack was timed for 4.15 a.m. At the first faint glimmer of dawn observers saw figures moving against the sky-line of Chunuk Bair. Were they our own men, or were they Turks? Telescopes were anxiously adjusted; the light grew stronger; men were seen climbing up from our side of the ridge; they were our own fellows—the topmost summit was ours!

On the right General Johnston's column, headed by the Wellington Battalion and supported by the 7th Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the 8th Welsh Pioneers, and the Maori Contingent, the whole most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Malone, had raced one another up the steep. Nothing could check them. On they went, until, with a last determined rush, they fixed themselves firmly on the south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height of Chunuk Bair. With deep regret I have to add that the brave Lieutenant-Colonel Malone fell mortally wounded as he was marking out the line to be held. The 7th Gloucesters suffered terrible losses here. The fire was so hot that they never got a chance to dig their trenches deeper than some six inches, and there they had to withstand attack after attack. In the course of these fights every single officer, company serjeant-major, or company quartermaster-serjeant, was either killed or wounded, and the battalion by midday consisted of small groups of men commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or privates. Chapter and verse may be quoted for the view that the rank-and-file of an army cannot long endure the strain of close hand-to-hand fighting unless they are given confidence by the example of good officers. Yet here is at

least one instance where a battalion of the New Army fought right on, from midday till sunset, without *any* officers.

In the centre the 39th Infantry Brigade and the 29th Indian Brigade moved along the gullies leading up to the Sari Bair ridge—the right moving south of the Farm on Chunuk Bair, the left up the spurs to the north-east of the Farm against a portion of the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, and the col to the north of it. So murderous was the enemy's fire that little progress could be made, though some ground was gained on the spurs to the north-east of the farm.

On the left the 4th Australian Brigade advanced from the Asmak Dere against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair (a spur running due north from Koja Chemen Tepe) with the intention of wheeling to its right and advancing up the spur. Cunningly placed Turkish machine-guns and a strong entrenched body of infantry were ready for this move, and the Brigade were unable to get on. At last, on the approach of heavy columns of the enemy, the Australians, virtually surrounded, and having already suffered losses of over 1,000, were withdrawn to their original position. Here they stood at bay, and, though the men were by now half dead with thirst and with fatigue, they bloodily repulsed attack after attack delivered by heavy columns of Turks.

So stood matters at noon. Enough had been done for honour and much ground had everywhere been gained. The expected support from Suvla hung fire, but the capture of Chunuk Bair was a presage of victory; even the troops who had been repulsed were quite undefeated—quite full of fight—and so it was decided to hold hard as we were till nightfall, and then to essay one more grand attack, wherein the footing gained on Chunuk Bair would this time be used as a pivot.

In the afternoon the battle slackened, excepting always at Lone Pine, where the enemy were still coming on in mass, and being mown down by our fire. Elsewhere the troops were busy digging and getting up water and food, no child's play, with their wretched lines of communication running within musketry range of the enemy.

That evening the New Zealand Brigade, with two regiments of New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Maoris, held Rhododendron Spur and the south-western slopes of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. The front line was prolonged by the columns of General Cox and General Monash (with the 4th Australian Brigade). Behind the New Zealanders were the 38th Brigade in reserve, and in rear of General Monash two battalions of the 40th Brigade. The inner line was held as before, and the 29th Brigade (less two battalions), had been sent up from the general reserve, and remained still further in rear.

The columns for the renewed attack were composed as follows:—

No. 1 Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiments, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two battalions of the 13th Division.

No. 2 Column, Major-General H. V. Cox.—21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Brigade (less the 7th Gloucesters, relieved), with the 6th Battalion

South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.

No. 3 Column, Brigadier-General A. H. Baldwin, Commanding 38th Infantry Brigade.—Two battalions each from the 38th and 29th Brigades and one from the 40th Brigade.

No. 1 column was to hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 6th, and, in co-operation with the other columns, to gain the whole of Chunuk Bair, and extend to the south-east. No. 2 column was to attack Hill Q on the Chunuk Bair ridge, and No. 3 column was to move from the Chailak Dere, also on Hill Q. This last column was to make the main attack, and the others were to co-operate with it.

At 4.30 a.m. on August 9th the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were heavily shelled. The naval guns, all the guns on the left flank, and as many as possible from the right flank (whence the enemy's advance could be enfiladed), took part in this cannonade, which rose to its climax at 5.15 a.m., when the whole ridge seemed a mass of flame and smoke, whence huge clouds of dust drifted slowly upwards in strange patterns on to the sky. At 5.16 a.m. this tremendous bombardment was to be switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.

General Baldwin's column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was moving up towards General Johnstone's headquarters. Our plan contemplated the massing of this column immediately behind the trenches held by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Thence it was intended to launch the battalions in successive lines, keeping them as much as possible on the high ground. Infinite trouble had been taken to ensure that the narrow track should be kept clear, guides also were provided; but in spite of all precautions the darkness, the rough scrub-covered country, its sheer steepness, so delayed the column that they were unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground, and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the Farm—Chunuk Bair till 5.15 a.m. In plain English, Baldwin, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way—through no fault of his own. The mischance was due to the fact that time did not admit of the detailed careful reconnaissance of routes which is so essential where operations are to be carried out by night.

And now, under that fine leader, Major C. G. L. Allanson, the 6th Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to the lighters. Not only did this battalion, as well as some of the 6th South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fast retreating enemy. But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme moment Baldwin's column was still a long way from our trenches on the crest of Chunuk Bair, whence they should even now have been sweeping out towards Q along the whole ridge of the mountain. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell. These falling so unexpectedly among the stormers threw them into terrible confusion. The Turkish

commander saw his chance; instantly his troops were rallied and brought back in a counter-charge, and the South Lancashires and Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land and had seemed for a moment to have held victory in their grasp, were forced backwards over the crest and on to the lower slopes whence they had first started.

But where was the main attack—where was Baldwin? When that bold but unlucky commander found he could not possibly reach our trenches on the top of Chunuk Bair in time to take effective part in the fight he deployed for attack where he stood, *i.e.*, at the farm to the left of the New Zealand Brigade's trenches on Rhododendron Spur. Now his men were coming on in fine style and, just as the Turks topped the ridge with shouts of elation, two companies of the 6th East Lancashire Regiment, together with the 10th Hampshire Regiment, charged up our side of the slope with the bayonet. They had gained the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on Chunuk Bair, and a few minutes earlier would have joined hands with the Gurkhas and South Lancashires, and, combined with them, would have carried all before them. But the Turks by this time were lining the whole of the high crest in overwhelming numbers. The New Army troops attacked with a fine audacity, but they were flung back from the height and then pressed still further down the slope, until General Baldwin had to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the Farm, whilst the enemy, much encouraged, turned their attention to the New Zealand troops and the two New Army battalions of No. 1 Column still holding the south-west half of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. Constant attacks, urged with fanatical persistence, were met here with a sterner resolution, and although, at the end of the day, our troops were greatly exhausted, they still kept their footing on the summit. And if that summit meant much to us, it meant even more to the Turks. For the ridge covered our landing places, it is true, but it covered not only the Turkish beaches at Kilia Leman and Maidos, but also the Narrows themselves and the roads leading northward to Bulair and Constantinople.

That evening our line ran along Rhododendron Spur up to the crest of Chunuk Bair, where about 200 yards were occupied and held by some 800 men. Slight trenches had hastily been dug, but the fatigue of the New Zealanders and the fire of the enemy had prevented solid work being done. The trenches in many places were not more than a few inches deep. They were not protected by wire. Also many officers are of opinion that they had not been well sited in the first instance. On the South African system the main line was withdrawn some 25 yards from the crest instead of being actually on the crestline itself, and there were not even look-out posts along the summit. Boer skirmishers would thus have had to show themselves against the skyline before they could annoy. But here we were faced by regulars taught to attack in mass with bayonet or bomb. And the power of collecting overwhelming numbers at very close quarters rested with whichever side held the true skyline in force. From Chunuk Bair the line ran down to the Farm and almost due north to the Asma Dere southern watershed, whence it continued westward to the sea near Asmak Kuyu.

(C 49—242)

On the right the Australian Division was still holding its line and Lone Pine was still being furiously attacked. The 1st Australian Brigade was now reduced from 2,900 to 1,000, and the total casualties up to 8 p.m. on the 9th amounted to about 8,500. But the troops were still in extraordinarily good heart, and nothing could damp their keenness. The only discontent shown was by men who were kept in reserve.

During the night of the 9th–10th, the New Zealand and New Army troops on Chunuk Bair were relieved. For three days and three nights they had been ceaselessly fighting. They were half dead with fatigue. Their lines of communication, started from sea level, ran across trackless ridges and ravines to an altitude of 800 ft., and were exposed all the way to snipers' fire and artillery bombardment. It had become imperative, therefore, to get them enough food, water and rest; and for this purpose it was imperative also to withdraw them. Chunuk Bair, which they had so magnificently held, was now handed over to two battalions of the 13th Division, which were connected by the 10th Hampshire Regiment with the troops at the farm. General Sir William Birdwood is emphatic on the point that the nature of the ground is such that there was no room on the crest for more than this body of 800 to 1,000 rifles.

The two battalions of the New Army chosen to hold Chunuk Bair were the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the 5th Wiltshire Regiment. The first of these arrived in good time and occupied the trenches. Even in the darkness their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Levinge, recognised how dangerously these trenches were sited, and he began at once to dig observation posts on the actual crest and to strengthen the defences where he could. But he had not time given him to do much. The second battalion, the Wiltshires, were delayed by the intricate country. They did not reach the edge of the entrenchment until 4 a.m., and were then told to lie down in what was believed, erroneously, to be a covered position.

At daybreak on Tuesday, 10th August, the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Chunuk Bair–Hill Q against these two battalions, already weakened in numbers, though not in spirit, by previous fighting. First our men were shelled by every enemy gun, and then, at 5.30 a.m., were assaulted by a huge column, consisting of no less than a full division plus a regiment of three battalions. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the Wilts, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The ponderous mass of the enemy swept over the crest, turned the right flank of our line below, swarmed round the Hampshires and General Baldwin's column, which had to give ground, and were only extricated with great difficulty and very heavy losses.

Now it was our turn. The warships and the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, and the 69th Brigade Royal Field Artillery were getting the chance of a lifetime. As the successive solid lines of Turks topped the crest of the ridge gaps were torn through their formation, and an iron rain fell on them as they tried to re-form in the gullies.

I

Not here only did the Turks pay dearly for their recapture of the vital crest. Enemy reinforcements continued to move up Battleship Hill under heavy and accurate fire from our guns, and still they kept topping the ridges and pouring down the western slopes of the Chunuk Bair as if determined to regain everything they had lost. But once they were over the crest they became exposed not only to the full blast of the guns, naval and military, but also to a battery of 10 machine-guns belonging to the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which played upon their serried ranks at close range until the barrels were red hot. Enormous losses were inflicted, especially by these 10 machine-guns; and, of the swarms which had once fairly crossed the crest line, only the merest handful ever straggled back to their own side of Chunuk Bair.

At this same time strong forces of the enemy (forces which I had reckoned would have been held back to meet our advance from Suvla Bay) were hurled against the Farm and the spurs to the north-east, where there arose a conflict so deadly that it may be considered as the climax of the four days' fighting for the ridge. Portions of our line were pierced, and the troops driven clean down the hill. At the foot of the hill the men were rallied by Staff Captain Street, who was there supervising the transport of food and water. Without a word, unhesitating, they followed him back to the Farm, where they plunged again into the midst of that series of struggles in which generals fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat. So desperate a battle cannot be described. The Turks came on again and again, fighting magnificently, calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it, and maintained, by many a deed of daring, the old traditions of their race. There was no flinching. They died in the ranks where they stood. Here Generals Cayley, Baldwin and Cooper, and all their gallant men achieved great glory. On this bloody field fell Brigadier-General Baldwin, who earned his first laurels on Caesar's Camp at Ladysmith. There, too, fell Brigadier-General Cooper, badly wounded; and there, too, fell Lieutenant-Colonel M. H. Nunn, commanding the 9th Worcestershire Regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Levinge, commanding the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. Carden, commanding the 5th Wiltshire Regiment.

Towards this supreme struggle the absolute last two battalions from the General Reserve were now hurried, but by 10 a.m. the effort of the enemy was spent. Soon their shattered remnants began to trickle back, leaving a track of corpses behind them, and by night, except prisoners or wounded, no live Turk was left upon our side of the slope.

That same day, 10th August, two attacks, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon, were delivered on our positions along the Asmak Dere and Damakjelik Bair. Both were repulsed with heavy loss by the 4th Australian Brigade and the 4th South Wales Borderers, the men of the New Army showing all the steadiness of veterans. Sad to say, the Borderers lost their intrepid leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie, in the course of this affair.

By evening the total casualties of General Birdwood's force had reached 12,000, and included

a very large proportion of officers. The 13th Division of the New Army, under Major-General Shaw, had alone lost 6,000 out of a grand total of 10,500. Baldwin was gone, and all his staff. Ten commanding officers out of 13 had disappeared from the fighting effectives. The Warwicks and the Worcesters had lost literally every single officer. The old German notion that no unit would stand a loss of more than 25 per cent. had been completely falsified. The 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of the 10th (Irish) Division had lost more than twice that proportion, and, in spirit, were game for as much more fighting as might be required. But physically, though Birdwood's forces were prepared to hold all they had got, they were now too exhausted to attack—at least until they had rested and reorganised. So far they *had* held on to all they had gained, excepting only the footholds on the ridge between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, momentarily carried by the Gurkhas, and the salient of Chunuk Bair itself, which they had retained for 48 hours. Unfortunately, these two pieces of ground, small and worthless as they seemed, were worth, according to the ethics of war, 10,000 lives, for by their loss or retention they just marked the difference between an important success and a signal victory.

At times I had thought of throwing my reserves into this stubborn central battle, where probably they would have turned the scale. But each time the water troubles made me give up the idea, all ranks at Anzac being reduced to one pint a day. True thirst is a sensation unknown to the dwellers in cool, well-watered England. But at Anzac, when mules with water "pakhsals" arrived at the front, the men would rush up to them in swarms, just to lick the moisture that had exuded through the canvas bags. It will be understood, then, that until wells had been discovered under the freshly-won hills, the reinforcing of Anzac by even so much as a brigade was unthinkable.

The grand coup had not come off. The Narrows were still out of sight and beyond field gun range. But this was not the fault of Lieutenant-General Birdwood or any of the officers and men under his command. No mortal can command success; Lieutenant-General Birdwood had done all that mortal man can do to deserve it. The way in which he worked out his instructions into practical arrangements and dispositions upon the terrain reflect high credit upon his military capacity. I also wish to bring to your Lordship's notice the valuable services of Major-General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division. He had under him at one time a force amounting to two divisions, which he handled with conspicuous ability. Major-General F. C. Shaw, commanding 13th Division, also rose superior to all the trials and tests of these trying days. His calm and sound judgment proved to be of the greatest value throughout the arduous fighting I have recorded.

As for the troops, the joyous alacrity with which they faced danger, wounds and death, as if they were some new form of exciting recreation, has astonished me—old campaigner as I am. I will say no more, leaving Major-General Godley to speak for what happened under his eyes:—"I cannot close my report," he says, "without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed, and the gallantry displayed by

the troops and their leaders during the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian units had been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the New Armies had only just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them had not been previously under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army."

Although the Sari Bair ridge was the key to the whole of my tactical conception, and although the temptation to view this vital Anzac battle at closer quarters was very hard to resist, there was nothing in its course or conduct to call for my personal intervention.

The conduct of the operations which were to be based upon Suvla Bay was entrusted to Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir F. Stopford. At his disposal was placed the 9th Army Corps, less the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of the 10th Division.

We believed that the Turks were still unsuspicious about Suvla and that their only defences near that part of the coast were a girdle of trenches round Lala Baba and a few unconnected lengths of fire trench on Hill 10 and on the hills forming the northern arm of the bay. There was no wire. Inland a small work had been constructed on Yilghin Burnu (locally known as Chocolate Hills), and a few guns had been placed upon these hills, as well as upon Ismail Oglu Tepe, whence they could be brought into action either against the beaches of Suvla Bay or against any attempt from Anzac to break out northwards and attack Chunuk Bair. The numbers of the enemy allotted for the defence of the Suvla and Ejelmer areas (including the troops in the Anafarta villages, but exclusive of the general reserves in rear of the Sari Bair) were supposed to be under 4,000. Until the Turkish version of these events is in our hands it is not possible to be certain of the accuracy of this estimate. All that can be said at present is that my Intelligence Department were wonderfully exact in their figures as a rule and that, in the case in question, events, the reports made by prisoners, etc., etc., seem to show that the forecast was correct.

Arrangements for the landing of the 9th Corps at Suvla were worked out in minute detail by my General Headquarters Staff in collaboration with the staff of Vice-Admiral de Robeck, and every precaution was taken to ensure that the destination of the troops was kept secret up to the last moment.

Whilst concentrated at the island of Imbros the spirit and physique of the 11th Division had impressed me very favourably. They were to lead off the landing. From Imbros they were to be ferried over to the Peninsula in destroyers and motor-lighters. Disembarkation was to begin at 10.30 p.m., half an hour later than the attack on the Turkish outposts on the northern flank at Anzac, and I was sanguine enough to hope that the elaborate plan we had worked out would enable three complete brigades of infantry to be set ashore by daylight. Originally it had been intended that all three brigades should land on the beach immediately south of Nibrunesi Point, but in deference to the representations of the Corps

Commander I agreed, unfortunately, as it turned out, to one brigade being landed inside the bay.

The first task of the 9th Corps was to seize and hold the Chocolate and Ismail Oglu Hills, together with the high ground on the north and east of Suvla Bay. If the landing went off smoothly, and if my information regarding the strength of the enemy were correct, I hoped that these hills, with their guns, might be well in our possession before daybreak. In that case I hoped, further, that the first division which landed would be strong enough to picket and hold all the important heights within artillery range of the bay, when General Stopford would be able to direct the remainder of his force, as it became available, through the Anafartas to the east of the Sari Bair, where it should soon smash the mainspring of the Turkish opposition to Anzacs.

On the 22nd July I issued secret instructions and tables showing the number of craft available for the 9th Corps commander, their capacity, and the points whereat the troops could be disembarked; also what numbers of troops, animals, vehicles, and stores could be landed simultaneously. The allocation of troops to the ships and boats was left to General Stopford's own discretion, subject only to naval exigencies, otherwise the order of the disembarkation might not have tallied with the order of his operations.

The factors governing the hour of landing were: First, that no craft could quit Kephalos Bay before dark (about 9 p.m.); secondly, that nothing could be done which would attract the attention of the enemy before 10 p.m., the moment when the outposts on the left flank of the Anzac position were to be rushed.

General Stopford next framed his orders on these secret instructions, and after they had received my complete approval he proceeded to expound them to the general officer commanding 11th Division and general officer commanding 10th Division, who came over from Mudros for the purpose.

As in the original landing, the luck of calm weather favoured us, and all the embarkation arrangements of Kephalos were carried out by the Royal Navy in their usual ship-shape style. The 11th Division was to be landed at three places, designated and shown on the map as A, B and C. Destroyers were told off for these landing-places, each destroyer towing a steam lighter and picket-boat. Every light was to be dowsed, and as they neared the shore the destroyers were to slip their motor-lighters and picket-boats, which would then take the beach and discharge direct on to it. The motor-lighters were new acquisitions since the first landing, and were to prove the greatest possible assistance. They moved five knots an hour under their own engines, and carried 500 men, as well as stores of ammunition and water. After landing their passengers they were to return to the destroyers, and in one trip would empty them also. Ketches with service launches and transport lifeboats were to follow the destroyers and anchor at the entrance of the bay, so that in case of accidents or delays to any one of the motor-lighters a picket-boat could be sent at once to a ketch to pick up a tow of lifeboats and take the place of a disabled motor-lighter. These ketches

and tows were afterwards to be used for evacuating the wounded.

H.M.S. "Endymion" and H.M.S. "Theseus," each carrying a thousand men, were also to sail from Imbros after the destroyers, and, lying off the beach, were to discharge their troops directly the motor-lighters—three to each ship—were ready to convey the men to the shore, i.e., after they had finished disembarking their own loads and those of the destroyers. When this was done—i.e., after three trips—the motor lighters would be free to go on transporting guns, stores, mules, etc.

The following crafts brought up the rear :—

(1) Two ketches, each towing four horse-boats carrying four 18-pounder guns and 24 horses.

(2) One ketch, towing horse-boats with 40 horses.

(3) The sloop "Aster," with 500 men, towing a lighter containing eight mountain guns.

(4) Three ketches, towing horse-boats containing eight 18-pounder guns and 76 horses.

Water-lighters, towed by a tank steamer, were also timed to arrive at A beach at daylight. When they had been emptied they were to return at once to Kephalos to refill from the parent water-ship.

A specially fitted-out steamer, the "Prah," with stores (shown by our experience of 25th April to be most necessary)—i.e., water-pumps, hose, tanks, troughs, entrenching tools, and all ordnance stores requisite for the prompt development of wells or springs—was also sent to Suvla.

So much detail I have felt bound, for the sake of clearness, to give in the body of my despatch. The further detail, showing numbers landed, etc., etc., will be found in the appendix and tables attached.

When originally I conceived the idea of these operations, one of the first points to be weighed was that of the water supply in the Biyuk Anafarta valley and the Suvla plain. Experience at Anzac had shown quite clearly that the whole plan must be given up unless a certain amount of water could be counted upon, and, fortunately, the information I received was reassuring. But, in case of accidents, and to be on the safe side, so long ago as June I had begun to take steps to counter the chance that we might, from one cause or another, find difficulty in developing the wells. Having got from the War Office all that they could give me, I addressed myself to India and Egypt, and eventually from these three sources I managed to secure portable receptacles for 100,000 gallons, including petrol tins, milk cans, camel tanks, water bags and pakhals.

Supplementing these were lighters and water-ships, all under naval control. Indeed, by arrangement with the Admiral, the responsibility of the Army was confined to the emptying of the lighters and the distribution of the water to the troops, the Navy undertaking to bring the full lighters to the shore to replace the empty ones, thus providing a continuous supply.

Finally 3,700 mules, together with 1,750 water carts, were provided for Anzac and Suvla—this in addition to 950 mules already at Anzac. Representatives of the Director of Supplies and Transport at Suvla and Anzac were sent to allot the transport which was to be used for carrying up whatever was most needed by units ashore, whether water, food or ammunition.

This statement, though necessarily brief, will, I hope, suffice to throw some light upon the complexity of the arrangements thought out beforehand in order, so far as was humanly possible, to combat the disorganisation, the hunger and the thirst which lie in wait for troops landing on a hostile beach.

On the evening of 6th August the 11th Division sailed on its short journey from Imbros (Kephalos) to Suvla Bay and, meeting with no mischance, the landing took place, the brigades of the 11th Division getting ashore practically simultaneously; the 32nd and 33rd Brigades at B and C beaches, the 34th at A beach.

The surprise of the Turks was complete. At B and C the beaches were found to be admirably suited to their purpose, and there was no opposition. The landing at A was more difficult, both because of the shoal water and because there the Turkish pickets and sentries—the normal guardians of the coast—were on the alert and active. Some of the lighters grounded a good way from the shore, and men had to struggle towards the beach in as much as 4 feet 6 inches of water. Ropes in several instances were carried from the lighters to the shore to help to sustain the heavily accoutred infantry. To add to the difficulties of the 34th Brigade the lighters came under flanking rifle fire from the Turkish outposts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba. The enemy even, knowing every inch of the ground, crept down in the very dark night on to the beach itself, mingling with our troops and getting between our firing line and its supports. Fortunately the number of these enterprising foes was but few, and an end was soon put to their activity on the actual beaches by the sudden storming of Lala Baba from the south. This attack was carried out by the 9th West Yorkshire Regiment and the 6th Yorkshire Regiment, both of the 32nd Brigade, which had landed at B beach and marched up along the coast. The assault succeeded at once and without much loss, but both battalions deserve great credit for the way it was delivered in the inky darkness of the night.

The 32nd Brigade was now pushed on to the support of the 34th Brigade, which was held up by another outpost of the enemy on Hill 10 (117 R and S), and it is feared that some of the losses incurred here were due to misdirected fire. While this fighting was still in progress the 11th Battalion, Manchester Regiment, of the 34th Brigade, was advancing northwards in very fine style, driving the enemy opposed to them back along the ridge of the Karakol Dagh towards the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Beyond doubt these Lancashire men earned much distinction, fighting with great pluck and grit against an enemy not very numerous perhaps, but having an immense advantage in knowledge of the ground. As they got level with Hill 10 it grew light enough to see, and the enemy began to shell. No one seems to have been present who could take hold of the two brigades, the 32nd and 34th, and launch them in a concerted and cohesive attack. Consequently there was confusion and hesitation, increased by gorse fires lit by hostile shell, but redeemed, I am proud to report, by the conspicuously fine, soldierly conduct of several individual battalions. The whole of the Turks locally available were by now in the field, and they

were encouraged to counter-attack by the signs of hesitation, but the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers and the 11th Manchester Regiment took them on with the bayonet, and fairly drove them back in disorder over the flaming Hill 10.

As the infantry were thus making good, the two Highland Mountain batteries and one battery, 59th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, were landed at B beach. Day was now breaking, and with the dawn sailed into the bay six battalions of the 10th Division, under Brigadier-General Hill, from Mitylene.

Here perhaps I may be allowed to express my gratitude to the Royal Navy for their share in this remarkable achievement, as well as a very natural pride at staff arrangements, which resulted in the infantry of a whole division and three batteries being landed during a single night on a hostile shore, whilst the arrival of the first troops of the supporting division, from another base distant 120 miles, took place at the very psychological moment when support was most needed, namely, at break of dawn.

The intention of the Corps Commander was to keep the 10th Division on the left, and with it to push on as far forward as possible along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt towards the heights above Ejelmer Bay. He wished, therefore, to land these six battalions of the 10th Division at A beach and, seeing Brigadier-General Hill, he told him that as the left of the 34th Brigade was being hard pressed he should get into touch with General Officer Commanding 11th Division, and work in support of his left until the arrival of his own Divisional General. But the Naval authorities, so General Stopford reports, were unwilling, for some reason not specified, to land these troops at A beach, so that they had to be sent in lighters to C beach, whence they marched by Lala Baba to Hill 10, under fire. Hence were caused loss, delay and fatigue. Also the angle of direction from which these fresh troops entered the fight was not nearly so effective.

The remainder of the 10th Division, three battalions (from Mudros), and with them the G.O.C. Lieutenant-General Sir B. Mahon, began to arrive, and the Naval authorities having discovered a suitable landing place near Ghazi Baba, these battalions were landed there together with one battalion of the 31st Brigade which had not yet been sent round to C beach. By this means it was hoped that both the brigades of the 10th Division would be able to rendezvous about half a mile to the north-west of Hill 10.

After the defeat of the enemy round and about Hill 10, they retreated in an easterly direction towards Sulajik and Kuckuk Anafarta Ova, followed by the 34th and 32nd Brigades of the 11th Division and by the 31st Brigade of the 10th Division, which had entered into the fight, not, as the Corps Commander had intended, on the left of the 11th Division, but between Hill 10 and the Salt Lake. I have been frustrated in my endeavours to get some live human detail about the fighting which followed, but I understand from the Corps Commander that the brunt of it fell upon the 31st Brigade of the 10th (Irish) Division, which consisted of the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 6th Royal Dublin

Fusiliers, the last-named battalion being attached to the 31st Brigade.

By the evening General Hammersley had seized Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hills) after a fight for which he specially commends the 6th Lincoln Regiment and the 6th Border Regiment. At the same time he reported that he was unable to make any further progress towards the vital point, Ismail Oglu Tepe. At nightfall his brigade and the 31st Brigade were extended from about Hetman Chair through Chocolate Hills, Sulajik, to near Kuckuk Anafarta Ova.

This same day Sir B. Mahon delivered a spirited attack along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge, in support of the 11th Battalion Manchester Regiment, and, taking some small trenches en route, secured and established himself on a position extending from the sea about 135 p., through the high ground about the p., of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, to about 135 Z. 8. In front of him, on the ridge, he reported the enemy to be strongly entrenched. The 6th Royal Munster Fusiliers have been named as winning special distinction here. The whole advance was well carried out by the Irishmen over difficult ground against an enemy—500 to 700 Gendarmerie—favoured by the lie of the land.

The weather was very hot, and the new troops suffered much from want of water. Except at the southernmost extremity of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge there was no water in that part of the field, and although it existed in some abundance throughout the area over which the 11th Division was operating, the Corps Commander reports that there was no time to develop its resources. Partly this seems to have been owing to the enemy's fire; partly to a want of that *nous* which stands by as second nature to the old campaigner; partly it was inevitable. Anyway, for as long as such a state of things lasted, the troops became dependent on the lighters and upon the water brought to the beaches in tins, pakhals, etc.

Undoubtedly the distribution of this water to the advancing troops was a matter of great difficulty, and one which required not only well-worked-out schemes from Corps and Divisional Staffs, but also energy and experience on the part of those who had to put them into practice. As it turned out, and judging merely by results, I regret to say that the measures actually taken in regard to the distribution proved to be inadequate, and that suffering and disorganisation ensued. The disembarkation of artillery horses was therefore at once, and rightly, postponed by the Corps Commander, in order that mules might be landed to carry up water.

And now General Stopford, recollecting the vast issues which hung upon his success in forestalling the enemy, urged his Divisional commanders to push on. Otherwise, as he saw, all the advantages of the surprise landing must be nullified. But the Divisional Commanders believed themselves, it seems, to be unable to move. Their men, they said, were exhausted by their efforts of the night of the 6th-7th and by the action of the 7th. The want of water had told on the new troops. The distribution from the beaches had not worked smoothly. In some cases the hose had been pierced by individuals wishing to fill their own bottles; in others lighters had grounded so far from the beach

that men swam out to fill batches of water-bottles. All this had added to the disorganisation inevitable after a night landing, following by fights here and there with an enemy scattered over a country to us unknown. These pleas for delay were perfectly well founded. But it seems to have been overlooked that the half-defeated Turks in front of us were equally exhausted and disorganised, and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest method of solving the water trouble and every other sort of trouble. Be this as it may, the objections overbore the Corps Commander's resolution. He had now got ashore three batteries (two of them mountain batteries), and the great guns of the ships were ready to speak at his request. But it was lack of artillery support which finally decided him to acquiesce in a policy of going slow which, by the time it reached the troops, became translated into a period of inaction. The Divisional Generals were, in fact, informed that, "in view of the inadequate artillery support," General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them, so far as was possible, to try and turn any trenches which were met with. Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of the 8th of August.

Normally, it may be correct to say that in modern warfare infantry cannot be expected to advance without artillery preparation. But in a landing on a hostile shore the order has to be inverted. The infantry must advance and seize a suitable position to cover the landing, and to provide artillery positions for the main thrust. The very existence of the force, its water supply, its facilities for munitions and supplies, its power to reinforce, must absolutely depend on the infantry being able instantly to make good sufficient ground without the aid of the artillery other than can be supplied for the purpose by *floating* batteries.

This is not a condition that should take the commander of a covering force by surprise. It is one already foreseen. Driving power was required, and even a certain ruthlessness, to brush aside pleas for a respite for tired troops. The one fatal error was inertia. And inertia prevailed.

Late in the evening of the 7th the enemy had withdrawn the few guns which had been in action during the day. Beyond half a dozen shells dropped from very long range into the bay in the early morning of the 8th, no enemy artillery fired that day in the Suvla area. The guns had evidently been moved back, lest they should be captured when we pushed forward. As for the entrenched positions, these in the ordinary acceptance of the term, were non-existent. The General Staff Officer whom I had sent on to Suvla early in the morning of the 8th reported by telegraph the absence of hostile gun-fire, the small amount of rifle fire, and the enemy's apparent weakness. He also drew attention to the inaction of our own troops, and to the fact that golden opportunities were being missed. Before this message arrived at general headquarters I had made up my mind, from the Corps Commander's own reports, that all was not well at Suvla. There was risk in cutting myself adrift, even temporarily, from touch with the operations at Anzac and Helles; but I did my best to provide against any sudden call by leaving Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my

Chief of the General Staff, in charge, with instructions to keep me closely informed of events at the other two fronts; and, having done this, I took ship and set out for Suvla.

On arrival at about 5 p.m. I boarded H.M.S. "Jonquil," where I found corps headquarters, and where General Stopford informed me that the General Officer commanding 11th Division was confident of success in an attack he was to make at dawn next morning (the 9th). I felt no such confidence. Beyond a small advance by a part of the 11th Division between the Chocolate Hills and Ismail Oglu Tepe, and some further progress along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge by the 10th Division, the day of the 8th had been lost. The commander of the 11th Division had, it seems, ordered strong patrols to be pushed forward so as to make good all the strong positions in advance which could be occupied without serious fighting; but, as he afterwards reported, "little was done in this respect." Thus a priceless 12 hours had already gone to help the chances of the Turkish reinforcements which were, I knew, both from naval and aerial sources, actually on the march for Suvla. But when I urged that even now, at the 11th hour, the 11th Division should make a concerted attack upon the hills, I was met by a *non possumus*. The objections of the morning were no longer valid; the men were now well rested, watered and fed. But the divisional commanders disliked the idea of an advance by night, and General Stopford did not care, it seemed, to force their hands.

So it came about that I was driven to see whether I could not, myself, put concentration of effort and purpose into the direction of the large number of men ashore. The Corps Commander made no objection. He declared himself to be as eager as I could be to advance. The representations made by the Divisional Commanders had seemed to him insuperable. If I could see my way to get over them no one would be more pleased than himself.

Accompanied by Commodore Roger Keyes and Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinall, of the Headquarters General Staff, I landed on the beach, where all seemed quiet and peaceful, and saw the Commander of the 11th Division, Major-General Hammersley. I warned him the sands were running out fast, and that by dawn the high ground to his front might very likely be occupied in force by the enemy. He saw the danger, but declared that it was a physical impossibility, at so late an hour (6 p.m.), to get out orders for a night attack, the troops being very much scattered. There was no other difficulty now, but this was insuperable; he could not recast his orders or get them round to his troops in time. But one brigade, the 32nd, was, so General Hammersley admitted, more or less concentrated and ready to move. The General Staff Officer of the division, Colonel Neil Malcolm, a soldier of experience, on whose opinion I set much value, was consulted. He agreed that the 32nd Brigade was now in a position to act. I, therefore, issued a direct order that, even if it were only with this 32nd Brigade, the advance should begin at the earliest possible moment, so that a portion at least of the 11th Division should anticipate the Turkish reinforcements on the heights and dig themselves in there upon some good tactical point.

In taking upon myself the serious responsibility of thus dealing with a detail of divisional tactics I was careful to limit the scope of the interference. Beyond directing that the one brigade which was reported ready to move at once should try and make good the heights before the enemy got on to them I did nothing, and said not a word calculated to modify or in any way affect the attack already planned for the morning. Out of the 13 battalions which were to have advanced against the heights at dawn four were now to anticipate that movement by trying to make good the key of the enemy's position at once and under cover of darkness.

I have not been able to get a clear and coherent account of the doings of the 32nd Brigade; but I have established the fact that it did not actually commence its advance till 4 a.m. on the 9th of August. The reason given is that the units of the brigade were scattered. In General Stopford's despatch he says that, "One company of the 8th Welsh Pioneer Battalion succeeded in getting to the top of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir, but the rest of the battalion and the 32nd Brigade were attacked from both flanks during their advance, and fell back to a line north and south of Sulajik. Very few of the leading company or the Royal Engineers who accompanied it got back, and that evening the strength of the battalion was nine officers and 380 men."

After their retirement from the hill north of Anafarta Sagir (which commanded the whole battlefield) this 32nd Brigade then still marked the high-water level of the advance made at dawn by the rest of the division. When their first retirement was completed they had to fall back further, so as to come into line with the most forward of their comrades. The inference seems clear. Just as the 32nd Brigade in their advance met with markedly less opposition than the troops who attacked an hour and a half later, so, had they themselves started earlier, they would probably have experienced less opposition. Further, it seems reasonable to suppose that had the complete division started at 4 a.m. on the 9th, or, better still, at 10 p.m. on the 8th, they would have made good the whole of the heights in front of them.

That night I stayed at Suvla, preferring to drop direct cable contact with my operations as a whole to losing touch with a corps battle which seemed to be going wrong.

At dawn on the 9th I watched General Hammersley's attack, and very soon realised, by the well-sustained artillery fire of the enemy (so silent the previous day), and by the volume of the musketry, that Turkish reinforcements had arrived; that with the renewed confidence caused by our long delay the guns had been brought back; and that, after all, we were forestalled. This was a bad moment. Our attack failed; our losses were very serious. The enemy's enfilading shrapnel fire seemed to be especially destructive and demoralising, the shell bursting low and all along our line. Time after time it threw back our attack just as it seemed upon the point of making good. The 23rd Brigade at first made most hopeful progress in its attempt to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe. Some of the leading troops gained the summit, and were able to look over on to the other side.

Many Turks were killed here. Then the centre seemed to give way. Whether this was the result of the shrapnel fire or whether, as some say, an order to retire came up from the rear, the result was equally fatal to success. As the centre fell back the steady, gallant behaviour of the 6th Battalion, Border Regiment, and the 6th Battalion, Lincoln Regiment, on either flank was especially noteworthy. Scrub fires on Hill 70 did much to harass and hamper our troops. When the 32nd Brigade fell back before attacks from the slopes of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir and from the direction of Abrijka they took up the line north and south through Sulajik. Here their left was protected by two battalions of the 34th Brigade, which came up to their support. The line was later on prolonged by the remainder of the 34th Brigade and two battalions of the 159th Brigade of the 53rd Division. Their right was connected with the Chocolate Hills by the 33rd Brigade on the position to which they had returned after their repulse from the upper slopes of Ismail Oglu Tepe.

Some of the units which took part in this engagement acquitted themselves very bravely. I regret I have not had sufficient detail given me to enable me to mention them by name. The Divisional Commander speaks with appreciation of one freshly-landed battalion of the 53rd Division, a Hereford battalion, presumably the 1/1st Herefordshire, which attacked with impetuosity and courage between Hetman Chair and Kaslar Chair, about Azmak Dere, on the extreme right of his line.

During the night of the 8th-9th and early morning of the 9th the whole of the 53rd (Territorial Division) (my general reserve) had arrived and disembarked. I had ordered it up to Suvla, hoping that by adding its strength to the 9th Corps General Stopford might still be enabled to secure the commanding ground round the bay. The infantry brigades of the 53rd Division (no artillery had accompanied it from England) reinforced the 11th Division.

On August 10th the Corps Commander decided to make another attempt to take the Anafarta ridge. The 11th Division were not sufficiently rested to play a prominent part in the operation, but the 53rd Division, under General Lindley, was to attack, supported by General Hammersley. On the 10th there were one brigade of Royal Field Artillery ashore, with two mountain batteries, and all the ships' guns were available to co-operate. But the attack failed, though the Corps Commander considers that seasoned troops would have succeeded, especially as the enemy were showing signs of being shaken by our artillery fire. General Stopford points out, however, and rightly so, that the attack was delivered over very difficult country, and that it was a high trial for troops who had never been in action before, and with no regulars to set a standard. Many of the battalions fought with great gallantry, and were led forward with much devotion by their officers. At a moment when things were looking dangerous two battalions of the 11th Division (not specified by the Corps Commander) rendered very good service on the left of the Territorials. At the end of the day our troops occupied the line Hill east of Chocolate Hill-Sulajik, whilst the enemy—who had been ably commanded throughout—were still receiving

reinforcements, and, apart from their artillery, were three times as strong as they had been on the 7th August.

Orders were issued to the General Officer Commanding 9th Corps to take up and entrench a line across the whole front from near the Azmak Dere, through the knoll east of the Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the 10th Division about Kiretch Tepe Sirt. General Stopford took advantage of this opportunity to reorganise the divisions, and, as there was a gap in the line between the left of the 53rd Division and the right of the 10th Division, gave orders for the preparation of certain strong points to enable it to be held.

The 54th Division (infantry only) arrived, and were disembarked on August 11th and placed in reserve. On the following day—August 12th—I proposed that the 54th Division should make a night march in order to attack, at dawn on the 13th, the heights Kavak Tepe-Teke Tepe. The Corps Commander having reason to believe that the enclosed country about Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and the north of it was held by the enemy, ordered one brigade to move forward in advance, and make good Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, so as to ensure an unopposed march for the remainder of the division as far as that place. So that afternoon the 163rd Brigade moved off, and, in spite of serious opposition, established itself about the A of Anafarta (118 m. 4 and 7), in difficult and enclosed country. In the course of the fight, creditable in all respects to the 163rd Brigade, there happened a very mysterious thing. The 1/5th Norfolks were on the right of the line, and found themselves for a moment less strongly opposed than the rest of the brigade. Against the yielding forces of the enemy, Colonel Sir H. Beauchamp, a bold, self-confident officer, eagerly pressed forward, followed by the best part of the battalion. The fighting grew hotter, and the ground became more wooded and broken. At this stage many men were wounded or grew exhausted with thirst. These found their way back to camp during the night. But the Colonel, with 16 officers and 250 men, still kept pushing on, driving the enemy before him. Amongst these ardent souls was part of a fine company enlisted from the King's Sandringham estates. Nothing more was ever seen or heard of any of them. They charged into the forest, and were lost to sight or sound. Not one of them ever came back.

The night march and projected attack were now abandoned, owing to the Corps Commander's representations as to the difficulties of keeping the division supplied with food, water, &c., even should they gain the height. General Birdwood had hoped he would soon be able to make a fresh attack on Sari Bair, provided that he might reckon on a corresponding vigorous advance to be made by the 11th and 54th Divisions on Ismail Oglu Tepe. On August 13th I so informed General Stopford. But when it came to business, General Birdwood found he could not yet carry out his new attack on Sari Bair—and, indeed, could only help the 9th Corps with one brigade from Damak-jelik Bair. I was obliged, therefore, to abandon this project for the nonce, and directed General Stopford to confine his attention of strengthening his line across his present front. To straighten out the left of this line General Stopford ordered the General Officer Commanding the 10th Division

to advance on the following day (15th August), so as to gain possession of the crest of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the 54th Division to co-operate.

The 30th and 31st Infantry Brigades of the 10th Irish Division were to attack frontally along the high ridge. The 162nd Infantry Brigade of the 54th Division were to support on the right. The infantry were to be seconded by a machine-gun detachment of the Royal Naval Air Service, by the guns of H.M.S. "Grampus" and H.M.S. "Foxhound" from the Gulf of Saros, by the Argyll Mountain Battery, the 15th Heavy Battery, and the 58th Field Battery. After several hours of indecisive artillery and musketry fighting, the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers charged forward with loud cheers, and captured the whole ridge, together with eighteen prisoners. The vigorous support rendered by the naval guns was a feature of this operation. Unfortunately, the point of the ridge was hard to hold, and means for maintaining the forward trenches had not been well thought out. Casualties became very heavy, the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers having only one officer left, and the 5th Inniskilling Fusiliers also losing heavily in officers. Reinforcements were promised, but before they could arrive the officer left in command decided to evacuate the front trenches. The strength of the Turks opposed to us was steadily rising, and had now reached 20,000.

On the evening of the 15th August General Stopford handed over command of the 9th Corps.

The units of the 10th and 11th Divisions had shown their mettle when they leaped into the water to get more quickly to close quarters, or when they stormed Lala Baba in the darkness. They had shown their resolution later when they tackled the Chocolate Hills and drove the enemy from Hill 10 right back out of rifle range from the beaches.

Then had come hesitation. The advantage had not been pressed. The senior Commanders at Suvla had had no personal experience of the new trench warfare; of the Turkish methods; of the paramount importance of time. Strong, clear leadership had not been promptly enough applied. These were the reasons which induced me, with your Lordship's approval, to appoint Major-General H. de B. De Lisle to take over temporary command.

I had already seen General De Lisle on his way from Cape Helles, and my formal instructions—full copy in Appendix—were handed to him by my Chief of the General Staff. Under these he was to make it his most pressing business to get the Corps into fighting trim again, so that as big a proportion of it as possible might be told off for a fresh attack upon Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur. At his disposal were placed the 10th Division (less one brigade), the 11th Division, the 53rd and 54th Divisions—a force imposing enough on paper, but totalling, owing to casualties, under 30,000 rifles.

The fighting strength of ourselves and of our adversaries stood at this time at about the following figures:—Lieutenant-General Birdwood commanded 25,000 rifles, at Anzac; Lieutenant-General Davies, in the southern zone, commanded 23,000 rifles; whilst the French corps alongside of him consisted of some 17,000 rifles. The Turks had been very active in the south, doubtless to

prevent us reinforcing Anzac or Suvla; but it is doubtful if there were more than 35,000 of them in that region. The bulk of the enemy were engaged against Anzac or were in reserve in the valleys east and north of Sari Bair. Their strength was estimated at 75,000 rifles.

The Turks then, I reckoned, had 110,000 rifles to our 95,000, and held all the vantages of ground; they had plenty of ammunition, also drafts wherewith to refill ranks depleted in action within two or three days. My hopes that these drafts would be of poor quality had been every time disappointed. After weighing all these points, I sent your Lordship a long cable. In it I urged that if the campaign was to be brought to a quick, victorious decision, large reinforcements must at once be sent out. Autumn, I pointed out, was already upon us, and there was not a moment to be lost. At that time (16th August) my British divisions alone were 45,000 under establishment, and some of my fine battalions had been allowed to dwindle down to the strength of a company. Our most vital need was the replenishment of these sadly depleted ranks. When that was done I wanted 50,000 fresh rifles. From what I knew of the Turkish situation, both in its local and general aspects, it seemed, humanly speaking, a certainty that if this help could be sent to me *at once* we could still clear a passage for our fleet to Constantinople.

It may be judged, then, how deep was my disappointment when I learnt that the essential drafts, reinforcements and munitions could not be sent to me, the reason given being one which prevented me from any further insistence. So I resolved to do my very best with the means at my disposal, and forthwith reinforced the northern wing with the 2nd Mounted Division (organised as dismounted troops) from Egypt and the 29th Division from the southern area. These movements, and the work of getting the 9th Corps and attached divisions into battle array took time, and it was not until the 21st that I was ready to renew the attack—an attack to be carried out under very different conditions from those of the 7th and 8th August.

The enemy's positions were now being rapidly entrenched, and, as I could not depend on receiving reinforcing drafts, I was faced with the danger that if I could not drive the Turks back I might lose so many men that I would find myself unable to hold the very extensive new area of ground which had been gained. I therefore decided to mass every available man against Ismail Oglu Tepe, a *sine quâ non* to my plans whether as a first step towards clearing the valley, or, if this proved impossible, towards securing Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove from shell fire.

The scheme for this attack was well planned by General De Lisle. The 53rd and 54th Divisions were to hold the enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt while the 29th Division and 11th Division stormed Ismail Oglu Tepe. Two brigades, 10th Division, and the 2nd Mounted Division were retained in Corps Reserve. I arranged that General Birdwood should co-operate by swinging forward his left flank to Susuk Kuyu and Kaiajik Aghala. Naturally, I should have liked still further to extend the scope of my attack by ordering an advance of the 9th Corps all along their line, but many of the battalions had been too highly tried,

and I felt it was unwise to call upon them for another effort so soon. The attack would only be partial, but it was an essential attack if any real progress was to be made. Also, once the Anafarta ridge was in my hands the enemy would be unable to reinforce through the gap between the two Anafartas, and then, so I believed, my left would find no difficulty in getting on.

My special objective was the hill which forms the south-west corner of the Anafarta Sagir spur. Ismail Oglu Tepe, as it is called, forms a strong natural barrier against an invader from the Ægean who might wish to march direct against the Anafartas. The hill rises 350 feet from the plain, with steep spurs jutting out to the west and south-west, the whole of it covered with dense holly oak scrub, so nearly impenetrable that it breaks up an attack and forces troops to move in single file along goat tracks between the bushes. The comparatively small number of guns landed up to date was a weakness, seeing we had now to storm trenches, but the battleships were there to back us, and as the bombardment was limited to a narrow front of a mile it was hoped the troops would find themselves able to carry the trenches and that the impetus of the charge would carry them up to the top of the crest. Our chief difficulty lay in the open nature and shallow depth of the ground available for the concentration for attack. The only cover we possessed was the hill Lala Baba, 200 yards from the sea, and Yilghin Burnu, half a mile from the Turkish front, the ground between these two being an exposed plain. The 29th Division, which was to make the attack on the left, occupied the front trenches during the preceding night; the 11th Division, which was to attack on the right, occupied the front trenches on the right of Yilghin Burnu.

By some freak of nature Suvla Bay and plain were wrapped in a strange mist on the afternoon of the 21st of August. This was sheer bad luck, as we had reckoned on the enemy's gunners being blinded by the declining sun and upon the Turkish trenches being shown up by the evening light with singular clearness, as would have been the case on ninety-nine days out of a hundred. Actually we could hardly see the enemy lines this afternoon, whereas out to the westward targets stood out in strong relief against the luminous mist. I wished to postpone the attack, but for various reasons this was not possible, and so, from 2.30 p.m. to 3 p.m. a heavy but none too accurate artillery bombardment from land and sea was directed against the Turkish first line of trenches, whilst twenty-four machine guns in position on Yilghin Burnu did what they could to lend a hand.

At 3 p.m. an advance was begun by the infantry on the right of the line. The 34th Brigade of the 11th Division rushed the Turkish trenches between Hetman Chair and Aire Kavak, practically without loss, but the 32nd Brigade, directed against Hetman Chair and the communication trench connecting that point with the south-west corner of the Ismail Oglu Tepe spur, failed to make good its point. The brigade had lost direction in the first instance, moving north-east instead of east, and though it attempted to carry the communication trench from the north-east with great bravery and great disregard of life, it never succeeded in rectifying the original mistake. The 33rd Brigade,

sent up in haste with orders to capture this communication trench at all costs, fell into precisely the same error, part of it marching north-east and part south-east to Susuk Kuyu.

Meanwhile the 29th Division, whose attack had been planned for 3.30 p.m., had attacked Scimitar Hill (Hill 70) with great dash. The 87th Brigade, on the left, carried the trenches on Scimitar Hill, but the 86th Brigade were checked and upset by a raging forest fire across their front. Eventually pressing on, they found themselves unable to advance up the valley between the two spurs owing to the failure of the 32nd Brigade of the 11th Division on their right. The brigade then tried to attack eastwards, but were decimated by a cross fire of shell and musketry from the north and south-east. The leading troops were simply swept off the top of the spur, and had to fall back to a ledge south-west of Scimitar Hill, where they found a little cover. Whilst this fighting was in progress the 2nd Mounted Division moved out from Lala Baba in open formation to take up a position of readiness behind Yilghin Burnu. During this march they came under a remarkably steady and accurate artillery fire. The advance of these English Yeomen was a sight calculated to send a thrill of pride through anyone with a drop of English blood running in their veins. Such superb martial spectacles are rare in modern war. Ordinarily it should always be possible to bring up reserves under some sort of cover from shrapnel fire. Here, for a mile and a half, there was nothing to conceal a mouse, much less some of the most stalwart soldiers England has ever sent from her shores. Despite the critical events in other parts of the field, I could hardly take my glasses from the Yeomen; they moved like men marching on parade. Here and there a shell would take toll of a cluster; there they lay; there was no straggling; the others moved steadily on; not a man was there who hung back or hurried. But such an ordeal must consume some of the battle-winning fighting energy of those subjected to it, and it is lucky indeed for the Turks that the terrain, as well as the lack of trenches, forbade us from letting the 2nd Mounted Division loose at close quarters to the enemy without undergoing this previous too heavy baptism of fire.

Now that the 11th Division had made their effort, and failed, the 2nd South Midland Brigade (commanded by Brigadier-General Earl of Longford) was sent forward from its position of readiness behind Yilghin Burnu, in the hope that they might yet restore the fortunes of the day. This brigade, in action for the first time, encountered both bush fires and musketry without flinching, but the advance had in places to be almost by inches, and the actual close attack by the Yeomen did not take place until night was fast falling. On the left they reached the foremost line of the 29th Division, and on the right also they got as far as the leading battalions. But, as soon as it was dark, one regiment pushed up the valley between Scimitar Hill and Hill 100 (on Ismail Oglu Tepe), and carried the trenches on a small knoll near the centre of this horseshoe. The regiment imagined it had captured Hill 100, which would have been a very notable success, enabling as it would the whole of our line to hang on and dig in. But when the report came in some doubt was felt as to its

accuracy, and a reconnaissance by staff officers showed that the knoll was a good way from Hill 100, and that a strongly-held semi-circle of Turkish trenches (the enemy having been heavily reinforced) still denied us access to the top of the hill. As the men were too done, and had lost too heavily to admit of a second immediate assault, and as the knoll actually held would have been swept by fire at daybreak, there was nothing for it but to fall back under cover of darkness to our original line. The losses in this attack fell most heavily on the 29th Division. They were just under 5,000.

I am sorry not to be able to give more detail as to the conduct of individuals and units during this battle. But the 2nd South Midland Brigade has been brought to my notice, and it consisted of the Bucks Yeomanry, the Berks Yeomanry, and the Dorset Yeomanry. The Yeomanry fought very bravely, and on personal, as well as public, grounds I specially deplore the loss of Brigadier-General Earl of Longford, K.P., M.V.O., and Brigadier-General P. A. Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C.

The same day, as pre-arranged with General Birdwood, a force consisting of two battalions of New Zealand Mounted Rifles, two battalions of the 29th Irish Brigade, the 4th South Wales Borderers, and 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, the whole under the command of Major-General H. V. Cox, was working independently to support the main attack.

General Cox divided his force into three sections: the left section to press forward and establish a permanent hold on the existing lightly held outpost line covering the junction of the 11th Division with the Anzac front; the centre section to seize the well at Kabak Kuyu, an asset of utmost value, whether to ourselves or the enemy; the right section to attack and capture the Turkish trenches on the north-east side of the Kaiajik Aghala.

The advance of the left section was a success. After a brisk engagement the well at Kabak Kuyu was seized by the Indian Brigade, and, by 4.30, the right column, under Brigadier-General Russell, under heavy fire, effected a lodgment on the Kaiajik Aghala, where our men entrenched, and began to dig communications across the Kaiajik Dere towards the lines of the 4th Australian Brigade south of the Dere. A pretty stiff bomb fight ensued, in which General Russell's troops held their own through the night against superior force. At 6 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd August, General Russell, reinforced by the newly arrived 18th Australian Battalion, attacked the summit of the Kaiajik Aghala. The Australians carried 150 yards of the trenches, losing heavily in so doing, and were then forced to fall back again owing to enfilade fire, though in the meantime the New Zealand Mounted Rifles managed, in spite of constant counter-attacks, to make good another 80 yards. A counter-attack in strength launched by the Turks at 10 a.m. was repulsed; the new line from the Kaiajik Aghala to Susak Kuyu was gradually strengthened, and eventually joined on to the right of the 9th Army Corps, thereby materially improving the whole situation. During this action the 4th Australian Brigade, which remained facing the Turks on the upper part of the Kaiajik Aghala, was able to inflict several hundred casualties on the enemy as they retreated or endeavoured to reinforce.

On the 21st of August we had carried the Turkish entrenchments at several points, but had been unable to hold what we had gained except along the section where Major-General Cox had made a good advance with Anzac and Indian troops. To be repulsed is not to be defeated, as long as the commander and his troops are game to renew the attack. All were eager for such a renewal of the offensive; but clearly we would have for some time to possess our souls in patience, seeing that reinforcements and munitions were short, that we were already outnumbered by the enemy, and that a serious outbreak of sickness showed how it had become imperative to give a spell of rest to the men who had been fighting so magnificently and so continuously. To calculate on rest, it may be suggested, was to calculate without the enemy. Such an idea has no true bearing on the feelings of the garrison of the Peninsula. That the Turks should attack had always been the earnest prayer of all of us, just as much after the 21st August as before it. And now that we had to suspend progress for a bit, work was put in hand upon the line from Suvla to Anzac, a minor offensive routine of sniping and bombing was organised, and, in a word, trench warfare set in on both sides.

On 24th August Lieutenant-General the Hon. J. H. G. Byng, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., assumed command of the 9th Army Corps.

The last days of the month were illumined by a brilliant affair carried through by the troops under General Birdwood's command. Our object was to complete the capture of Hill 60 north of the Kaijak Aghala, commenced by Major-General Cox on the 21st August. Hill 60 overlooked the Biyuk Anafarta Valley, and was therefore tactically a very important feature.

The conduct of the attack was again entrusted to Major-General Cox, at whose disposal were placed detachments from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and the 5th Connaught Rangers. The advance was timed to take place at 5 p.m. on the 27th of August, after the heaviest artillery bombardment we could afford. This bombardment seemed effective; but the moment the assailants broke cover they were greeted by an exceeding hot fire from the enemy field guns, rifles and machine guns, followed after a brief interval by a shower of heavy shell, some of which, most happily, pitched into the trenches of the Turks. On the right the detachment from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades could make no headway against a battery of machine guns which confronted them. In the centre the New Zealanders made a most determined onslaught, and carried one side of the topmost knoll. Hand-to-hand fighting continued here till 9.30 p.m., when it was reported that nine-tenths of the summit had been gained. On the left the 250 men of the 5th Connaught Rangers excited the admiration of all beholders by the swiftness and cohesion of their charge. In five minutes they had carried their objective, the northern Turkish communications, when they at once set to and began a lively bomb fight along the trenches against strong parties which came hurrying up from the enemy supports and afterwards from their reserves. At midnight fresh troops were to have strengthened our grip upon the

hill, but before that hour the Irishmen had been out-bombed, and the 9th Australian Light Horse, who had made a most plucky attempt to recapture the lost communication trench, had been repulsed. Luckily, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles refused to recognise that they were worsted. Nothing would shift them. All that night and all next day, through bombing, bayonet charges, musketry, shrapnel and heavy shell, they hung on to their 150 yards of trench. At 1 a.m. on August 29th the 10th Light Horse made another attack on the lost communication trenches to the left, carried them, and finally held them. This gave us complete command of the underfeature, an outlook over the Anafarta Sagir Valley, and safer lateral communications between Anzac and Suvla Bay.

Our casualties in this hotly contested affair amounted to 1,000. The Turks lost out of all proportion more. Their line of retreat was commanded from our Kaijak Dere trenches, whence our observers were able to direct artillery fire equally upon their fugitives and their reinforcements. The same observers estimated the Turkish casualties at no less than 5,000. Three Turkish machine guns and 46 prisoners were taken, as well as three trench mortars, 300 Turkish rifles, 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and 500 bombs. Four hundred acres were added to the territories of Anzac. Major-General Cox showed his usual forethought and wisdom. Brigadier-General Russell fought his men splendidly.

My narrative of battle incidents must end here. From this date onwards up to the date of my departure on October 17th the flow of munitions and drafts dried up. Sickness, the legacy of a desperately trying summer, took heavy toll of the survivors of so many arduous conflicts. No longer was there any question of operations on the grand scale, but with such troops it was difficult to be downhearted. All ranks were cheerful; all remained confident that, so long as they stuck to their guns, their country would stick to them, and see them victoriously through the last and greatest of the crusades.

On the 11th October your Lordship cabled asking me for an estimate of the losses which would be involved in an evacuation of the Peninsula. On the 12th October I replied in terms showing that such a step was to me unthinkable. On the 16th October I received a cable recalling me to London for the reason, as I was informed by your Lordship on my arrival, that His Majesty's Government desired a fresh, unbiassed opinion, from a responsible Commander, upon the question of early evacuation.

In bringing this dispatch to a close I wish to refer gratefully to the services rendered by certain formations, whose work has so far only been recognised by a sprinkling of individual rewards.

Much might be written on the exploits of the Royal Naval Air Service, but these bold flyers are laconic, and their feats will mostly pass unrecorded. Yet let me here thank them, with their Commander, Colonel F. H. Sykes, of the Royal Marines, for the nonchalance with which they appear to affront danger and death, when and where they can. So doing, they quicken the hearts of their friends on land and sea—an asset of greater military value even than their bombs or

aerial reconnaissances, admirable in all respects as these were.

With them I also couple the *Service de l'Aviation* of the *Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient*, who daily wing their way in and out of the shrapnel under the distinguished leadership of M. le Capitaine Césari.

The Armoured Car Division (Royal Naval Air Service) have never failed to respond to any call which might be made upon them. Their organisation was broken up; their work had to be carried out under strange conditions—from the bows of the "River Clyde," as independent batteries attached to infantry divisions, &c., &c.—and yet they were always cheerful, always ready to lend a hand in any sort of fighting that might give them a chance of settling old scores with the enemy.

Next I come to the Royal Artillery. By their constant vigilance, by their quick grasp of the key to every emergency, by their thundering good shooting, by hundreds of deeds of daring, they have earned the unstinted admiration of all their comrade services. Where all fought so remarkably the junior officers deserve a little niche of their own in the Dardanelles record of fame. Their audacity in reconnaissance, their insouciance under the hottest of fires, stand as a fine example not only to the Army, but to the nation at large.

A feature of every report, narrative or diary I have read has been a tribute to the stretcher bearers. All ranks, from Generals in command to wounded men in hospital, are unanimous in their praise. I have watched a party from the moment when the telephone summoned them from their dug-out to the time when they returned with their wounded. To see them run light-heartedly across fire-swept slopes is to be privileged to witness a superb example of the hero in man. No braver corps exists, and I believe the reason to be that all thought of self is instinctively flung aside when the saving of others is the motive.

The services rendered by Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) E. A. Altham, C.B., C.M.G., Inspector-General of Communications, and all the Departments and Services of the Lines of Communication assured us a life-giving flow of drafts, munitions and supplies. The work was

carried out under unprecedented conditions, and is deserving, I submit, of handsome recognition.

With General Altham were associated Brigadier-General (temporary Major-General) C. R. R. McGregor, C.B., at first Commandant of the Base at Alexandria and later Deputy Inspector-General of Communications, and Colonel T. E. O'Leary, Deputy Adjutant-General, 3rd Echelon. Both of these officers carried out their difficult duties to my entire satisfaction.

My Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Pollen, has displayed first-class ability in the conduct of his delicate and responsible duties.

Also I take the opportunity of my last dispatch to mention two of my Aides-de-Camp—Major F. L. Magkill-Crichton-Maitland, Gordon Highlanders, Lieutenant Hon. G. St. J. Brodrick, Surrey Yeomanry.

I have many other names to bring to notice for distinguished and gallant service during the operations under review, and these will form the subject of a separate communication.

And now, before affixing to this dispatch my final signature as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, let me first pay tribute to the everlasting memory of my dear comrades who will return no more. Next, let me thank each and all, Generals, Staff, Regimental Leaders, and rank and file, for their wonderful loyalty, patience, and self-sacrifice. Our progress was constant, and if it was painfully slow—they know the truth. So I bid them all farewell with a special God-speed to the campaigners who have served with me right through from the terrible yet most glorious earlier days—the incomparable 29th Division; the young veterans of the Naval Division; the ever-victorious Australians and New Zealanders; the stout East Lances, and my own brave fellow-countrymen of the Lowland Division of Scotland.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

IAN HAMILTON,

*General, Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.*

APPENDICES TO DISPATCH OF GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON, DATED 11TH DECEMBER, 1915.

Vice-Admiral, Commanding
Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,
17th July, 1915.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward a series of tables drawn up to show in detail the men, animals, vehicles, stores, &c., which it will be required to land in connection with the forthcoming operations. I shall be grateful if you will let me know as early as possible if you consider that any part of the programme indicated presents especially serious difficulties or is likely to require modification.

In informing me of the results of your consideration, I shall be obliged if you will let me know what craft you intend to use in carrying out the disembarkations referred to in tables B, C, D and E, so that detailed arrangements with regard to embarkation and to the allocation of troops, &c., to boats may be prepared.

2. Immediately after the disembarkation of the details referred to in the attached tables it will be necessary, if the operations are successful, to land 5,000 to 7,000 horses in order to render the force sufficiently mobile to carry the operations to a conclusion. Details as to disembarkation of these

horses will be forwarded to you later. In the meantime the horses will be collected at Alexandria, and should subsequently be brought up to Mudros or Imbros, to begin arriving on August 6th.

It will also be necessary to land the remaining portions of the units referred to in the tables (first line transport, &c.), and, further, the remaining units of the formations to which they belong. In this latter category will be included three batteries of heavy artillery with mechanical

transport. It will not be required to land any of the above until after August 7th, and details as to numbers, order of disembarkation, &c., will be forwarded to you later.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) IAN HAMILTON,

*General, Commanding
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.*

TABLE A.

Table showing units and details which it is required to land gradually at Anzac Cove before the morning of the 3rd August. It will be necessary to carry out these disembarkations by night, and the movements can begin as soon as it is convenient to the Naval Transport authorities.

Unit.	From	To	Per- sonnel.	Vehicles.	Animals.	Stores.	Remarks.
69th Howitzer Bde. R.F.A.	Mudros ...	Anzac Cove	312	16 guns, 16 wagons, 4 water carts	Nil		
1/3rd City of Glasgow 5" Howr. Battery	Helles ...	Anzac Cove	78	4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 water cart	Nil		
10th Heavy Battery R.G.A.	On board ship at Mudros	Anzac Cove	11	4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 water cart, 2 G.S. wagons	Nil		I.G.C. has already been instructed to arrange for this move.
One F.A. Bde. (11th Division, "A" Bde.)	On board ship at Mudros	Anzac Cove	33	16 guns, 32 wagons, telegraph cart, 4 water carts	Nil		I.G.C. has already been instructed to arrange for this move.
Reinforcements for Units of A.N.Z.A.C.	Alexandria	Anzac Cove	7,000 to 8,000	Nil	Nil		—
Mule Corps ...	Helles ...	Anzac Cove	50	Nil	200		By August 1st.
Ammunition Park	Mudros ...	Anzac Cove	65	Nil	Nil	S.A. Ammn. 5,500,000 rounds Mk. VII (a) (225 tons), 760,000 rounds Mk. VI (30 tons) Gun Ammunition (b) 10 pr. 2,700 (19 tons), 18 pr. 5,500 (70 tons), 4-5" How. 1,600 (45 tons), 5" How. 10,000 (330 tons), 6" How 1,200 (70 tons), 60 pr. 1,000 (30 tons)	

(a) If possible, an additional 3,000,000 S.A.A. should be landed, so that half the reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ashore before operations begin (see Table "C" Remarks).

(b) If possible, the following additional gun ammunition should also be landed, so that the full reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ashore before operations begin :—

10 pr. ...	...	...	...	...	3,000 rounds	} See Table "C" Remarks.
18 pr. ...	...	...	...	...	10,000 "	
6" Howitzer ...	...	...	...	...	1,000 "	

TABLE B.

Table showing units and details which it is required to land at Anzac Cove on the nights of August 3rd/4th, August 4th/5th and August 5th/6th.

Unit.	From	Date.	Personnel.	Vehicles.	Remarks.
6 Battalions (a), 13th Division	Mudros ...	Night, August 3rd/4th.	4,650	Nil	Machine guns and other equipment carried by hand.
Bearer Sub-Division, personnel Anzac	Mudros ...	Night, August 3rd/4th	100	Nil	
7 Battalions (a), 13th Division	Mudros ...	Night, August 4th/5th	5,425	Nil	Machine guns and other equipment carried by hand.
Bearer Sub-Division, 1 Field Ambulance, 13th Division	Mudros ...	Night, August 4th/5th	125	Nil	
4 Battalions, 10th Division	Mudros ...	Night, August 5th/6th	3,100	Nil	Machine guns and other equipment carried by hand.
29th Indian Brigade and Field Ambulance	Imbros ...	Night, August 5th/6th	2,000	Nil	
Bearer Sub-Divisions, 2 Field Ambulance, 13th Division	Mudros ...	Night, August 5th/6th	255	Nil	—
3 Field Companies R.E. (a), 13th Division	Mudros ...	Night, August 5th/6th	525	Nil	Machine guns and other equipment carried by hand. All tools carried by hand.

(a) These units to move from Helles to Mudros as follows :—

1 Brigade	Night,	1 Brigade	Night,	1 Brigade	Night,
1 Field Company	28th/29th July.	1 Field Company	29th/30th July.	1 Field Company	30th/31st July.

TABLE C.

Table showing units and details which it is required to land at New Beach during the night of August 6th/7th, beginning one hour after dark (9.30 p.m.). All troops will come from Imbros, but horses will come direct except where otherwise stated.

Unit.	Personnel.	Horses.	Vehicles.	Remarks.
1 Inf. Bde. and Sig. Sec. (a) ...	3,050	36	Nil	Personnel only to be disembarked in the order shown. Animals of Mountain Batteries as soon as there is sufficient light, followed by horses of one 18-pr. Battery (82) and of H.Q. F.A. Brigade (10). Animals of remaining units to follow in the order shown. Supplies and forage for 7 days for these troops and animals to be dumped on the beach as soon as possible, will amount to about 250 tons. S.A.A. 4,000,000 will also have to be landed besides that carried by the troops, say, 150 tons.
1 Bearer Sub-Div. ...	40	Nil	Nil	
1 Inf. Bde. and Sig. Sec. and 1 W/T Station	3,065	36	Nil	
1 Bearer Sub-Div. ...	40	Nil	Nil	
Field Co. R.E. ...	175	16	4 tool carts	
2 Mountain Batts. (b) ...	100	80	Nil	
Div. H.Q. and Sig. Co. ...	125	28	2 cable wagons, 1 water cart, 2 limbd. R.E. wagons	Artillery reserve ammunition will also be required as follows :— To come by trawler from Mudros 10 pr. 3,000 rds. (20 tons) 18 „ 10,000 „ (130 „) 60 „ 1,000 „ (30 „) (See notes to Table A.) If reserve S.A.A. and gun ammunition can be put ashore at Anzac Cove before operations begin this will also be done. But the above-mentioned reserves must also be landed at New Beach in case the congestion on the road from Anzac makes its forwarding a matter of great difficulty.
1 Inf. Bde. and Pioneer Bn. and Sig. Sec. and 1 W/T Station	3,840	44	Nil	
7 Bearer Sub-Divs. ...	300	Nil	Nil	
2 Platoons Div. Cycl. Co. ...	62	Nil	62 bicycles	
2 Field Cos. R.E. ...	350	32	8 tool carts	
1 F.A. Bde. ("L" Bde.) (c) ...	550	251	16 guns, 44 wagons, 1 telephone wagon, 5 water carts	

(a) Helles to Imbros, night July 31st/August 1st.

(b) Helles to Imbros, night August 1st/2nd.

(c) Animals in remarks columns (82 and 10) come from Imbros, remainder from Mudros in horse-ships.

TABLE C—continued.

Unit.	Personnel.	Horses.	Vehicles.	Remarks.
Ammn. Park Personnel (11 Div.)	65	Nil	Nil	
9 Tent Sub-Divs. ...	350	84 horses or 144 mules	30 ambulance wagons, 9 water carts, 3 Maltese carts	
4 Casualty Clearing Stations ...	360	Nil	Nil	
Bde. Ammn. Col. ...	60	62	8 ammunition wagons, 1 water cart, 4 S.A.A. wagons	
2 Bns. for Beach Parties ...	1,000	Nil	Nil	
Mule Corps ...	150	300	150 mule carts	
Wireless Sec. ...	18	16	2 two-horse vehicles	

TABLE D.

Table showing units and details which it is required to land at Anzac Cove beginning at dawn August 7th. Order of landing as shown. All these troops will come from Mudros.

Unit.	Personnel.	Horses.	Vehicles.	Remarks.
Medical personnel, tent sub-divisions A. and N.Z.A.C. Field Ambulance	900	Nil	Nil	All spare stretchers to be carried by hand.
Bearer Sub-Divisions of 1 Field Ambulance, 10th Division	125	Nil	Nil	
One 18-pr. Battery and H.Q. F.A. Bde. ("A" Bde.)	120	92	Nil	
10th Heavy Battery R.G.A. ...	110	70	Nil	
Three 18-pr. Batteries ("A" Brigade) ...	300	246	Nil	Guns and personnel already ashore. (See Tables A and B.)
Mules of Mule Corps ...	*	400	Nil	* Sufficient personnel to look after mules.

TABLE E.

Table showing units to be ready to land immediately after those shown in Tables A, B, C and D. Units will probably be required in the order shown either at New Beach or Anzac Cove as circumstances may dictate.

Unit.	From	Personnel.	Animals.	Vehicles.	Remarks.
Divl. H.Q. 10th Divn. ...	Mudros ...	125	28	2 limbered R.E. wagons, 1 water cart, 2 cable wagons	S.A.A. 2,600,000 rounds besides that carried on the men.
3 Battalions 10th Divn. ...	Mudros ...	2,325	40	6 water carts ...	
6 Battalions 10th Divn ...	Port Iero	4,650	76	12 water carts.	
H.Q. Divl. R.E. ...	Mudros ...	525	30	12 tool carts, 3 water carts	
3 Field Cos. R.E. 10th Division	—	—	—	—	
Bearer Sub-Divisions of 2 Field Ambulances, 10th Divn.	Mudros ...	250	—	—	
15th Heavy Battery R.G.A. ...	On board ship — Mudros	121	70	4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 water cart, 2 G.S. wagons	
Tent Sub-Divisions of 10th Divn.	Mudros ...	350	54 horses or 84 mules	15 ambulance wagons, 12 carts	
Mule Corps ...	Mudros ...	150	300	150 carts.	

General Officer Commanding
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

With reference to your G. 288 of 15th July, the Navy is being asked to provide transport for the following ammunition to be landed at Anzac by the 3rd August :—

For A. and N.Z.A.C.—Sufficient S.A.A. to bring the amount on shore up to 500 rounds per rifle and 27,500 per machine-gun.

For other Troops.—300 rounds per rifle and 24,000 rounds per machine-gun (in addition to what the troops will carry on landing).

These will come to 10,000,000 rounds in all, and arrangements are being made to begin landing this ammunition as soon as possible.

2. The following artillery ammunition will also have to be gradually landed and stored, and should all be ashore, if possible, by August 3rd :—

10 pr.	5,700 rounds
18 pr. (probably 15 per cent. H.E.)	15,500 "
4.5" Howitzer probably half H.E.	1,600 "
5" Howitzer majority H.E.	10,000 "
6" " majority H.E.	1,200 "
60 pr. probably two-thirds H.E.	1,000 "

All of this ammunition is not yet arrived, and the proportion of H.E. shell is not yet ascertainable from England. The arrangements suggested in your paragraph 2 (iii.) of your letter are noted, and will be followed as far as possible.

3. With regard to the marking of ammunition-boxes, the necessary arrangements are being prepared. You will be informed of the arrangements and of the system of marking in due course.

Consignments of Mark VI. and Mark VII. will be sent separately as you suggest.

4. The above figures do not include the periodical replenishment referred to in para. 2 (iv.) of your letter. Despatch of consignments on this account and consignments for the reserve will be notified to you separately.

(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

Enclosed a copy of tables forwarded to Vice-Admiral showing troops, animals, stores, &c., which the Navy is being asked to land at Anzac.

22nd July, 1915.

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
9TH CORPS.

The General Commanding wishes me to send you the following outline of his plans for the next general attack, for the exclusive information of yourself, your divisional Generals, and such Officers of your Corps Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters as you may consider it necessary to take into your confidence. I am to add that it is Sir Ian's wish that as few officers as possible should be made acquainted with it.

2. The general plan is, while holding as many of the enemy as possible in the southern theatre, to throw the weight of our attack on the Turkish forces now opposite the Australian and New Zealand

Army Corps. It is hoped, by means of an attack on the front and right flank of these forces, to deal them a crushing blow, and to drive the remnants south towards Kilid Bahr. It will then be the object of the General Commanding to seize a position across the peninsula from Kaba Tepe to Maidos with a protected line of supply from Suvla Bay.

3. The strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr at the present time is about 30,000 men. Of these some 12,000 are permanently maintained in the trenches opposite the Anzac position, and the majority of the remainder are held in reserve at Boghali, Kojadere and Eski-Keui. It is believed that there are about three battalions in the Anafarta villages, a battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe (New map 1/20,000), a battalion near Yilghin Burnu, and small parties of outposts at Lala Baba (Sq. 104.L.) and Ghazi Baba (Sq. 106.N.). The hills due east of Suvla Bay towards Aji Liman are believed to be held only by a few Gendarmerie, but information on this point is at present not precise. The hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain one 4.7" gun, one 9.2" gun, and three field guns, protected by wire entanglements and infantry trenches, but it is believed that the main defences are against attack from the south or west, and that there is no wire on the northern slopes of the hills; also that the guns can only be fired in a southerly direction.

4. The success of the plan outlined in paragraph 2 will depend on two main factors :—

- (a) The capture of Hill 305 (Sq. 93.W.).
- (b) The capture and retention of Suvla Bay as a base of operations for the northern army.

5. The operations from within the present Anzac position against the enemy on Hill 305 will be carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Corps, temporarily reinforced by the following units of the 9th Army Corps :—

- 13th Division (less 66th, 67th and 68th Brigades, R.F.A.).
- 29th Infantry Brigade (10th Division).
- 29th Indian Brigade.
- 69th Howitzer Brigade, R.F.A.

6. The landing near Suvla will be entrusted to you, and you will have at your disposal :—

- 11th Division.
- 10th Division (less 29th Brigade).
- Highland Mountain Artillery Brigade.
- 1st/4th Lowland Howitzer Brigade.

The disembarkation of your command, which may be expected to be opposed, though not in great strength, will be after dark at a point immediately south of Lala Baba. The first troops to disembark will be the 11th Division, which will have been concentrated at Imbros previously to the attack, and will be brought across under cover of darkness in destroyers and motor-lighters. It is expected that approximately 4,000 men will be disembarked simultaneously, and that three infantry brigades and the mountain artillery brigade will be ashore before daylight.

Your first objectives will be the high ground at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba, and the hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe. It will also be necessary to send a small force to secure a footing on the hills due east of Suvla Bay. It is of

first importance that Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe should be captured by a coup-de-main before daylight in order to prevent the guns which they contain being used against our troops on Hill 305 and to safeguard our hold on Suvla Bay. It is hoped that one division will be sufficient for the attainment of these objectives.

Your subsequent moves will depend on circumstances which cannot at present be gauged, but it is hoped that the remainder of your force will be available on the morning of the 7th August to advance on Biyuk Anafarta with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of Hill 305, so as to assist General Birdwood's attack.

7. The operations from within the present Anzac position will begin during the day immediately preceding your disembarkation (the reinforcements for General Birdwood's force having been dribbled ashore in detachments at Anzac Cove on the three previous nights). The operations will begin with a determined attack on the Turkish left centre, Lonesome Pine and Johnston's Jolly (see enlarged map of Anzac position), with the object of attracting the enemy's reserves to this portion of the line. The Turks have for long been apprehensive of our landing in the neighbourhood of Kaba Tepe, and it is hoped that an attack in force in this quarter will confirm their apprehensions. At nightfall the Turkish outposts on the extreme right of the enemy's line will be rushed, and a force of 20,000 men will advance in three or more columns up the ravines running down from Chunuk Bair. This advance, which will begin about the same time as your first troops reach the shore, will be so timed as to reach the summit of the main ridge near Chunuk Bair about 2.30 a.m. (soon after moon-rise).

Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on this ridge do not extend further north than Chunuk Bair, and it is unlikely that the higher portions of the ridge are held in great strength.

As soon as a lodgement has been effected on this ridge a portion of the attacking force will be left

to consolidate the position gained and the remainder will advance south-west against the enemy's trenches near Baby 700, which will be attacked simultaneously by a special detachment from within the Anzac position.

An advance by your force from the east will, as already indicated in paragraph 6, be of great assistance in the event of this attack being checked.

8. The landing of sufficient transport to secure the mobility of your force will be a matter of considerable difficulty. No animals or vehicles of any kind will be able to land in the first instance, and machine-guns, tools and necessary medical and signalling equipment must be carried by hand. All men will land with two iron rations (one day's meat ration only is advised); infantry will carry 200 rounds S.A.A. and machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds in belt boxes. Packs and greatcoats will not be taken ashore. Before dawn it is hoped to land enough horses to secure the mobility of the mountain artillery brigade and one battery R.F.A., and it is hoped that within the first 24 hours the disembarkation of all the personnel, horses and vehicles enumerated in the attached table will be complete.

One brigade R.F.A. 11th Division, 1/4th Lowland 5th Howitzer Brigade (two batteries) and the 10th Heavy Battery, will be landed at Anzac before the operations commence, and their personnel and horses will disembark on the morning following your disembarkation, and will then be directed along the beach to join your command.

Water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley, but pending the disembarkation of water carts a number of mules with special 8-gallon water bags will be attached to the units of your command.

(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

P.S.—This letter is never to be out of an officer's possession, and if, as is probable, you require to send it to your Brig.-Gen. G.S., it must be sent to Mudros in charge of an officer.

TABLE.

11TH DIVISION.						ANIMALS.	VEHICLES.
Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co.	...	...	...	...	...	28	1 cart, 2 cable wagons.
3 Infantry Brigades	...	...	...	...	...	108	Nil.
Pioneer Battalion	...	...	...	...	...	8	Nil.
2 F.A. Brigades	...	...	...	...	...	506	32 guns, 88 wagons, 2 telegraph wagons, 10 carts.
1 Heavy Battery R.G.A.	...	...	...	...	...	45	4 guns, 4 wagons, 2 G.S. wagons, 1 cart.
3 Field Coys. R.E.	...	...	...	...	...	48	12 tool carts.
2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co.	...	...	...	...	...	Nil	62 bicycles.
3 Field Ambulances	...	...	...	...	...	144	30 ambulances, 12 carts.
10TH DIVISION.							
Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co.	}					—	Transport on approximately the same scale as that for 11th Division.
1½ Infantry Brigades							
Pioneer Battalion							
3 Field Coys. R.E.							
3 Field Ambulances							
29th Indian Brigade and Indian Field Ambulance.							
2 Mountain Batteries (80 mules).							
2 Battalions (of 500 men each) for Beach parties.							
Mule Corps with 300 mules and 150 carts.							
3 Casualty Clearing Stations.							

Organisation Orders for Troops Landing at Anzac.

1. Troops landing at Anzac are to land equipped as follows:—

F.S. equipment, including respirator;

Pack and waterproof sheet;

No blanket.

Officers' kit reduced to what they can carry.

No transport of any kind will be available to move baggage or equipment.

Ammunition S.A.A. 200 rounds per rifle or person. 3,500 rounds per machine-gun in belt boxes.

No regimental reserve S.A.A.

Gun, limbers and wagons filled with fuzed shell.

Water bottles—filled.

Rations—iron rations one day meat and biscuit, two days' groceries.

Sufficient to provide breakfasts.

(Fuel will be issued on shore.)

Tools—infantry. Regimental reserve distributed to individuals and carried on person; Brigade reserve entering tools distributed to units, by them to individuals and carried on person.

Engineers—tools for road making and entrenching work—carried on person.

Other arms—usual allotment.

Signal company cable and equipment usually carried in carts to be transferred to barrows.

Ambulances—all available stretchers and equipment of dressing stations only. Tent subdivisions in readiness to rejoin early.

A.S.C.—Small allowance of distributing equipment, to be brought by advance parties of S. and T. personnel.

Establishments.

2. No horses, attendants or drivers are to land. Brigade Sections of Signal Companies are to land with the brigades they serve.

Tent sub-divisions of field ambulances are not to land.

Equipment carried in technical vehicles is to be transferred to vehicles which can be hand-propelled or else carried on person.

3. Troops should disembark into lighters, &c., in complete units, companies, platoons, and so on, unless much space is sacrificed in so doing.

4. All troops should land wearing two white 6-inch armlets and a white patch on back of right shoulder.

5. No lights or noise are to be permitted while disembarking; troops will move into the lighters or horse-boats as quickly as possible.

6. On disembarking troops will be met by staff officers and guides, and will be marched off direct to the ground allotted to them—in no case more than 1,200 yards from the beach. All kit brought must be removed by the troops, and must be taken out of the lighters at the same time as the troops leave.

Special parties to assist with the machine-gun and other loads are to be detailed in the load of each lighter.

7. No lights or talking are permitted on the beach or till the troops reach their allotted area. Fires are not to be lit in any area till 4.15 a.m., and must be extinguished by 8 p.m. Green wood is not to be used; the smoke it causes will draw shell fire.

8. No troops are to leave the area allotted to them between 4 a.m. and 8 p.m. except on special duty with the authority of the Brigade Commander. Piquets will be placed under area arrangements at intervals round the area to prevent men straying independently.

9. Troops may be exposed to desultory shelling during the day or night. This is never aimed, and the best protection against it is to move into the bottom of the gully in which the troops are bivouacked.

10. Troops are not to use any portion of the iron ration with which they land. Issues will be made under brigade arrangements of rations and extras to last the period of their stay.

11. Water is issued on ration at one gallon fresh water per day. This includes water for all purposes. For bathing, the sea is available, but may only be visited after 9 p.m. daily.

12. Latrines for immediate use are dug and marked in each area; additional latrines are to be prepared by units and the strictest orders issued to prevent fouling the ground. Latrines are to be made very deep, as space is much restricted.

13. Casualties of any kind after treatment in the field ambulance affiliated to the brigade will be taken to the casualty clearing station in Anzac Cove for removal to Hospital Ship.

Urgent cases at any time; others as far as possible between 7.30 and 8.30 p.m. and between 6 and 9 a.m.

14. The following is to be practised by all troops after landing:—

Falling in once during the night in any close formation, and to remain so closed up for a period of at least half an hour, during which passing of commands (messages from front to rear and back again and to the flanks) is to be practised.

The troops must be accustomed to the starlight, which may be expected during night operations.

15. If aeroplanes pass overhead troops are not to look up, as this will give away the position of bodies of troops and probably draw shell fire.

16. Troops landing should be provided with Maps 1/20,000 of the area in which operations are to take place. These maps to be in bulk, and not issued till after landing.

Maps 1/10,000 of the Anzac area showing roads and bivouacs will be issued to unit commanders on arrival.

17. Telephone lines will be found laid from Anzac Headquarters to points suitable for Brigade or higher Headquarters. On arrival brigades will join up these points to Anzac.

An officer and two orderlies per brigade will also be detailed to remain at Anzac Headquarters.

Staffs of formations higher than brigades will be located within easy reach of Anzac Headquarters.

G.S.R.Z. 18/2.

Instructions for G.O.C. 9th Army Corps.

Reference Sheet Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli
Map 1/20,000.

1. The intentions of the General Commanding for the impending operations, and a rough outline of the task which he has allotted to the troops under your command, were communicated to you in my G.S.R.Z. 18, dated 22nd instant.

2. In addition to the information contained in paragraph 3 of the above quoted letter, small numbers of Turkish mounted troops and Gendarmerie have been reported in the country north of Anzac, and three guns with limbers, each drawn by six oxen, have been seen moving into Anafarta Sagir. An aeroplane photograph has also disclosed the presence of a few trenches on Lala Baba. A sketch of these trenches, which have apparently been constructed for some months, is attached. It is believed that the channel connecting the Salt Lake with Suvla Bay is now dry.

3. Your landing will begin on the night 6th/7th August. Your primary objective will be to secure Suvla Bay as a base for all the forces operating in the northern zone. Owing to the difficult nature of the terrain, it is possible that the attainment of this objective will, in the first instance, require the use of the whole of the troops at your disposal. Should, however, you find it possible to achieve this object with only a portion of your force, your next step will be to give such direct assistance as is in your power to the G.O.C. Anzac in his attack on Hill 305, by an advance on Biyuk Anafarta, with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of that hill.

4. Subject only to his final approval, the General Commanding gives you an entirely free hand in the selection of your plan of operations.

He, however, directs your special attention to the fact that the hills Yilghin and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain guns which can bring fire to bear on the flank and rear of an attack on Hill 305, and that on this account they assume an even greater importance in the first instance than if they were considered merely part of a position covering Suvla Bay. If, therefore, it is possible, without prejudice to the attainment of your primary objective, to gain possession of these hills at an early period of your attack, it will greatly facilitate the capture and retention of Hill 305. It would also appear almost certain that until these hills are in your possession it will be impossible to land either troops or stores in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay by day.

5. The troops at your disposal will be:—

11th Division (less one Brigade R.F.A., at Helles).

10th Division (less 29th Infantry Brigade).

Three squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division, R.N.A.S. (one squadron motor cycles, six machine guns; one squadron Ford cars, six machine guns; one squadron armoured cars, six machine guns).

Two Highland Mountain Artillery batteries.

An endeavour will be made to release for your force one or more 5-in. howitzer batteries, now at Anzac, during the day following your initial disembarkation.

(C 49—242)

6. In order that you may be able to arrange for the disembarkation of your force to agree, so far as Naval exigencies will admit, with the plan of operations on which you decide, the allocation of troops to the ships and boats to be provided by the Navy is left to your decision.

With this object, tables have been drawn up, and are enclosed with these instructions, showing the craft which can be placed at your disposal by the Navy, their capacity, and the points at which the troops can be disembarked. The tables also show what numbers of troops, animals, vehicles, and stores can be landed simultaneously.

The beaches available for your landing on the first night are (1) a frontage of 600 yards in Suvla Bay (sq. 117 Q.V.); (2) a frontage of 1,800 yards S. of Kuchuk Kemikli (sq. 9, 103 z, 101 V; 91 A.B.), called "New Beach" in the tables. It will not be possible in the first instance to land more than one brigade of your force in Suvla Bay, though other vessels can simultaneously be discharging their passengers on New Beach.

7. As regards the time at which the disembarkation may be expected to commence, no craft will be allowed to leave Kephalos Harbour till after dark, and the passage across will take from one and a half to two hours. It is unsafe, therefore, to count on any troops being ashore before 10.30 p.m., and in no case must your approach be disclosed to the enemy till 10 p.m., the hour at which the outposts on the left flank of the Anzac position are to be rushed.

8. No allowance has been made in the tables for the disembarkation of your headquarters, as it is not known at what period of the operations you will wish them to land.

9. Special attention is directed to paragraph 8 of my letter G.S.R. Z. 18, dated 22nd July.

10. The infantry of the 53rd Division will be available as Army Reserve, and will be at the disposal of the General Commanding.

11. Special instructions regarding signal communications will be issued later. In general terms the arrangements will be as follows:—

There is a submarine cable between Imbros and Anzac, and a cable will be laid as soon as practicable from Imbros to Suvla Bay. A submarine cable and a land cable will also be laid between Anzac and Suvla Bay as soon as circumstances permit, probably before dawn. Pending the completion of this work inter-communication between Anzac and Suvla Bay will be carried out by lamp, and, subject to Naval approval, between Suvla Bay and Imbros by wireless telegraphy.

*Two military pack W.T. stations and one R.M. Base W.T. station will be provided at Suvla Bay, 4 naval ratings will be attached to each station as visual signalling personnel. One of these military pack W.T. stations will be disembarked with the second brigade to land, and will act as a base station pending the arrival of the R.N. Base wireless station. The second military pack W.T. station will be disembarked with the third brigade to land; it will be placed on a flank and used mainly for fire control under the B.G.R.A.

A wagon wireless station at G.H.Q., Imbros, will be in communication with both these pack W.T. stations.

* All W.T. arrangements are subject to alteration, as they have not yet been confirmed by the Vice-Admiral.

K 2

One officer and 23 other ranks, with two pack animals from the Brigade Signal Section, will be landed with each Infantry Brigade.

These parties will lay their cable by hand and establish telephone and vibrator communication from the beach forward. No vehicles will be landed in the first instance, all necessary stores being man-handled.

Three officers, 74 other ranks, 28 animals and five vehicles will be landed with Divisional Headquarters.

The advance parties will release the brigade sections from the beach and be prepared to lay cable lines by hand.

Two cable wagons will be included in the five vehicles, and should be the first of those vehicles to be disembarked.

As soon as possible after Corps Headquarters go ashore, the personnel of the Divisional Signal Companies will be released from work at the beach.

Arrangements will be made subsequently to disembark an air line detachment and a cable section to provide and pole local lines.

The remainder of the Corps Headquarters Signal Company will be kept in readiness to be forwarded as soon as Corps Headquarters reports that circumstances admit of its disembarkation.

12. Two Military Landing Officers and their assistant military landing officers will be placed at your disposal from units other than those under your command.

13. In addition to the units mentioned in Tables A-E forwarded to you with my letter

G.S.R. Z. 18, dated 23rd July, the following are being dispatched from Alexandria in this order:—

Three Squadrons Armoured Car Division R.N.A.S. (These will be available to land on the morning after your disembarkation begins, if you so desire.)

(1) H.Q.R.A. 10th Division.

Two F.A. Brigades 10th Division (modified scale of horses).

R.A. personnel and ammunition of 10th Divisional Ammunition Park.

(2) One F.A. Brigade 11th Division (modified scale of horses).

One F.A. Brigade 10th Division (modified scale of horses).

(3) Two F.A. Brigades 13th Division.

(4) Horses for 11th Division.

and the following will be assembled at Imbros to land when required:—

11th Divisional Cyclist Company (less two Platoons).

10th Divisional Cyclist Company.

13th Divisional Cyclist Company.

14. You are requested to submit your proposed plan of operations to G.H.Q. for approval at the earliest possible date.

(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

Major-General, C.G.S.,

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

29th July, 1915.

Time of Arrival off Coast.	Craft.	Capacity.	Landing Place.	Method of Disembarkation.	Remarks.
In time to disembark all troops, vehicles, horses, stores, &c., by night	10 motor lighters (10 steamboats accompanying)	500 infantry each (and 400,000 rds. S.A.A. if necessary)	7 lighters at New Beach, 3 lighters at Suvla Bay	Land direct on beach	Ammunition if necessary may be left on motor lighters until convenient to land it, according to circumstances.
	10 destroyers ...	530 infantry each	One attending each motor lighter	Motor lighters take off troops and land them on beach	The disembarkation from the destroyers cannot begin until the 10 motor lighters have landed their complement and returned.
	1 sloop, towing 1 motor lighter and 4 horseboats (1 steamboat accompanying)	600 men ... 88 horses 8 mtm. guns 30 bicycles	New Beach ...	Motor lighters and horseboats loaded with guns, horses of mountain and 18-pr. batteries. Sloop loaded with men and bicycles	The sloops and trawler, after casting off their tows, will return to Kephalos. Other horseboats will be there, ready filled with the remainder of the horses required in the first instance for the two Mountain Batteries, the 18-pr. Battery, and the Signal Company. They will pick up these horseboats and tow them over to the beach immediately.
	1 sloop, towing 4 horseboats (1 steamboat accompanying)	500 men ... 24 horses 4 18-pr. guns or wagons	New Beach ...	Horseboats loaded with guns, vehicles, and horses of 18-pr. battery. Sloop loaded with men and bicycles	
	1 trawler, towing 4 horseboats (1 steamboat accompanying)	250 men ... 24 horses 4 18-pr. guns or wagons	New Beach ...	Horseboats loaded with guns, vehicles, and horses of 18-pr. battery. Trawler available to carry men.	
	H.M.S. "Endymion"	1,000 men ...	New Beach or Suvla Bay, as may be convenient	Landed either from cutters towed by steamboats, or from motor lighters	—
	H.M.S. "Theseus"	1,000 men ...			—

The above would admit of the disembarkation before dawn at and in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay of :—

Divisional Headquarters.
Signal Co. with 40 horses.
1 W.T. Section and 2 W.T. Stations.
H.Q. F.A. Bde. (18-pr.) with 10 horses.
1 F.A. Battery (18-pr.) with 82 horses.
2 Mountain Batteries with 80 horses.
3 Field Companies R.E.
3 Infantry Brigades and part of remainder of F.A. Bde. (personnel).

1 Pioneer Battalion.
2 Battalions for Beach parties and part of Ammn. Park personnel.
2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co. and part of Tent Subdivisions of Field Ambulances.
Bearer Subdivisions of 3 Field Ambulances and part of Casualty Clearing Stations.

The 10 motor lighters will land their complements first, and then the troops from the 10 Destroyers, the two sloops and their tows, and the trawler and her tows, can proceed simultaneously on a front of about 600 yards in Suvla Bay and 1,800 on the beach south of Suvla Bay, directly beach secured. The two landing places are about 2 miles apart. The landing of the troops from H.M.S. "Endymion" and "Theseus" may be able to take place simultaneously, or may have to be deferred until the motor lighters have cleared the destroyers.

Time of Arrival off Coast.	Craft.	Capacity.	Landing Place.	Method of Disembarkation.	Remarks.
At or immediately after dawn	1 horse transport	All horses enumerated in Table C appended to letter G.S.R. Z. 18 of 23rd July, except those already provided for. Water bags and pumps	Suvla Bay ...	Six of the horseboats from which the 18-pr. and mountain batteries will previously have been landed	Transport comes from Mudros.
	1 mule transport	All mules and mule carts provided for in Tables C and E appended to G.S.R. Z. 18 of 23rd July	Suvla Bay ...	Six of the horseboats from which the 18-pr. and mountain batteries will previously have been landed	Transport comes from Alexandria.
	6 small transports	5,000 Infantry	Suvla Bay (or New Beach if necessary)	Landed from motor lighters as soon as they have finished clearing the destroyers and (if necessary) H.M.S. "Endymion" and "Theseus"	Six battalions 10th Division coming from Port Iero.
Called up from Kephalos as soon after dawn as circumstances permit	1 supply ship ...	7 days' supplies for troops and animals in Tables C and E appended to G.S.R. Z. 18 of 23rd July	Suvla Bay ...	Landed from motor lighters as soon as the Port Iero troops are cleared	
Called up from Kephalos as soon after dawn as circumstances permit	4 small transports	2,700 Infantry	Suvla Bay (or New Beach if necessary)	Landed from motor lighters as soon as the Port Iero troops are cleared	Three battalions 10th Division from Mudros.
	1 horse transport	All horses and vehicles enumerated in Table E, appended to G.S.R. Z. 18 of 23rd July	Suvla Bay ...	Landed from horse boats brought up on second trip by the trawler and two sloops, as soon as the horseboats have been emptied	

The above will provide for the disembarkation of the remainder of the troops, &c., enumerated in Tables C and E, appended to letter G.S.R. Z. 18 of 23rd July, that is those not already detailed to be landed before dawn, viz. :—

Remainder of F.A. Brigade (18-pr.)
" Ammunition Park Personnel.
15th Heavy Battery R.G.A.
Brigade Ammunition Column.
Remainder of Tent Subdivisions of field ambulances.
" Casualty Clearing Stations.
Mule Corps.

Also 4,000,000 rds. S.A.A. Reserve Gun Ammunition (by special trawlers from Mudros) 7 days' supplies for the above troops and animals.

G.S.R. Z.18/2.

July 29th.

General Officer Commanding,
8th Corps.

The General Commanding has decided that his next main attack shall be made in the vicinity of Anzac with the object of placing ourselves astride the Peninsula to the north of Kilid Bahr.

2. The 8th Corps with attached troops is to assist this main operation by offensive action in the south, the scope and form of this action being determined solely with reference to its effects on the main operation.

As the decisive point will be in the neighbourhood of Anzac, all reinforcements will be utilised in that theatre, and it is improbable that any will be available for the southern zone before the middle of August, except such drafts for the 8th Corps and the Corps Exp. Orient as may reach the Peninsula in the next ten days.

3. In order to free sufficient troops to enable the 8th Corps to take the offensive, the French will take over part of the line as defined in Force Order No. 22.

4. In addition to the troops of the 8th Corps and R.N.D. at present at your disposal, the following reinforcements may be expected:—

29th Division	..	280	due 29th July.
29th Division	..	900	due 4th August.
42nd Division	..	100	due 29th July.

Total .. 1,280

which, allowing for normal wastage, should give an effective total of 24,780 on 5th August. These numbers, with the shorter line you will be called upon to hold, should leave you with sufficient troops to undertake a limited offensive operation on or about that day.

5. Assuming that you are not attacked in the meanwhile, the total amount of ammunition which should be available at Helles early in August for offensive action, and to maintain a reserve is:—

18 pr.	..	36,000	} Plus any amounts saved from normal daily expenditure.
4.5"	..	2,000	
5"	..	4,000	
6"	..	545	
60 pr.	..	3,000	

but it must be borne in mind that no replacements can be looked for before August 16th.

6. The scope of your offensive action must be based upon these figures, and it is thought that the most suitable objective will be the capture of the Turkish trenches up to the line F. 13, G. 13, H. 13, and H. 12. Plans for this operation should, therefore, be undertaken at once.

7. Pre-supposing that this attack is successful, and that the numbers at your disposal admit of a further advance, the capture of the trenches on the line H. 14 to H. 15, followed perhaps by the capture of Krithia could then be undertaken, and plans for this action should be prepared beforehand. But as the launching of this further attack must be entirely dependent on unknown factors, a definite decision on this point cannot be arrived at beforehand. It is, moreover, essential that the plan of your first attack should not definitely commit your troops to a further advance unless the

trend of events should render such a course desirable.

8. As regards the date for launching your first attack, it is thought that the most favourable time would be shortly before the main operations at Anzac begin, and you should therefore arrange for your first attack to take place on the 4th August.

9. Beyond holding the enemy in front of them to their positions and assisting you with artillery fire, the French will not be asked to take part in your first attack, but, in the event of your reaching Krithia, they will be directed to conform to your movements and to establish themselves on the spurs leading up to Achi Baba.

I will ascertain the amount of artillery support and lean you can expect from the C.E.O., and if the information arrives in time will attach it as an appendix to this letter.

10. The possibility of the southern force being able to capture Achi Baba has not been dealt with in this memorandum, as the attempt should only be made in the event of large reinforcements being available for the southern zone, and these must depend on the course of events in the main theatre.

(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

*Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.*

It will be apparent to you how necessary it is not to allow any suspicion of the reason for the date mentioned in paragraph 8 being told to any person other than your Brigadier-General G.S.

(Intd.) W. P. B.

APPENDIX.

French Artillery Support for 8th Corps.

1. One Brigade of 75's will be placed at the disposal of the 8th Corps for the attack on 4th-5th August.

Of these

- (a) One battery will be moved to support closely the attack on Krithia.
- (b) One battery will fire up the Nullah E. of Krithia.

2. In addition, six French howitzers will be so disposed as to open fire upon Turkish artillery north of the ridge 150—Achi Baba peak.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR G.O.C. A. & N.Z. ARMY CORPS.

Reference Map Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli
Map 1/20,000.

1. The General Commanding has decided to mass the whole of his reinforcements in and immediately north of the area occupied by the corps under your command, with a view to securing Suvla Bay as a base of operations, driving the enemy off the Sari Bair, and eventually securing a position astride the Gallipoli Peninsula from the neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe to the straits north of Maidos.

2. The general outline for your proposals for the action of the A. and N.Z. Army Corps contained in your G a 89 of 1st July are approved.

3. (a) The General Commanding wishes your operations to begin on August 6th with a strong and sustained attack on Hill 125 (Plateau 400), every effort being made to deceive the enemy as to the locality against which our main effort is to be made, and to induce him to believe that it will be directed against his lines opposite the southern portion of your position. In pursuance of this object the Vice-Admiral has arranged that H.M. ships shall in the meantime display increased activity off the coast between Gaba Tepe and Kum Tepe. It has been arranged that soundings shall be taken by night off the coast south of Gaba Tepe; and, on the evening of August 6th, a naval demonstration will be made off this part of the coast, H.M. ships being accompanied by a number of trawlers as if a landing were to be undertaken.

(b) The General Commanding further concurs in the subsequent sequence of the operations outlined by you, namely:—

- (i) The clearing of the enemy's outposts from the ridges facing Nos. 2 and 3 posts, to be undertaken after nightfall.
- (ii) An attack in as great strength as possible up the Sazli Beit Dere, the Chailak Dere and the Aghyl Dere, against the Chunuk Bair ridge, by night.
- (iii) When the Chunuk Bair ridge is gained, a converging attack from that ridge, and from the north-eastern section of your present position, against Hill 180 (Baby 700).

4. (a) For the above operations the following troops will be at your disposal:—

A. & N.Z. Army Corps.
13th Division, less all artillery except 69th F.A. (Howitzer) Brigade.
29th Brigade (10th Division).
29th Indian Brigade.

(b) At the date of commencement of the operations the following troops belonging to or attached to the 9th Army Corps will be at Anzac, but will not, except so far as is stated hereunder, be at your disposal:—

One F.A. Brigade, 11th Division: To rejoin 9th Army Corps as soon as horses are landed.
10th Heavy Battery, R.G.A.: Ditto.
14th Lowland (Howitzer) Brigade (two Batteries): Arrangements must be made so that these batteries may be free to rejoin the 9th Army Corps before night-fall on August 7th.

5. The operations carried out by the Corps under your command will form part of a general combined offensive undertaken by the whole of the forces of the Gallipoli Peninsula and by the 9th Army Corps, which will be disembarked in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay, beginning on the night of August 6th-7th.

(a) The 8th Army Corps, in conjunction with the Corps Expéditionnaire, will attack the Turkish lines south of Krithia on August 4th and 5th. The attack will be made on a large scale, and will be vigorously pressed, and it is hoped that by its means the enemy will be induced to move part of his central reserves southward into the Cape Helles zone during the 5th and 6th, so that they

may not be available in the northern zone on the 6th and 7th.

(b) The 9th Army Corps will begin landing in and close to Suvla Bay during the night of August 6th-7th. Three infantry brigades, with one field and two mountain batteries, engineers and medical services, should be ashore before dawn, and will be closely followed by two more infantry brigades and additional artillery and engineers.

The G.O.C. 9th Army Corps has been informed:

- (i) That his mission is to secure Suvla Bay as a base of operation for all the forces in the northern zone.
- (ii) That the seizure of Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe ("W" and Chocolate Hills), on account of the presence there of artillery which may interfere with your operations, must be considered as of very special importance.
- (iii) That so far as is possible after the fulfilment of his primary mission, he is to render you such direct assistance as may be practicable by moving any available troops via Biyuk Anafarta up the eastern slopes of the Sari Bair.

(c) At the commencement of these operations the infantry of the 53rd Division will be available as Army Reserve and will be at the disposal of the General Commanding.

6. The Vice-Admiral has agreed provisionally to the following allotment of ships affording naval support to the operations:—

In Suvla Bay: One 6" monitor.

South of Kuchuk: H.M.S. "Endymion."

Kemliki (Nibrunesi Point): H.M.S. "Edgar," H.M.S. "Talbot," one 6" monitor, one 9.2" monitor.

These ships would be in position at daylight on August 7th, and would mainly be required to support the operations of the 9th Army Corps.

West of Gaba Tepe: H.M.S. "Baccanto," H.M.S. "Humber," H.M.S. "Havelock," one 6" monitor.

These ships would be in position at 3 p.m. on August 6th, except H.M.S. "Havelock," which would be in position at daylight on August 7th. They would be detailed for support of the right flank of the A. and N.Z. Army Corps.

Off Kum Tepe: One 6" monitor.

A separate communication is being sent to you with regard to the final settlement of details as to the support of the operations by naval guns, allocation of targets, &c.

7. Special instructions regarding signal communication will be issued later. In general terms the arrangements will be as follows:—

A submarine cable and a land cable will be laid between Anzac and Suvla Bay as soon as circumstances permit.

A submarine cable will also be laid as soon as practicable between Imbros and Suvla Bay. Pending the completion of connection between Anzac and Suvla Bay, inter-communication will be carried out by lamp.

Two military pack W/T stations and a R.N. Base W/T station will be established in

the vicinity of Suvla Bay. The W/T station at Anzac will be able to intercept messages from seaplanes, but must not attempt to reply.

W/T via the ships will be an alternative means of communication between G.H.Q. and the troops ashore in case of interruption of cable communication.

A system of flares will be arranged for employment on the left flank of your position at dawn on August 7th to indicate to the ships the positions reached by the troops.

8. G.H.Q. will in the first instance be at Imbros.

(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

G.H.Q., 30th July, 1915.

FORCE ORDER No. 25.

General Headquarters,
2nd August, 1915.

1. The total forces of the enemy in the Gallipoli Peninsula are estimated at 100,000.

Of these, 27,000 are in the neighbourhood of Anzac (5th, 19th, 16th Divisions, and 18th and 64th Regiments); 36,000 are in the Southern zone (1st, 4th, 6th Division less one regiment, 7th Division, 11th Division less one regiment, and one regiment each of the 12th, 25th and 3rd Divisions); and 37,000 are in Reserve (9th Division less one regiment, 12th less one regiment, 13th, 14th, and 25th less one regiment, and 10th Divisions). Of this reserve force two Divisions are in the Bulair district and one Division in the Eyerli Tepe zone. There are 12,000 on the Asiatic shore of the Dandanelles (2nd Division and 8th Division less one regiment). There are believed to be five Divisions (45,000 men) in the Keshan area belonging to the 5th and 6th Corps.

All reports tend to show that though the enemy may be expected to fight well in trenches, their *moral* has suffered considerably as a result of their recent heavy casualties, and that their stock of ammunition is low.

2. The General Commanding intends to carry out a combined and simultaneous attack on the enemy in the northern and southern zone commencing on 6th August, in accordance with the special instructions already issued to the Corps Commanders concerned.

During the first phase of these operations the 13th Division (less three 18-pdr. Bdes. R.F.A.), the 29th Infantry Brigade will be attached to the A. and N.Z. Army Corps. Three squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division and two batteries Highland Mounted Artillery will be attached to 9th Corps. 86th Brigade R.F.A. and 91st Heavy Battery R.G.A. will be attached to 8th Corps.

3. Special instructions regarding embarkation and disembarkation are issued to G.O.C. 9th Corps, G.O.C., A. and N.Z. Corps, and I.G.C., as appended to this order.

4. The 53rd Division will remain at the disposal of the General Commanding as general reserve.

5. G.H.Q. will remain in the first instance in its present situation.

(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

Issued to: G.O.C. Corps Expéditionnaire; G.O.C. A. and N.Z. Army Corps; G.O.C. 8th Army Corps; G.O.C. 9th Army Corps; G.O.C. 53rd Division; I.G.C.; Vice-Admiral.

Appendix to Force Order No. 25.

Embarkations.

1. The embarkation of units of the 9th Corps concentrated at Imbros will be carried out under the orders of G.O.C. 9th Corps, commencing for personnel on 6th August, for vehicles and stores at such earlier date as may be convenient. The necessary ships and boats (lists of which have already been handed to the G.O.C. Corps) will be assembled in the harbour beforehand; and the embarkation programme will be worked out in consultation with Commander Ashby, R.N., who has been detailed by the Vice-Admiral for this purpose, and who will arrange for the various vessels to be in their allotted positions at the hours arranged.

G.O.C. 9th Corps will also be responsible for the allocation to ships or lighters, and for the embarkation of the following units:—

At Imbros: One W.T. Section (Nos. W. 10 and W. 11 Pack Wireless Stations); Two Anson Battalions R.N.D. (for duties on the beach); No. 16 Casualty Clearing Station.

In transit from Mudros to Imbros: One Casualty Clearing Station.

Units and formations concentrated at Mudros and Mitylene will be embarked for their various destinations under the orders of I.G.C. in accordance with the programme already issued to that officer.

Military Transport Officers.

2. G.O.C. 9th Corps and I.G.C. respectively will ensure that an officer is appointed Military Transport Officer on every ship for the embarkation of which they are severally responsible (*vide* para. 1).

Landing Places.

3. The landings of the 9th Corps will be referred to as "A," "B," and "C" Beaches.

"A" Beach—Square 117.q. and v.

"C" Beach—Square 103.u.z.

"B" Beach—Square 91.b, i, o.

"C" and "B" beaches are practically contiguous.

Beach Control Personnel.

4. The following naval and military beach control personnel have been appointed for the landing places of the 9th Corps:—

Principal Beach Master: Captain H. F. G. Talbot, R.N.

Beach Masters: Commander I. W. Gibson, M.V.O. ("A" Beach), Captain C. P. Metcalfe, R.N. ("B" Beach), Commander C. Tindal-Carril-Worsley ("C" Beach).

Assistant Beach Masters and Beach Lieutenants: Four Lieutenant Commanders, ten Lieutenants, R.N.

Principal Mil. L.O.: Colonel W. G. B. Western, C.B.

Mil. L.O.'s: Major F. W. Pencoek, Derbyshire Yeomanry, Major Sir R. Baker, Dorset Yeomanry, Captain Tylsen Wright, A.S.C.

Assistant Mil. L.O.s: Captain Wade Palmer, Derbyshire Yeomanry, Captain B. A. Smith, South Notts Hussars, Lieutenant H. V. Browne, Dorset Yeomanry, Lieutenant Krabbe, Berks Yeomanry.

The allocation of the above military officers to the various landing places will be detailed by the P.M.L.O. in consultation with the P.B.M.

Special instructions with regard to beach fatigue parties have already been issued to the G.O.C. 9th Corps.

G.O.C., A. and N.Z. Army Corps will detail such military landing officers, assistant military landing officers, and beach parties for A.N.Z.A.C. as he may consider necessary. The names of officers so appointed will be reported as early as possible to V.A. and to G.H.Q.

The following special service officers are attached to H.Q., A. and N.Z. Army Corps, for such duties in connection with the landing as the G.O.C. may direct:—

Major P. R. Bruce, S. Notts Hussars.

Captain C. R. Higgins, County of London Yeomanry.

Captain Sir E. Pauncefort Duncombe, Royal Bucks Hussars.

General Instructions for Landing.

5. All troops will land with two iron rations (one day's meat only in case of troops disembarking at Anzac). Infantry will carry 200 rounds of S.A.A., machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds. Packs will not be worn. A proportion of heavy entrenching tools, signalling and medical gear will be carried by hand. Camp kettles will be handed to the Ordnance Officer of the camp at which units concentrate before embarkation. They will be forwarded and reissued at the first opportunity.

6. Horses will be landed harnessed, and with nosebags filled to their full capacity.

Poles of G.S. wagons will be removed before slinging and made fast to the body of the wagon. Poles of carts, limbers, and limbered wagons will not be removed; these vehicles should be so placed in the boats that they can be landed pole leading.

Ammunition.

7. The G.O.C. 9th Corps will depute an officer to arrange, in consultation with the P.M.L.O., for the storing of reserve ammunition in convenient localities near the beach. Guards for these stores may be found from the beach fatigue parties.

Water.

8. The strictest economy must be exercised with regard to drinking water. Under arrangements already made by G.H.Q., receptacles filled with water will be landed as early as possible from the ships carrying the mule corps, and will be conveyed

to the troops as transport becomes available. Waterproof tanks (2,300 gallon capacity) and lift and force pumps will be available on the "Prah"—R.E. Storeship—in Kephalos Harbour, and will be forwarded by D.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., on request of G.O.C. Corps.

Transport.

9. Transport to supplement that in possession of units will be provided for the 9th Corps and the A.N.Z. Corps by the Indian Mule Corps. The amount of transport for such formation has been calculated to carry rations, water, and S.A.A., making one or two trips a day, according to the anticipated distance of the various units from the beach.

This transport will be handed over, as it is landed, by an officer appointed by the D.S.T., to transport officers of Brigades and divisional troops for allotment as circumstances may require.

Senior transport officers of Divisions will be ordered to report to the following representatives of the D.S.T. immediately on landing:—

At Anzac: Lieutenant-Colonel Streidinger, A.D.T.

At "A" Beach: Major Badcock, D.A.D.T.

Supplies.

10. A supply depôt has been formed at Anzac, and it is in charge of Major Izod, A.S.C. A supply depôt will be formed by D.S.T. at "A" beach as soon as supplies can be landed, and will be in charge of Major Huskisson, A.S.C. Senior supply officers of Divisions will be ordered to place themselves in communication with the officer in charge of the nearest supply depôt and to keep him informed of their daily requirements. Supplies will, so far as possible, be handed over to them in bulk at the depôt. Owing to the difficulty in landing sufficient animals in the first instance it is possible that only half rations may be available on the third and fourth days after the operations begin. All units should be specially ordered to husband their rations.

Medical.

11. Arrangements have been made to establish on the beach at Anzac two casualty clearing stations, which will be embarked by I.G.C., and two at "A" Beach, which will be embarked under orders of G.O.C. 9th Corps (see paragraph 1). Medical officers will be appointed by G.H.Q. to control these units, and to take charge of the arrangements for evacuation of the wounded from the beach.

(Signed) C. F. ASPINALL,

Lieutenant-Colonel,

*For Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.*

APPENDIX.

Instructions to Major-General H. de Lisle,
C.B., D.S.O.

1. The operations of the northern wing of the Army have only been partially successful.

(a) The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, with the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of 10th Division attached has greatly

extended the area occupied, and now holds a position under the Chunuk Bair Ridge, which the G.O.C. considers a favourable one from which to launch the final attack on the ridge. The necessity for reorganisation after the recent operations, and for establishing a satisfactory system of forwarding water, ammunition and supplies, will involve a delay of some days before the attack on the main ridge can be made.

(b) The 9th Army Corps, less the 13th Division and 29th Brigade, but with the 53rd and 54th Divisions attached, holds the Yilghin Burnu hills, and a line northwards from the easternmost of these two hills roughly straight across the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova to the highest point of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Attacks by the 11th Division against the Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur from the north-west have been made without any success. In the course of the operations the 9th Corps became very much disorganised, and since August 11th the work of reorganisation and consolidation has been proceeding.

2. At present the enemy has shown no great strength north of an east and west line through Anafarta Sagir. He has a force operating on and near the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the strength of which cannot yet be accurately estimated. From present indications this appears to be a detachment which is known to have guarded the coast from Ejelmer Bay to Suvla Bay; it does not appear to have been reinforced to any extent. Across the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova there appear to be no more than snipers. In the region Anafarta Sagir-Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Biyuk Anafarta Valley the enemy has developed considerable strength—his intention being, no doubt, to protect the right of his main force which opposes the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and to prevent our advance on the Anafarta gap.

3. The General Commanding has decided to strike as quickly and in as great strength as possible against the enemy's on the line Ismail Oglu Tepe-Anafarta Sagir with the objects, first, of driving in this flank and preparing a further enveloping advance; and, secondly, by clearing the Anafarta spur to deny to the enemy the gun positions and facilities for observation therefrom, which would otherwise endanger Suvla Bay. He considers it imperative to effect this with the least possible delay. In his view the left flank of this advance will require comparatively little protection, at all events in the first instance, in view of the difficulty which the enemy may be expected to find in throwing any considerable force round our left over the high and difficult country north of Anafarta Sagir. It appears that the double purpose of defeating the enemy and securing Suvla Bay as a port for the northern wing of the Army can best be served by an attack on the enemy's right on the Anafarta spur, made with all the strength at our command, while leaving a comparatively small force as left flank

guard to clear the enemy's snipers out of the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and to occupy and press back his detachment in the Ejelmer Bay region.

4. You will have at your disposal the following troops:—

11th Division,
10th Division (less 29th Brigade),
53rd Division,
54th Division,

and there is on its way from Egypt to join you the 2nd Mounted Division (5,000 men dismounted), which should be available by August 18th. The 10th, 11th and 53rd Divisions are considerably depleted, and the *moral* of the latter at present leaves much to be desired. There are at present ashore, belonging to the above two F.A. Brigades (three batteries of which are awaiting horses to bring them up from Anzac) and two Heavy Batteries. In addition, two Highland Mountain Batteries, attached to the 9th Corps, are ashore, and the 1/4th Lowland Brigade (two batteries 5-inch howitzers) are at your disposal when they can be brought up from Anzac. It has only been possible to land a bare minimum of horses owing to difficulties in respect of water and the landing of forage.

Three further F.A. Brigades and the 57th Brigade (two batteries) 4·5-inch howitzers are at Mudros ready to be brought up as soon as it is possible to land them. These Brigades will probably have to be landed without any horses in the first instance, and taken into position by the artillery horses already ashore.

5. For the purpose of an early attack in accordance with the plan indicated in paragraph 3, the A. and N.Z. Army Corps will probably not be able to co-operate directly with more than one Infantry Brigade, and it is possible that it may be able to do no more than swing up its left into line with the right of your advance. It is improbable that the 8th Corps and the C.E.O. will be in a position to do more than undertake vigorous demonstrations.

6. With the above in view, you will proceed at once to Suvla Bay and take over command of the 9th Corps. Your immediate and most urgent concern will be to complete the reorganisation of the Corps and to prepare as large a force as possible for the offensive against Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur, bearing in mind that time is of vital importance. You will then consider and report at the earliest moment:—

(a) What force you consider that you will be able to employ for this purpose.

(b) The date on which you will be ready to undertake the offensive.

(c) The method by which you purpose to carry out your task.

(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

*Major-General,
Chief of the General Staff,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.*

**STATEMENT BY SURGEON-GEN. SIR W. BARTIE, V.C., K.C.M.G.,
C.B., M.B., K.H.S.**

1. At the outbreak of war I was Director of Medical Services in India, and at the end of May, 1915, I was, at the request of the Secretary of State for War, appointed Principal Director of Medical Services, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, Malta and Egypt, landing at Suez on 15th June, 1915, and continuing to hold that appointment until I left for England on the 10th March, 1916. I had some previous knowledge of Egypt, as I had been sent there on special duty in February and March, 1915, to inspect the medical arrangements, and was thus familiar with the hospital arrangements at that time.

2. My duties were defined in a War Office telegram. I was to assume command of the Medical Services and be responsible for their co-ordination in the three Commands concerned.

3. I was thus directly responsible to the Army Council for the general working of the Medical Services in the Eastern Mediterranean, but I was also responsible to the different Commanders-in-Chief for any advice or action taken in respect to their Commands.

4. My responsibility was general in character, and except when I intervened did not relieve the Directors of Medical Services of the Commands of their responsibility for the administration of the Medical Services in their respective spheres. My position was therefore, *qua* medical services, analogous to that laid down in Field Service Regulations, Part II, Section 22, para. 3, for a Commander-in-Chief or Inspector-General of Communications in connection with administrative services.

5. My appointment was in that respect exceptional and my principal duty was that of co-ordinating the work between the three Commands; I had to arrange for the reception of the sick and wounded from the Dardanelles in Egypt and Malta, and for the equitable distribution of personnel, &c., between the Dardanelles and Egypt and Malta. It was also my duty to tender advice when necessary with regard to sanitary and other matters connected with the troops and, until a Hospital Transport Officer was appointed to arrange in co-operation with Q.M.G.'s Branch of the Staff and the Naval Transport Officers, for the working of the Hospital Ships.

6. When troops were sent to Salonika my responsibility included that Force.

7. I was in direct communication with the different Commanders-in-Chief and in close touch with the Directors of Medical Services and the Staffs concerned.

8. My first duty, after satisfying myself as to the immediate sufficiency of the hospital arrangements in Egypt, was to proceed to the Dardanelles to investigate the situation there as regards the organisation of the hospitals and the arrangements for the evacuation of the sick and wounded to Egypt, Malta and the United Kingdom.

9. The situation in Egypt was, that owing to the very large influx of wounded resulting from the initial operations in the Dardanelles, the strain on the hospital accommodation had been very great, and large numbers of hospitals had to be improvised to deal with the wounded that had been brought down. I was able to make a hasty survey of the hospital accommodation, and within two days of my arrival I reported to the War Office that consequent on the recent arrival of reinforcements of medical officers and nurses the situation was no longer acute. At this date (middle of June) there was hospital or convalescent accommodation in Egypt for 445 officers and 13,712 other ranks.

A train service had been established and the wounded were moved from the port to Cairo or the provinces in comfortable well-equipped ambulance trains, which were also used for the transfer of Indian invalids across Egypt to Suez.

10. As regards sea transport, the position at this date (20th June, 1915) was:—

- (a) A ferry service of five hospital ships between England and Egypt, these vessels bringing Indian sick and wounded from England to Egypt and being available to take back British sick and wounded to the United Kingdom.
- (b) Sir Ian Hamilton had decided that 12 hospital ships were required for the evacuation of the sick and wounded from the Dardanelles, and with regard to these the position was that there were two hospital ships fitted and in use, two more were being got ready at home and two were being fitted out in Egypt. It was proposed that another pair be fitted up in the United Kingdom and two for British and two for Indian troops at Alexandria; with these it was proposed to institute a weekly service between the Dardanelles and United Kingdom via Egypt and Malta. This was estimated to take six ships and would leave four British hospital ships and one of the two special Indian vessels always at the Dardanelles. At this stage, therefore, many of the sick and wounded were of necessity carried in transports.

On 24th June the War Office wired out proposals for services between (a) Dardanelles and United Kingdom direct; (b) Alexandria and Marseilles or United Kingdom; (c) Dardanelles and Alexandria; (d) Suez and Bombay; (e) Suez and Australia and New Zealand; the total number of ships involved being 27. Five ships were to be employed for the Dardanelles and United Kingdom service, four for the Alexandria and United Kingdom service, and 12 for the ferry between Dardanelles and Egypt.

I then proposed a programme of pre-determined

sailings from the Dardanelles in a Memorandum, of which I attach a copy.

Briefly, it allowed of seven hospital ships being always present at the Dardanelles and would permit of the evacuation of 12,700 men per month, 1,500 British going direct to the United Kingdom, and 10,000 British and 1,200 Indians to Egypt or Malta. At this date some of the ships allotted had not been fitted or painted in accordance with the Hague Convention, and my first care was to hasten matters in regard to these vital considerations.

11. Within a week of my arrival in Egypt I proceeded to the Dardanelles, first visiting the intermediate Base at Mudros, afterwards going to Anzac and Helles and to General Headquarters at Imbros. I found the I.G.C. and his Staff had their headquarters on a ship in Mudros Harbour, an arrangement that, as far as the Medical Administration of the port was concerned, was a not unreasonable one, for it minimised the inconvenience that the Deputy Director of Medical Services, in common with other Staff officers, suffered through the lack of a sufficient number of launches.

Much of the duty of the Deputy Director of Medical Services was connected with the inspection and preparation of transports required for the conveyance of the sick and wounded, and it was impossible for him or his Staff to get about from ship to ship and from ship to shore as freely as was necessary without launches of his own. This was a striking defect in the arrangements and one it was impossible to remedy on the spot. I was in frequent telegraphic communication with the War Office on the subject, and I know that this defect was appreciated at home, for, in one of the first telegrams I received from the War Office, the question was referred to. I replied that launches were not available at Mudros nor could I obtain them in Egypt. Until the late Autumn, when the Scottish Red Cross sent out special launches earmarked for the Medical Services, this difficulty continued, but was lessened as time went on through the goodwill of the British Red Cross, who lent their launches whenever it was possible to do so. I lay stress on these facts as they were a very serious handicap to the work of the medical service at Mudros in connection with the inspection of transports and hospital ships.

On shore, the conditions were extremely primitive, due to the difficulty that was experienced in landing stores and material.

The camps at Mudros were poor and some of the hospitals were not sufficient or satisfactory either as regards their accommodation or their sites, which were limited to East Mudros owing to the lack of piers and water on the west side of the Harbour. In particular, the sites of the Australian Stationary Hospitals were bad, bordering the road through which much traffic passed but convenient to the "Australian" pier.

The sites of the two British Stationary Hospitals were better but there was an absence of considered plans of encampments for the troops, with the result that hospital and camp sites were cheek by jowl, to the obvious disadvantage of the former.

The hospital accommodation was insufficient for the number of wounded that were arriving from the beaches and patients were in consequence

transferred direct to hired transports in the Bay, with the result that the proper sorting out of cases was often impossible, and a man, once he got on a hired transport, was pretty certain to be sent away whether this was really necessary or not. There was, however, little disadvantage in this, as the vast majority were cases of wounds and as the main consideration was evacuation. In order to remedy this, the accommodation in the hospitals was increased and Casualty Clearing Stations utilised as Convalescent Depôts.

One of my first cares was to secure the appointment of an Administrative Medical Officer on shore at Mudros East.

As a result of the action at Helles, in the last week in June I saw a good deal of the conditions under which the wounded were dealt with. The wounded were brought from the beaches in hospital ships or "sweepers" to Mudros. In the former case they either went on in the hospital ship to Alexandria or when hospital ships could not be spared for the voyage, were transferred to transports or the shore hospitals at Mudros. Cases arriving at Mudros in sweepers were landed there in ordinary circumstances, or when battle casualties were numerous were transferred direct to a carrier which, when filled, was despatched to Egypt. Some of these carriers were partially fitted for sick; the Staffs were comparatively small, but were supplemented from the ships' companies. There were no women nurses, the supply of clothing and utensils was sometimes insufficient to meet demands, but the Red Cross was able, as a rule, to make good deficiencies and supplement the official provision. There was not, so far as I know, any shortage in medical supplies or comforts. These carriers were often crowded and many cases had to be treated on deck; but this was not a disadvantage, for, thanks to the climate, these deck cases did so well that I gave instructions that all serious septic cases should be treated on deck. Although I was not satisfied as to the conditions under which the wounded were being moved at this period, I was thoroughly satisfied that the best possible was being done through the energy of the D.D.M.S., L. of C., who spared no effort to ensure that the sick and wounded suffered no avoidable hardship.

The Medical Units at Mudros at this date were 2 British and 2 Australian Stationary Hospitals, 2 Casualty Clearing Stations, 1 Indian Field Ambulance, 1 Section British Indian Field Ambulance and 1 Base Depot Medical Stores.

12. From Mudros I proceeded to visit the positions occupied by the troops at Gaba Tepe and Helles. I found the conditions far from being sanitariously satisfactory—the terrain held was limited, and the space that could be used for hospital purposes very small and without protection from the enemy's fire. There was much difficulty in making adequate sanitary arrangements, for the ground available for trenching was insufficient. There were also constant difficulties as to the supply of water, rations and material.

The Medical Units at the beaches consisted of the bearer divisions of the Divisional Field Ambulances with at each a Casualty Clearing Station, a Sanitary Section and an Advanced Depot of Medical Stores.

The hospitals (Casualty Clearing Stations) at Anzac and Helles were alike exposed to fire, but the space available at Helles was much larger, and No. 11 Casualty Clearing Station there was, in fact, an excellent hospital, where, at the time of my visit, 23,000 wounded had been dealt with. At both places, through the energy of those in authority, everything possible—with the limited means available—was being done to make adequate sanitary and hospital arrangements and provide shelter for the troops.

A hospital ship was stationed off each beach and was used for the reception of the serious cases, but the more lightly wounded were taken straight to Mudros in sweepers or transferred to them from the hospital ships, where they had to be retained until the arrival of the sweepers, for at neither beach was it possible to keep many cases on shore for any length of time.

It was necessary to employ sweepers, as, owing to the number of cases requiring evacuation (about 150 from Anzac and 300 from Helles daily) they could not all be accommodated on hospital ships.

These sweepers were steamers of the cross-Channel type, and could each take 150 patients, for about half of whom there was lying-down accommodation. Each sweeper carried 2 medical officers and 7 to 20 orderlies, with medical supplies, comforts and three days' provisions. These vessels, which generally brought up reinforcements, had good saloons and cabins, were reasonably well equipped, and suitable for this duty.

13. I then went to General Headquarters and saw the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff. I should have mentioned that the Director of Medical Services, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (at that time Surgeon-General Birrell) had met me in Egypt and came back with me to the Dardanelles, and that we discussed the many sanitary and administrative problems that had arisen and were likely to arise during the voyage from Egypt.

I discussed with Sir Ian Hamilton questions such as canteens, sanitary requirements, the provision of additional hospitals and improvement of those at Mudros, and the question of evacuation of the sick and wounded.

The Commander-in-Chief told me that it was proposed to send out Surgeon-General Sir James Porter, Royal Navy, as Principal Hospital Transport Officer, and that he would be responsible for all sea transport arrangements. I said that I thought the effect of such an arrangement would be an unfortunate division of responsibility, and Sir Ian then told me that he had already wired to the War Office deprecating an appointment of the sort.

While I was at General Headquarters it was settled that it would be necessary to provide a hutted General Hospital of 1,000 beds at Mudros, and the War Office was so informed. I also discussed with the Staff concerned water supplies, condensing plant, piers, hutting for the Casualty Clearing Station at Helles, and the introduction of the pail system of latrines on the Peninsula, and with the Quartermaster-General, the programme of evacuation by hospital ships to which I have already referred. I also asked the War Office to appoint a special Sanitary Officer to General Headquarters.

14. On my return to Mudros suggested sites for

additional hospitals on the west side of the harbour were examined with the representative of the D. of W., and I arranged with the Deputy-Director of Medical Services and D. of W. as to hutting for the Stationary Hospitals and for dining shelters for existing hospitals.

The provision of medical stores, the supply of equipment and staffs for transports, and of a reserve staff for transport duty, were discussed with the Deputy-Director of Medical Services.

I arranged with the D.O.S. as to the provision of new pattern hospital marquees, of hospital clothing and other requirements for hospitals and transports, and for a very large supply of stretchers.

With the I.G.C. I discussed the arrangements to be made for evacuation of the wounded by transport in the event of heavy casualties occurring, and embodied my views in a memorandum, of which I attach a copy.

15. On my return to Egypt (9th July) I took up the question of improving the disembarkation arrangements at Alexandria, arranged for emergency staffs for transports on the principle of each hospital providing the staff for one ship. I asked the War Office for 50 additional motor ambulances and 3,000 naval cots, and ordered through the Ordnance 10,000 mattresses to be made up locally for use in transports carrying wounded.

I wired to the War Office as to the unsuitability of the "Glan McGillwray" and "Secangchoon" as hospital ships.

I arranged for the establishment of special bacteriological laboratories at Mudros, Anzac and Helles, and asked the War Office for additional supplies of cholera vaccine and for special officers to inoculate the troops where this became desirable.

Following on this, I devoted much time to the inspection and improvement of the hospitals in Egypt and their expansion on emergency. A convalescent depot for enteric fever cases at Port Said and convalescent camps for other cases at Montaza and at Mustapha, near Alexandria, were arranged for.

The appointment of the following officers as Consulting Surgeons to the troops in the Dardanelles, Malta and Egypt was approved at this time:—

Colonels Mayo Robson, Sir V. Horsley, Warren Low, Tubby, Bird, Stoneham, Ryan, Charters-Symonds, Thorburn and Ballance.

The following Consulting Physicians were also appointed about this period:—

Colonels Purves-Stewart and Gulland, Lieutenant-Colonels Sir Ronald Ross and Willcox.

These officers were some of them employed on hospital ships and some in hospitals on shore. It was so arranged that the hospital ships off the beaches always had Consulting Surgeons, these officers transferring from ship to ship when necessary.

16. About the middle of July I began to prepare for the battles expected in connection with the landing at Suvla.

It became essential to increase very largely the hospital accommodation in Egypt and Malta, as it was estimated that accommodation for 20,000 wounded would be required. On the 21st July I wired to Director-General, Army Medical Service, an appreciation of the situation as to hospital

accommodation. There were then about 18,000 beds in Egypt, of which 10,000 were occupied, Malta was preparing 10,000 beds, of which 5,600 were then occupied, in addition to which 400 beds were available at Gibraltar; at this time, therefore, I could arrange for between 12,000 and 13,000 wounded, but by the 12th August the number of beds in Egypt had grown to 24,000 and in Malta to 13,700, and I was able to provide for 18,000 wounded in these Commands, while considerable numbers could be dealt with in the expanded hospitals at Mudros itself. Some of the extra accommodation was obtained by the despatch of certain hospitals to the Mediterranean from England, some by clearing hospital patients either to United Kingdom or to convalescent camps and barracks, as well as by arranging for the temporary expansion of the hospitals themselves.

Reinforcements of medical personnel were asked for, and the War Office arranged to send out 70 medical officers, 100 nurses, and 425 other ranks to Malta, and 270 medical officers, 394 nurses and 1,250 other ranks to Egypt and the Dardanelles, the latter figures including provision for the large number of transports that would be required.

The strain on the hospital accommodation was likely to be great, especially as it was impossible, owing to the number of ships necessarily locked up in the Mediterranean at this juncture, to evacuate cases to the United Kingdom to the extent that would have been desirable. Evacuation was the crux of the medical situation, for without very large clearances the hospital population was bound to increase.

I wish to acknowledge my deep obligations to Field-Marshal Lord Methuen and General Sir John Maxwell in this connection, for it is to the efforts of these officers, backed by their Directors of Medical Services, Surgeon-Generals Whitehead and Ford, that a situation that developed unanticipated proportions was met as it was.

In the 26 days between 10th August and 5th September about 50,000 sick and wounded were evacuated from the Dardanelles, of whom 20,000 were sick and 30,000 wounded. Some of these were accommodated in the hospitals and camps at Mudros, very large numbers were sent to Egypt, and a proportion to Malta and Gibraltar, while the pressure on the hospitals at Mudros, Egypt and Malta was kept down by sending considerable numbers of both sick and wounded direct to the United Kingdom from the Dardanelles.

17. Great as were the difficulties on shore, the provision of adequate sea transport was just as difficult. There were, it is true, a large number of transports in the Dardanelles that had brought stores and reinforcements, but the tale of hospital ships was not yet complete. Of these transports 25 had to be used for the conveyance of sick and wounded, staffed with medical officers, nurses and orderlies, and provided with equipment, medical and ordnance. Unfortunately it was not possible to bring the ships down to Alexandria to be staffed and fitted, and there was delay or uncertainty about the arrival of staffs and equipment from home and in getting what had been prepared in Egypt sent up to the Dardanelles in time. In the end these difficulties were overcome and the transports were reasonably equipped and staffed.

I think there was only one ship that came down

to Egypt without nurses, that being due to the ship having been hastily filled and despatched before the nurses could reach her.

Transports were sent to Egypt or Malta according to the amount of vacant accommodation at these places, and towards the end a number of transports, including the "Aquitania," were despatched direct to the United Kingdom.

18. The arrangements for these vessels and the hospital ships were by this time in the hands of Sir James Porter, the Principal Naval Transport Officer, who had arrived in the Mediterranean late in July and was responsible for all sick transport arrangements from the beaches to the bases in the Mediterranean and at home.

19. I cannot speak as to the detailed medical arrangements made in connection with the operations at Suvla, as I was not in the Dardanelles at the time of the landing, but I attach a copy of a letter I wrote to the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, and of a memorandum in which I addressed the Director of Medical Services on the scope and nature of the preparations I thought desirable.

20. The sanitary and epidemiological problems likely to be encountered during the campaign had occupied my attention from the time of my appointment, and before I arrived in Egypt I had telegraphed and written to the Director-General, Army Medical Service, as to the necessity for a special sanitary staff, military or civil.

In response to my appeal a Sanitary Advisory Committee, consisting of Colonel Hunter of the London Fever Hospital, Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan of the Local Government Board, Balfour of Khartoum and Dudgeon of St. Thomas's Hospital, arrived in Egypt in July, and after making a survey of the cases in hospital and sanitary conditions there, proceeded as soon as the August fighting permitted to the Dardanelles, where they carefully investigated the sanitary conditions at Suvla, Anzac, Helles and Mudros. This committee did not in any way supersede the established sanitary organisation of the troops, and was able to devote its whole time to special investigations and inspections, while the acknowledged scientific position of its members lent great weight to its reports.

The reports of this committee, which were made to me, were of the utmost value, and immediate action was taken on them through the Staff of the Command concerned, while copies, with notes of what had been done and other comments, were sent to the War Office.

Investigation showed that the sanitary conditions under which the troops had to live on the beaches left much to be desired, but the difficulties in remedying defects were almost insuperable owing to the cramped positions held and the lack of sanitary materials such as wood and corrugated iron. Apart from suggestions for the remedy of gross sanitary defects the Committee was able to give most valuable advice in connection with inoculation and protection of the troops from cholera, the differentiation of enteric and paratyphoid fevers and of the dysenteries met with on the peninsula and the many problems that beset a force operating in a trying climate.

After my first visit to the Dardanelles I had arranged for the establishment of bacteriological laboratories at Mudros and on the beaches, while,

later, special laboratories were arranged in Egypt and Malta, where work, much of it of permanent value, has been carried out.

The striking sanitary defect throughout was the lack of sufficient supplies of timber, which rendered it impossible to protect latrines and cooking places to an adequate extent, and thereby render innocuous the flies and infected dust which were the most potent agents in the dissemination of disease.

21. I arrived at Mudros on 20th August, where I was met by the Director of Medical Services, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, with whom and the Deputy-Director of Medical Services, Lines of Communications, I inspected the new hospital units that had just arrived from home. These comprised No. 3 Australian General Hospital (1,040 beds), No. 18 British and Nos. 1 and 3 Canadian Stationary Hospitals (400 beds each), the Lowland Divisional Casualty Clearing Station and, No. 7 Base Depot Medical Stores. All were encamped at West Mudros on good sites, and although not fully established, were already taking in patients.

In addition, No. 2 Australian Stationary Hospital had been moved over from East Mudros, piers were being built, a special gas laboratory erected and condensing plant installed. Much remained to be done in connection with road making, water supplies, erecting of bathing and drying establishments, etc., but progress was being made.

An Assistant Director of Medical Services had been appointed for East Mudros where there was a notable improvement in the efficiency of the hospitals and in the general sanitary conditions of the camps.

An excellent Convalescent Camp had been established well inland on good ground. I inspected some ambulance carriers ("black" ships) about to leave for England and found them reasonably staffed and equipped, but the number of patients was large, being in one case 1,000.

I saw the Sanitary Committee who had examined the camps at Mudros and who brought to my notice certain sanitary defects and requirements, of which the chief was the lack of sufficient protection to the water supply and the need for special attention to the chlorination of all water used whether from water tank vessels or local sources.

I conferred with the Principal Hospital Transport Officer regarding evacuation from Mudros and from Egypt and Malta, and after arranging for the establishment of a central bacteriological laboratory at West Mudros and for the Sanitary Committee to visit Anzac, Helles and Suvla, I proceeded to General Headquarters at Imbros to see the Commander-in-Chief.

I had gathered that there had been some difficulties as to Surgeon-General Birell's proposals for the evacuation of the wounded, and I feared from what I had heard that he was not working well with the Principal Staff Officers of the Force. I consulted the I.G.C., the C.G.S., A.G. and Q.M.G. as to this, and as all agreed that he was not a success, the A.G. and I saw the Commander-in-Chief on the subject. I said that although I had little fault to find with his work it was an impossible position if he had not the full confidence of the Staff, and that I thought that he had better go home. The Commander-in-Chief agreed.

I spoke to the Commander-in-Chief as to the health of the troops and as to their future requirements.

During my visit arrangements were completed for hospital huts for 7,000 sick, and for the preparation of the hutted hospitals for the peninsula when it became possible to put them there.

I inspected the Casualty Clearing Station that had been established at Imbros because of the recent battles, and which had done admirable work; its accommodation had been expanded and it could take 2,000 patients. The number of sick in the force at this time was growing rapidly, and the troops were suffering from bowel complaints; to this question the special attention of the Military Sanitary Staff and of the Sanitary Committee was directed.

An additional sanitary officer (Lieutenant-Colonel Aldridge, C.S.I.) who had exceptional experience in India arrived from home and was appointed Assistant Director of Medical Services (Sanitary) at General Headquarters.

22. On my return to Egypt (4th September) I had with the General Officer Commanding and Director of Medical Services, to consider the alterations and variations in Hospital and Convalescent Establishments that would be necessary during the winter months, including a large Convalescent Depot at Luxor. The staffing of carriers taking invalids to England, the provision of a central laboratory, and of a splint factory, the improvement of the X-Ray outfits, and the supply of reinforcing drafts had to be arranged; and with Sir Courtauld Thomson, the Red Cross Commissioner, the enlargement of the Montaza Convalescent Camp and the provision of special invalid diet kitchens in the hospitals was agreed to.

23. On the 15th September I sailed for Malta. *En route* I had the opportunity, which I took on all voyages, of carefully inspecting the hospital ship in which I travelled.

After seeing Field-Marshal Lord Methuen, the Commander-in-Chief, I visited, with the Director of Medical Services, Surgeon-General Whitehead, the hospitals and convalescent establishments on the Island. Briefly, owing to the diminution of the number of troops many of the barracks in Malta were available for hospital purposes, and in addition many excellent schools and other institutions had been placed at the disposal of the medical authorities.

I reported to the Director-General that I was much delighted with what I had seen, and that accommodation for 14,000 patients in hospital, and convalescent camps as good as hospitals, had been provided through the vigour and energy of the Commander-in-Chief and his Director of Medical Services.

There was some difficulties in getting recovered men back to the Front, and various points as to scientific work and administrative details to be settled but the general arrangements were of the highest standard.

24. Leaving Malta, I sailed for Mudros, arriving on 29th September, to meet and consult with the new Director of Medical Services, Surgeon-General Bedford, C.M.G., who had arrived a few days before. There was a good deal to be done in connection with the arrangements for the despatch of troops from the Dardanelles to Salonika, and I had a special conference with the I.G.C. and P.H.T.O. as to evacuation, when it was agreed to send two hospital ships with the troops to Salonika. The Medical Units of the 10th Division had to be inspected and arrangement made to bring them up to strength; there were discussions as to fly destruction with an expert from

the British Museum sent out by the War Office, as to the provision of spectacles for the troops and surgical work in the hospitals; matters of administration and reinforcements connected with the Australian Troops had to be decided with Colonel Howse, V.C., the senior Australian Medical Officer in the Dardanelles, and sanitary questions decided with the Sanitary Committee, which, as the result of visits to the beaches, had made a number of important recommendations which I did all I could to get given effect to. The principal were the boxing of latrines and protection of cooking places, but the giving effect to these recommendations was necessarily dependent on the supply of wood, and wood was very scarce.

Meanwhile, the number of sick and wounded to be evacuated continued to grow, and as the 10,000 vacant beds I had left in Malta and Egypt had been filled, it was necessary for me to return to Egypt and see what could be done to meet the pressure.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stammers, my A.D.M.S. (Sanitary), was left at Mudros to accompany the troops going to Salonika, and Bt.-Colonel Gibbard was appointed A.D.M.S. at West Mudros where camps for hospitals and troops were rapidly extending.

25. On 7th October I disembarked at Alexandria and met Colonel Fetherston, the Director-General of the Australian Army Medical Service, as to Australian Medical matters.

The next question was the despatch of Medical Units at Salonika. It had been arranged at Mudros that two Stationary Hospitals (one New Zealand from Port Said and one British from Mudros) should go in the first instance, and the War Office had arranged to send out two General Hospitals.

A few days later I went to Cairo and Port Said on a visit of inspection and on my return arranged for invalids for England to be taken up to Mudros and transferred to the "Aquitania" there. I might explain that the "Aquitania," "Mauretania" or "Britannic" could not come into any harbour at Egypt or Malta, and therefore they had either to be filled up with cases from Mudros or cases sent to them and transferred there. In the event, both procedures were adopted, as Mudros itself could not fill these great ships without sending home cases for whom change to England was not necessary.

At this time a consulting ophthalmologist and X-Ray expert joined the Force, their services being available throughout the Mediterranean.

The Sanitary Committee returned to Egypt and I met it from time to time as to the many pending sanitary questions in the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and in Egypt.

My responsibility as to the Salonika Force was confirmed by the War Office and a Royal Army Medical Corps Base Dépôt was established at Alexandria.

Special Committees were convened to work out a simple system of statistical returns and reports for infectious diseases, the co-ordination of bacteriological work in connection with the enteric fevers and dysentery, and the consulting surgeons met and discussed a suggested appendix (dealing with local conditions) to the War Office Memorandum on "Injuries in War."

Early in November I directed the Sanitary Committee to return to the peninsula to report on the progress made in sanitary matters.

26. On 6th November I embarked for Salonika, No. 4 Canadian General Hospital being on board. My first duty was to inspect sites for the hospitals, and excellent positions to the west of the town were selected subject to the approval of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Ronald Ross as to their suitability for occupation in the summer months when malaria was reported to be very prevalent. I also inspected the Medical Units there, the positions occupied by our troops near Salonika, and on the Doiran front.

Surgeon-General Macpherson arrived at Salonika a few days after my departure and assumed duty as Director of Medical Services, Salonika Force, which was under the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

27. On 16th November I returned to Mudros. Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener was in Mudros at this time and I had an interview with him, reporting what had been and what remained to be done.

I attended a special conference with I.G.C., P.H.T.O., and Q.M.G. and D.D.M.S. Lines of Communication as to the number of hospital ships likely to be required in the future, and also with reference to the evacuation of 10,000 casualties from the peninsula in four days.

I saw General Sir C. Munro, who had assumed command, as to the sanitary requirements of the troops and explained how it was proposed to clear 12,000 beds in Egypt and Malta for the emergency, which latter question was also discussed with P.H.T.O.

Colonel Melville and Major LeLean joined my Staff for duty as sanitary officers and I arranged with the latter for special classes of instruction in sanitation for medical officers.

During this visit the weather was extremely cold and stormy, with snow showers, and I was storm-bound on board ship for some days. The troops on the peninsula suffered greatly during the blizzard and about 16,000 cases of frost-bite and exposure were evacuated from the peninsula, 12,000 of these being from Suvla, 2,700 from Anzac and 1,200 from Helles. This imposed a great strain on the hospital accommodation at Mudros and the Bases, especially in view of the casualties anticipated in connection with the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac.

What had happened was, firstly, a southerly gale with deluges of rain which flooded the trenches and dug-outs, especially at Suvla and then the wind veered round suddenly to the north with icy snow showers. There was no shelter for the men and wet through as they were they were literally frozen as they stood. Fortunately many of the cases were slight and the men recovered within a few hours; but many were serious and resulted in the loss of toes and feet in a large number of instances. The suffering was not due to lack of warm clothing as the men were reported to be on the whole well clad, having great coats and good under-clothes.

This blizzard also affected the troops at Salonika but to a much less extent, and from the rough figures I have given it will be seen that at Anzac and Helles things were very much better than at Suvla.

About the end of November the War Office determined to revert to the ordinary arrangements as to sea transport and Sir James Porter the P.H.T.O. left for England.

More than once the suggestion had been made that one of the great hospital ships should be kept at Mudros as a floating hospital. I consulted the I.G.C. as to the feasibility of the suggestion, having in view the difficulties of coaling and watering. The I.G.C. was of opinion that while these difficulties were not insuperable they would cause great discomfort to the patients and that there were other general objections.

I agreed; especially as during bad weather when a ship would be most in request it would often be impossible to put patients on board, and the smaller vessels could if necessary be used when the weather conditions would permit.

28. On 1st December I returned to Egypt and was very fully occupied arranging for the additional hospital accommodation required there and in Malta. With the energetic assistance of the Directors of Medical Services I was able to raise between 6,000 and 7,000 additional beds in Egypt and 2,000 at Malta. Hospitals were cleared to convalescent camps and the latter to Base Details Camps, and in this way it was hoped to meet the constant influx of sick and wounded and to provide for the casualties to be anticipated on the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac. For this evacuation every possible hospital ship was concentrated at the Dardanelles, and at the time of evacuation there were 15 of these vessels actually present while further assistance was assured by the arrival of the "Aquitania" and other big ships, and by the speedy return of the ships sent to Egypt and Malta.

As the ships were not required for the wounded, a proportion was utilised to take invalids home from Egypt and Malta while the big ships took cases direct from Mudros, being partly filled by transfers sent from Egypt and Malta.

For the evacuation of Helles similar arrangements were made.

A little later it was determined to establish a General Base for the supply of all Forces in the Levant and through which all questions of hospital ships and carriers would be arranged. I became Director of Medical Services of the Levant Base in addition to my duties as Principal Director of Medical Services, Mediterranean, and the working of the hospital ships as carried out from my office, under the authority of the General Officer Commanding, Levant Base.

The hospital and convalescent accommodation available in the Mediterranean about this time amounted to some 70,000 beds, of which 35,000 were in Egypt, 20,000 in Malta, 10,000 in Mudros, and 5,000 in Salonika.

29. I have not in these notes referred to, or only referred incidentally, to certain special questions that affected or may have affected the health of the troops, and I might conveniently summarise my remarks on these points here.

Rations.—The field service ration was the liberal one sanctioned just before the outbreak of war; there were great difficulties in the supply of vegetables, and sometimes of bread which was sent up in sweepers and must often have arrived in bad condition. Then there were difficulties as to fuel, one result of which was that tinned meat was sometimes preferred to fresh as the boxes could be used for fuel and many other purposes. Again, there was an entire absence of canteens for many

months, and in consequence the men were confined to their regulation rations. In the autumn a revised and specially liberal scale of rations was sanctioned for use during the winter months.

Water Supply.—The local supplies were poor, and though many efforts were made to improve them they were not particularly successful. The beaches were largely dependent on water brought in barges and the water so provided was brought in tank ships from England or the Mediterranean ports, with consequent danger of contamination *en route* and when delivered to the shore. Later a large condensing plant was installed at Mudros and distributed by pipes to the camps there, but for the major portion of the campaign there was constant handling of water with all its attendant difficulties and dangers. Chlorination was relied upon as the general means of purification, but with raw troops and inexperienced officers (military and medical) it was by no means as carefully and universally carried out as it should have been. The investigations made as to the water supplies did not, however, result in tracing the dysentery, from which the troops suffered to such a large extent, to water pollution, and I think I may say that there was little evidence that enteric and paratyphoid fevers were water-borne.

Clothing.—In August, 1915, a special scale of clothing for use during the winter months was sanctioned; it was most liberal and suitable, and as good, if not better, than had ever been issued to an army in the field.

Rest.—The troops on the peninsula suffered from the absence of places where they could rest in the intervals when not on duty in the trenches, for when relieved from these they were still subject to fire. Rest camps were established in Mudros and Imbros, but for a long time the men remained unrelieved on the peninsula, and the strain that resulted *plus* the difficulties as to rations and water undoubtedly exercised an unfavourable influence on their health, and power of resisting disease.

Timber and Corrugated Iron.—I have already referred to the scarcity of wood, but I wish to emphasise that the shortage in wood and corrugated iron was perhaps the most important factor in the dissemination of disease. It was foreseen at a comparatively early period that disease was spread through the agency of flies, and that the remedy was, first to prevent these pests breeding in or about latrines, second to deny them access to latrines, and third to protect food and kitchens from infected flies. The first could under certain circumstances be achieved by a careful conservancy, but it was often impossible in and about the trenches; the second was dependent on the supply of wood whereby the latrines could be boxed in and made fly-proof, and the third only by the erection of fly-proof kitchen shelters.

The accidents of war led to the loss of ships carrying iron and wood, and there was never anything like adequate supplies available either for the hospitals or the troops, who not only suffered from the absence of protected latrines and kitchens but from insufficient shelter from the weather. I had large numbers of box latrines prepared in Egypt, but only a small proportion reached the troops owing to their bulk and difficulties of carriage.

Inoculation.—The troops were carefully pro-

ected by inoculation against enteric fever, but not until a late stage was a paratyphoid vaccine available. The relative incidence of these two groups was carefully investigated in the different laboratories at Mudros and in Egypt, and the proportion of true enteric fever to paratyphoid was about 1 to 19, so that of the total of between 8,000 or 9,000 cases of the enteric group under 500 were genuine enteric fever. Inoculation against cholera was also carried out on an extensive scale by a special staff, and a large proportion of the men protected, but as the disease did not appear the efficacy of the protection afforded was not demonstrated.

Red Cross.—The sick and wounded are under particular obligations to the work of the British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John of Jerusalem, which never failed to meet the demands for supplies required to supplement the official equipment of hospitals and hospital ships. This work of the joint societies was most ably directed by Colonel Sir Courtauld Thomson, the Chief Commissioner in the Near East, whose aim was not to supplant but to supplement official resources, and to utilise and direct to the best advantage all offers of help. In addition, special hospitals, convalescent homes, and camps were provided by the Red Cross.

W. BARTIE, *Surg.-General.*

War Office,

30th November, 1916.

Office of P.D.M.S.,

Alexandria.

21st July, 1915.

D.M.S., M.E.F.

There are some points I want to write to you about in regard to the arrangements for battle casualties:—

1. The special personnel being sent is for the use of both Egypt and M.E.F. at my discretion, and I hope that you shall have (over and above staffed hospital ships) 200 M.O.s. and 240 nurses for the special transports. As to the N.C.O.s. and men, the War Office telegrams are not clear, but you may be able to supply any shortage of R.A.M.C. from field units not engaged. You shall have every man I can send you.

2. As to supplies, Egypt has already arranged for medical stores for a dozen ships, and mattresses, pillows, blankets, sheets, can be supplied in large numbers. Regarding this you must look ahead as I am not clear that you will be provided with all you want from home in time.

3. One of my chief anxieties is the getting of the wounded to the transports, which presumably will be at Mudros, but by using all available and suitable craft this may be overcome.

4. Another difficulty will be getting wounded from the shore to the hospital ships and sweepers, and great delay can only be avoided by the most careful organisation and active co-operation of Army and Navy.

5. Wounded waiting on the beaches must be well looked after and exceptional arrangements for attending to them and feeding them will be essential. As to how this can best be done I am, of course, unable to advise, but there should be no difficulty

in conjunction with D. of S. in providing ample supplies of food.

As to the character of that food, my experience is that most men who have been lying out require substantial food, such as good stews, and cannot be satisfied with bovril and that sort of thing. Stews, cocoa or tea, biscuits or bread, bovril, etc., should all be available in every C.C.S. and at every embarkation place or collecting station.

Much must depend on the military situation, but a high standard in this respect is essential.

6. The cases on the shore must be sorted, however roughly, into those for hospital ships and those for sweepers; the hospital ships should take serious cases, and as large numbers as are possible of cases requiring early attention and operation. I fear it will not be possible to discriminate much further—possibly not so far.

7. I presume that you will have the hospital ships available as close up to the scene of action as possible, and I know that you will have much difficulty in preventing cases getting to the wrong ships—very serious cases being put on sweepers and light cases getting to the hospital ships; but if the rough sorting I have suggested can be carried out it may be possible to minimise this. It is a matter of organisation—if only the opportunity of applying the organisation is not lacking.

8. Similarly the organisation of the embarkations at Mudros will require to be carefully worked out. If I were personally responsible I should arrange that sweepers as they arrived should come alongside the "Aragon" or a medical ship conveniently anchored to intercept them, and get definite orders as to what they are to do with their human freight. If this can be done the D.D.M.S. L. of C. or whoever represents him can learn exactly what is on board the sweeper and issue his orders accordingly—to ship or hospital on shore, or whatever it is.

9. I don't know if the Red Cross or other launches for the Medical Service have arrived or not, but special facilities for the D.D.M.S. and his staff getting about at a time like that contemplated are imperative. He must move about and see many transports. Every one of them must be visited by him, or by some responsible officer on his staff, who must see that the ship does not go to sea till she has sufficient M.O.s., nurses, orderlies, and supplies, medical, Red Cross and other. The inspecting officer must be generally responsible that the cases are *prima facie* suitable for the ship.

10. The equipping and staffing of the transports will fall on the over-burdened D.D.M.S. at Mudros, and his staff must be augmented to the extent necessary, and he should have a Naval transport representative to help him. It is a matter of regret that the ships and staff cannot be assembled here, *en route*, where we would have had the assistance of the principal matron in selecting nurses for charge—a very important point—and been able more or less deliberately to select M.O.s. for their special duties. I am asking War Office to name from the special staff of M.O.s. and nurses a sufficient number suitable for charge of ships—they know them; we do not.

11. Report to me by letter or wire if you can do so with due regard to military considerations, what arrangements you propose. I should like to know how you are going to utilise your Casualty Clearing Stations, and what are your plans for receiving,

dressing and feeding the wounded, on shore and on sweepers.

12. The sweepers will require special attention, and M.O's. must see that they are fully provided with food, Red Cross sweeper-boxes of comforts, dressings, and all else possible. Written instructions as to these things must be issued to each M.O. on a sweeper and nothing left to chance. It is just there that default and sins of omission are most likely to occur.

13. The reception of wounded in transports and hospital ships also requires watching; patients must be fed on arrival, that is to say, food in plenty must always be ready.

14. I am not going into the surgical treatment of cases, because the consultants with you will no doubt frame for you any necessary rules for general guidance. One thing I cannot however omit, and that is the necessity of treating severe sepsis and gangrene on deck—never in a ward.

15. Are your supplies of peroxide, anti-tetanic serum, etc., sufficient?

16. Are gas respirators available for use if wanted?

17. Where are you going to put No. 3 A.G.H.? It is a good unit, and it should be of the very greatest assistance. The site selected at Mudros for the hut hospital would do, I think, or better still one near that would leave the chosen site unpolluted. The hospital has sisters, remember.

18. The ships cannot all go to Egypt or Malta. It is very unlikely that Egypt and Malta will be able together to take more than 12,000 or 13,000 cases. Therefore some must go straight home, and of course one would prefer to send well filled hospital ships home, but if one battle is to be succeeded by another you cannot deplete yourself of hospital ships which are in effect your field hospitals, so it will be wise to select some of the best transports to send direct to the United Kingdom if necessary. Another point of importance is not to send ships to Alexandria, or Malta in such quick succession as to block these ports, or overtax the ambulance train capacity of Egypt. Alternate, Alexandria, Malta, and possibly England so long as vacant accommodation allows. As to that Egypt will keep D.D.M.S. L. of C. informed from day to day, and Malta should be asked to do the same.

19. The housing on ships of the special medical and nursing staff at Mudros may present difficulties, but the aim there should be to get them allocated and on board their ships as soon as possible after arrival.

20. Would "stretcher carriages" be useful to you on the beaches? I could collect some, I think.

21. I have remarked, I am sure, on many very obvious points, and I am just as sure that I have forgotten or omitted many others of equal importance, but your experience will correct the omissions and you will I know forgive the obvious.

(Sd.) W. BABTIE.

MEMORANDUM on the Medical Provisions that would be required in the event of a Battle on the Peninsula, involving say, 15,000 casualties.

The principal consideration is that owing to the military conditions on the beaches at Anzac and Helles, the immediate embarkation of all wounded is necessary.

(C 49—242)

2. As transports cannot lie off the beaches it is necessary in order to effect this to have sufficient (a) shore boats; (b) hospital ships for bad cases; and (c) sweepers to take the lightly wounded to transports.

3. Hospital ships and transports will also be required for the movement of cases to the base and to the United Kingdom.

4. The number of hospital ships and transports that are generally available would be insufficient to meet requirements. Of the first we can calculate on nine at present, and although all would not be on the station at any one time, with warning we might concentrate five or six. These cannot accommodate more than 500 wounded each (200 serious, 300 light), their maximum capacity being therefore some 3,000 cases of all sorts.

5. There remains hospitals on shore at Mudros, practically always full of patients but not generally of men seriously ill. These hospitals can take about 2,500 and, if they can be cleared into convalescent camps, and to Egypt, of a proportion of light cases, accommodation for a maximum of 1,500 wounded might be available on shore. But here again a question of ships is likely to arise at a time when ships may be very precious.

6. Taken together (4) and (5) may be taken as accounting for 4,500 cases. There remains 10,500 to be dealt with in transports. I do not know the number of transports generally available, but assuming that six could be found with an average capacity of 600, 3,600 can be accounted for, a grand total of, say, 8,000.

7. For the balance (7,000) transports must be found from outside the theatre of operations.

8. With the assistance of the Navy and the presence of spare field ambulances at Mudros as at present, staff for five ships might be found here. The other transports must bring staffs with them.

9. To assemble and keep together transports capable of dealing with 7,000 casualties is the initial difficulty, and it is in this respect that the problem differs from that of the original landing when the transports carrying soldiers up could be and were used to bring wounded down. To allow some margin the number of additional transports required may be taken as 14 and they must bring their staffs with them. It will be agreed that 14 transports cannot be assembled without ample warning.

10. The only alternative is the establishment of a sufficient number of large hospitals on shore at Mudros and possibly at Imbros. Even if this was possible it would not avoid, though it might postpone, the necessity for the assistance of transports, and the time taken to establish these hospitals would be much greater than that required to assemble transports.

11. The number of sweepers and other similar vessels required for the conveyance of the wounded from the beaches to the transports is another important consideration. A sweeper can only make one voyage a day to Mudros, but two voyages would be possible to Imbros if transports could go there and if hospitals were available there.

After making allowance for the number embarked on the hospital ships, upwards of 50 trips would be necessary. I do not know the number of sweepers available in a great emergency, but this aspect of the matter is very important indeed if delay on the exposed beaches is to be avoided.

L 2

The disposal of the wounded after leaving the Dardanelles must also be considered, for the resources of Egypt and Malta are limited; transports if sufficiently fitted for the voyage might go to the United Kingdom direct but only a proportion of hospital ships could be spared to do this. The hospitals in Egypt and Malta must be kept as clear as possible by a system of liberal evacuation which in itself would probably prevent the diversion of hospital ships from the Egypt-United Kingdom, and other lines of evacuation to India and Australasia.

Mudros, (Sd.) W. BABTIE.
3 July, 1915.

MEMORANDUM on the evacuation of the sick and wounded of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

D.Q.M.G. } Med. Force.
D.M.S. }

In War Office Telegram No. 5738 Q.M.G. 2 of 24th June, 1915, certain arrangements are proposed for the service of hospital ships not only for the Mediterranean Force to Egypt and the United Kingdom, but also for the services between Suez and Bombay, Suez and Australia and New Zealand, and Egypt and Malta and the United Kingdom.

For the Mediterranean Force there are two suggested services—(1) From the Dardanelles to the United Kingdom direct, to which five vessels are allotted; (2) a ferry service to Alexandria, for which 12 ships are allowed. The first will allow of a ship sailing every 10 days and the patients to be put on these vessels must, as a rule, all be cases regularly invalided to England. These ships will provide, taking the average as 500 per vessel, for 1,500 invalids a month. (2) Of the 12 vessels under this category, I understand two are to be earmarked for Indians and wounded Turkish prisoners, and 10 for British and Colonial sick and wounded. The latter number should be sufficient to permit of two vessels sailing every three days, say 20 sailings per month, and taking each vessel as carrying about 500, the number of British sick and wounded that can be evacuated to Alexandria by this means may be 10,000.

The two ships for Indians are less suitable, but each could easily take 300 cases and make two voyages per mensem; this will provide for 1,200 cases per mensem, a number in excess of probable requirements, but this cannot be helped, as an Indian ship will always be required at Mudros. Allowing seven days for the voyage to Alexandria and back, and 40 days for the round voyage to England, there will always be one ship on the station for the reception of invalids for England, five for sick and wounded for Alexandria, and one for Indians—a total of seven.

Of this seven, two will be off Anzac and Helles; one (reserved for Indians) and three (for Alexandria) and one (for England) for British in Mudros Bay. In ordinary circumstances the Alexandria ships for British sick and wounded at Mudros will fill up one by one; this will permit of a constant reserve for battle casualties, and as the ships will sail in quick succession, no serious dislocation need result after an ordinary engagement; for as ships become filled others will become available.

An adequate supply of suitable launches, capable of taking cases, serious and other, to and from ship to shore and ship to ship is necessary. These launches should be marked with a Red Cross and reserved for the medical service. Similarly, it is most desirable that each hospital ship should be provided with a steam launch or motor boat for the use of medical staff.

It is of prime importance that the hospital ships should in ordinary circumstances run and adhere to a pre-arranged programme of sailings and arrivals. It is obvious that the stress of war may upset any predetermined plan, but adherence to this principle is essential to success. The programme must be one of "sailings," not of individual ships, for it will be necessary to fit in the ships at the beaches as they fill up.

The programme must also be observed even if ships have to sail with less than their full complement of patients. On punctuality in this respect the maintenance of the reserve on the station is entirely dependent.

General Headquarters, (Sd.) W. BABTIE.
29th June, 1915.

SIR IAN HAMILTON.

Alexandria,
27th July, 1915.

DEAR GENERAL,

I had hoped to be with G.H.Q. at this time, but I am unfortunately in bed with dysentery, and fear that I may not be able to come up until too late.

There is, however, a very great deal I can do here, even now, in assisting to clear the hospitals and in adding to the accommodation in them. The difficulty is that the automatic requirements of the Force is, owing to its increasing strength, growing to such an extent that it is not easy to keep the hospital population within bounds.

Lord Methuen and Sir John Maxwell are doing everything possible to provide additional beds and to facilitate the clearing of the hospitals of convalescent patients. The Red Cross, too, is very active and helpful, and their work requires attention, as do the arrangements for the disembarkation and distribution of the wounded here. Ever since I received your telegram as to the number of possible casualties I have been in constant communication with the War Office as to the additional hospitals, M.O's., nurses and other ranks to be sent from home. That has now been settled on a very liberal scale, and I do not think there will be any deficiency in personnel. I hope all may arrive in time. I have also discussed with Birrell how best to meet the extraordinary circumstances of the medical situation.

The chief difficulties to be anticipated are:—

1. The man-handling of large numbers of wounded to the beaches. This will impose a very severe strain on the field ambulances, who may require such assistance as is possible from the troops and from the fleet in the provision of bearers.

2. The caring for the wounded awaiting embarkation; exceptional arrangements for attending to and feeding the waiting wounded will be required, and I have asked D.M.S. to make special provision as regards food with the D. of S. What is wanted is plentiful supplies of substantial food, such as

stews supplemented by tea, cocoa and medical comforts.

3. The sorting out of the cases into those requiring early attention on hospital ships and those that can be sent to transports. The boat services for these two classes of cases should be distinct, cases for hospital ships being collected and embarked at different places from those for transports. If only mixing can be avoided the scandal of serious cases being carried long distances on sweepers while the hospital ships get filled up with lightly wounded men may be averted.

With the help of the Navy and careful organisation I feel certain that serious trouble in this important respect may be avoided. The difficulty will be the provision of a sufficient number of boats for shore work and of sweepers, and I hope it may be possible to supplement the latter by using tugs and swift paddle-steamers.

4. The Red Cross have provided special boxes of utensils, clothing and comforts for the wounded on the sweepers, and I have impressed on D.M.S. the necessity for very careful medical arrangements on board these craft.

5. The arrangements for the embarkation, reception and feeding of the wounded on the transports is a matter of importance.

6. The staffs arranged for the transports carrying wounded are liberal and include nurses who, I hope, will do much to diminish suffering.

7. The number of beds available in Egypt and Malta is not likely to exceed 12,000 or 13,000, and

even after allowing for the possibility of treating large numbers of the lighter cases on the shore at Mudros, I fear it may be necessary to send considerable numbers of wounded direct to England.

If hospital ships can be spared for this well and good, but these ships are really the field hospitals of the Force, and if battle is likely to succeed battle then it would be unwise to detach them (they cannot be back under a month), and it may be necessary to use transports for this purpose. I have therefore asked D.M.S. to select suitable ships, and these should be specially staffed and equipped.

Sir James Porter, the H.T.O., who has gone up to Mudros to take up his appointment, will be a great help in these respects, and I have promised him every possible help and assistance in his new duties. I have learnt that at our interview here there was a misunderstanding, Sir James thinking I was reluctant to hand over to him while I was endeavouring to explain that his was an appointment that involved taking over duties performed not by me but by the Q.M.G.'s staffs of the G.O.C's. concerned and the Naval Transport authorities. I hope that has now been made clear and that all will be well, but I mention the matter as I repeated a telegram on the subject to G.H.Q.

With many apologies for writing at this time.

Believe me, dear Sir Ian Hamilton,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) W. BABTIE.

"NOTE.—Though transports and other vessels were used for the purpose of carrying wounded, these were not marked or distinguished as hospital ships, nor was any immunity claimed for them, and their use in this way involved no breach of The Hague Convention."

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PERCIVAL'S STATEMENT (APPENDIX E). SCALE OF RATIONS.

APPENDIX E. MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. SCALE OF DAILY RATIONS FOR BRITISH TROOPS. FIELD SERVICE SCALE (OVER- SEAS).

1 lb. fresh or frozen meat, or 1 lb. (nominal) preserved meat.
 1½ lbs. bread, or 1 lb. biscuit, or 1 lb. flour.
 4 ozs. bacon.
 3 ozs. cheese.
 2 ozs. peas, beans, or dried potatoes.
 ½ oz. tea.
 4 ozs. jam, or 4 ozs. dried fruits.
 3 ozs. sugar.
 ½ oz. salt.
 1 oz. mustard.
 1 oz. pepper.
 1 tin of condensed milk.
 1 gill (320 gallon) lime juice.
 1 gill (320 gallon) rum.
 Tobacco, or cigarettes. Not exceeding 2 ozs. per week, for those who smoke.
 Fresh vegetables, whenever obtainable, issued at the rate of ½ lb. per ration, and when these are supplied peas, beans or dried potatoes and lime juice are not issued.
 2 ozs. butter twice a week, additional to above.
 At the discretion of the G.O.C., on the recommendation of the Medical Officer.
 For soldiers in the trenches or at the immediate front of the field of operations.

GENERAL ROUTINE ORDER, DATED 17TH MAY, 1915.

164. Scale of Rations for Greek Labour Corps.—

Biscuits ...	1½ lb.	Pepper ...	3½ oz.
Cheese ...	1½ "	Beans, rice or	
Jam ...	1½ "	lentils ...	1½ lb.
Dried vegetables ...	1½ "	Olives ...	2 ozs.
Sugar ...	3 ozs.	Olive oil ...	2 "
Tea ...	½ oz.	Meat ...	1½ lb.
Salt ...	1½ "	Dried fish ...	1½ ozs.

165. *Tobacco*.—Cigarettes, tobacco and matches may be issued to Gurkha soldiers of the Indian Brigade at the scale laid down for British troops.

GENERAL ROUTINE ORDER, DATED 30TH JUNE, 1915.

322. Lime juice will be issued at the rate of four issues a week; this issue will be made even when there is a daily issue of fresh vegetables.

GENERAL ROUTINE ORDER, DATED 4TH JULY, 1915.

338. *Rations and Forage*.—(a) Cigarettes will be issued at the scale laid down for British troops to all Indian troops, including transport drivers.

(b) An issue of ½ lb. grain and 2 lbs. hay per head daily is authorised for slaughter live-stock.

GENERAL ROUTINE ORDER, DATED 6TH JULY, 1915.

339. *Supplies*.—When available the following scale of equivalents may be followed; this cancels all former scales of equivalents published:—

Flour 1 lb. = Biscuit 1 lb. = Bread 1½ lbs.	
Rice ...	4 ozs.
Jam ...	4 "
Golden syrup ...	4 "
Cheese ...	3 "
Preserved meat ...	6 "
Fresh meat ...	10 "
Dried fruits ...	4 "
	All equivalents of each other.

It is hoped that dried fruits and rice will be available by 25th July.

Cheese will shortly cease to be issued and condensed milk will be issued in lieu at the rate of one tin condensed milk = 8 rations cheese, but condensed milk will not be issued as an equivalent for anything else.

EXTRACT FROM MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE LETTER, DATED 20TH OCTOBER, 1915.

Winter Scale of Rations.—D.Q.M.G. has written to say that he has gone carefully into the matter with the

D.M.S., who is of opinion that dried fruit should be given for special anti-scorbutic purposes. If, however, potatoes or green vegetables become available, he is quite willing that the dried fruit shall be discontinued. D.Q.M.G. says: "the Commander-in-Chief himself has expressed a desire that dried fruit shall be given." D.Q.M.G. goes on to say: "the net result is that the scale for the winter ration shall be as follows:—

Fresh meat ...	1 lb.
or	
Preserved meat ...	1 ration.
Bread ...	1 lb.
or	
Biscuit or flour ...	1½ lb.
Bacon ...	4 ozs.
Milk ...	1 tin.
Rice ...	4 ozs.
Jam ...	3 "
Sugar ...	3 "
Cheese ...	3 "
Dried fruit ...	3 "
Dried vegetables ...	2 "
Tea ...	½ oz.
Salt ...	1½ "
Mustard ...	1 oz.
Pepper ...	1 oz.
Lime juice (2 weekly issues) ...	1 gill.
Tobacco or cigarettes (weekly) ...	2 ozs.
Fresh vegetables, when available, at the rate of ...	½ lb.†
Rum ...	1 gill.†

* When fresh vegetables are not available.

† Instead of dried vegetables and dried fruit.

‡ At the discretion of corps commanders, on the recommendation of the medical officer.

SCALE OF FIELD SERVICE RATION AUTHORISED by G.R.O. 650, DATED 16TH NOVEMBER, 1915.

The following scale of rations will be issued from 1st December, 1915, and will replace the scales that are now in use:—

Fresh meat ...	1 lb.
or	
Preserved meat ...	1 ration.
Bread ...	1 lb.
or	
Biscuit or Flour ...	1½ lb.
Bacon ...	4 ozs.
Milk ...	1 tin.
Rice ...	4 ozs. (5 issues a week).
Oatmeal ...	4 "
Jam ...	3 "
Sugar ...	3 "
Cheese ...	3 "
Dried fruit ...	3 " (when fresh vegetables are not issued).
Dried Vegetables ...	2 " (when fresh vegetables are not issued).
Tea ...	½ oz.
Salt ...	1½ "
Mustard ...	1 oz. (6 issues a week).
Pepper ...	1 oz.
Curry Powder ...	1 " (1 issue a week).
Lime Juice ...	1 gill. (2 issues a week).
Tobacco or Cigarettes	2 ozs. weekly.
Fresh vegetables, when available, at the rate of ½ lb. instead of Dried Vegetables and Dried Fruit.	
Rum, 1 gill (at the discretion of corps commanders, who may delegate their authority as they may consider desirable).	
Cocoa or Chocolate, 1½ ozs. may be issued instead of Rum for those who prefer it.	

Extras for Troops on the Peninsula.

DAILY.

1 oz. Pea Soup or Oxo.

1 oz. Tea.

1 oz. Sugar.

G.R.O. 715, dated 27/12/15.—These extras may now, with the exception of Pea Soup or Oxo, be drawn by all British Troops at Mudros and Imbros.

TWICE A WEEK.

2 ozs. Butter or Margarine.

(Signed) WALTER CAMPBELL, Major-General,
Deputy Quartermaster-General, M.E.F.

STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE OF LIEUT.-COL. F. H. WILLIAMSON, R.E., Director of Army Postal Service, Home.

The Army Postal Service is a section of the Royal Engineers, Special Reserve, and is recruited entirely from the staff of the Civil Post Office. In this country it consists of a Home Depot or General Base Post Office, which collects from the Civil Post Office all letters and parcels addressed to the Expeditionary Forces, sorts them into separate unit bags for almost every separate unit in the overseas forces, and controls their conveyance from this country to the port of disembarkation in the theatre of operations. Overseas, each Expeditionary Force has its own Army Post Office, under a Director of Postal Services, which, through its system of Base, Stationary and Field Post Offices, controls the actual delivery arrangements in the field, arranges all local transport, collects and despatches all correspondence posted in the field and disposes of undelivered correspondence for the killed and wounded.

The Army Postal System differs in one important point from the civil—it does not deliver letters and parcels to the addressee personally, but hands over the correspondence for each military unit to the authorised Post Orderly of that Unit. When a bag of letters and parcels or a registered letter has been handed over to a Post Orderly and a discharge obtained, the responsibility of the Army Post Office ceases.

This general system was applied to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force; but the conditions attending the despatch of that Force made it a matter of some difficulty to organise the postal service at the outset on any satisfactory basis, and it was some little time before the conditions were sufficiently stable to permit of the establishment of anything approaching a regular service.

An Assistant Director of Postal Services with 15 N.C.Os. and men was despatched from England on 24th February, 1915, and arrived at Mudros early in March; but the military situation did not at that time admit of the formation of a Postal Base at Mudros, and after a stay of a fortnight he was despatched to Alexandria, where he proceeded to establish a Base Post Office.

A second officer with a small postal force left England on 20th March, proceeded to Alexandria, and was despatched thence to Mudros, arriving there in April, when the troops were beginning to re-assemble. Considerable inconvenience was caused at the outset by the absence of proper postal personnel from certain formations. The 29th Division had the personnel provided under War Establishments, and the New Zealand troops also were properly equipped. But the Naval Division and the Australians had arrived without any postal force, and their service in the field had to be extemporised. This proved a somewhat slow and difficult task, and some time elapsed before their arrangements could be said to be satisfactory.

Meanwhile, the problem of despatching the mails to the Force presented many difficulties. The Army Post Office at Home, whose province it is, as above explained, to make up the mails for the troops, and to arrange for their overseas conveyance

to the Base of the Expeditionary Force, was unable to obtain sufficient information to enable it to consider what were the best means to adopt. Mails were first despatched on 18th March, 1915, when 17 bags of letters and 27 bags of parcels were sent to the new Base "Z." The first instructions from the War Office were to send all mails to Malta, whence they were sent on by the Naval authorities. At the outset, an attempt was made to separate mails for Lemnos from those for Egypt. This was soon abandoned, and all mails were despatched to Lemnos, whether intended for the troops there or for the Base in Egypt. But this circulation naturally led to a good deal of delay to correspondence for the Base in Egypt, and early in May the Home Post Office was asked to separate mails for Egypt from those for Lemnos, a small postal staff being stationed at Malta to superintend their onward transmission. This arrangement, however, only lasted for three weeks. Finally, at the end of May the service *via* Malta, which, owing to inadequate communications, was not a very satisfactory centre, was discontinued, and all mails were despatched to Alexandria. The Advanced Base Post Office had by that time been definitely established on the *Aragon* at Mudros, and arrangements had been made for all transports to call in Mudros Bay and deliver their mails, while stationary and field Post Offices had been got into working order on the Peninsula and a service to the landings organised. This service to Alexandria continued up to the time when a direct service to Mudros was organised at the end of the year.

In the meantime, the postal personnel had been considerably augmented, Major H. F. McClintock having been sent out in April as Director of Postal Services with four Officers and 80 men. The numbers sent out were based on the probable requirements of the Force under normal conditions; but the work at the Base at Alexandria was soon increased beyond all expectations by the large number of casualties, which resulted in the return to the Base Post Office of an enormous number of letters and parcels from the Front. Attempts were made to deal with these by reference to Base records, but as the records were incomplete and the staff very fully occupied, this soon proved impracticable, and it was found necessary in order to provide a satisfactory system of re-direction to organise in co-operation with the Hospitals a complete list of patients in hospital, and to keep this constantly up to date. At one period, an attempt was made to examine mails going through Alexandria to the Front with a view to intercepting correspondence for casualties, but this procedure both delayed the mails, and also used up staff which was urgently required for other purposes, and had to be abandoned. On the whole, the treatment of casualty correspondence, though hampered by shortage of staff, which made it impossible to treat it as expeditiously as was desirable, worked fairly satisfactorily; in October about 25 per cent. of the returned letters, and 40 per cent. of the parcels were being delivered to the

addressees in hospital; and it is understood that there was a substantial improvement later.

In July and August, complaints of the defects of the service became frequent, and it was alleged that letters and parcels were delayed, lost or stolen on a considerable scale. Very little was known at home of the actual working of the service and the Postmaster-General, who accepted general responsibility for the Army Postal Service, sent out the Witness to make a special inquiry on the spot. A copy of the Witness's report, which describes in detail the working of the mail service to Gallipoli, has been supplied to the Commission.

About this time also the question of accelerating the service from England began to be raised. The letter mail service to Gallipoli *via* Alexandria and Mudros took about three weeks, and was liable, owing to irregularities in the transport service, to take considerably longer; the parcel service was much slower, and might take up to 5 to 6 weeks, according to the connections made at Alexandria. It was suggested by the Inspector-General of Communications that the service should be improved by the establishment of a direct service by two special ships between Marseilles and Mudros and Imbros, two additional ships being employed to give a regular service between Alexandria and Mudros, which was important because of the official correspondence with the Base and the Australian, Indian and New Zealand mails. The adoption of these suggestions would have effected a great improvement in the service; but unfortunately it was quite impossible at the time to procure ships which could be devoted entirely to the mail service; and after full discussion between the War Office, Admiralty and Post Office, the scheme was found to be impracticable.

The French Post Office and War Office were approached with a view to the use of the French direct supply ships from Marseilles, and agreed to take all the letter mails for Mudros. Although the frequency of the service was cut down from thrice to once a week after the landing of the Salonika Force, this scheme was the best alternative possible, particularly in view of the diversion of transport services from Egypt to Salonika. It was accordingly brought into force in November, was supplemented in December by a service *via* Malta, and continued until the withdrawal of the Expedition. The result of the change was an average reduction of nearly a week in the letter post service from England. If the Home authorities had been in possession of fuller information, it is probable that the service could have been improved much earlier than it was.

In order to improve the Parcel Post, arrangements were made with the Admiralty to use the weekly Fleet messenger despatched from Malta to Mudros. This service was actually established, and gave an acceleration of about a fortnight as compared with the service *via* Egypt; but owing to difficulties at Mudros, and to the prolonged suspension of the despatches from Malta during the evacuation (which began immediately after the establishment of the service), the full effect of the improvement was never realised.

The evacuation naturally made it impossible to carry out the postal service satisfactorily during the transitional period before the troops settled

down in their new locations. There were heavy accumulations of mails, particularly of parcels, of which 20,000 bags were at one time stored at Alexandria and several thousand at Malta; but all mails were in time delivered to the various units and a regular service was established as soon as the troops had returned to Egypt.

It is not contended that the organisation of the Army Postal Service could not have been better, and that a more adequate service could not have been furnished with the means available. But the principal defects were due to causes which the Army Post Office could not control, *viz.*, defective communications and shortage of staff.

The establishment of a special mailship service, whether from Alexandria or from Marseilles, though it could have been justified by the great volume of correspondence—some 8,000 to 10,000 bags a week—and the reduction in the time of transit, proved impossible because of the shortage of ships. The Admiralty could not allocate any of their transports solely to the Mail Service, and to charter suitable ships in the open market was out of the question. There was no alternative but to use services already established for other purposes—first, the regular Peninsular and Oriental Mail boats to Egypt and the supply ships from Egypt onwards, in spite of the delay, irregularity, and uncertainty of such a service, and later on French ships already running from Marseilles. A serious obstacle to schemes of improvement was the difficulty of obtaining any satisfactory information as to the services actually running.

The service was also badly hampered by the very insufficient transport allocated to the Army Post Office at Mudros. All mails for the Peninsula, whether arriving from Egypt, Malta or Marseilles, had to be transhipped at Mudros; but in spite of the great volume of the mails the Post Office had only one lighter and one motor launch with which to load and unload all transports and ferry ships and to carry out the local services at Mudros itself.

As regards shortage of staff, there was great delay, due apparently to transport difficulties, in sending out drafts, who were urgently needed, first, to meet the great increase of work which was entailed by the heavy casualties, and then to deal with the additional mails which followed the despatch of several new Divisions in June and July. For example, a draft applied for on 13th May and authorised within a few days only reached Alexandria on 15th June; another applied for on 30th July arrived in the middle of September; while a large draft requisitioned on 5th November only reached Alexandria on 1st February. In fact the Army Post Office only received a fully adequate staff after the evacuation of the Peninsula.

The Postal Service after the withdrawal from Gallipoli and the return of the troops to Egypt presented no special difficulties, and does not seem to call for detailed comment.

The dates on which the various reinforcements were applied for, were authorised, and arrived in Egypt are given in Appendix "A."

Appendix "B" contains statistics of the volume of the mails despatched to Gallipoli up to December, 1915.

APPENDIX A.

Details of Despatch of Drafts to Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

Numbers.	Date applied for.	Date authorised.	Date embarked.	Date of arrival.
2 Officers— 63 o.r.	... 13 May	27 May	3 June	15 June.
1 Officer— 91 o.r.	... 13 July	26 July	12 Aug.	About 24 Aug.
86 o.r.	... 30 July	14 Aug.	5 Sep.	About 17 Sept.
1 Officer— 100 o.r.	... 5 Oct....	18 Oct....	6 Nov.	19 Nov.
3 Officers— 100 o.r.	... 5 Nov.	30 Nov.	21 Jan.'16	1 Feb.
60 o.r.	...	16 Dec.	21 Jan.	1 Feb.

APPENDIX B.

Statistics of Numbers of Bags of Letters and Parcels sent Weekly to Mediterranean Force.

Month.	Letter Bags.	Parcel Bags.
March... ..	64	57
April	675	395
May	817	498
June	791	1,543
July	1,094	2,866
August	1,440	4,071
September ...	1,787	6,047
October	1,970	4,560
November ...	3,169	7,676
December ...	3,389	6,082

STATEMENT OF MAJOR MCCLINTOCK.

POSTAL SERVICE FOR THE DARDANELLES EXPEDITION.

I. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARMY POSTAL SERVICE.

1. The Postal Service for an Expeditionary Force is conducted by a section of the Royal Engineers (Special Reserve) known as the "Royal Engineers, Postal Section," or "R.E.P.S." for short. This body is recruited, both as to officers and men, from servants of the General Post Office, and is only mobilised for war or for annual military training. Its methods of procedure, which are regulated by the "Manual of Army Postal Services, 1913," differ somewhat from those of the Civil Postal Service but have been considerably departed from during the present war, especially in France where the conditions are simplified by the proximity to England.

2. The arrangements in the field are controlled by an officer of this Corps with the title of "Director of Army Postal Services," who is assisted by a Deputy Director and a number of assistant directors. The Director is responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Force and is usually—but not invariably—attached to the Staff of the Inspector-General of Communications. For instance, in the Dardanelles campaign I was attached successively to (a) G.O.C. Base, Alexandria; (b) I.G.C., Mudros; (c) D.Q.M.G., General Headquarters.

3. The postal personnel is divided between:—

- (a) Field Post Offices attached to and forming part of Brigades, Divisions and Corps, and
- (b) Base Army Post Office, Stationary Army Post Offices and postal regulating depôts, which are under the direct control of the D.A.P.S. These generally occupy 60 per cent. or more of the total postal force.

4. In England the Army Postal Service is represented by the "Home Dépôt R.E.P.S." and the "Director of Army Postal Services, Home" both of which have been brought into existence during the present war. The former, besides acting as a regimental dépôt for the Corps, comprises large sorting offices in London where the mails for the various expeditionary forces are made up, the correspondence for each battalion, battery or other unit being enclosed in a separate bag or bags. It is staffed by R.E.P.S. officers and men but also employs a large civilian staff. The Officer in Charge acts under the direction of the "D.A.P.S., Home," who is an official of the General Post Office, working at St. Martin's-le-Grand and on his ordinary civil duties, but given a temporary commission as Lieut.-Colonel, R.E., in order to act as liaison officer between the War Office and Post Office on postal matters and to exercise a general supervision over the Home Dépôt and the postal arrangements for troops in Great Britain. He has no authority over the Directors in the Field who, in their turn, have none over the Home Dépôt either as to the manner in which the mails should be made up or the routes by which they should be sent.

5. There is also a Territorial Section of the R.E.P.S. under a "Director of Postal Services, Home Defence" for the service of troops engaged on Home Defence. The last named appointment is at present in abeyance the duties being performed by the Deputy Director under the supervision of the D.A.P.S. (Home).

6. The Australian, Canadian and New Zealand and Indian Forces each have their own postal corps. In the mixed force these work under the D.A.P.S. of the Force as a whole, while continuing to follow their own methods of procedure as to system of sorting, facilities offered to the troops, &c. (See also paragraphs 89–92.)

II. STAGES OF CAMPAIGN AND MAGNITUDE OF WORK.

7. The history of the Postal Service at the Dardanelles falls into three stages: (a) initial arrangements and early service via Malta, from February to 10 June; (b) service via Alexandria from 10 June to middle of November; and (c) attempts to accelerate the service in November and December, and the evacuation.

8. As to the magnitude of the work, the campaign was about equal to that in South Africa, 1899–1902, both as to the size of force and as to the area involved, taking the extreme points—Egypt, Cyprus, Dardanelles, Salonica and Malta—into consideration. In bulk of mails and facility of communication, however, there was no comparison. Owing to the growth of letter writing and reduction of parcel post rates the mails for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force were altogether larger than those for the South African Field Force, while instead of a daily train from the port of disembarkation of the mails to all parts as in South Africa, the Postal Service in the M.E.F. had nothing to depend on but transports sailing without pretence of regularity and with a most tedious and difficult transshipment half-way into smaller craft running at night to the various landing places on the Peninsula. As, perhaps, the most important factor of all in a postal service is regularity, it would be impossible to exaggerate the difference that this made.

III. INITIAL ARRANGEMENTS.

9. The first step was the dispatch of two small Royal Engineers Postal Section parties in February and March, 1915, with great secrecy, under two Second Lieutenants for duty at two unnamed "Bases" in the Mediterranean, which for postal purposes were designated "Base Z" and "Base Y." Mails were ordered to be sent to Malta and nothing was known in England as to their subsequent treatment.

10. I was appointed Director of Army Postal Services to the Force on 15th March. No official information as to the nature of the expedition was obtainable except that the force consisted of four Infantry Divisions (two British and two

Australasian) and one Mounted Division; and on this I made an estimate for a total R.E.P.S. staff of seven officers and 200 other ranks. This estimate—itself a modest one—was cut down at the War Office to 164 and, as will be shown, proved quite insufficient.

11. As the preparations for the campaign were already well advanced the officers and men had to be collected with the greatest haste from wherever obtainable and without time for any elaborate selection, and the whole were ready to embark, with postal stock, stores and everything, within 16 days. There then followed a little delay in getting a passage, but the officers and the main party sailed on 12th April.

IV. EARLY STAGES OF CAMPAIGN AND SERVICE VIA MALTA.

12. The main R.E.P.S. party, with myself, which left England on 12th April, 1915, reached Alexandria on 23rd April, the day before the landing on the Peninsula, when the force was already assembled, and the campaign launched. This was much too late, as there was a great deal of preliminary organisation, securing and fitting up of buildings, &c., which should have been completed some weeks before, and the late start seriously hindered the work at the outset and, indirectly, for long after. The "Base Y" party was found to be working at the Dardanelles, and the "Base Z" party had opened a small Base Office at Alexandria in a single room building at the docks, where from lack of staff it was much overworked.

13. The postal problem on arrival was a difficult one. The force had its Base at Alexandria and Advance Base at Mudros, but with something like an alternative base at Malta. A considerable portion of the force including the 3rd Echelon, G.H.Q., Base Headquarters and Base details and the mounted portions of many units like A.S.C. Trains and R.E. Signal Companies, was at Alexandria and likely to remain there, and most of the hospitals were intended to be in Egypt. The nearest point to Gallipoli on any existing mail route was Port Said, with Malta running it close as to distance but with a less reliable service from England. In neither case was there any means of forwarding the mails except by such transport ships as might be going with men or stores, and it was very uncertain whether the transport service from Malta or that from Egypt would prove the more reliable.

14. I found that the mails for the force were being sent to Malta and forwarded thence in bulk to Mudros. This caused great delay to correspondence for M.E.F. troops in Egypt and was provoking strong complaint; so I arranged at once for two mails to be made up at the Home Depot, one to Malta for the Dardanelles, and the other to Alexandria via Port Said for the M.E.F. troops in Egypt, and supplied lists of troops for the purpose. A small R.E.P.S. staff had already been stationed at Malta on the journey out to see to the proper checking and loading of the Dardanelles mail. The Malta route was only retained because the G.O.C. Base thought at the time that there would

be a more frequent transport service to Mudros from Malta than from Alexandria.

15. But this arrangement prevented the employment of the Base Office for one of the purposes laid down in the Army Postal Manual, viz., to open and examine the incoming mails in order to rectify errors of sorting from local knowledge and to re-direct correspondence for patients in hospital or officers and men detached from their units from rolls supplied by the hospital authorities or from instructions from the addressees themselves. Malta was outside the M.E.F. area and too remote from the seat of operations to serve for this purpose.

15a. The arrangement also proved unsatisfactory as to speed, partly owing to the irregular mail service to Malta itself and partly to a falling-off in the number of transports from Malta to Mudros. Moreover, the existence of two mails for one force led to mis-sending and complaints.

V. SERVICE VIA ALEXANDRIA—INTRODUCTION AND DESCRIPTION.

16. I therefore obtained permission at the end of May for the whole mail to be brought to Egypt, and this change effected a considerable improvement in the service. The first mail under the new régime reached Alexandria on 10th June.

17. The following is a description of the service as it was carried on via Alexandria for the five months, from 10th June until the introduction of a direct service to Mudros on 19th November, which comprised the most important part of the campaign. There were variations from time to time in the treatment of the mails at Alexandria and Mudros but in its essential outlines the service remained the same throughout.

18. *Inward Mails, Arrival.* (i) *Letters.*—The main letter mail was made up at the Home Depot at 8 p.m. on Thursday and sent on Friday morning with the civil mails via France to Marseilles and thence by Peninsular and Oriental steamer to Port Said, generally reaching Alexandria the following Friday but sometimes on Thursday night. There was another weekly letter mail by French packet which left London on Monday but only reached Alexandria on Wednesday or Thursday of the following week, usually such a short time before the Peninsular and Oriental mail as practically to make one mail.

19. The average number of bags received by the two mails each week grew steadily from 722 in June to 1,858 in October and 1,938 in the first two weeks of November when the service ended.

20. After conveyance to the Base Office the mail was checked and bags for headquarters of Divisions and Brigades, &c., and for units of which part was in Egypt and part at the front were opened to check the sorting and attend to re-direction orders. After these, bags for other units were similarly treated, so far as time allowed; but as the interval between the arrival of a mail and the departure of the next transport was quite uncertain from week to week no settled system of working could be followed, and in spite of many experiments and much thought, the results, except in the two classes of bags named, were not

proportionate to the labour expended, though it is only fair to say that during most of the time this work was much hampered by lack of staff and, up till the second week of August, also by very inadequate premises.

21. Before dispatch all the bags were re-labelled to their appropriate Field Post Offices.

22. (i) *Parcels*.—There was one parcel mail a week which left London on Wednesday and was brought by P. & O. steamer the whole way to Port Said arriving usually the following Thursday fortnight. At Port Said the treatment of parcel mails was not as expeditious as that of letter mails, and they generally did not reach Alexandria till Sunday. The treatment and embarkation of parcels at Alexandria was liable to be delayed till that of the same week's letter mails was completed; so altogether it may be taken that parcels took about 10 days longer than letters of the same date. Apart from this, the treatment of parcel mails was on the whole similar to that of letter mails.

23. The average number of parcel bags each week was 722 in June growing month by month to 5,081 in October with a drop to 4,598 in December, due no doubt to the public saving their efforts for Christmas. The average number of parcels may be taken as 13 per bag.

24. *Dispatch from Alexandria*.—Information as to the sailing of transports was obtained from the Embarkation Staff Officer. The loading was done by native labour under the supervision of an R.E. officer. The number of bags was checked and entered, with destination, on a waybill which was signed by the master of the ship as a receipt, and a telegram of advice was sent to the Army Post Office at Mudros. As a further precaution an R.E. Pioneer travelled on board as mail guard.

25. Lock-up accommodation was seldom obtainable on board the transports, but if necessary a guard was obtained from the Officer Commanding troops on board, and space was so limited that it was hardly ever possible to load the bags in separate stacks for the various "Beaches" and Islands—a fact which materially increased the delay at the next stage—Mudros.

26. *Reception at Mudros*.—No transports went beyond Mudros, and everything had to be transferred there to the ferry ships and trawlers which ran daily to the "Beaches" and Imbros. This had to be done in the open harbour, as there were no quays or deep-water piers, either by lighters or by bringing the two vessels alongside one another. The harbour was large and exposed to gales, and in rough weather, such as was frequent in winter, there was a considerable sea, which added much to the difficulty and delay. The Army Post Office could get no harbour transport for its own until November and so had to indent for a launch or lighter on every occasion and had to wait, often for hours and sometimes for a day or more, for its turn.

27. The procedure was as follows: As soon as possible after the arrival of a ship with mails an R.E.P.S. party of 10 or 12 under an officer or non-commissioned officer was sent on board from the Army Post Office which worked on board the

"Aragon" to get the bags on deck, where they were checked and sorted out according to their destinations, the labels examined and corrected if the unit had moved, or replaced if torn off. The bags for Mudros and Imbros and (later) Salonica were taken to the "Aragon," and those for Helles, Anzac and (later) Suvla were left on board under an N.C.O. to be picked up by the ferry ships which came alongside for the purpose. The mails for Imbros and Salonica were transferred by launch from the "Aragon" to the Imbros trawler and the British or French Salonica ferry ship respectively.

28. A mail guard travelled with every ferry ship or trawler, taking a way-bill with particulars of the mail.

29. The unloading on board the transport was a tedious process and it was difficult to deal with much more than 2,000 bags in one day. The ferry ship could only call early in the day, so a mail could seldom be sent to the Peninsula till the day after its arrival at Mudros. If there was any unusual delay in getting a launch or lighter, or if the ferry ship failed to run, this time might be increased to two days or more. Large consignments of 3,000 bags and upwards would almost inevitably take two days or more to dispose of.

30. *Treatment at the Beaches*.—The mails were unloaded from the ferry ships on to a pier or lighter at night. In the morning they were conveyed by mule cart, fatigue party or Greek labour to the Stationary Army Post Office on the beach and there checked and sorted out inside the Army Post Office enclosure into dumps for the various Field Post Offices. This work was often interrupted by shell fire or by the fatigue party being called away for other duties.

31. Two men attended from each Field Post Office each morning to list the mails and deliver them (still in sealed bags) to the Regimental Post Orderlies who came in—usually with the ration carts—in the course of the day, taking receipts for them. The post orderlies were required on first appointment to produce a written authority from their Commanding Officer or Adjutant to take over the unit mails. Registered letters were taken to the Field Post Offices for delivery.

31A. The treatment and delivery of letters after this stage was left to regimental arrangement; but a special leaflet containing instructions for regimental post orderlies as to the treatment of registered letters, endorsement of undeliverable letters and similar matters was distributed and a General Routine Order was issued making Commanding Officers responsible that these instructions were obeyed.

32. *Conditions of Work on the Peninsula*.—These were much more trying for the staff than for their fellows in France. Instead of a comfortable billet the Field Post Offices had at best a tent to live and work in, but more often a dug-out or a simple hole in the ground with a sail-cloth or, if lucky, a corrugated iron and earth covering. No portion of the land was exempt from shell fire and the beaches were a special target for the Turkish guns and were "watered" most days and occasionally subjected to regular bombardments. The Beach Army Post Offices were frequently hit by shrapnel

and work on the mails had often to be stopped because of shell fire. Dysentery and minor sicknesses were also common. It was under these conditions that all the work had to be done and a large stock of postal orders, stamps and cash to be guarded.

33. The casualties amounting to 5 deaths and 17 wounded in a corps so little exposed by its duties to danger speak for themselves.

34. *Homeward Mails.*—These were at first made up at Mudros from bags and labelled bundles received from the "Beach" Stationary Army Post Offices and the Field Post Offices, but subsequently at the Beach Army Post Offices themselves and sent to Mudros for onward dispatch. From Mudros they were usually sent by transport to Malta for onward shipment by the regular mail steamers to Marseilles or elsewhere, but sometimes were sent by transport direct to England. The service from Mudros to Malta was much more frequent than in the reverse direction and the time taken by letters from Mudros to England varied from 6 to 15 days according to the speed of the transport and the connection secured at Malta. From one to three days should be added for the journey from the Peninsula to Mudros and the letters might have to wait some days at Mudros for a ship. Otherwise the service calls for no comment.

35. *Local Services.* (a) *Mudros to Alexandria.*—The upward service has already been described. The downward service was slower, as there were not so many transports. Its delay and uncertainty was a constant source of complaint from the departments at the Base, especially the "Records" branch of the 3rd Echelon which dealt with casualty returns. In consequence a large amount of correspondence which might have been dealt with by post was thrown on the telegraph cables at cost to the country and prejudice to the telegraph work. I frequently represented the need for better transport facilities but without avail, and attach a copy of my last formal application on the subject which sums up the whole case (Appendix A).

Another section of the downward mail to Alexandria consisted of the "Returned" or "Casualty" correspondence for the wounded and others not with their units. It was naturally very bulky and its treatment at Alexandria is described in paragraphs 93-96.

36. (b) *Mudros to Imbros, Helles, Anzac and Suvla.*—These were maintained by ferry ships or trawlers as already described. They call for no special remark except that the ferry ships were liable to fail from bad weather or other causes so that the services averaged nearer four or five than seven a week. During active operations they were often suspended for some days.

37. (c) *Imbros to Helles, Anzac and Suvla.*—Maintained by daily trawlers. The remarks under (b) apply here too.

38. (d) *Mudros to Salonica.*—There were five ferry ships a week—two British and three French—all of which were used except on a few occasions when the weather was too rough to let the mails be embarked. (These ships did not come alongside the "Aragon," like the Peninsula ferry ships, and the mails had to be put on board by launch.)

VI. EFFICIENCY OF THE SERVICE DURING PERIOD JUNE-NOVEMBER.

39. In spite of all obstacles and defects this service as a whole could not be properly termed bad, especially having regard to the admittedly extraordinary difficulty of the communications. The English mails were delivered week by week to the troops with unfailing certainty. With only one known exception, due to the carelessness of one man, not a bag was lost except, unavoidably, on a few occasions by fire on board ship or by the sinking of a transport or by the act of the enemy, as when a H.E. shell burst in a dump of mails on the beach at Anzac.

40. At the same time it could not by any stretch be called good, especially when compared with the service at home or in the B.E.F., France.

41. The principal defects from the point of view of the administration were:—

(a) *The Irregularity and Uncertainty of the Transports.*—Although there were generally three or four ships a week from Alexandria there was no certainty whatever about their sailing nor any attempt to provide a "Ferry" service on fixed days. Several ships, for instance, would start on one day and all but one would be wasted so far as the carriage of mails was concerned. Times announced for sailing were constantly altered, and it was a common thing for ships to sail in a different order to that announced, causing local and sometimes even English letters to arrive out of their date of posting. Such events would upset all loading calculations and were disastrous for a mail service which depends above all things on regularity and certainty. It happened more than once that ships after starting returned to Alexandria, and one at least was diverted from Mudros to take wounded to Malta without unloading and so delayed a large parcel mail for 10 days. The loading was further hampered by the secrecy necessitated by the danger from submarines, notice of starting being delayed till the last minute and sometimes till too late to get a whole consignment aboard.

42. (b) *Bad Accommodation in the Transports.*—As previously mentioned (para. 25), very few ships had lock-up accommodation for mails and minor cases of looting—generally by native labourers—were not uncommon. The actual amount of loss was trifling, but the consequent enquiries gave great trouble and such occurrences were much exaggerated by rumour.

43. As also mentioned (para. 25), the space was hardly ever sufficient to allow the sectional stowing of mails in spite of great efforts to this end, and this much increased the time taken in unloading and sorting out the mails at Mudros.

44. (c) *Transshipment Difficulties at Mudros.*—These have already been described in paragraphs 26-29, and need not be repeated.

45. (d) *Irregularity of the Ferry Ships and Trawlers.*—The ferry ships from Mudros to the beaches and Imbros were supposed to run daily but, as a matter of fact, there were few weeks when each of them did not fail to run on one day or more owing to weather, accidents or diversion for other purposes. The average number of days

per week was in practice nearer four or five than seven, the Imbros trawler being the best, and the Suvla ferry the worst. During active military operations a service would often be suspended for several days on end.

46. So much for the administration. As regards the public the effect of these shortcomings were :—

(a) *That the Service was Slow.*—Although the Peninsular and Oriental service to Alexandria took only eight days and that from Alexandria to Mudros in June took two, the average time for mails to the Peninsula was five days from Alexandria and from 14 to 18 days from England according to the delay in Egypt. From August onwards the Alexandria-Mudros journey was lengthened by two days owing to “zig-zagging” and the circuitous routes taken to escape submarines, and consequently the minimum time for letters from England became 16 and the average 18 to 21, with possibly another day on the Peninsula in reaching the addressee.

47. It should be noted that these times are reckoned from the actual dispatch from the Home Depot, or, in the case of Egyptian letters, from Alexandria. The time between posting and dispatch is not taken into account. It could hardly be less than 24 hours and if a letter either missed a mail or was posted too soon it would be more still. As the public always reckon by the “postmark” time, this point is important. (Please compare paragraphs 97–99.)

48. (b) The troops never knew when to expect an English mail; and they felt this almost as much as the slow service.

49. (c) The delivery of an English mail was unavoidably spread over several days, some units or some men in the same unit receiving their letters before others—another natural cause of complaint. This was due to: (a) Insufficient time at Alexandria to load the whole mail between the arrival of the mail and departure of the ship; (b) Lack of space on a ship to carry the whole mail; (c) Inability at Mudros to unload and transfer the whole mail before the sailing of the ferry ship. In extreme cases, as mentioned, mails or parts of mails would arrive out of sequence due to ships sailing out of the order notified or to one passing another on the way.

50. (d) Damage or destruction of parcels from the frequent handlings and transshipments undergone, leading to complaints of “lost” or “stolen” parcels. The damage and loss from this cause, which was very extensive, was largely contributed to by the flimsy packing of many parcels and was much reduced by some stringent notices inserted in the English papers and posted at Post Offices. (Please compare paragraphs 57 and 60.)

51. (e) Delay to correspondence between the front and Alexandria, which in the case of official letters, was a standing grievance with the various departments of the Army at the Base—especially the “Records” branch of the 3rd Echelon. (Compare paragraph 35 (a) above.)

52. (f) The impossibility, already mentioned, of organising a satisfactory re-direction system, which meant several weeks delay to letters for the wounded.

VII. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR DEFECTS DESCRIBED.

53. The root of all the difficulties and shortcomings in the service was in the inadequate sea-transport—the irregularity of the transports and, to a less extent, their bad accommodation. The obvious remedy was to establish a “Ferry Service” on fixed days to suit the arrival of mails by ships with sufficient reserved hold accommodation to permit of the sectional stowing of mails in order to save time in Mudros Harbour. If small ships could be allotted which after dropping the Mudros and Imbros mails at Mudros could go on to the beaches, a further great improvement would result, as this would save the transfer of large mails in Mudros Harbour and so would economise time and staff and much reduce the damage to parcels. This arrangement would have afforded a *regular* service from England with a delivery on the same, or nearly the same, day every week in 12 days to Mudros and 14 to the Peninsula for letters, and in slightly over three weeks to the Peninsula for parcels, and would have enabled, together with the staff economised, a large proportion if not the whole of the “casualty correspondence” to be re-directed at Alexandria before dispatch.

54. I represented this to the G.O.C. Base as early as 19th May and tried in various quarters, with the Naval Transport authorities and others, to get some such arrangement sanctioned, but without success. The chief objections raised were (a) that the Naval Transport Regulations contained no provision for the carriage of mails, and that this precluded the making of any special arrangements which might interfere with the free use of the ships for such purposes as were specifically provided for in the regulations; and (b) that there was already a sufficiently frequent service from Alexandria to Mudros and nothing more was warranted.

55. Objection (a) is dealt with in paragraph 122 towards the end of this report. As regards (b) this objection entirely overlooked that it was *regularity* and not increased frequency that was needed in the service. Half the number of ships sailing on fixed days would have given better results so far as the mails were concerned.

VIII. D.A.P.S. TRANSFERRED TO STAFF OF I.G.C., AUGUST, 1915. COMPLAINTS ABOUT PARCEL SERVICE.

56. In August I was transferred from the Staff of the G.O.C. Base at Alexandria to that of the I.G.C. at Mudros.

57. There had been some complaints at home about the postal service which had been taken up by General Sir Ian Hamilton, and the question of improved facilities for the mail service was taken up in earnest. The complaints mostly related to the supposed theft of parcels and I was able to show from the very complete system of way-bills and check at every point that they were founded on a misunderstanding. Their real causes were :—

58. (a) A confusion between *postal* parcels and those sent by the A.S.C. parcel transit service in

which a good deal of looting had admittedly occurred.

59. (b) The much longer time taken by parcels than letters of the same date advising their dispatch, due to the parcels being sent from England by a longer route. (Please see paragraph 22.)

60. (c) The large number of parcels broken or rendered undeliverable by the rough handling inevitably accorded to the mails at the many loadings and transshipments. This was contributed to by the bad packing of many of the parcels sent. A stringent notice in the English papers as to the packing of parcels considerably reduced the proportion of those broken.

61. (d) The practice, forbidden in orders but tacitly indulged in and even sanctioned by some Commanding Officers, of appropriating and distributing among their comrades the contents of parcels for men who were in hospital or for other cause absent from their units.

62. As regards (d) above, it may be argued that the parcels should have been packed in cases or hampers for their protection instead of in bags. The answers to this are—first, that the G.P.O. would certainly not have consented to any such arrangement which, although still followed in many countries, has for years been abolished in England, so that the parcels would still have come for a large part of their journey in bags and would have had to be re-packed at Alexandria, for which we had neither the necessary staff nor space. Secondly, it would have been impossible to get hampers or cases returned by the units. The expense would therefore have been very great and it is doubtful whether enough such receptacles could have been got—at any rate in Egypt—bearing in mind that the average weekly parcel mail in August was 3,300 bags growing to over 5,000 in September and October. Thirdly, the difficulty of handling the mails on lighters, piers and beaches and between the beaches and the trenches would have been enormously increased.

63. I will conclude the subject of the supposed loss of mails or theft of parcels with two quotations from a report to the Postmaster-General by Lieut.-Colonel Williamson, R.E., D.A.P.S. (Home) who inspected the service on the spot in October, 1915:—

“It will be seen . . . that the system of check in force is very thorough, and that it is scarcely possible for any discrepancy in the number of mail bags to remain undiscovered. Discrepancies do arise occasionally but they are as likely to show an excess as a deficiency and are always cleared up ultimately; I am told that there is only one authenticated case of the disappearance of a mail bag during the whole campaign.”

* * * * *

“The Maps Section of the General Staff at Cairo dispatches large quantities of maps to the front, and has insisted that special arrangements shall be made to take the packets of maps along with the mails to Mudros, as no other means of communication is sufficiently speedy or reliable. Packets of maps are accordingly sent with every mail and are specially entered on the waybill.”

More important is a special notice issued with a General Routine Order by the Commander-in-Chief on 4th October. After recapitulating the risks attending the conveyance of parcels (i.e., parcels sent as freight and not through the post) sent by transport and the measures taken to meet them, the notice proceeds:—

“The Commander-in-Chief trusts that the troops will inform their friends at home of what is being done in this matter and that they will also advise them that, when all is said and done, the best and safest plan will still remain to send the article by parcel post.”

IX. SCHEMES FOR IMPROVING THE SERVICE.

64. There remained the question of accelerating and otherwise improving the service. To meet this, three successive schemes were put forward.

65. *My own*, for a “ferry service” between Alexandria and Mudros on fixed days twice or three times a week. Finding that the Principal Naval Transport Officer would not set aside transports for this purpose but that the Commander-in-Chief had power to hire ships in local waters I proposed that a sufficient number of small steamers able to carry 5,000 bags each should, if possible, be hired for the purpose, which after unloading the mails for Mudros and Imbros should go on to Anzac, Helles and Suvla to drop the mails for those places and so save the delay caused by unloading at Mudros.

66. The advantages would be:—

(1) A practically regular mail arrival on the Peninsula instead of the existing erratic one, and a reduction in the time taken by English letters from a varying period of 16 to 20 days to a practically constant one of 14.

(2) A properly executed system for re-directing correspondence for the wounded and others before dispatch from Alexandria instead of after delivery at the unit and return to Egypt.

(3) A regular and accelerated service between Alexandria and the front for the benefit of official and local correspondence and of the mails for the Australian, New Zealand and Indian troops.

(4) A reduction in the damage done to parcels by the repeated handlings of the mails.

67. The scheme had the further advantages of being economical, as any space not needed for mails could be used for troops and stores, of not dislocating existing arrangements, and of being capable of being introduced immediately on the acquisition of the necessary ships and without waiting for other preliminary arrangements.

68. *Inspector-General of Communication's Scheme.*—My scheme was considered by the Inspector-General of Communications not to offer sufficient acceleration, as he wished to secure the fastest possible English mail service for the men at the front. He, therefore, decided to ask the War Office for special mail ships with a speed of 12 knots to run from Marseilles to Mudros once a week. This would have reduced the transit of letters from England to seven or eight days to Mudros and nine or ten to the Peninsula and would have

afforded an immense improvement. Its disadvantages were :—

- (a) Its cost.
- (b) The difficulty of creating a satisfactory postal base at Mudros owing to the absence of buildings and dearth of landing facilities.
- (c) The termination of all attempts to organise the re-direction of correspondence for hospital patients and others before delivery. Up-to-date hospital rolls could not be collected at Mudros.
- (d) It would do nothing for the Australian, New Zealand and Indian mails nor for official correspondence between Mudros and the front, the delay of which had been a frequent cause of complaint.
- (e) It would revive the system of having two mails for the one force which had already been tried and found wanting.
- (f) It would greatly increase the work in Mudros Harbour which was already a matter of much difficulty.
- (g) Considerable preparation, *e.g.*, the erection of a sorting office ashore at Mudros and the placing of an army postal transfer staff at Marseilles, was necessary before the scheme could be introduced.

69. Plainly, however, no one scheme could possess all the advantages and it was a case where either speed or a certain degree of efficiency had to be sacrificed, and though my opinion favoured, and still favours, the proposed improved service via Alexandria, there was much to be said on the other side and I did everything in my power to support the Marseilles scheme once its advocacy had been decided on.

X. POST OFFICE SCHEME—ITS ADOPTION.

70. The War Office, advised by the Admiralty, objected to the provision of the ships asked for and a considerable correspondence followed. The claims of the mails to special consideration was strongly advocated by the I.G.C. and supported by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Monro, but without success. Eventually, the Post Office seems to have been commissioned by the War Office to negotiate with the French Government for a joint postal service direct from Marseilles to Mudros by French transport and Messageries Maritimes, and a War Office telegram dated 9th September said that "this should reduce the time occupied in transit for letters from some eighteen to eight days. There would probably be four services weekly from Marseilles."

71. The matter was thus taken out of the hands of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force altogether and for some time nothing further was heard.

72. The new *wetter* mail service from Marseilles thus arranged did not begin till well on in November—the first mail reaching Mudros on 30th November—just a fortnight before the evacuation began. For some weeks before this the French ships had been cut down to one a week, most of the French troops having been transferred to Salonica, and even this one was very slow and erratic, often putting in at Salonica on its way and sometimes going no further. In all, 13 mails came by this route during the 72

days from 30 November to 9 February when the last of the troops embarked for Egypt or hardly more than one a week. The time taken from Marseilles to Mudros varied from 7 to 15 days with an average of 10½ths, or, allowing for the journeys from London to Marseilles and from Mudros to the Peninsula, at least 15 or 16 days in all and probably more.

73. The acceleration of two or three days thus effected was of little or no value to the troops and was coupled with an increased irregularity due to the erratic movements of the French ships.

74. Meanwhile, the French Government had refused to carry our parcel mails and a rather precarious service via Malta by fleet-messenger, transport and naval collier was arranged which did not come into force at Mudros till 9th December. So far as it went this effected a considerable acceleration, but it was too late to be of any service and passed unnoticed in the general hold-up of mails in consequence of the evacuation (paras. 79–83) which began immediately afterwards. Even so its start in some ways was premature. It was brought in just at the moment of Xmas pressure and before the additional R.E.P.S. transfer staff, which was to be sent from the Home Dépôt had reached Malta (paragraph 100 (6)) where great difficulties consequently arose. The Mudros A.P.O. had no accommodation for parcel sorting (paragraph 77) and the only ship from Malta which could be depended on for any regularity—the fleet messenger "*Wahine*," not an Army transport—stayed only eight or nine hours at Mudros and in rough weather there was a great risk of not being able to unload the whole mail before her return journey.

XI. RESULTS OF THE NEW SERVICE.

75. It will be seen that little or no benefit to the troops resulted from the new services but rather the reverse. Unfortunately great—perhaps exaggerated—hopes had been roused in the force by public statements of the improved service about to be introduced. At home, an acceleration of about a week to both letters and parcels had been spoken of by the General Post Office, while a general order (Appendix B.) issued to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force on 4th October—the exact authority for which I do not know, as I was not consulted—promised a service of 10 or 11 days from England to the Peninsula. When the introduction of the service was delayed till December and then failed to effect any visible improvement, there was wide disappointment and loud complaint at the failure to redeem the promises made or supposed to have been made.

76. From the administrative point of view the changes gave rise to great difficulties. These were cheerfully faced by the staff in the hopes that public benefit would result, but deserve to be stated :—

77. (a) *Mudros as a Postal Base* (compare paragraph 68 (b)).—The Mudros Army Post Office, which had to be expanded to a considerable sorting office to meet the new service, could no longer be housed on board the "*Aragon*." No buildings or huts were obtainable at Mudros everything being earmarked for the hospitals, but I secured

a good sectional building when at Alexandria at the beginning of October and with some trouble got a promise that it should be shipped. Meanwhile the Mudros Army Post Office was moved ashore on 1st November and housed temporarily in four large marquee tents (with separate living quarters for the men) in order not to delay the introduction of the service pending the arrival of the hut ordered. The hut was lost in the sinking of the "Orange Prince" at sea and the tents were wrecked by gales at the end of November. The office was moved to a partly finished building which fortunately was available, and had to remain there, though very inadequately housed, for the rest of the campaign. A second hut was immediately ordered on the loss of the first, but transport again was the difficulty and it had not left Alexandria when the evacuation began.

78. (b) The work in Mudros harbour was greatly increased. The same number of transports to and from Alexandria had to be met as before and the ships from Marseilles and Malta were all additional. As the Army Post Office had only one lighter and one motor launch for all purposes including daily services to the "Aragon" and two Post Offices the other side of Mudros harbour and to the five Salonica ferry ships a week in either direction, and seeing that the introduction of the new service almost coincided with the commencement of Xmas pressure, the strain on the staff and resources of the Army Post Office was very great.

79. (c) The dispersion of the incoming mails between four ports of departure in the Mediterranean (Marseilles, Malta, Salonica and Alexandria) instead of one—Alexandria—as formerly, was a great handicap when the evacuation came. So long as the mails all came through one base office it would have been an easy matter in case of need to arrest and store them there, or to divert those for any particular units to a new destination. The Army postal staff at Marseilles and Salonica, however, were not acquainted with the composition of the Dardanelles Army and could not be relied on to divert mails from Mudros to Alexandria for units on their way to Egypt, and even Malta was insufficiently staffed and only partly qualified to cope with such work. Similarly when it came to holding up the mails (paragraphs 81, 82) we had part stored at Malta and part at Alexandria as well as at Mudros. I have always thought it radically unsound when dealing with a force which is at all likely to move to have more than one mail and one base. (This does not apply to a force of the size of that in France, where the size of the mails compels one to use more than one route), and it was very fortunate in the case of the evacuation of Gallipoli that the ill-consequences were as slight as they were.

XII. THE EVACUATION.

80. The evacuation period began on 12th December and lasted two months—till 10th February—when the last of the Dardanelles troops embarked for Egypt. The handling of the mails during the withdrawal of so large a force was naturally a matter of great difficulty and was increased by three causes :—

(C 49—242)

(1) Shortage of staff due to :—

- (a) A draft of 100 men applied for on 5th November and urgently needed before Xmas not actually arriving till February.
- (b) The division of the force between Egypt and Mudros which took up a larger staff than would otherwise have been needed, and
- (c) The general extra handling of mails.

(2) The dislocation of the services by the recent attempts to accelerate the English mail, as already described in paragraph 79.

(3) The fact that the first evacuation coincided exactly with the period of Christmas pressure.

81. The sequence of events is as follows :— (The actual arrangements were not all quite so simple as they read owing to many contradictory orders and altered instructions received.) On 12th December having been instructed to suspend dispatches to Anzac and Suvla and having been notified that the second lighter allotted to the Post Office at Mudros for Christmas would be withdrawn, and knowing that there were very heavy mails already on the sea for Mudros, I instructed Marseilles, Malta and Alexandria to suspend all dispatches to Mudros except bags for headquarters of Corps, Divisions, &c., and of local official correspondence, in order to lessen the inevitable congestion and landing difficulties at Mudros under the circumstances described. This embargo was maintained till the 20th December for ordinary letter mails and till 1st January for parcel mails, but mails for other troops than those at Anzac and Suvla were let through earlier so far as it was possible for them to be picked out at Malta and Marseilles.

82. The mails for the Anzac and Suvla troops which were already on the sea, and which included the bulk of their Christmas mails, were got ashore at Mudros to the number of 20,000 bags and stacked there under tarpaulins against the arrival of the troops from the Peninsula. Most of the work had to be done at night as the one cramped little pier was congested by day with the landing of troops, sick, and stores. Mails for the Helles troops were sent forward as usual.

83. The troops withdrawn from the Peninsula were temporarily congregated on Imbros and Lemnos pending embarkation for Egypt, and their accumulated mails were delivered to them after their arrival on those islands or, where this was impossible from their short stay or other causes, were forwarded after them to Egypt. Many battalions refused to accept more than a limited amount of mails while in these temporary camps and bivouacs.

84. The outward dispatches from Imbros were also suspended for some days for reasons of military secrecy.

85. The evacuation of Helles began for postal purposes on 29th December and followed a similar course except that, Christmas being over and mails for the late Anzac and Suvla troops mostly diverted to Alexandria, the congestion was less and incoming dispatches therefore, were not suspended. Outgoing dispatches were again suspended for several days by orders from Headquarters.

M

86. The zeal and energy shown by all the officers and men R.E.P.S. during this time made it possible to overcome the difficulties with comparatively very few hitches. So far as I know the local service from Alexandria to Mudros and the onward dispatch of a part of one week's Salonica mails from Malta alone suffered for a short time from the confusion caused. But for the difficulties mentioned above—and especially number 2—the situation could have been met by the normal Army postal organisation with very little difficulty.

87. With the arrival of the last troops in Egypt about 10th February terminated the Dardanelles campaign. The Naval Division alone remained for a time at Mudros, being transferred from the M.E.F. to naval control. Its R.E.P.S. Field Post Offices were withdrawn and the treatment of its mails was handed over to the Navy.

88. I will now deal with some matters of a miscellaneous nature.

XIII. AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND AND INDIAN POSTAL DEPARTMENTS.

89. The Army Postal Service for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was a composite body and comprised besides the British (R.E.) postal staff large Australian, New Zealand and Indian postal contingents which formed an important part of the whole. These other postal corps were under their own officers for discipline, &c., and differed in many details of their procedure from the Royal Engineers Postal Section and from each other but, departmentally, they were all under my control as Director of Army Postal Service to the Force and I was held responsible by Headquarters for their efficiency and for the due co-ordination of their energies. As far as reasonably admissible, they were treated as one service and where necessary as at Mudros, Anzac, &c., joint British and Australian Post Offices were run under the same officer or N.C.O.

To take each briefly in detail—

90. *Australian.*—The Australian force was by far the largest of the three and came without any Postal Corps but had improvised one in Egypt before my arrival. Field Post Offices had been formed as laid down in the British Establishment Tables and had gone forward to the Dardanelles under an officer with some fourteen years' experience in the Melbourne General Post Office who was afterwards made Assistant Director of Army Postal Services at Anzac. I found the Base Office working at Cairo without an officer and very much under-staffed. With the consent of Colonel Selheim, O.C. Australian Intermediate Base, its numbers were increased and it was transferred to Alexandria so as to be better placed for dispatching overseas and to be where we could give it any assistance in our power. An Australian officer was placed in charge and I lent for a time an experienced R.E. Warrant Officer to assist in the organisation. One of the difficulties of this office was that it had, of necessity, to deal with the mails for the large Australian force in Egypt as well as of the two Australian Divisions at the front and there was always a conflict between the two parties for the prior claims to the mails. Notwithstanding this and other difficulties, such

as inadequate premises and the rather shadowy claims of many of the staff to previous postal experience, the office in a short time got into very creditable working order, thanks to the enthusiasm of the staff and the really remarkable energy and organising power of the officer in charge. Similarly, the work at Anzac, which for the first month or two was very erratic and led to some grave complaints of delay to official correspondence, was reduced to good order by the Assistant Director of Army Postal Service in charge under the supervision of my Deputy Director at Imbros.

91. *New Zealand.*—The New Zealanders brought a postal contingent under an officer and their service appeared to be very well conducted. Complaint was made of the inordinate delay to their parcels due to their being brought by sea via England instead of direct to Suez—a matter about which I wrote to the Postmaster-General of New Zealand who had it set right.

92. *Indians.*—The Indians had a similar contingent. Their staff (except some of the officers) is native and the bulk of the correspondence is addressed in the vernacular. The service appeared to be well conducted.

XIV. TREATMENT OF CORRESPONDENCE FOR THE WOUNDED.

93. The casualties during the campaign, as is well known, were enormous, amounting to 15,000 in the first fortnight and to more than in the whole South African war of 2½ years, during the first 10 weeks; and they brought a proportionate amount of correspondence returned from the front each week with no other address than "wounded" or "in hospital." A large part of the staff and energies of the Base Army Post Office at Alexandria was devoted to dealing with returned correspondence for the wounded, and others absent from their units. This is a class of work which does not exist in the British Expeditionary Force, France, as owing to the short distance from London and the rapid communication between different parts of the Army in the Field, re-direction can be left to the post orderlies of the units or, at most, to the Field Post Office for delivery. If a man transfers to a new unit or appointment he can inform his family within 48 hours and in another 48 hours or so will be receiving letters addressed to his new address. It is a matter of relatively small importance whether he receives the letters written in the interim—that is assuming the post orderly at his old address cannot re-direct them and he has not left his address at his old Field Post Office of delivery. The same applies to men in hospital but, in point of fact, most of the sick and wounded are transferred immediately from France to England so that in a few days when their friends know what hospital they are in their letters cease to come in the Army mails at all.

94. But in a force like the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, as in the South African War, this is not the case, and if the Army Postal Office were to summarily send to the Dead Letter Office all letters returned to it marked "left battn." or "wounded" the addressees would be left for weeks without letters and such a course could not be defended.

95. Elaborate machinery had therefore to be set up for ascertaining the addresses of the wounded and re-directing the correspondence.

96. I enclose as an Appendix (Appendix C) a copy of a memorandum describing the system as it was in August, 1915. Naturally the work increased during the subsequent months and many details of the procedure were altered, but the main outlines remained the same and this account may suffice to give an idea of what was a very important and on the whole very successful branch of the Army postal work during the campaign.

XV. TIME OF POSTING IN ENGLAND.

97. There was one contributory cause to the long time taken by letters in reaching addressees in the M.E.F. which I think might have been remedied. This lay in the method of making up the mails at the Home Depot.

98. The civil mails for Egypt and the East generally are not closed at the General Post Office till the small hours of Friday morning, but at the Home Depot, from motives I believe of economy, no night staff was employed, and the mails for the M.E.F. were closed on Thursday evenings. Consequently a large quantity of correspondence was excluded from the M.E.F. mails which would have been in time for the civil mails, and this correspondence, as luck would have it, included the *Weekly Times*, which is brought out late on Thursday night specially for inclusion in the Eastern mails. This caused frequent complaint from officers who subscribed to this paper, especially in Egypt where they did not receive it till nearly a week after the clubs and civilian subscribers, and led to comparisons between the Army and Egyptian Post Offices not in favour of the former.

99. To make matters worse, the public was not told, and did not know, when to post letters for the M.E.F. The counter staff at Post Offices were not allowed to say anything except that letters were forwarded by the first opportunity. Not only did this give an impression of indifference, but it meant great delay to the letters. Many persons would post as for Egypt and miss the mail; other letters posted at random would lie several days in London before dispatch. It cannot be repeated too often that what the public judge a service by is the *postmark* time, i.e., from posting to delivery, and there is no question that two or even three days could have been saved on the average postmark time of letters by announcing a definite "latest time of posting" for the M.E.F., even though it were earlier than that for Egypt. I drew attention to this as soon as it came to my knowledge (I think in June) but without effect.

XVI. STAFF AND CONDUCT.

100. Except for a portion of June and July there was a chronic shortage of staff throughout the campaign and until after the withdrawal to Egypt. This was due partly to (1) my own original low estimate having been cut down at the War Office by 20 per cent.

(2) The necessity for staffing the Field Post Offices of the 42nd Division which was transferred

(C 49—242)

to the M.E.F. from the Egyptian garrison early in the campaign.

(3) The immense casualties which, several times over during the campaign, upset all calculations, coupled with the necessity for delivering returned letters to men in hospital, a laborious class of work not undertaken in France.

(4) The omission to send any men for Base and Lines of Communication work with the six new Divisions which arrived in June and July. This was particularly serious. To meet such contingencies in the future I have recommended an alteration in the Establishment tables.

(5) Delay in the sending of drafts, and especially one draft of 3 officers and 100 men asked for on 5th November and not received till 1st February.

(6) At Malta, the failure to send from home, the extra staff urgently needed for the transfer of parcel mails (para. 74).

(7) Drainage on the M.E.F. Postal Establishment to staff Salonika, the Western Frontier Force (Egypt) and the mail transfer station at Malta.

101. The conduct of all ranks was exemplary and the zeal and energy displayed, often under trying and discouraging circumstances, deserves the highest praise.

XVII. BUILDINGS.

102. It is impossible to do accurate and orderly work in the Base and larger sorting office without good premises and good fittings—a fact which is not always recognised in the Army as well as it should be. The Base office for the first 3½ months was much hindered by the inadequate premises and the difficulty of obtaining better quarters. This was largely due to my late arrival in Egypt when all suitable buildings at the Docks and many elsewhere had been appropriated. Eventually a very suitable building was obtained in the centre of the town. The same difficulty was encountered over premises for the Australian Base Office, and, to a less extent, that of the New Zealanders.

103. The difficulties at Mudros have been described in para. 77.

XVIII. MALTA.

104. As mentioned in para. 14, a small R.E.P.S. staff was stationed at Malta from the commencement of the campaign to see to the transfer of Army mails. Subsequently (in September) it became necessary to take over the work of addressing and delivering letters for the wounded in the many M.E.F. hospitals in Malta, and an officer with additional staff was stationed there and did very good work. Later on, Malta became an important mail transfer station for Mudros and Salonika and this work was taken over by the existing A.P.O. there.

XIX. WORK DONE FOR THE EGYPT COMMAND.

105. A good deal of work, directly and indirectly, was done for the Egypt Command which, except for a small Indian Postal contingent along the Suez Canal, had no Army Postal Service of its own. Among other things, at General Sir John

Maxwell's request we staffed and entirely directed the postal service for the Western Frontier Force, and opened a Post Office at Mena Camp, Cairo. From time to time R.E.P.S. staff was lent to the P.M. General of Egypt to man the "Military Post Offices" maintained at the principal Post Offices in Garrison towns, and special trouble was caused through the transfer of the 2nd Intd. Division from M.E.F. to Force-in-Egypt in May. As the Division retained its Field Post Offices and its correspondence continued for a long time to be addressed to the M.E.F. and to come in the M.E.F. mail, its arrangements had to be supervised informally by the officer in charge of the Base A.P.O., Alexandria. I twice proposed either formally taking over the work or that a R.E.P.S. officer should be got from England for the purpose, but the suggestions were not adopted.

XX. BASE OFFICE, ALEXANDRIA.

106. I will not deal with the work of this office in detail as I assume that that will be done by Captain Newsome, but its duties were many and responsible. In France a Base Office is principally, though not wholly, a *depôt* where mails are landed and loaded into a train an hour or two later, or are received by train and embarked for England. The Base A.P.O. at Alexandria had infinitely more to do than this. For instance, there was the large department which addressed and delivered returned letters for the wounded (Chap. XIV, §93-96, and Appendix C)—work which has no counterpart in France. There were large branches for correspondence accounts and stores, most, if not all, of which work in France is relegated to the Home *Depôt*. There were intricate relations with the Egyptian Post Office connected with the local deliveries and many other matters, and there was the general supervision of all the common services for the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian Base A.P.O.s, etc., etc., etc.

XXI. INSPECTION OF SERVICE.

107. The service was inspected in October, 1915, on behalf of the Postmaster-General by Lieut.-Colonel Williamson, R.E., Director of Army Postal Service, Home Forces, whose very full and instructive report will no doubt be referred to by the Commission.

XXII. THANKS TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS.

108. Every courtesy and much assistance were received from the Postmaster-General of Egypt and his staff. The Army Postal Service was also indebted to the Police, Quarantine, Ports and Lights and—most of all—to the Customs Authorities at Alexandria for the loan of premises.

109. Every consideration was received from principal Naval Transport Officer and his staff, who were always ready to help so far as their resources permitted.

XXIII. GENERAL SUMMARY AS REGARDS MAIL SERVICE.

110. The outstanding points which I would emphasise are (a) that from first to last no sea transport was provided to suit the special needs of the mails and, when applied for by me locally

and by the I.G.C. and the Commander-in-Chief to the War Office, was refused; (b) that all the deficiencies in the service were directly or indirectly due to the absence of proper transport; and (c) that, in spite of this, a very tolerable service was given. The sealed bags made up in the Home *Depôt* were delivered to the units—which is all that the Army Post Office in France undertakes to do—with perfect safety. In addition a great work was accomplished, which is not attempted in France, in the re-addressing and delivering of letters for men in hospital. For thoroughness of invoicing and check and for promptness of handling, the service easily surpassed any other in the M.E.F. and this was pretty generally recognised by all who had goods to send. For official purposes we carried, besides many thousand rolls and cases of maps above the postal limits, so large an article as a printing press with set of type complete, for General Headquarters. Bags of urgent "sealed packets" were regularly carried for the Signal Service between Mudros, the Peninsula and Salonika, and I would also refer to Sir Ian Hamilton's General Order quoted in paragraph 63.

111. The faults were that the service though certain was rather slow and irregular, and that, from lack of time for re-direction at the Base, letters for men in split units or in hospital were apt to be greatly delayed. This was unavoidable. The worst sufferers were probably the Yeomanry, many regiments of which were partly in Egypt, partly serving dismounted in the Peninsula and partly in composite Cavalry regiments at Salonika.

112. These were the inevitable shortcomings imposed by a transport system which left the mail service to be nothing better than a bye-product of the carriage of troops and stores.

113. As regards the direct services to Mudros introduced in November and December, 1915, it will be seen that neither I nor anyone in the M.E.F. had anything to do with their framing, nor with the causes which led to their non-success.

114. The opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the M.E.F. on this point, so far as I am concerned, is given in his letter to the War Office of 15th March, 1916, of which a copy is attached (Appendix D).

115. The scheme being framed at home, its authors had to rely on information gained in London, and this was unfortunate as, from instances which I could give, information about the local conditions at Mudros and the Dardanelles obtained elsewhere was not always correct, and possibly this was so also with information in Paris about the French transports.

116. It is quite certain, however, that all did their best, and the failure to bring about more satisfactory results may be put down to (a) the absence of any defined policy as to the degree of importance or precedence to be assigned to the mail service, and (b) the large number of authorities employed—D.A.P.S., I.G.C., War Office, Admiralty, and Post Office having all taken part and those most directly responsible and in touch with the work having in turn each been overruled, or their proposals modified, by others more remote.

XXIV.—RECOMMENDATIONS.

117. This Statement would not be complete if it did not draw specific attention to the more important lessons learned. Of these I think there are two, namely :—

118. Firstly, the necessity for deciding upon and recording the same definite principles as to the degree of consideration and precedence to be given to mails in matters of transport and other facilities.

119. The existence of enormously bulky mail and the desire of frequent and rapid communication between the troops and their relatives and friends at home are comparatively new phenomena in the Army, but have undoubtedly come to stay. In previous British campaigns—at any rate, before the South African war—letter writing as a habit was comparatively infrequent among the rank and file, and parcel post was in its infancy or non-existent, and troops generally were content with a slow and rough-and-ready mail service. Now this is not so, and the time has come when—to use common language—it has got to be settled whether a mail service in war is a luxury or a necessity. The Army Postal Service too often finds itself in the unlucky position of being treated as both—a luxury when it asks for facilities; and a necessity when, on account of their refusal, the service is slow and bad. One hears from the Staff every conceivable degree of opinion—from the man who thinks that the troops would fight better and be more contented and freer from preoccupations if entirely cut off from communication with their friends and families, to the one who says that a good and rapid English mail service does more to keep up the morale of a force than anything else.

120. On this matter I do not pretend to decide, but I know that many officers far more experienced than I—including the former I.G.C. to the M.E.F. (General Sir E. Altham, K.C.B.)—hold strongly the need for better transport than, at all events, that provided for mails to the Dardanelles, and with this opinion I entirely agree.

121. I will only say further that, in my opinion, local services, as distinguished from the English mail, deserve more consideration than they usually obtain, both in view of their value for Army administration and for the relief they give to the telegraphs. (Please compare paragraph 35.)

122. I have recommended to the Post Office that some instructions on the subject should be inserted in the Naval Transport Regulations (*vide* paragraph 54), but I think that some guiding principles should also be stated in Part II of the Army Field Service Regulations.

123. I would draw attention to the very large revenue earned by the mails for the various Expeditionary Forces. At the present moment, I understand, the postage on letters and parcels for the troops abroad amounts to over £70,000 a week, or £3,500,000 a year. It is obvious that a large proportion of this must be profit, and if the public are willing to spend this huge sum for the carriage of letters and parcels to the troops, it is the barest duty of the State to see that they get an adequate service in return before any of it is carried to revenue.

124. The other matter is that of control, and is connected with the division of authority mentioned in paragraph 111 (b).

125. In theory, and by its constitution, the Army Postal Service is as much a part of the Army as the Supplies, Signals, or any other service. Its officers and men are in precisely the same position as any other soldiers, and the directors are responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of their Force like those of any other service. All the factors, moreover, on which the service depends—Establishments, Buildings, Transport, &c.—are controlled by the War Office or the General in Command.

126. In spite of this, however, the Postmaster-General, and not the Secretary of State for War, is the recognised spokesman for the Service to the public, both in Parliament and elsewhere, and exercises a kind of control with power of inspection over the work in the Field. For instance, it is the custom, and directors are expected to present their reports periodically or at the end of a campaign, not to the War Office but to the Postmaster-General; and Lieut.-Colonel Williamson was sent out to inspect the service at the Dardanelles (as mentioned in paragraph 107), not on behalf of the War Office, but of the Post Office.

127. I do not know of any authority for this, and cannot think that it is either sound or in the long run beneficial. So long as the Post Office takes partial responsibility for the service in the manner described the War Office cannot be expected to take the same interest in its efficiency as if it were itself answerable; and I cannot resist the belief that if this had been so, the applications for better mail transport in August, 1915, would have received more support at home than they did. It seems, moreover, altogether anomalous that one Department should assume responsibility for a service the entire means for carrying on which are controlled by another. Nor is the existing division of control fair to the directors, who must, in any circumstances, remain responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of their Force and cannot also serve another master.

128. The present position is partly the outcome of tradition from days before the creation of a Postal Corps, when (as in the Crimea) the mail service was conducted by a civil staff from the General Post Office, partly due to the officers and men being all drawn from the Post Office Service, and partly to the absence of a D.A.P.S. at the War Office, which results in many questions relating to the Army Postal Service being referred to the Post Office. The tendency has been intensified in the present war, and is helped by the fact that, as mentioned in paragraph 4, the Home Dépôt is practically under General Post Office control.

129. I am strongly of opinion that the control should be brought into conformity with the theoretical by :—

- (a) The assumption of full control of, and responsibility to the public for, the Army Postal Service by the War Office instead of the Post Office.
- (b) The appointment of a D.A.P.S. responsible to the War Office only, and having control over the Home Dépôt, instead of the present D.A.P.S. Home.

130. One good result of this arrangement would be that there would be a definite person to decide whether the Home Depôt should or should not undertake any work desired by one of the D.A.P.Ss. abroad. There were occasions in the Dardanelles campaign when I wished the Home Depôt to do something to which it did not agree. I had no power to require it to do what I wanted, and there was no superior authority over us both to decide.

131. Apart from recognising the authorities mentioned, I believe that it is essential for the future development of the Army Postal Service that it should be free to work without direction from St. Martin's-le-Grand. This is in no sense setting up the Army Postal Service as a rival to the civil postal service or denying the value or even the necessity for staff trained in civil methods. But the requirements of the postal service of a mobile army in the field are totally different from those for a civil stationary population. The Army Telegraph ("Signal") Service is almost entirely manned from or trained by the civil telegraph service, but it would obviously never have reached its present efficiency in the field if it had remained under the direction of the telegraph side of the General Post Office.

132. This reform could be carried out at once. But I would go further and would recommend that after the war the R.E.P.S. be changed from a Special Reserve to a Regular corps and manned by officers and men trained, like the Regular Army telegraphists, in post offices at home, and possibly employed in peace time in conducting the postal work at Aldershot and other military centres. In war it would be augmented from a reserve of officers and men in the civil postal service. To build up such a corps and to train the Regular officers and men would necessarily take some years, but the process might be accelerated by the voluntary transfer of officers and men from the existing R.E.P.S.

H. F. McCLINTOCK,

Major,

8th Battn. London Regt.

(Late Temp. Major, R.E., D.A.P.S., M.E.F.)

London.

6th February, 1917.

APPENDIX A (referred to in paragraph 35).

(Copy.)

Director, Army Postal Service, M.E.F.

6th November, 1915.

Registered No. 384.

I.G.C.—

This matter was discussed at some length between the S.T.O., the D.A.P.S. (Home) and myself on the 18th ultimo, and the difficulties of the transport service are fully realised.

At the same time it is extremely important that something should be done to improve and regularise the service with Alexandria. Even with a direct service to Mudros for the English mail, the mails

between Mudros and Alexandria will remain of great importance. They will include :—

- (1) All Australian, New Zealand and Indian mails in both directions.
- (2) Down-going correspondence returned from the units for men in hospitals amounting to about one-third of the total mail for the Force.
- (3) Official correspondence in both directions between the field and Alexandria and Cairo.
- (4) Private correspondence with Egypt in both directions, including many orders for kit, provisions, &c., necessary for the comfort of the troops.

The present service by chance transport is entirely irregular and uncertain. The intervals between the transports vary extraordinarily, and there is no guarantee when a letter from Alexandria will reach Mudros and *vice versa*. Last time I quoted an instance where a letter might have taken nine days in reaching Mudros; now I can point to one where it could have taken *seventeen*.

I would draw special attention to the official correspondence mentioned at (3) above, as it is constantly represented to me how seriously the departmental and kindred services—Works, Ordnance, Supplies, &c.—as well as the office of the D.A.G., 3rd Echelon, are hampered by the absence of an efficient postal service with the Base.

Not merely is the average time of post slow in consequence of the irregular service, but there is no certainty or even approximate certainty when a letter will reach its destination. Consequently all business is done as far as possible by telegraph, at a very heavy cost to the Government, and what cannot be done by telegraph suffers.

The postal administration itself is very much hampered by the slow and uncertain post; and a considerable time is taken up in answering complaints of delay for which the Army Post Office is in no way responsible.

The only remedy is to establish a ferry service with Alexandria such as we have already with the beaches and with Salonica, and as the French have long had with Marseilles.

The S.T.O.'s observations as to the absence of any provision in the transport regulations for the carriage of mails are very suggestive, and if a regular service cannot be provided by the Transport Department, it is recommended that the Army should charter packets for the purpose. With a service three times a week it would not, in normal circumstances, be necessary to use transports for mails at all, and the space now taken up in their holds would be set free for other purposes.

On the assumption that the whole of the English mails, including parcels, are brought direct to Mudros, quite small ships would suffice. If the scheme for a direct service should fall through, especially as regards parcels, three ships a week, each able to accommodate 4,000 bags, would suffice and would furnish a very good alternative to the Marseilles scheme.

(Intd.) H. F. McC.,

Major,

D.A.P.S.

Mudros.

6th November, 1915.

APPENDIX B (referred to in paragraph 75).

New Mail Service.

Whilst on the subject of communications with Home, the Commander-in-Chief feels sure that all ranks will be pleased to know that the War Office, in consequence of his strong representations, has arranged with the General Post Office that the mails for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force shall, in future, be sent via Marseilles. The cost of this concession will be considerable, but the gain in time appreciable. Letters which have hitherto taken 18 days at least to reach their destination in the Peninsula should, when the new arrangement is in working order, be delivered in 10 or 11 days. A further announcement will be made of the date from which the new mail service is to take effect.

General Headquarters.
4th October, 1915.

APPENDIX C (referred to in paragraph 96).

Treatment of Letters and Parcels for the Wounded.

1. *Origin of the work.*—Almost immediately after the arrival of the main party R.E.P.S. at Alexandria (24th April) letters began to be returned from the Front in large numbers marked "Wounded" or "Hospital," but without any indication of any particular hospital, and have continued to be so returned by every mail.

2. *Necessity for Post Office to redirect.*—It would have been obviously improper to have returned such letters to the senders, and, as the units had no knowledge of the hospitals in which the wounded were, it became the duty of the Army Post Office, as in the South African war, to undertake the redirection of the correspondence to the best of its ability.

3. *Nature of work involved.*—The work involved falls under two heads: (a) Collection and tabulation of addresses; (b) treatment of correspondence.

4. *Collection of addresses.*—Most hospitals in Egypt send a daily, and hospitals in Cyprus and Malta a weekly list of admissions and discharges, to the Base Army Post Office, Alexandria. (Other arrangements exist at Lemnos, where patients are not usually kept for more than 21 days.)

5. *Preparation of lists.*—The names on these lists are abstracted by battalions or other units into alphabetical rolls by a joint British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian staff of about 18 working at the British Base, A.P.O.

6. *Treatment of returned correspondence.*—The returned letters and parcels go to a special section of the Office, called the Returned Letter Office or R.L.O., and are dealt with by a special staff. The letters for more convenient examination are set upright in alphabetical order between wooden divisions, much in the manner of a card index.

7. *Broken parcels.*—A staff is employed in repacking broken parcels, which are treated to the number of about 150 a day.

8. *Proportion of correspondence redirected.*—Correspondence which cannot be disposed of by the help of the lists is taken to "Records," i.e., the

office of the A.A.G., 3rd Echelon, and about half of it is disposed of by the aid of the records there. The remainder is kept for six weeks from the date of posting, and if not then traced is then sent back to the unit for retrieval.

9. *Hospitals scattered.*—The hospitals are scattered from Lemnos to Cyprus, Egypt and Malta; while many of the wounded have been sent direct to England, in some cases without any list of their names being made before departure. To keep trace of the wounded is therefore a work of the greatest difficulty, and, in fact, is not possible in its entirety; while often information is not received until after the man in question has been discharged or transferred to another hospital or convalescent dépôt, as such transfers are made with great frequency.

10. *Large numbers of casualties.*—The casualties in the M.E.F. by the end of June—i.e., in about 10 weeks from the commencement—exceeded the total casualties in the two and a half years of the South African campaign, and they have steadily continued since then. The postal staff available for dealing with the correspondence, on the other hand, is much smaller than in South Africa.

11. *Number of addresses recorded.*—Apart from Australian, New Zealand, and Indian lists, the names of sick and wounded entered on the British lists, together with the relative hospital and date of admission, number now about 27,000. Separate working lists are required in the R.L.O. and in the sorting office, as well as a standard list, so that the total number of entries is now 81,000.

12. *Number of alterations.*—Moreover, the entries constantly need alteration to keep pace with a patient's movements from hospital to hospital, and, roughly, 6,300 alterations are received weekly, representing about 19,000 separate amendments.

13. *Up-going correspondence.*—The lists are also used to redirect letters for the wounded from the up-going mails so as to save the delay and risks of a journey to the Peninsula and back. From shortage of staff and pressure of time it is not possible to examine the whole mail; but correspondence for those units who have suffered most heavily is so examined with useful results, especially with parcels. This work has been temporarily suspended from shortage of staff, and it is questionable whether in view of the labour involved and delay to correspondence, for the troops at the Front it will not have to be given up.

14. *Comparison with B.E.F. and Home service.*—No similar work is undertaken in the B.E.F., where it is understood that no special lists of the wounded are kept, and where all correspondence which cannot be redirected at the unit is at once sent to London for return to the sender. Still less is there anything similar in the Home Postal service where redirection is not undertaken till the letters reach the actual office of delivery, and each address is furnished to the Post Office by the addressee.

15. *Laborious nature of work.*—The process of checking each individual letter with the lists is a slow one, and requires a large and careful staff. It has been much handicapped till lately by want of space, and is so still by want of staff; but none the less very good progress is being made in the

work of getting the correspondence to the addressees.

16. *Growth of work.*—The work has steadily grown, and is still fast increasing, as the subjoined statements will show :—

	Number of Hospitals, etc., Sending Lists.	Number of Standard Lists. (Battalions and Units.) Present System commenced 14th June.
End of May	15	—
Middle of June	19	—
End of June	37	48
Middle of July	48	74
Beginning of August...	57	124

	Approximate Number of Wounded on Standard Lists.
Middle of July	21,000
Beginning of August	27,000

	Number of Weekly Alterations in Hospital Lists.
Middle of July	4,500
Beginning of August	6,300

	Number of bags Received in Returned Letter Office.
May (8-31)	269
June	670
July	1,276
August (1-9)	469

17. *Difficulties to be overcome.*—The main obstacles are :—

- (1) *Lack of staff.*—This will be remedied when the drafts applied for on the 13th and 30th ultimo both arrive.
- (2) *Imperfect information supplied by the hospitals.*—It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the P.O. is entirely dependent, whether directly or through 3rd Echelon, on information furnished by the Hospitals, and that for various reasons, notably the remoteness of some of the Hospitals and pressure of work or insufficient clerical staff at the Hospitals themselves, the information is far from complete and not

always accurate. Moreover, even when accurate, it is sometimes received too late for a man to receive his letters before being discharged or transferred to some other Hospital or Convalescent Depôt. To meet this difficulty a scheme was drawn up for having a permanent "B"—i.e., discharged from Hospital as cured, but permanently unfit for any but light duty—man attached to each Hospital for the double purpose of furnishing the Army Post Office with information and of seeing to the proper treatment and redirection of letters for the patients, a matter in which there is room for improvement at some Hospitals; but the men were not available. The point will be pressed and if the men asked for are still not obtainable it will become a question of attaching R.E. men to at any rate the principal Hospitals or groups of Hospitals.

APPENDIX D (referred to in paragraph 114).

C.M.Q. 25/17.

From

The General Commanding
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

To

The Secretary,
War Office, London, W.C.
General Headquarters,
15th March, 1916.

SIR,

With reference to my telegram C.M.Q.T. 794, dated 27th February, in which Major H. F. McClintock's, Army Postal Service, departure for home was reported, I wish to place on record the good work that Major McClintock has performed while holding the appointment of D.A.P.S., M.E.F.

The conducting of a satisfactory Postal Service at and about the Gallipoli Peninsula was a matter of extreme difficulty, and to pretend that the Service during this period was satisfactory would be incorrect, but I consider that that was due to circumstances over which Major McClintock had no control.

I am of opinion that the organization, administration, and actual local distribution of Postal matter over which Major McClintock had control was satisfactorily carried out.

On arrival in Egypt at the beginning of this year Major McClintock reorganised the whole of the Army Postal Administration, and in my opinion handed over everything in a satisfactory manner to Colonel Warren.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) A. J. MURRAY,

General, Commander-in-Chief, M.E.F

REPORT ON NEW ZEALAND POSTAL SERVICE

By CAPTAIN D. A. McCURDY, Commanding, New Zealand Base Post Office.

Organisation.

The New Zealand Army Postal Service, when the main body of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force left Wellington, consisted of three field post offices which were attached to Divisional Headquarters, the Mounted Rifles Brigade and the Infantry Brigade respectively.

On the 7th November, 1914, I received appointment as Officer Commanding, New Zealand Postal Service, and took charge of the postal arrangements of the force from that date.

The force arrived at Zeitoun, Cairo, on the morning of the 4th December, and a post office was opened on the following day.

About March, 1915, the Divisional Train was formed, and a field office was attached in accordance with the authorised establishment. The personnel was obtained from the second reinforcements. Further details arrived with the third and fourth reinforcements.

On the 9th April the Infantry Brigade and Divisional Train left for Alexandria to embark for the Dardanelles.

About the 16th April a New Zealand mail arrived, and was sent aboard the troopship "Goslar," the last of the New Zealand boats to leave Alexandria.

On the same date arrangements were made with the Commandant, New Zealand Infantry Base Depot, Alexandria, for the use of a portion of Shed 43, which had been allotted to him, and a staff of four postal details and myself commenced duty there.

This staff was added to from time to time, as the work increased, by drawing convalescents from the base camp and the postal reinforcements from New Zealand. Unfortunately only a small percentage of these men had had postal training.

It was brought before the notice of the D.A.P.S. (Major McClintock) that non-postal men were being sent as postal reinforcements. He represented the matter to New Zealand and from the sixth reinforcements until the present time all reinforcements have been trained postal men.

Treatment of Mails.

While the force was all encamped the matter of the distribution of mails was very simple, and was carried out in accordance with the instructions in the Army Postal manual. Correspondence was sorted into units in the Post Office, and was then delivered to the postal orderlies of the different units, who called daily at the Post Office.

The orderlies were responsible for the re-direction of correspondence for men absent from their units. Correspondence re-addressed was handed in to the Post Office for transmission to the new address.

On the departure of the force for Gallipoli this system was altered. A card index was then set up showing the addresses of men in hospital, addressed post cards were given out to the wounded by the Rev. Greene, C.F., on the arrival of the hospital

ships at Alexandria, and the men were instructed to post them as soon as they reached the hospital. Unfortunately a large number of men did not think it worth while to forward these cards. Captain Greene also supplied the Post Office with the names of the men he had visited in the different hospitals. It was arranged later by Major McClintock for lists of admissions and discharges to be supplied by the different hospitals—direct lists were supplied by the Australian and New Zealand hospitals, and information regarding men in British and Egyptian hospitals was obtained from the Base "Z" office daily.

On the arrival of a mail the letters were sorted into alphabetical order, and were compared with the address cards. The letters were then re-directed accordingly. Parcels and newspapers were treated in the same way.

As there was always several days between the departure of ships for Mudros, this process did not delay the mails for the troops in Gallipoli, and enabled us to deliver letters, &c., for men in hospital promptly. For this purpose a motor cyclist was attached to the New Zealand Base to make a daily delivery to New Zealanders in the Alexandria hospitals.

During the early part of the campaign hospital lists were very slow in coming to hand, weeks elapsing between the time of a man's admission to hospital and the receipt of advice at the New Zealand Base Post Office. This was particularly noticeable with regard to Lemnos and Malta hospitals.

To obviate the delay the attention of all ranks has several times been drawn to Field Service Regulations, Part 2, Section 102, paragraph 2:—

"Officers and men who are detached from their unit will send a card to:

The Officer in charge,
Base Post Office,

notifying the unit or place to which their correspondence from home is to be sent."

Parcels.

While in Egypt the parcel mails were very small, as men were able to buy the articles they required at the canteens: only a few hundred parcels being received per week. These parcels came by the New Zealand Shipping Company's steamers via Cape Horn to London, where they were despatched and sent in bags to Port Said, the time occupied in transit being about three months.

This was a fruitful cause for complaint, as men would receive advice (via Suez) stating that a parcel had been posted at the same time, and would not receive the parcel until seven weeks later. In the meantime complaint would be made to New Zealand of its non-arrival, and the opinion formed that the parcel had been stolen. Representations were made to the D.A.P.S., M.E.F., and a cable was sent to New Zealand requesting that

parcels be sent via Suez. This necessitated an increase in the rates of postage owing to the transshipment at Sydney. The first mail by the Suez route left Wellington on the 19th August, 1915, and arrived at Alexandria on the 22nd September.

Parcels posted in England also suffered delay due to their despatch by a different route from letters.

During the early part of the time parcels for Gallipoli were very badly packed, and on arrival at the base were found to be damaged, and had to be re-packed. Owing to the rough handling of the bags it was frequently impossible to identify the parcels. Cakes very often arrived as crumbs in the bottom of the bags.

Circulation of Mails.

Mails for the New Zealand Forces were received direct from the trains or boats by a representative of the New Zealand Base Post Office, who tallied the number of bags or parcel receptacles, and gave a receipt to the R.E.P.S. representative. They were then taken to the Base Post Office and sorted, and the letters for wounded or men stationed in Egypt extracted.

The sealed bags were then delivered to the trains or transports, and a receipt obtained from the British postal authorities. Waybills accompanied each despatch. Until arrival at Anzac the mails were in the charge of the British Army Postal Service.

At Anzac the bags were unloaded from the trawlers into lighters, and on the beach were taken charge of by the Landing Post Office, the staff of which consisted of Australian and New Zealand postal men.

After the mail had been checked it was taken over by the Field Post Offices concerned, and was then handed over to the unit post orderlies. As soon as delivery was made to the unit post orderlies the responsibility of the Post Office ceased. The regimental post orderly was responsible for the correct delivery to men with the unit, and the return to the base of all mail for absentees.

Owing to the difficulties of transport of mails very few of the undeliverable parcels were returned; the parcels and papers being distributed among those on the Peninsula. This action was discountenanced by the Post Office, and notices appeared in Routine Orders forbidding it, but it could not be prevented altogether.

With regard to the cases quoted by Sergeant Balfour on the 13th March, page 4, "N.Z.E.F. Mails," I am not now able to trace the men's movements before their arrival in England, but no doubt they have had other changes.

2/202 *Bombardier H. W. Sinclair*.—Admitted Military Hospital, Fulham, 1st September, 1915. Furlough, 21st October to 4th November, 1915.

I have interviewed Sinclair, and he states that he received his mail at the New Zealand Hospital until late in August. He states that his early letters were held by *his unit*. He did not advise the Base Post Office of his address in England.

2/2236 *Private G. O'Rourke*.—Came with the fifth reinforcements. He went to Mudros on the 25th September, and was admitted to an Australian hospital there. He left Mudros about the end of November for England, was admitted to the 1st Southern General Hospital, Birmingham, on the 5th December, 1915, and went on furlough on the 6th January, 1916. He states that he did not advise the Base Post Office of his whereabouts.

13/189 *Trooper G. H. Griffin*.—Was admitted to the 27th General Hospital on the 24th December after several changes of address, embarked for England on the 27th August, and was admitted to the 1st Southern General Hospital, Birmingham, on the 16th September. He was discharged on the 13th November, and was re-admitted during December. He went on furlough on the 13th January, 1916. I interviewed him, and he states that he received his mail until he left Egypt, also that he called at the High Commissioner's office in London on two occasions and received no mail. He called a third time, and states that he was told that there was none on hand. He states that he said he would not leave until he got some, and after further search a large bundle was delivered to him. He did not advise the Base Post Office of his whereabouts.

8/2325 *Private R. L. Ward*.—Was killed on the 16th August, 1915.

10/1599 *Private G. O. Nilson*.—Admitted to University War Hospital, Southampton, 27th October, 1915; 1st Southern General Hospital, 30th December, 1915; Addington Park Hospital, 8th February, 1916. Furlough until 28th April, 1916.

6/2150 *Private W. E. Halden*.—Admitted Western General Hospital, Manchester, 27th September, 1915. Returned to active service, 11th January, 1916.

10/3622 *Private L. A. Bluett*.—Admitted hospital, Mudros, 5th October, 1915; admitted Walton-on-Thames, 27th October, 1915. Discharged, 23rd March, 1916.

8/2111 *Private F. T. Riley*.—Killed in action, 22nd March, 1916.

I interviewed Griffin, Sinclair, and O'Rourke, and each man states that he did not advise the Base Post Office of his address. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the other men also failed to do so.

With regard to the cable of the 19th January, and my letter of the 26th January, 1916, I have made inquiries in London, and find that the statement that 400 or 500 bags of mail were delivered to the High Commissioner's office in the course of a few days is incorrect. Mails were delivered regularly as they arrived. The largest number received at one time was 82 bags delivered on the 10th December, which were despatched from Alexandria on the 17th, 20th, 25th, and 29th November, and 69 bags delivered on the 24th December, which were despatched from Alexandria on the 7th and 10th December. The total number delivered during December was less than 200.

D. McCURDY,

Captain.

O.C. New Zealand Base Post Office.

Scale 1:250000

Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 Miles

Roads
Telegraphs
Heights in feet



OUTLINE MAP OF TURKISH EMPIRE



G.S.G.S. 2851

Scale 1:10,000,000

REFERENCE

Railways —————
Roads - - - - -
Streams ~~~~~~
International Boundaries